183. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)1

SUBJECT

  • Conversation of 14 February 1980 [portion marking not declassified]

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the hostage crisis.]

5. We then discussed the Iran finding.2 I showed the list of the people we were building contacts with and described the idea of a substitute national front. I pointed out that this clearly did have some risk for the hostage negotiations but that was the nature of political action. We had to deal covertly with people who were unacceptable to the establishment which the government was dealing with overtly. We can’t turn these people on and off like a spigot. There was recognition of this. I pointed out we were slowing things down. Though there was some risk that Bakhtiar was dealing with the Iraqis, we didn’t think he was ready to move nor would any of them be ready to move without our energizing it. I pointed out that we needed to keep the overall effort going, however, because of the danger that a power vacuum would develop if Bani Sadr could not take hold.

[Page 480]

There was a comment about how good relations with Bani Sadr had been, how he had lived up to what he had said thus far. I poured some cold water, however, on what the prospects were for Bani Sadr in the long run, especially with regard to the economy. [portion marking not declassified]

6. I then raised the possibility of the hostage negotiations going afoul for one of three reasons: (a) Khomeini would not come along; (b) Khomeini and Bani Sadr would demand more than the country could afford to give; and (c) left-wing militants would do harm to one of our hostages in the process of resisting their release. [portion marking not declassified]

7. I therefore indicated we ought to keep the rescue operation option open and recommended that despite the risks we proceed with an SOG operation at the end of the month in support of this. I said I would have to have a decision this week. I recommended we have a meeting with Dave Jones tomorrow. I was asked if there were procedures for periodic reviews of the status of our covert actions of this sort with NSC and State. I said we kept very close with State in particular on this and that we would set up procedures for some kind of periodic reviews as we went along. [portion marking not declassified]

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the hostage crisis.]

Stansfield Turner3
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 95M01183R: Policy Files (1977–1981), Box 1, Folder 3: DCI Turner—Eyes Only Files—Memos and Meetings with Various Officials and Subjects. Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to McMahon and Cogan and a copy was sent to the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia. The memorandum recounts Turner’s meeting with Carter that day. According to the President’s Daily Diary, they met from 11:01 until 11:35 a.m. (Carter Library) In another February 14 memorandum to Carlucci, McMahon, and Cogan, Turner reported that he had conveyed to Brzezinski on February 13 that his general purpose in meeting with Carter was “to get a better understanding of the President’s concept of the covert actions we are presently undertaking and how committed he is to them.” While discussing specifics, Brzezinski also told Turner that he thought the chances of the Twin Otter operation gaining approval was very slim but told Turner to raise the issue with Carter during their meeting. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 95M01183R: Policy Files (1977–1981), Box 1, Folder 3: DCI Turner—Eyes Only Files—Memos and Meetings with Various Officials and Subjects)
  2. See Document 110.
  3. [name not declassified] signed above Turner’s typed signature.