28. Draft Summary of Meetings1

CHRONOLOGY

September 5, 1978—Tuesday

1430–14572

President Carter President Sadat

Subject: Welcomes Sadat at helipad. No substantive conversation. Secretary Vance accompanied Sadat from Andrews to Camp David.

1640–17163

President Carter Prime Minister Begin

Subject: Welcomes Begin at helipad. No substantive conversation. Secretary Vance accompanied Sadat from Andrews to Camp David.

[Page 85]

2030–22534

President Carter Prime Minister Begin

Subject: General discussion of proposed Camp David scenario. President emphasized importance of the conference to all the parties. At Begin’s request, the President agreed to send a personal message to Assad about the Lebanese situation.5

Memcon-Tab

2130–22306

Secretary Vance Defense Minister Weizman

Subject: General tour d’horizon of proposed Camp David scenario and discussion of principal issues.

Memcon-Tab

September 6, 1978—Wednesday

1003–11517

President Carter President Sadat

Subject: Preliminary exchange of views on Egyptian position and how President Carter proposed to proceed during Camp David talks. Sadat told President Carter he would present a proposal for a peace framework.8

Memcon-Tab

[Page 86]

1000–11009

Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Kamel
Dr. Brzezinski Minister of State
U.S. Delegation Boutros Ghali
Egyptian Delegation

Subject: Preliminary exchange of views with Egyptian Delegation on Egyptian position with respect to the peace negotiations, Somalia, Libya, Chad, etc.

Memcon-Tab 3

1455–163710

President Carter Prime Minister Begin

Subject: President Carter informed Mr. Begin that President Sadat would be submitting a new Egyptian paper.

Memcon-Tab

1500–163011

President Carter President Sadat Prime Minister Begin
[Page 87]

Subject: First trilateral meeting. General exchange of views; Sadat presented to Begin a new Egyptian paper.

Memcon-Tab

September 7, 1978—Thursday

0830–093012

President Carter Prime Minister Begin
Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Dayan
Dr. Brzezinski Defense Minister Weizman

Subject:

Memcon-Tab

1030–134513

President Carter President Sadat Prime Minister Begin

Subject: Second trilateral meeting.

Memcon-Tab

1115–122014

[Page 88]
Vice President Mondale Foreign Minister Dayan
Secretary Vance Defense Min. Weizman
Dr. Brzezinski Professor Barak
U.S. Delegation Israeli Delegation

Subject: Lebanese situation; Israelis put forward a suggestion that Sinai issues remain unresolved; withdrawal problems on West Bank, etc.

Memcon-Tab 8

1515–1600;

1700–180015

Vice President Mondale Foreign Minister Dayan
Secretary Vance Defense Min. Weizman
Dr. Brzezinski Professor Barak
Secretary Brown General Tamir

Subject: Resume discussion of Israeli ideas for West Bank/Gaza settlement. Explore Israeli positions on refugee return, security/withdrawal on West Bank, settlements, Sinai air bases and authority for interim regime.

Memcon-Tab 9

1600–170016

Vice President Mondale Foreign Minister Kamel
Secretary Vance Ahmed Maher
Ambassador Eilts

Subject: Discussion of Egyptian proposal.

Memcon-Tab 10

1702–185517

President Carter President Sadat Prime Minister Begin

Subject: Resumption of earlier trilateral meeting.

Memcon-Tab

[Page 89]

1700–183018

Vice President Mondale Foreign Minister Dayan
Secretary Vance Defense Min. Weizman
Secretary Brown Professor Barak
U.S. Delegation General Tamir

Subject: Resumption of earlier meeting. Exploration of Israeli positions on refugee return, security/withdrawal on the West Bank, settlements, Sinai airbase, etc.

Memcon-Tab

1900

Marine Tattoo.

2230–245519

President Carter President Sadat
Vice President Mondale Dep. Pr. Min. Touhamy
Secretary Vance Hassan Kamel

Subject: Discussion of Egyptian ideas on West Bank/Gaza issues, Jerusalem and Sinai.

Memcon-Tab

September 8, 1978—Friday

0930–113020

Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Dayan
Secretary Brown Defense Min. Weizman
Dr. Brzezinski Professor Barak
Amb. Atherton General Tamir
Asst. Sec. Saunders Mr. Rubinstein

Subject: Continuation of previous meeting. Sovereignty/ withdrawal on West Bank, settlements, devolution of authority for self-governed and related issues.

Memcon-Tab 14

[Page 90]

1433–160221

President Carter Prime Minister Begin
Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Dayan
Defense Min. Weizman

Subject:

Memcon-Tab

1500–173022

Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Kamel
U.S. Delegation Egyptian Delegation

Subject: Lengthy discussion of Egyptian concern over West Bank sovereignty issue, Israeli settlements, and Jerusalem.

Memcon-Tab 15

1607–165323

President Carter President Sadat

Subject:

Memcon-Tab

1900

President Carter attends Prime Minister Begin’s Seder.24

September 9, 1978—Saturday

[Page 91]

1026–112625

Sadat/Weizman meeting.

1830–191526

Secretary Vance Defense Minister Weizman

Subject: Primarily topics were Weizman’s worries about Begin’s rigidity, concerns about tripartite meeting among leaders having exacerbated the situation, Secretary Vance’s providing some hints of the nature of the U.S. paper then in its final stages of preparation.

Memcon-Tab

2045–220027

Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Dayan
Ambassador Lewis Israeli Delegation

Subject: General discussion topics which had been addressed in earlier meeting with Weizman.

Memcon-Tab

September 10, 1978—Sunday

1000–1330

Trip to Gettysburg.

