242. Message From the Swiss Ambassador to Iran (Lang) to the Department of State1
2. The last cards are being played. B back from Paris just visited me (11:30) before going to see GH. B shared with me the current strategy.
2.1 A “family” meeting is to take place at the Imam’s with BS, a delegation from the Revolutionary Council, and students. The results should be known soon. B has a very interesting theory: the Imam, in his hatred for the Americans, wants to humiliate them ad nauseam. This is not the case with BS. Like a Persian rug merchant, the Imam believes he can pressure the US ad infinitum the more so since he interprets American moderation as weakness. Unlike BS he does not realize the damage caused by the sanctions. Paradoxically the Imam does not seem to oppose the transfer of power, but he wants BS and the leadership to do it by themselves and prove their maturity and their authority by showing that they are directing the country effectively. The Imam would be delighted if BS shows himself to be a real President. (Here there is a paradox because he takes umbrage if (BS) becomes too popular or influential.) What is BS doing? Good will, certainly, but no courage. BS is seized by “the great fear” that if he acts the Imam by a word or a speech of which he is a master will not guarantee or not guarantee entirely the action (transfer) or the release, and in so doing ignite public opinion and cause him to lose the Presidency which he values above all. He therefore fears a stab in the back.
2.2 So what is to be done if the results of the consultation with the Imam is negative or inconclusive. B and V and GH have the following cards in reserve.
2.3 Mgr. Capucci has just arrived with B. He is, perhaps, the best person in all the world, given the context, and has perhaps the greatest capacity to persuade because he is “not involved”. Capucci is religious, Palestinian favorably viewed by the students,2 well viewed by the [Page 638] Imam, he knows what it is to be a captive, but above all intelligent. He could make the Imam understand that the affair is costing Iran as much as the USA and that it is likely to cost much more. That numerous Iranians have died and are dying because of this affair (due to a lack of spare parts for helicopters, Khuzestan, medical equipment, etc.). And finally, that Iran has won enough points for this stage and Iran is now likely to lose more than it gains.
2.4 As a last resort if necessary GH will go to the Imam and use all his credit, since he is the favorite child of the Imam.
3.0 B was astonished that I have no message from Carter for BS. He left me convinced that I was going to receive one in a matter of minutes. (It’s a question of a message that should indicate that the Monday3 deadline was understood as assisting BS and should not be interpreted as a sign of weakness and that the immediate implemetation of sanctions will occur if the affair is not dealt with in the coming x number of hours. My version is not exact but I hope that the idea is right. Should I understand by your 180.3 that Carter had decided not to do it or the contact between B and the State Department is later and something is foreseen?4
4. Taylor of Reuters has called me to say that the prayers in the Mosque this morning is against the transfer.
5. I remained in touch with B and V and will go to the Presidency.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Iran 4/1/80–4/18/80. Secret. In an April 5 covering note to Carter, Aaron wrote: “Attached is the latest message from the Swiss. Cy asked that I send it up to you.” There is no numeral 1 in the original.↩
- In his memoir, Carter suggested Capucci was acceptable to the students “because he was convicted in Israel for smuggling weapons to the Palestinians.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 505) As reported in telegram 8450 from Rome, March 30, the United States approached Capucci on March 29 about traveling to Tehran to meet with the hostages during Easter week. Capucci agreed to go not only to provide spiritual comfort, but to talk with key Iranians “in order to explore the possibilities for the release of the hostages.” (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Iran NODIS Cables Mar 1980)↩
- April 7.↩
- Message not further identified. Carter noted in his personal diary that “Bourguet, Villalon, and Lang all recommended against any sort of further explanation of the U.S. position, or any further assurances to” the Iranians. “So we held firm consistently,” he added. (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 505)↩