Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

184. Handwritten Memorandum From the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter¹

Undated

I will try to divide this report into several sections:

1) Meeting with Mr. S

2) Future relations with Iran

3) Report on Scenario/Implementation

4) Draft statement

5) Where do we go from here?

Meeting with Mr. S:

Prior to my meeting, I asked that our French contacts meet with me to discuss how to handle Mr. S. We spent a couple of hours on this subject. Their joint recommendation was that I should regard his desire for such a meeting as an opportunity for Mr. S. to convey directly to the President the thoughts and feelings of the Imam. He said that Mr. S.’s presumption was that Carter did not understand the meaning of their revolution and that his meeting with me was a way to penetrate the “wall of people” responsible for the past 30 years of U.S. policy. Conversely, they suggested to me that I convey back to the Imam thru this man a sense of understanding and a desire to have a better relationship.

I showed them the letter addressed to me from the President containing the assurance on the scenario² and said that this would be very helpful with Bani-Sadr and Mr. S. as it could be used as a written promise to follow the scenario if an early release seemed desirable/feasible.

I met alone with Mr. S. for 3½ hours, during which we had a leisurely dinner. We started off by exchanging pleasantries. I kidded him that his face was better known in the United States than Walter Cronkite. He laughed and responded that while his face was well known, he was unable to accomplish anything. “Your situation is the opposite, Mr. Jordan, you are never seen publicly, but everyone knows that you guide the President in every decision.”

I quickly felt at ease with him. I told him that I was honored to be able to meet with him and that I recognized the risk that he was taking.

He said, “if this meeting is known to the Communists in Iran, I will lose my job at least and possibly my head.”

I told him that while great difficulties remained between our two countries, that I thought that it was important that we look to the future to determine how and when the U.S. and Iran could begin to build a new relationship based on the “new realities” of Iran and a better understanding of the past.

I told him that it would be terribly helpful for me and President Carter to understand better the origins of the revolution and the present situation. That while we had the desire to learn and to understand, we lacked a clear and direct presentation of their case and their view of U.S.-Iranian relations in a historical context.

This approach hit a responsive chord.

Mr. S. said, “Mr. Jordan, for the past three months and the past three days (his trip to Greece, Italy and France) all that I have heard about is the American hostages. I realize that the taking of the hostages was both a mistake for Iran and a violation of international law, but the great frustration of my people is that no one cares to investigate the circumstances leading to that action. I know that the hostages are of great personal concern to you and your country, but your desire to understand our revolution and grievances is a very encouraging sign to me and will be conveyed by me to the Imam.”

He then, encouraged by me, launched into a 45 minute review of the history of U.S.-Iranian relations. He divided his discourse into three periods: 1900–1953, 1953 to 1978 and from Khomeini’s landing in Tehran to the present.

Although certain things that he said were colorful and/or amusing, his litany of allegations was predictable. I was impressed by both the passion of his presentation and the sincerity with which he spoke, both about “the revolution” and the “Imam.” His dedication to the Imam exceeds loyalty and approaches a mystical reverence difficult for me to comprehend. There is no question in my mind that it is real.

He was neither abusive or accusatory in his recital of Iran’s grievances, but said it with a sense of sadness and regret that things between us had gone so far and were in such a mess.

At one point in the conversation, I asked him, “How do you evaluate President Carter? Do you see him in the tradition of American Presidents anxious to intervene in the affairs of other countries?”

He responded, “I believe that President Carter is a good man and well intentioned President who does not understand our history or our revolution. His sending you here is the first indication we have had that he wants to understand.”

I then presented our case. I said that President Carter is the first American President in a generation who understands both the influence we have in the world, but also understands our country’s limitations. I said that he was not an “interventionist” in the worst sense of that word, indeed, that he had resisted intervention and military action both during the time of the revolution and since the seizure of the Embassy. I told him that there were many people inside and outside of government who wanted the President to take unilateral action in late ’78 and early ’79, ranging from urging the Shah to “crack down” to direct U.S. military intervention. I told him that you rejected such ideas.

I told him that at the time of the capture of the embassy, public opinion supported extreme measures, including punitive military action, but that you had shaped and sustained a mood of restraint.

He acknowledged that these were sound arguments and said that as counterproductive as the sanctions had been, any type of military action or blockade would have resulted in the death of our people.

He then said, “Now, let’s talk about the hostages, and I’m in a better mood to talk about them since you have heard our case.”

He went on to say “President Carter wants the hostages out for the sake of those people and so that he can be re-elected—I want them out so that we can turn our full anger and attention toward the Soviet Union.”