1600–170528

President Carter Prime Minister Begin
Vice President Mondale Foreign Minister Dayan
Secretary Vance Defense Min. Weizman
Dr. Brzezinski Professor Barak

Subject: New U.S. draft Framework proposal29 given to Israelis and discussed on a preliminary basis.

Memcon-Tab

[Page 92]

1755–180530

President Carter President Sadat

Subject:

Memcon Tab

2130–0300 (Sept. 11)31

President Carter Foreign Minister Dayan
Vice President Mondale Defense Min. Weizman
Secretary Vance Professor Barak
Dr. Brzezinski

Subject: Detailed discussion of new U.S. Framework paper. Israelis present their objections and some redrafting based on Israeli views.

Memcon-Tab

September 11, 1978—Monday

0300–034532

President Carter Foreign Minister Dayan

Subject: The President asked Dayan to walk from Holly to Aspen with him.

[Page 93]

1030–123033

President Carter President Sadat

Subject: The President went over orally with Sadat the revised U.S. Framework paper.34

Memcon-Tab

1200–123035

Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Dayan
Asst. Sec. Saunders
Amb. Lewis

Subject: Luncheon conversation. Israeli suggestion that Sinai agreement be made more precise. Israeli suggestion that Sinai talks be pursued in parallel with broad Framework talks.

Memcon-Tab

1430–153036

Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Dayan
Amb. Lewis Defense Min. Weizman
General Tamir
Israeli Delegation

Subject: Possible joint Jordanian-Israeli and/or Egyptian-Israeli border patrols, nature of Israeli security requirements in West Bank, Gaza and Sinai (with briefings from Tamir’s maps), potential cost of refugee resettlement in Gaza. Secretary went over quickly latest version of U.S. Framework proposal, indicating which Israeli suggestions had been accepted and which rejected.

Memcon-Tab 24

1830–194537

President Carter Defense Minister Weizman
Israeli Delegation
[Page 94]

Subject: Sinai and Israeli security requirements.

Memcon-Tab

2130–230038

Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Kamel
Amb. Eilts Amb. Ghorbal
Ahmed Maher

Subject: Preliminary Egyptian comments on revised U.S. Framework paper. Egyptian concerns with it. They view it as retreat from previous U.S. positions. It makes no clear reference to withdrawal from Sinai and Palestinians and refugee problems inadequately treated.

Memcon—Tab 26.

2040–224039

President Carter Foreign Minister Dayan
Professor Barak

Subject: Sinai and handling settlements problem.

Memcon—Tab .

September 12, 1978—Tuesday

081540

President Carter Foreign Minister Kamel
Ahmed Maher

Subject: The President met Kamel and his associates while bicycling. Brief general discussion in which President Carter said he did not want Sadat to have to bear burden of West Bank. King Hussein should be absorbed into peace talks. President Carter thought Israelis will be willing to look at Egyptian suggestions.

[Page 95]

1040–120541

President Carter President Sadat

Subject:

Memcon—Tab_______.

1030–111542

Dr. Brzezinski Prime Minister Begin

Subject: Settlements.

Memcon—Tab_______.

1300–134543

Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Dayan

Subject: Luncheon conversation. Dayan urged that as a fall-back position to avoid a breakdown, the West Bank/Gaza agreement should be separated from Sinai since the latter seemed at that point insoluble. Secretary said this would not work.

Memcon—Tab_______.

1400–161544

Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Kamel
U.S. Delegation Egyptian Delegation
[Page 96]

Subject: Lengthy discussion of revised U.S. Framework paper and Egyptian concerns about it. Egyptians presented written comments and suggestions on U.S. Framework paper.

Memcon—Tab 31.

1640–170045

President Carter President Sadat

Subject: Discussion of new Sinai principles based on President Carter’s handwritten memo.46

Memcon—Tab_______.

1755–175847

President Carter President Sadat

Subject:

Memcon—Tab_______.

181548

President Carter Prime Minister Begin
Israeli Delegation

Subject: Impromptu meeting at dinner. Brief exchange about Begin’s insistence that he meet alone with President Carter later in the evening.

1956–213249

President Carter Prime Minister Begin

Subject: Begin discussed at length his objection to the “inadmissibility” language and to removing the Israeli settlements from the West Bank and Sinai.

Memcon—Tab_______.

[Page 97]

2130–233550

Secretary Vance Prime Minister Begin
U.S. Delegation Israeli Delegation

Subject: Resumed discussion of U.S. Framework paper and separate Sinai Framework concept.51

Memcon—Tab_______.

September 13, 1978—Wednesday

0810–165352

President Carter Prof. Barak Osama el-Baz

Subject: Lengthy drafting session on revising the overall Framework paper.53

2005–2215

President Carter Prof. Barak Osama el-Baz

Subject: Continuation of redrafting session on a new overall Framework paper.

2215–222054

President Carter Prime Minister Begin

Subject: President Carter called on the Prime Minister in order to express appreciation for the constructive Israeli approach during the protracted drafting session earlier in the day.

2220–2315 (Sept. 14)55

Secretary Vance Prime Minister Begin
U.S. Delegation Israeli Delegation

Subject: Focus on U.S. paper on Sinai.

Memcon—Tab 36.

[Page 98]

September 14, 1978—Thursday

0800–090556

President Carter President Sadat

Subject: Obtain Sadat’s reaction to the work of the joint drafting committee done on the previous day.

084557

Ambassador Eilts Foreign Minister Kamel

Subject: Deliver U.S. draft Sinai Framework document.

