Office of the Historian

185. Memorandum From Jasper Welch of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, February 19, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Soviet Union Moves into Iran

Last Friday Bill Odom asked me to meet with him, Marshall, and Fritz to review our thoughts on U.S. responses to Soviet moves into Iran.2 Our conversation reached two conclusions with regard to current intelligence:

(1) Soviet readiness activities that we see are consistent with the Soviet policy of taking the maximum prudent steps that would not be so inflamatory as to trigger any additional U.S. response. (TS)

(2) That the Soviets do not see U.S. military activities in the Greater Persian Gulf as sufficiently hostile to warrant any Soviet reaction. (TS)

With regard to possible U.S. actions in the near term in reaction to a Soviet move upon Iran, our conclusions parallel quite closely those reached in a prior memo of January 16 (attached at Tab A).3 All felt that it would be appropriate for you to review that memo at this time. (TS)

There was one additional consideration not prominent in our prior memo, that is, the central role of inserting U.S. ground forces into Saudi Arabia. This is undoubtedly necessary either as an alternative to insertion into Khuzistan in the event that was tactically infeasible or as an adjunct to a Khuzistan operation to forestall Soviet airborne operations or an Iraqi move into Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. (TS)

We were divided on the wisdom of U.S. air attacks on invading Soviet forces, both as to its efficacy and the desirability of initiating [Page 489] conflict versus emplacing U.S. forces at some point where the Soviets had not yet arrived. (TS)

Clearly, detailed military analysis is in order in all of these near-term options, however grim may be the prospects for a successful outcome.4 (TS)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 154. Top Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. A stamped notation in the upper right corner of the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.”↩
  2. Friday, February 15. A CIA speculation on what motives and calculations “from the Soviet point of view” would lead the Soviet Union to cross into Iran concluded that, on balance, the decision to intervene would be more political in nature and that the Soviets would seek for lower-risk options of political influence than overt military intervention. (Paper prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, “A Soviet ‘Best Case’ for Military Intervention in Iran, NFAC #1227–80,” February 19; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 14, Folder 1)↩
  3. Tab A, a January 16 memorandum from Welch, Brement, and Utgoff to Brzezinski, is attached but not printed. See footnote 2, Document 156.↩
  4. Brzezinski drew a vertical line beside the last two paragraphs and wrote in the left margin: “What next steps? ZB.”↩