240. Draft Message From the U.S. Government to the Iranian Government1
I telephoned the gist of your early-morning report2 personally to Secretary Vance and he asked me to send Ambassador Brunner and you his deep personal thanks for your most timely responses and your analysis. Then, I took the full text to Assistant Secretary Saunders.
Following conversations in the State Department, I want to pass on to you my reading of the situation in Washington.
The Americans remain prepared to cooperate fully in a series of reciprocal steps including the transfer of the hostages to the full custody and protection of the government and their early release. The Americans do not wish to humiliate Iran and want very much for the crisis to end in a way so that gradually they can begin to build with Iran a new relationship of mutual respect and equality. They realize that the alternative could be very harsh for Iran and could give the USSR greater opportunities in Iran, but U.S. larger interests could require the pursuit of such a course if Iran remains intransigent.
The Americans recognize that members of the Revolutionary Council in Tehran are making persistent efforts to achieve the transfer of the hostages to government custody, but the Americans are reaching a point where they doubt whether the authorities in Tehran have the ability to do what they say they will do. Because of the pressures mounting in the United States as a result of repeated inability in Tehran to act as promised, the U.S. Government will have little choice but to take decisive steps in the very near future and to press other governments to follow these steps.
At the same time, the steps which they deferred taking on April 1 could put them on the road to even graver measures. If the crisis continues to drag on, the U.S. will be obliged to take sterner measures which will have the inevitable effect of causing hardship to many [Page 634] Iranians. In these circumstances, the Americans should have the fullest possible understanding of what is likely to happen in Tehran.
With the concurrence of my American colleagues, I believe the time has come for you to seek urgently a personal meeting with Bani-Sadr to convey the above analysis of the state of mind and decision-making in Washington. I believe it would be reasonable and important in this situation to tell Bani-Sadr that the United States must know with some precision what his plans for the transfer of the hostages are. You may state as my judgment that the Americans are on the verge of important decisions, and it is essential for them to know what Bani-Sadr is planning to do.
It is important that you try to see Bani-Sadr as early as possible Saturday3 and before the meeting of the Revolutionary Council and the students with Khomeini, which we understand is scheduled for Saturday morning.4
- Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 7. Secret. Sent via the Swiss ostensibly as a message from the Swiss Ambassador in Washington, Raymond Probst, to Lang. In an April 4 covering memorandum to Carter, Aaron wrote: “Attached is the draft message to the Iranians which Cy has prepared. It incorporates all my comments.” On another copy of this draft, an unknown hand wrote: “cleared by pres 1900.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 32, Subject File, Iran [Retained 4/80]) Villalon told Precht the United States should send a firm message laying out the U.S. position and the gravity of the situation to eliminate any doubt of U.S. willingness to go forward. If the message were oral, he suggested sending it through Lang. (Memorandum of conversation, April 4; ibid.)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 239.↩
- April 5.↩
- Sick recalled that the Iranian Foreign Ministry asked for clarification of this message, but the United States responded that there would be no further clarifications. (Sick, All Fall Down, p. 338)↩