093058

President Carter Professor Barak

Subject:

1110–120559

President Carter Foreign Minister Dayan
Israeli Delegation

Subject:

[Page 99]

1336–143160

President Carter President Sadat

Subject: Discussion of new Sinai Framework paper.

1400–180061

Secretary Vance Prof. Barak Osama el-Baz

Subject: Further revision of overall Framework paper developed during the previous day’s drafting session.

1515

Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Kamel

Subject: Secretary stopped by to explain the revised Framework paper to Kamel.

2000–2230

Secretary Vance Prof. Barak Osama el-Baz

Subject: Continuation of tripartite drafting session; indepth discussion of revised Framework paper.

September 15, 1978—Friday

1030–112162

President Carter Foreign Minister Dayan
Vice President Mondale
Secretary Vance

Subject:

[Page 100]

1130–115063

Secretary Vance President Sadat
Secretary Brown (later) Foreign Minister Kamel
Ambassador Ghorbal

Subject: Sadat explains difficulty of signing an agreement with President Carter if Begin does not also sign. Such an agreement would become the basis for further compromises in any future negotiations.

1207–123764

President Carter President Sadat

Subject: Sadat agrees to President Carter’s request that the Egyptian delegation not leave that day and wait until Sunday. This will allow another effort to be made with the Israelis to obtain their agreement to the revised overall and Sinai Framework texts.

1400–160065

Vice President Mondale (part) Foreign Minister Dayan
Secretary Vance Defense Minister Weizman
Secretary Brown Professor Barak
Dr. Brzezinski

[Page 101]Subject: Settlements, airfields and withdrawal from Sinai. Reiterated commitment to Israeli security and readiness to provide needed equipment.

Memcon—Tab _______.

1520–154566

Vice President Mondale President Sadat

Subject: Conveyed copy of handwritten letter67 of President Carter.

1555–162568

Vice President Mondale Prime Minister Begin

Subject: Conveyed copy of handwritten letter69 of President Carter. General discussion of status of summit and Sinai settlements issue.

197570

Secretary Vance Nabil el-Araby

Subject: Egyptian paper71 on proposed textual changes presented.

2000–220072

Secretary Vance Professor Barak
Ambassador Lewis Ambassador Dinitz
Eli Rubinstein
Def. Min. Weizman (later)
General Tamir (later)

Subject: Discussion of Israeli proposed textual changes for overall Framework paper.

2045–211573

Sadat/Weizman meeting.

[Page 102]

2130–240074

President Carter President Sadat
Vice President Mondale
Secretary Vance

Subject: Watched Muhammed Ali/Spinks fight.

September 16, 1978—Saturday

0800–090075

President Carter President Sadat

Subject: During early morning walk, the two Presidents discussed

1015–113076

Secretary Vance Defense Min. Weizman

Subject:

1130–133077

Vice President Mondale Foreign Minister Dayan
Secretary Vance Professor Barak
[Page 103]Harold Saunders Ambassador Dinitz
Amb. Sam Lewis
William Quandt

Subject: Discussion of Israeli proposed textual changes to overall Framework document.

1200–125078

President Carter Foreign Minister Weizman

Subject: Sinai Framework

1300–133079

President Carter Defense Minister Weizman

Subject: Sinai Framework

1630–180080

President Carter President Sadat
Secretary Vance Osama el-Baz

[Page 104]Subject: Drafting framework and Sinai papers.

2000–243081

President Carter Prime Minister Begin
Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Dayan
U.S. Delegation82 Professor Barak

Subject: Discussion of para 1(c), settlements,83 etc.

September 17, 1978—Sunday

0030–010084

Secretary Vance Professor Barak
U.S. Delegation Meir Rosenne
Simcha Dinitz
Eli Rubinstein
General Tamir

Subject: Brief discussion of para 1(c) prior to Israeli side undertaking redraft of that para.

0930–095085

Sadat/Weizman meeting.

1030–111086

President Carter President Sadat

Subject:

1052–122587

Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Dayan
U.S. Delegation Professor Barak
Israeli Delegation

Subject: Language on para 1 (c) Jerusalem exchange of ideas and minor drafting questions.

1120–114088

President Carter Foreign Minister Dayan
[Page 105]

Subject:

1340–135589

Secretary Vance Foreign Minister Dayan
U.S. Delegation Professor Barak
Israeli Delegation

Subject: Jerusalem

1355–143090

President Carter Foreign Minister Dayan
Vice President Mondale Defense Min. Weizman
Secretary Vance Professor Barak
Hamilton Jordan Simcha Dinitz

Subject: Jerusalem several points of Sinai agreement

1445–151591

President Carter Defense Minister Weizman
Secretary Vance Professor Barak

Subject:

1520–171992

President Carter President Sadat
Secretary Vance Osama el-Baz

Subject: Finalization of drafting changes on framework documents

1730–184593

President Carter Prime Minister Begin
Secretary Vance Professor Barak

Subject: Finalization of drafting changes on framework documents

[Page 106]

1904–192494

Prime Minister Begin calls on President Sadat.

1952–2010

President Sadat calls on Prime Minister Begin.

2100–2130

Egyptian party helicopters from Camp David to Washington.

2115–2145

Israeli party helicopters from Camp David to Washington.

2136–221095

President Carter, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin helicopter from Camp David to the White House.

223096

Signing ceremony at White House of the two “framework” documents.