He then made some philosophical comments about the United States and Soviet Union. “While you have a better country, with certain values and a democratic system for your people, the Soviet Union does a much better job of marketing their ideology. I oppose communism because it is an ideology that lacks a moral basis. But the bottom line for Iran is that we will not be the pawn of the U.S. or the Soviet Union. If I am killed fighting for my country, I do not care whether it is a communist bullet or a capitalist bullet—either way I am dead.” More on this in person.

We then got into a discussion of the scenario for release of the hostages.

Point #1. I’ll tell you about in person.³

#2. He believes that if we follow the scenario, they should be out in 2–3 weeks. More on this later.

#3. He went into great detail describing for me all the work that he would have to do with Bani-Sadr, the Imam and the Revolutionary Council to obtain their release.

#4. He has “complete faith” in our French contacts. They have his “power of attorney” in this matter although they would dispute that as overstating their influence.

#5. He claims that all 50 are alive. I questioned him specifically about Mr. M.⁴ He claimed no knowledge of this particular person but said that “All are alive.” More on this in person.

#6. We talked at length about the problem of obtaining release of the hostages from the compound. He said that he and Bani-Sadr “had a plan” which would work, but would probably have to involve the Imam personally. I told him that we had heard very specific rumors about suicide pacts among the militants which were of great concern to us. I asked him was he aware of these rumors and plans, and he laughed and said, “Mr. Jordan, don’t worry. We will get every one of your people out safely—we have more friends in the compound than you realize.”

I pressed him to explain, but he would not talk about it anymore.

I gave him the letter (which he asked me to entrust to Bourguet) and pressed him on early release of the hostages. He told me that he would “go back to Tehran, see the Imam and redouble his efforts” but that he thought it was more realistic to expedite the agreed upon plan than to hope to short-circuit it. He said that should they decide to move early on the hostages, they were “equipped” with President Carter’s written promise. He said, “tell President Carter that I will do my best.”

Future Relations with United States

As directed, I raised the subject of our relationship beyond the crisis. I told him that we would be anxious to try to build a new relationship but that the evolution of that relationship would be largely determined by Iran’s attitude. I told him after our hostages were released, that we could move quickly to solve problems such as freezing of assets, etc., but what kind of relationship did he envisage and at what speed could it evolve?

He replied that he had personally persuaded the Imam not to break diplomatic relations with the U.S. He said that it is easy to break relations, but very, very difficult to re-establish them. He mentioned Cuba as an example.

He said that within 6–9 months after the hostages are released, he would hope that a small group of U.S. diplomats could return to Iran. I mentioned here that it was going to be a very difficult decision for us to send people back to Iran given the present crisis. He said that he understood, but that our political presence was needed to counter Soviet activities. He said that he was anxious to use the excuse of a small U.S. diplomatic presence to reduce the Soviet embassy to a comparable size.

He talked about our future relationship almost exclusively in the context of the U.S. counterbalancing Soviet presence in Iran. At some point, I gave him (on a plain white sheet of paper) our most recent summary of Soviet buildup on the NW Iranian border.⁵ He loved it. He said, “I will wave this paper at the next meeting of the Council and tell everyone to get off their asses and prepare for attempted Soviet domination of Iran.”

I made most/all of the points in the paper prepared for me by Hal.⁶ I will report orally on them.

To summarize, Mr. S.’s attitude in talking with me about future U.S.-Iranian relations seemed to be that now they have proven the strength of the Revolution to the United States, they are willing and anxious to teach the Soviet Union a lesson. He said that the Soviet Ambassador complained to him recently about his anti-Soviet statements and that he told him, “Don’t complain to me while you have stolen Afghanistan and are assembling troops on our own borders. You will not have to fight us on the borders, but in every house and in every street in Iran, and we will prevail.”

After our meeting, I commented to one of our French friends that while very pleased with the meeting, I was not certain that I had moved the process on time for release of the hostages forward at all. He said, “You are wrong. If he considered it a good meeting it will help you more than you will ever know.”

He offered two interesting observations.

First, he said that Mr. S. will see and use this meeting as a “psychological victory” with the Imam. He says that he will go to the Imam and say, “I met one of Carter’s top men. I convinced them of the evils of their past policies and taught them about our revolution. You have humbled the Americans.” According to my friend, this will score points for Mr. S. with the Imam and also help soften his attitude.

Secondly, by having established a “secret” relationship with an American official, his desire to end the crisis and his large ego will be reinforced. Also, he is a “rug merchant” who loves to bargain and trade. He says if he wants to do something for you, he will describe in great detail how difficult it will be to accomplish, then go off and do it quicker or better than you had anticipated.

