50. Draft Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- US Vice President Mondale
- US Secretary of State Vance
- US National Security Adviser Brzezinski
- Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan
- Israeli Defense Minister Weizman
- Israeli Legal Adviser Barak
Today the Vice President, Dr. Brzezinski and I met with Messrs. Dayan, Weizman and Barak. I opened the meeting by saying there were a number2 of items I wished to discuss. I suggested we first discuss the outstanding issues with respect to the proposed Framework for a Sinai settlement. We discussed these issues at length and concluded that we would3 resume the discussion4 either later today or tomorrow.
I next stated that I wished to reaffirm the US commitment to the security of Israel and stated, as we had said on numerous occasions in the past, that we would provide the assistance necessary to meet Israel’s essential security requirements. I then asked how important Israel considered the possible negotiation of a mutual security treaty between the United States and Israel to be. I added, as the President and I had both said before, that if the negotiation of such a treaty would provide the necessary linchpin to bring about a settlement of the Middle East problem, that we5 would very seriously consider recommending such a treaty to the Congress. Dayan responded that it was his personal view that the negotiation of such a treaty was not desirable. He said that he believed the negative aspects of the negotiation of6 such a treaty outweighed the positive contributions it could make. He noted that if such7 a treaty existed, he felt that it might8 be used to try to get Israel to compromise on the delineation of borders and other questions on the basis that with a mutual defense treaty such concessions would be acceptable. I said that I was interested to hear that since Prime Minister Begin had indicated on previous occasions that he was interested in the possibility of such a treaty.
I then asked Messrs. Dayan and Weizman to give us their views as to what the next steps should be based upon two assumptions—(1) that we were able to reach an agreement at Camp David, and (2) that we were unable to reach an agreement at Camp David. We discussed at length the various possible scenarios. We both agreed that it was necessary to provide safety catches in the event that the negotiations at [Page 196] Camp David were not successful. In this connection, Messrs. Dayan and Weizman emphasized the importance of trying to get an extension of the presence of UN forces under the second disengagement agreement when the issue arises next month.
- Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Talks—Pre May 1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Vance. The meeting took place in Holly Lodge. According to an undated chronological summary of the Camp David meetings prepared for the NSC, this meeting took place from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m., September 15. The summary also stated that Brown attended the meeting. See footnote 65, Document 28.↩
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- An unknown hand struck through “concluded that we would” and replaced it with “and decided to.”↩
- Two further meetings to discuss on the Israeli proposed textual changes to the overall Framework paper took place at Ministerial level September 15–16. On September 15, from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m., Vance and Lewis met with Barak, Dinitz, Rubinstein, Weizman, and Tamir. On September 16, from 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m., Mondale, Vance, Saunders, Lewis, and Quandt met with Dayan, Barak, and Dinitz. See footnotes 72 and 76, Document 28.↩
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- An unknown hand struck through the phrase “of the negotiation.”↩
- An unknown hand struck through the word “if.”↩
- An unknown hand struck through the segment “existed, he felt that.”↩