  1. Source: Department of State, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, Principal Officer Program Files, Lot 85F104, Personal for Ambassador Lewis—Sensitive Notes 1978. Secret. Unless noted otherwise, no memoranda of conversation for the meetings listed in the summary have been found.
  2. In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: “Sadat, on arrival at Aspen [Lodge], emphasized that he was eager to reach agreements, total if possible, not just to establish procedures for future negotiations. He stated that Begin did not want an agreement and would try to delay as much as possible. Sadat said he would back me in all things and has a comprehensive proposal ‘here in my pocket’ that would include establishment of diplomatic relations and end the boycott against Israel.” Carter responded: “I told him I would delay any U.S. proposals until after he and Begin explored all the differences. He said he would try to protect me by putting forward good proposals and make it unnecessary for U.S. proposals. I told him he needed to understand Begin’s problems and attitudes. He seemed to be somewhat impatient of Begin, distrustful of him, determined to succeed, perhaps overly bold and inclined to acquire my partnership against Begin.” (Carter, White House Diary, pp. 216–217) For Carter’s memoir account of this meeting, see Keeping Faith, pp. 327–329.
  3. In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: “The next conversation was with Begin after his arrival—quite a different attitude. Begin was immediately interested in the techniques of Camp David discussion: times, places, how many aides at the meetings, and so forth. He pointed out that this meeting was historically unprecedented, that there had not been an agreement between a Jewish nation and Egypt for more than two thousand years.” Carter responded: “I told him we three principals could not expect others to settle major issues if we couldn’t, that all issues should be discussed at Camp David, and that Sadat had a concern about Begin’s preoccupation with details instead of the major issues. Begin said, ‘I can handle both.’” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 217) Carter also discussed this meeting, in which he described both Begin and himself as “somewhat ill at ease,” in Keeping Faith, pp. 329–330. Following this meeting, Carter met with Brzezinski and Vance at the Presidential lodge. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 255) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
  4. For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, see White House Diary, pp. 217–219, and his more fulsome account in Keeping Faith, pp. 332–338.
  5. See Document 29.
  6. No other record of this meeting has been found.
  7. For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, see White House Diary, pp. 219–220, and Keeping Faith, pp. 338–342. Following the meeting, Carter met with Mondale, Vance, and Brzezinski to discuss this meeting: “We were all concerned about Sadat’s harsh opening proposal and Begin’s inflexibility on all the issues. However, we were not overly discouraged, because Cy and Zbig reported a much more forthcoming attitude among the other Israelis, and I was counting on Sadat’s promised concessions. (Keeping Faith, p. 342)
  8. Sadat presented his proposed “Framework for the Comprehensive Peace Settlement of the Middle East Problem” to Carter at the meeting and the text is printed in Quandt, Camp David, pp. 356–360. Carter’s annotated copy of this proposal is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President’s Working Papers, undated. According to Quandt, Sadat also presented three typewritten pages outlining a series of concessions he would be prepared to make in the negotiations. (Quandt, Camp David, pp. 222–223) A copy of this document is in the Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 28, Mid-East: Camp David Summit, President’s Working Papers, undated. Annotated copies of the successive drafts of the Framework documents negotiated at the summit were collected by Lewis and are in the Department of State, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, Principal Officer Program Files, Lot 85F104, Box 1, A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David—September 1978. Multiple, undated, annotated versions of the Sinai Framework are also in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President’s Working Papers, undated.
  9. See Document 30. For Brzezinski’s account of the meeting, see Power and Principle, p. 255. Brzezinski noted that following this meeting, “we [Brzezinski, Vance, Mondale] then had a rather useful discussion with the Israelis. I was struck by how relatively open-minded Dayan and Weizman were.” Brzezinski continued: “Dayan discussed in some detail his conversations with moderate Palestinians, and both he and Weizman indicated a willingness to discuss seriously the question of terminating additional settlements and of finding some formula that would give the Palestinians genuine self-government.” (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 255–256) Although no memorandum of conversation of a September 6 meeting among Mondale, Vance, Brzezinski, and the Israelis has been found, Brzezinski may possibly be referring to the September 7 meeting printed as Document 33.
  10. Reference is presumably to a brief private exchange between Carter and Begin before Sadat arrived for the afternoon meeting. (See footnote 11 below) In his personal diary, Carter wrote: “I met earlier with Begin to tell him two things: I had sent Assad a personal message calling for peace in Lebanon; and for Begin to expect a very tough proposal from Sadat and not to overreact to it. (Carter, White House Diary, pp. 220–221) Carter added that “Sadat was not yet ready for a three-three-three meeting, but that we would try to schedule one for the next morning.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 342)
  11. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Sadat and Begin on the patio of Aspen Lodge from 2:55 p.m. to 4:37 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, see White House Diary, pp. 220–222, and Keeping Faith, pp. 343–345. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the President met with Mrs. Carter, Vance, Atherton, Saunders, Eilts, Lewis, Brzezinski, and Quandt, at Holly Cabin from 10:14 p.m. to 11:59 p.m. on September 6. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Of the meeting, Carter wrote: “I brought the entire American group together in my cottage to discuss the apparent damage Sadat’s proposal had done. Begin was treating it as an insurmountable obstacle, and the other members of the Israeli delegation were also deeply troubled. We knew that Sadat was ready to make immediate modifications, but it seemed advisable for me to meet with all the Israelis before Begin and Sadat met again with each other, so that I could ease their concern. I asked Cy to arrange such a session.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 346)
  12. According to the President’s Daily Diary, this meeting took place in Holly Cabin from 8:30 a.m. to 10:25 a.m. on September 7. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: “I made the following points: Sadat’s proposal is more rigid than I anticipated; the U.S. has not been active in the preparation of either [the] Israeli or Egyptian proposal.” Continuing the account, Carter quoted Begin as saying: “The document smacks of a victorious state dictating peace to the defeated. Sadat was ill-advised to submit the document—not the basis for negotiations.” Carter responded: “Sadat was reiterating established Arab position.” Summarizing further in an annotation to the diary, Carter wrote: “Begin then insisted on going through Sadat’s paper in detail, refuting dozens of points. I tried to convince the Israelis that the Egyptian proposal included its maximum demands and to trust me and let me know what they actually needed for security and to comply with international agreements they had already been accepted. Sadat had proposed minor adjustments in the pre-1967 borders. What did Israel propose? Expansion of settlements was the crucial issue.” Carter quoted Begin as stating, “I will ask Sadat to withdraw the paper,” to which Carter responded: “Everyone should be free to submit anything they want. You can be equally effective by saying it is unacceptable.” Begin replied, “Okay. We will not ask for withdrawal. We’ll simply say it is unacceptable.” (Carter, White House Diary, pp. 222–223) On this meeting, see also Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 346–350.
