Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

43. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 11, 1978, 2:30–3:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• AMERICAN SIDE

  • Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
  • Samuel Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel

• ISRAELI SIDE

  • Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister
  • Ezer Weizman, Minister of Defense
  • Avraham Tamir, Director, Army Planning Branch
  • Aharon Barak, Member Israeli Supreme Court
  • Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor to the Foreign Minister
  • Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States
  • Elyakim Rubinstein, Assistant Director General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs

SUBJECT

• Israeli Views on Their Security Requirements

Secretary Vance and Ambassador Lewis met initially alone for a few minutes with Foreign Minister Dayan at Secretary Vance’s request. He wanted to explore some of the Israeli views of their security requirements, primarily with regard to Sinai but also with respect to some aspects of the West Bank and Gaza. Dayan said he would like to invite Defense Minister Weizman to join since this was the subject of the discussion, and the remainder of the participants came in ten minutes later.

Before their arrival, Secretary Vance asked whether the Israelis could accept joint patrolling with the Jordanian and Egyptian armed forces. Dayan replied that he would not rule it out for the Jordan River Valley with the Jordanians; in fact, he thought it was a good idea. However, he saw no appropriate way to do it in Gaza since the international frontier was only about three miles long between Gaza and Sinai. It was apparent, moreover, that Dayan saw no possibility of Egyptian forces being readmitted to Gaza; he admitted only the possibility of mixed border control points with some token Egyptian participation.

Vance then went over very quickly with Dayan the latest version of the U.S. draft “Framework” document,² pointing out to him where the Israeli suggestions on the previous draft³ had been rejected and where they had been accepted. (Review with Dayan was so rapid that he could not have obtained more than a very general idea as to which of the Israeli counterproposals had been accepted.)

Dayan then made his familiar argument in favor of the U.S. taking over Etam air base, both to solve the problem on the air base itself and also to make easier an ultimate solution of the Rafah settlements issue. Vance explained why Sadat had rejected this idea and why the whole concept of foreign bases on Arab soil is antithetical to the Arabs at this point. He said that Sadat had not completely ruled out the idea, but would consider it only with the greatest reluctance, and that he, himself, was not enthusiastic about it.

Dayan said that he was against the idea of “civilianizing” the three Israeli airports; under Egyptian-civilian control they could be transformed over night during a crisis into staging bases for Egyptian military aircraft almost adjacent to the Israeli frontier. If the UN had control over the airport at Sharm el-Sheikh, this would be a good way to protect it for use as a civilian facility; the same idea could apply to port facilities at Sharm el-Sheikh. Perhaps the same idea could apply to the other two airfields as well.

Dayan then said he wanted to raise another subject, that of the need to resettle permanently the large refugee population in Gaza. They all have employment, he said; what is needed is sufficient money to house them properly, and this would all be accomplished under the aegis of the Arab self-governing council. Would it be possible for the U.S. to finance this resettlement? The Secretary replied that he would not rule it out and asked whether Dayan could provide a rough estimate of the cost, which Dayan said he would do. (Later in the day, Rubenstein told Ambassador Lewis that a very rough estimate of the cost involved would be $200 million.)

Dayan then said he was hard pressed to know how best to pursue the question of detailed negotiations over Sinai here at Camp David. Would it have to be done between Begin and Sadat, or rather between Sadat and Weizman?

(At this point in the conversation Weizman and Tamir along with the other participants joined the discussion.)

Secretary Vance asked Weizman if he would please review his understandings with Sadat and Gamasy with respect to security zones in the Sinai.

Weizman replied that Sadat insists that the air bases must be totally out within two years along with all Israeli settlements. He would agree to limiting his troops across the Canal to one infantry division with approximately 200 tanks between the Canal and the Mitla Pass. Various “frontier force” units would be spread out East of the Mitla. (Weizman said that this was all a bit confusing, however, since Sadat at one point in Salzburg⁴ had talked about needing only one brigade of troops throughout the Sinai.) There would be UN forces stationed at Sharm el-Sheikh and elsewhere along the eastern borders of Sinai, although Sadat really would prefer to have all UN forces out. Any electronic early warning systems retained would have to be based on the principle of reciprocity. (Here Weizman added that the Israelis would prefer to give up electronic warning sites of their own in Sinai if having them meant that there would have to be Egyptian sites within Israel proper. But perhaps U.S. monitoring sites of the type now at the Sinai Field Mission could substitute.) Weizman said that Sadat had spoken of a general thinning out of his overall forces, cutting back substantially from the present level of 750,000 men under arms.

Weizman then made clear that he saw no difficulty making firm decisions on the various security zones once Israel had made a clear decision to get totally out of Sinai. But he made clear there was no such decision at present because the Israelis cannot accept Sadat’s insistence that their settlements be dismantled. One other unresolved issue was whether or not Sadat would insist on having his own military aircraft east of the passes at bases like Bir Gifgafa.

Tamir, at Vance’s request, then unveiled several detailed maps⁵ of the West Bank and Gaza showing exactly what force dispositions Israel would require during the five-year transition period, and in most cases beyond. He also explained in detail the roles of the various Sinai air bases, force dispositions near Gaza (it would be unnecessary to retain forces within Gaza itself except for the military nahals), and the areas along the Jordan River required as permanent installations to defend against attacks from the east. Secretary Vance studied the maps carefully and listened to the briefing. He remarked that it would be very helpful if Weizman and Tamir would repeat this briefing for President Carter. (This occurred later in the evening.)⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 7, Camp David: 9/9–17/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Lewis on September 15.
2. See footnote 34, Document 28.
3. See footnote 31, Document 28.
4. Reference is to the July 13 meetings between Sadat and Weizman in Salzburg, Austria. For documentation on these meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978.
5. Not found.
6. See footnote 37, Document 28.