I hope this is true as relates to the release of the hostages, because he told me in great detail all of the problems, but also saying that “only I can solve this.” We’ll see.

The final thing he told me was this:

“Please tell President Carter that I appreciate his sending you to meet with me. I will report to the Imam your attitude of friendship and your desire to build a new relationship.

Also tell President Carter that I hope he understands that the things I have said personally about him were said either in frustration with the U.S. or for domestic political purposes. I hope he understands.

Tell him that the strength and success of the Revolution will be a better ally against Soviet aggression than the Shah ever was.

And, finally, tell him that I will return to Tehran and redouble my efforts to obtain a quick release of the hostages.”

Conclusion

At best, Mr. S. is a deeply committed revolutionary, dedicated to the survival of that revolution and to the integrity and independence of Iran. His ego is enormous, but his devotion to the Imam is genuine. His commitment to the revolution makes the Soviet threat the dominant political concern in his life.

At worst, Mr. S. is a devious person whose only source of power is the Imam. Now that the Imam’s health is in question, he is engaged in a number of activities (hostage negotiation, anti-Soviet rhetoric, etc.) that he perceives as being in his own self-interest.

The truth about Mr. S. is probably somewhere in between, but either way, we should use his present attitudes to our own benefit.

Report on Scenario/Implementation

After four hours sleep, I awoke to what was supposed to be a brief review session with our French friends on the scenario.

It was the most difficult but also the most honest and possibly the most successful session that we have had to date.

I opened by saying that I had grown increasingly concerned during the week with some of Bani-Sadr’s claims that President Carter had to “apologize,” “admit the mistakes of the past” and enter a period of “self-criticism.”

I said that we were prepared to do what we had promised to do last weekend in Switzerland,⁷ nothing more and nothing less. I told them that President Carter had personally authorized that we supplement his statement with certain things that he wanted to say, but I said that there should be no illusions on anyone’s part as to what we would say and would not say. I said that President Bani-Sadr should know that we would not “apologize,” that we would not “admit mistakes” nor do other things which we would consider a violation of principle. I told our French friends that we had taken seriously Bani-Sadr’s private statement that he had no desire to “humiliate us.” I told our French friends for us to say the kinds of things he had been calling for publicly would be humiliating and would not be said by President Carter.

I told them that as much as we cared about the hostages, the honor of our country was even more important. And that the hostages could stay in Iran another two months or ten months before we would agree to a scenario “apologizing” or admitting “guilt.”

Our French friends argued that Bani-Sadr, while endorsing the scenario, had created a tremendous problem for himself and consequently for us all by claiming that the U.S. would apologize. They said that they felt certain that he would have to have some knowledge of what would be in the U.S. statement before he moved to free the hostages. We all agreed that exchange of statements in advance was a bad idea as was the deposit of advance statements with Waldheim. A possible compromise would be an informal arrangement whereby our French friends informally reviewed the proposed statements by each side to insure that they conformed with the principles agreed upon at Berne.

1. Source: Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 34, Iran 3/80. Secret. Jordan wrote this report on the plane from Paris to Washington following his meeting with “Mr. S,” Sadegh Ghotbzadeh. The editor transcribed the text from Jordan’s handwritten original. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Jordan and Vance upon Jordan’s return, February 17, from 7:40 until 8:52 p.m. (Carter Library) No other record of the meeting with the President has been found.
2. In a February 15 letter to Jordan, Carter wrote: “If, at any time, the Government of Iran desires to release the American hostages at an earlier date than called for in the mutually agreed plan, the Government of Iran has my personal assurance that the United States will abide by all the terms of that plan.” (Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 34, Iran 2/80)
3. In his account of this meeting, Jordan wrote that one solution posed by Ghotbzadeh was for the United States to “kill the Shah.” (Jordan, Crisis, pp. 162–168)
4. Presumably hostage Michael Metrinko.
5. Not further identified.
6. Saunders’s paper stressed the U.S. interest in the independence and integrity of Iran from Soviet control, separatism, or U.S. dominance; stated that the United States would “respect a genuinely non-aligned Iran” and wanted good relations with Iran; concurred in the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry; supported any Iranian legal action in U.S. courts; supported lifting of the Iranian asset freeze once the hostages were released; promised to work with Iran to resolve regional strategic problems; and requested that all 53 hostages leave at the same time. Saunders also requested that the scenario be further refined. (“Points to Cover,” February 25; Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 1)
7. See Document 180.