  13. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Begin on September 7 from 10:30 a.m. to 1:45 p.m., with Sadat joining the meeting at 10:45 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) For Carter’s accounts of the “very, very bitter” discussions, which covered the Egyptian proposal, questions over the return of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty, Israeli settlements, Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza, the situation in Lebanon, and the status of Jerusalem, see White House Diary, pp. 223–225, and Keeping Faith, pp. 350–357.
  14. See Document 33. Lewis’s handwritten notes of the meeting, which bear a handwritten date of September 6, are in the Department of State, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, Principal Officer Program Files, Lot 85F104, Personal for Ambassador Lewis—Sensitive Notes 1978.
  15. See Document 34.
  16. See Document 35.
  17. For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, which again covered Sinai, including the future of the Israeli settlements and airfields there, as well as the Straits of Tiran, see White House Diary, pp. 225–226, and Keeping Faith, pp. 357–359. Carter noted that the meeting “began very stilted” and later “deteriorated,” prompting Sadat to state that a “stalemate had been reached, and he saw no further reason for discussions to continue.” In his personal diary, Carter wrote that he then “made an analysis of all areas of agreement and pointed out that the United States had a strong security interest in Mideast peace that could, if violated, cause a worldwide conflict.” He continued: “If they were willing to reject the entire peace agreement because of some minor difference, I don’t believe their people would accept it.” Carter concluded by encouraging Begin and Sadat “not to break off their talks, to give me a chance to use my influence, to have confidence in me. Sadat reluctantly agreed; Begin agreed easily. We adjourned.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 226)
  18. See Document 34.
  19. For Carter’s personal diary account of this meeting, in which he quotes at length the two leaders’ discussion of the course of the day’s trilateral meetings as well as Sadat’s desire to seek a resolution of sovereignty issues in the West Bank and Gaza, in addition to those in Sinai, see White House Diary, pp. 226–227. According to Carter’s account in his memoirs, Mondale, Brown, and Vance on the U.S. side and Tuhamy, Kamel, and Boutros-Ghali on the Egyptian side also attended the meeting. (See Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 360–363) For Brzezinski’s account of the meeting, see Power and Principle, pp. 257–258.
  20. See Document 36.
  21. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in Aspen Lodge from 2:30 p.m. to 4:04 p.m. on September 8. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) On the origins of the meeting, Carter wrote the previous day in his personal diary: “Later [after the evening meeting with the Egyptians] I met Zbig on the path, and he pointed out that both Israelis and Egyptians were frustrated about whether any progress could possibly be made. The Egyptians are contemplating leaving because of the intransigence of the Israelis, primarily on the settlements issue. I asked them both [Begin and Sadat] if I could come to their cabin. Begin, because of protocol, said he must come to call on me. Sadat said OK.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 227) For Carter’s accounts of the meeting with Begin, which covered the subject of the Israeli settlements, see White House Diary, pp. 227–228, and Keeping Faith, pp. 365–367. At the meeting, Carter informed Begin that the U.S. delegation would present a comprehensive proposal for agreement to both the Israeli and Egyptian delegations.
  22. See Document 37.
  23. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in Dogwood Cabin from 4:08 p.m. to 4:52 p.m. on September 8. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) At the meeting, Carter informed Sadat that the U.S. delegation intended to work out the text of a proposed draft agreement the following day. For Carter’s accounts of the meeting, see White House Diary, pp. 228–229, and Keeping Faith, pp. 368–369.
  24. Reference is to the attendance of President and Mrs. Carter at a Jewish Sabbath evening meal with the Israeli delegation at Hickory Cabin from 7:07 p.m. to 8:50 p.m. on September 8. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) In his personal diary, the President noted that Begin had invited the Carters to attend the meal at the end of their September 8 afternoon meeting. (Carter, White House Diary, p. 228) In his memoirs, Carter reflected on the event: “That evening Rosalynn and I had a delightful time with the entire Israeli delegation, enjoying a delicious kosher meal and trying to join in the robust singing. The Israelis seemed carefree and lighthearted, in a completely different mood from the attitude during our discouraging negotiations. Although no concessions had been made and there was no tangible basis for any optimism, I was much more encouraged as we returned to our cabin.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 369)
  25. See Document 41.
  26. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
  27. Ibid.
  28. For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, which included a “heated discussion” between the two leaders about the language in United Nations Resolution 242, see White House Diary, p. 230, and Keeping Faith, pp. 372–374.
  29. See Document 40.
  30. This meeting was scheduled, but not held. Following his meeting with Begin, Carter reported its substance to Sadat and the two decided to reschedule their meeting to discuss the U.S. Framework draft for the following morning. (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 374) See footnote 33 below.
  31. For Carter’s account of this meeting, which covered the applicability of United Nations Resolution 242, navigation in the Straits of Tiran, the definition of “Palestinian,” political and military control over the West Bank, Palestinian self-government, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem, see Keeping Faith, pp. 375–378, and White House Diary, p. 230. For Brzezinski’s version of the “heated and prolonged discussion,” see Power and Principle, pp. 260–261. At the meeting a new version of the U.S. Framework paper was presented to the Israelis for their comments. A copy of this September 10 version, bearing comments presented by the Israeli delegation at 8 a.m. the following morning, is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Talks—Pre May 1979. Vance also kept a “master” copy of this version, upon which decisions to accept or reject Israeli decisions on the draft were recorded. A copy of this version is ibid.
  32. On this meeting, Carter wrote in his personal diary: “At 3:00 in the morning, I asked Dayan to walk with me. I described the problem: that Begin was unreasonable and the obstacle to peace; that I had doubts about his commitment to an agreement. I asked Dayan to help me with these phrases when the Israelis meet again. Dayan told me that the question of Sinai settlements was the most serious. I told him I would bring this up with Sadat, but I didn’t think there was any chance for success.” Carter further commented: “Dayan is a levelheaded, competent person, and if he or Weizman were prime minister, we could long ago have reached a resolution. It’s becoming clearer that the rationality of Begin is in doubt.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 231) See also Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 378–379, and Dayan Breakthrough, p. 156.
  33. For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, see White House Diary, p. 231, and Keeping Faith, pp. 379–380.
  34. A revised version of the Framework document, dated September 11 and produced based on the Israeli proposals of September 10, was presented to Sadat at this meeting. A copy of this revised version is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Talks—Pre May 1979.
  35. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
  36. See Document 43.
  37. For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, see White House Diary, p. 232, and Keeping Faith, p. 381. In his personal diary, Carter noted that during the meeting Vance telephoned “to say that the Egyptians requested a twelve-hour delay so Sadat could spend more time with his advisors. This is a bad sign.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 232)
  38. See Document 44.
  39. In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: “I found Dayan to be a little more optimistic but willing to accept failure rather than yield completely on the Sinai settlements because of political considerations in Israel. This also would set a precedent for full withdrawal on the Golan Heights. This is what we’ve long suspected, but the Israelis have never admitted any of these things. I guess it is a sign that they now are more trustful of us.

    “I outlined to them the consequences of failure. They informed me that Begin was not going to reject the paper out of hand but would have several levels of action: acquiescence in an issue; approve it, but get cabinet and Knesset confirmation; disapprove it, but let the Knesset make the ultimate decision. Dayan suggested I proceed with a proposal Sadat might accept. At least it would clarify the issue.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 232) See also, Keeping Faith, pp. 382–383.

  40. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met members of the Egyptian delegation enroute while bicycling. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No specific time for these encounters is given.
  41. For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, which covered regional security, as well as the draft Framework document, see White House Diary, pp. 232–234, and Keeping Faith, pp. 383–385. During their exchange, Carter informed Sadat that the United States would formally propose that Israeli settlements in the West Bank “should not be expanded or the number increased.” Moreover, he informed him, “we had to delay some questions: permanent borders in the West Bank; permanent status of the Palestinian Arabs; permanent status of Jerusalem. Palestinian Arabs might after five years—if there was a genuine self-government and genuine autonomy—prefer, with Israeli and Jordanian withdrawal, to keep the interim government intact. He [Sadat] said he would keep an open mind about it and accept that possibility in the language to be drafted.” (Carter, White House Diary, pp. 233–234) Following this meeting, Carter reported on these discussions in a meeting with members of the U.S. delegation. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 263) Carter then returned to his cabin and “looked again at the detailed maps of the Middle East I had been studying for the last few months. All of a sudden, I felt fairly confident that I could get both leaders to agree to a general proposal that could resolve all the long-term differences concerning the Sinai, and also provide the basis for a future treaty between the two nations. The only exception was the Israeli settlements, which remained a crucial problem. Within about a half hour, I had jotted down my thoughts on a yellow pad.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 234)
  42. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. For Brzezinski’s account of this meeting, during which Begin stated that his “right eye will fall out, my right hand will fall off before I ever agree to the dismantling of a single Jewish settlement,” see Power and Principle, p. 263.
  43. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
  44. See Document 46.
  45. In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: “I went over and met with Sadat. I only had a rough scratch copy of my concept. [See footnote 40 above] He read it over carefully and made only two suggestions for changes, involving the width of the demilitarized zone and the delay in implementation of the agreement after it was concluded. I agreed to have it typed up, make one copy, and let him look it over before it was submitted to the Israelis. The meeting lasted fifteen minutes.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 234)
  46. See Document 47.
  47. No record of the substance of this meeting has been found.
  48. In his personal diary, Carter noted Begin’s suggestion to meet that evening: “I tried to induce him to wait until tomorrow after the drafting session, but he insisted.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 234)
  49. For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, see White House Diary, pp. 234–235, and Keeping Faith, pp. 385–387.
  50. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
  51. See Document 47.
  52. For Carter’s accounts of the lengthy Framework re-drafting sessions, September 13, see White House Diary, pp. 235–236, and Keeping Faith, pp. 387–388.
  53. An annotated copy of the September 11 version of the Framework, prepared for the September 13 re-drafting sessions is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President’s Working Papers, undated. A September 12 “early master draft” version, annotated to indicate Israeli and Egyptian redrafting is ibid.
  54. For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, see White House Diary, p. 236 and Keeping Faith, p. 388.
  55. See Document 48.
  56. In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: “I walked for an hour with Sadat. I complained about the adamant attitude the Egyptians had taken yesterday, and asked Sadat to be more flexible on the West Bank and Gaza. We discussed the questions of Jerusalem and self-determination. I reminded him that we had worked this out together at Aswan, and he said it could be in the implementing section of the agreement. He was interested in having an international highway connect the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat and was willing to have the Etzion air base used for the supply of Eilat so long as it was operated by the Egyptians and not the Israelis.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 236) On this meeting, see also, Keeping Faith, pp. 389–390.
  57. No other record of this meeting has been found.
  58. In his memoirs, Carter wrote of this meeting: “When I returned from the walk [with Sadat], Barak was waiting for me. He was still encouraged about the positive attitude prevailing among Begin and the other Israelis. He suggested that I discuss the Sinai questions with Dayan, who was more knowledgeable than he about the subject.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 390)
  59. In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: “Later, Dayan and Weizman came by. We discussed the entire Sinai question. It ultimately resolved into the same subject—the settlements near Gaza. I told them I would draft language letting this be a matter open for negotiation, to be resolved during the three-month period.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 236)
  60. During this meeting, Carter presented Sadat with a new draft of the Sinai Framework document. Sadat “immediately responded that there were preconditions: the airfields not being used for military purposes, and the settlements. He would negotiate when—not if—the settlements should be withdrawn.” Carter “discussed with him the procedure to be followed if the Israelis won’t agree on the settlements issue in the Sinai, and he said he would like to sign the document anyway, because it described his proposal. (Carter, White House Diary, p. 236) Also see Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 390. For the text of this revised version of the Sinai Framework, see footnote 55 above.
  61. No other record of this tripartite drafting session, or of the two drafting sessions involving Vance which followed, havebeen found. The same afternoon, according to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Dayan from 2:46 p.m. to 3:01 p.m. in Aspen Lodge. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Of this meeting, Carter wrote: “I went to ask Dayan how we could best end the deadlocked talks, and he said he preferred a paper that would list each paragraph, with the differences delineated side by side.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 390)
  62. According to the President’s Daily Diary, this meeting took place in Aspen Lodge from 10:30 a.m. to 11:21 a.m. on September 15. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No other record of this meeting has been found. In his memoirs, Carter wrote that Dayan reported “that he and Sadat had just concluded an unsatisfactory meeting. It had been arranged by Weizman in hopes that the two men might find some basis for continuing the talks.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 391)
  63. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. In his memoirs, Vance wrote of this meeting: “Friday, September 15, was a fateful day. That morning I received word from Sadat that he wanted me to come and see him in his lodge. When I saw him, his face was clouded and his mood somber. He was clearly deeply troubled, and not his warm and empathetic self. He asked me to sit down and then told me he had decided he must go home, as there was no hope that we could achieve an agreement. I struggled to persuade him to stay, stressing the importance of our task and our responsibility to our peoples and to world peace. I asked him to remember that it was his courageous initiative that in large part had made it possible for us to be here at all, and that history would treat us harshly if we failed. I urged Sadat to think about what I had said while I went at once to inform President Carter.” (Vance, Hard Choices, p. 224) Following the meeting, Vance walked to Aspen Lodge, where he informed Carter of the discussion. Carter noted in an annotation to his personal diary, “This was one of the worst moments of my life.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 237)
  64. According to the President’s Daily Diary, this meeting took place in Dogwood Cabin from 12:07 p.m. to 12:36 p.m. on September 15. For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, in which the President persuaded Sadat to remain at Camp David and continue the negotiations, see White House Diary, pp. 237–238, and Keeping Faith, pp. 392–393. Despite Sadat’s agreement, Carter noted that the U.S. delegation continued to prepare “failure plans” should the talks fail to produce an agreement by Sunday. He added: “But I did not want to give up. That afternoon and evening I went over the proposals—the Framework and the Sinai document—with Vance and Mondale. (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 393) Quandt wrote that Carter had tasked him with preparing a speech announcing the failure of the talks. (Quandt, Camp David, p. 240) Brzezinski’s handwritten note to Quandt, outlining the points to include in the speech, including the U.S. role and interest in securing Middle East peace and areas of agreement achieved is in the Papers of William B. Quandt, Private Collection.
  65. See Document 50.
  66. No other record of this meeting has been found.
  67. See Document 51.
  68. No other record of this meeting has been found.
  69. See Document 51.
  70. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. The exact time of the meeting, here rendered incorrectly as “1975,” has also not been found.
  71. Reference is possibly to an undated Egyptian paper titled “Amendments on the U.S. Proposal for A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David,” in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Talks—Pre May 1979.
  72. For Lewis’s handwritten notes of the meeting, see Document 52.
  73. For Weizman’s account of this meeting, in which he “made one more effort to soften” Sadat with regard to the Israeli settlements in Sinai, see The Battle for Peace, pp. 369–370.
  74. Carter discussed this meeting in White House Diary, p. 238, and Keeping Faith, pp. 393–394. Before the start of the boxing match, Carter and Mondale discussed the negotiations with Sadat: “I [Carter] recapitulated the situation in Fritz’s [Mondale’s] presence, to make sure that all of us had the same understanding of the terms under which we would work for the last few crucial hours.

    “I said, ‘Sadat has been the linchpin in the negotiations. Provided the rights of the Palestinians are protected, I have maximum flexibility on the West Bank and Gaza. In Sinai, we must preserve the integrity of sovereignty and land. We are determined to put together a document that we can both sign, and we’re still hopeful that Prime Minister Begin will be willing to sign it too. If not, then my hope is that the only remaining issue will be the Israeli settlements on Egyptian territory.’” “Sadat agreed, which reconfirmed his promise to me earlier that day.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 393)

  75. In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: “I got up early and listed all the things that the Israelis could possibly use as arguments on the Sinai document, and then went for a walk with Sadat. I told him that I needed him to give me some flexibility on the Sinai settlements. He said he would be willing to accept UN forces in the settlements area, agree not to dismantle the settlements, be flexible on the time of withdrawal of Israeli settlers—but he could not be flexible on the principle of their withdrawal.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 238) See also Keeping Faith, p. 394.
  76. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
  77. For Lewis’s handwritten notes of the meeting, see Document 53. In his memoirs, Dayan described the meeting as focused on the “contentious Article which dealt with the Palestinian issue.” “After comparing our proposed formula with theirs,” he wrote, “I explained that in our view there should be a clear distinction between the principles which should serve as a negotiating basis for autonomy for the Arabs of the territories, and the basis for any future negotiations with Jordan which should have as its objective a peace treaty with that country.” Dayan continued, “Vance said the Americans held a different position, but it seemed to have been arrived at for practical considerations rather than for reasons of principle. It was impossible, he said, to reach agreement with the Egyptians over autonomy if it applied only to people and not to boundaries.” He noted: “Each side kept explaining its position, and then we pulled a rabbit out of the hat—the working paper which had been produced and agreed to by the Americans and ourselves in talks that had preceded Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem. In that memorandum, there was a clear distinction between the peace treaties, which were to be concluded between us and the Arab States, and the issues that were to be discussed with the Arabs in the administered territories. Vance admitted that was indeed true, but that was in the context of the proposed Geneva Conference, and since then things had changed.” (Dayan, Breakthrough, p. 175)
  78. Carter met with Dayan, not Weizman. In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: “I decided to discuss the settlements issue with Dayan, and other matters concerning the general framework. The negotiations are primarily about whether UN 242 applies to all aspects of the discussions in the West Bank. On the West Bank settlements, he thought we could handle it with no new settlements, but that’s something I would have to work out with Begin. He said that Begin felt somewhat excluded, and this evening I should meet with just Begin and Barak, since Weizman had met with Sadat this morning.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 238) See also Keeping Faith, p. 394.
  79. According to the President’s Daily Diary, this meeting took place on September 16 from 1:07 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. in Aspen Lodge, though it adds question marks next to the recorded times. (Carter Library, Presidential Material) In his memoirs, Carter wrote of this meeting, which followed his meeting with Dayan: “I then went to see Weizman, to find out about his meeting with Sadat. As he walked to Aspen with me, he reported that Sadat would be willing to say in the Sinai document that future negotiations would settle the issue of the Israeli settlements. I was startled, because this was not at all what Sadat had just told me. I knew that in general Ezer was an optimist, and that at Camp David, unfortunately, this attitude had rarely been justified. Weizman said he had also predicted to Sadat that the Knesset would vote to remove the settlements; Dayan had also told me the opposite.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 394–395)
  80. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter and Vance met with Sadat and el-Baz at Aspen Lodge on September 16 from 4:40 p.m. to 7 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: “The meeting was constructive. I went over my draft on Sinai with him, and also the general framework. I outlined all the advantages he would derive from a success at Camp David; everything that he would lose if we failed.”Carter continued: “On the Sinai, we are substantially in agreement. Sadat was willing to say ‘international waterway’ relating to the Strait of Tiran. He insisted that full diplomatic relations and open borders would apply only when the interim withdrawal was complete. He accepted the question of settlers by expressing the Egyptian and Israeli positions and then to let the Israelis decide—to go ahead or to fail. Sadat was in a sober and constructive mood.” (Carter, White House Diary, pp. 239–240)
  81. See Document 54.
  82. Lewis drew brackets around the words “U.S. Delegation” and drew a line through them.
  83. Lewis inserted the handwritten words “freeze proposal” after this word.
  84. No other record of this meeting has been found.
  85. For a brief account of this meeting, see Weizman, The Battle for Peace, pp. 373–374.
  86. See footnote 3, Document 54.
  87. See Document 55.
  88. See footnote 3, Document 54.
  89. See Document 56.
  90. See Document 56. See also, footnote 3, Document 54.
  91. See Document 57.
  92. See Document 57. The President’s Daily Diary records that Carter and Vance met with Sadat at Aspen Lodge on September 17 from 3:40 p.m. to 6:10 p.m.
  93. See Document 57. The President’s Daily Diary does not record any meeting between Carter and Begin or Barak during this time period or at any point until 8:12 p.m., when it records a one-minute telephone conversation between the President and Prime Minister. After that, the next meeting recorded between Carter and Begin is when the two men, along with Sadat, traveled to the Camp David helipad to return to Washington, at 9:34p.m. Therefore, this entry refers presumably to Carter’s conversations with Barak, in person, and Begin, over the telephone, in which they discussed Begin’s draft of the West Bank and Sinai settlements language, prior to Begin’s meeting with Sadat.
  94. See Document 57. This entry, and the entry which follows, presumably refers to the face-to-face meeting between Begin and Sadat, during which Sadat agreed to Begin’s language on the Knesset vote.
  95. The President’s Daily Diary records that Carter, Begin, and Sadat, along with the rest of the Presidential party, departed Camp David on Marine One at 9:37 p.m. and arrived at the White House at 10:14 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)
  96. See Document 57.