82. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
6116. For Atherton From Lewis. Following sent action USDel Secretary aircraft August 11. Repeated for your action. Herewith follows portion of Tel Aviv 5958 dealing with Begin/Dayan conversation [Page 451] with Secretary2 as requested in McKune-Glaspie phone conversation Aug 17.3
Quote. For the Secretary from Lewis. Subject: Draft Message on Your Private Meeting With Begin and Dayan, August 10.
1. Following is a draft message from you to the Acting Secretary and the White House on the restricted Begin/Dayan meeting yesterday which you asked me to prepare. You said you would also add to it additional material from your private tete-a-tete with Begin last night and from your dinner discussion with Dayan.
2. Begin draft text:
3. In view of the large group participating in the meetings with the Israelis, Prime Minister Begin and I agreed to meet with only Foreign Minister Dayan and Ambassador Lewis to go further into questions of South Lebanon and future Israeli settlements policy. This meeting took place immediately following the final general session in late morning August 10.4
4. Settlements in the occupied territories: Begin began by reviewing the “misunderstanding” between us over the legalization of three existing settlements, stressing with all apparent sincerity that he honestly had no idea this kind of “routine action” would have been viewed so adversely by the U.S.5 He referred to his earlier proposal that “we have an agreement between us on any such cases to explore them initially through diplomatic channels, either Ambassador Lewis or Ambassador Dinitz, in order to avoid such misunderstandings.” I carefully recounted the circumstances in Washington surrounding this incident and made clear that we had indeed waited until Ambassador Dinitz had confirmed for us the facts before making any public statement. I went on to underscore our belief that the whole question of settlements is a terribly sensitive problem, especially at this point in our efforts to move toward Geneva. I said that we sincerely hoped he would not approve any new settlements for this reason.
5. Begin then asked Dayan to tell me what the Israeli Government policy toward new settlements would be. Dayan said “We cannot stop settlements altogether, or even suspend new settlements for any substantial period of time. Such an effort would not be sustainable, just as the British effort to limit or suspend immigration into Israel during the Mandate period never proved enforceable or sustainable. However, [Page 452] recognizing the sensitivity of the problem, what we have in mind is to limit new settlement activity during ‘the next few months’ to about six to eight locations, all on land encompassed in existing military base areas, on government-owned land currently under military control. Approximately 40–50 civilian families would be permitted to settle in such areas; no acquisition of new land would be involved, and certainly no Arabs would be in any way displaced. All these new settlements would be within 25 kilometers of the ‘green lines.’ Two would be in the area near Jerusalem.” (This is obviously exactly the same formula which Dayan had earlier outlined on July 24—see Tel Aviv 5442.6) In response to a later query by Lewis, Dayan acknowledged that even under his criteria some of the settlements would be close to the center of the West Bank, but he insisted that none would be close to heavily populated areas.
6. I responded that we obviously had a continuing different interpretation of the international legal situation, as had been clearly spelled out in the larger meeting just preceding this one. I said that it is the moving of civilians into military camps which raises the international legal problem in our view, since under the Geneva Convention the stationing of military forces in an occupied territory is permissible. I pressed the question: “Why is it necessary?” In response, Begin essentially restated the historic arguments which he made in Washington to the President when this subject was raised, referred to the dedication and determination of the “wonderful young generation” of Israeli youth, especially religious youth, who are determined to till their historic lands; and also referred to the President’s press conference statement that it would be easier for the U.S. if existing settlements were expanded rather than new ones being established. Begin went on to say that quite frankly he could have followed the practice of previous governments by winking at the illegal squatting by the settlers, since his government could not and would not ever forcibly remove illegal settlers. If they were to do so his government would not survive. But he said he did not want to follow such devious tactics; that he wanted to be perfectly straightforward and honest on all matters with us. Therefore he hoped that the President would understand the motives and necessity for his actions. He felt confident that he would understand, since President Carter had already acknowledged publicly Begin’s electoral commitment on this settlement issue. There were only a few families who would be involved. “What we ask for is not your blessing but your understanding. Now you know what we intend to do. Please talk to President Carter and explain our position.”
[Page 453]7. I assured him I would talk to the President as soon as I return. But I said that the President already understands this problem but is deeply convinced that any new settlements will greatly complicate the peace-making process.
8. Dayan then interjected that he knew he was speaking for the Prime Minister in again saying that no Israeli settlement will be an obstacle to any peace agreement. If an agreement is negotiated which establishes withdrawal to a certain line which leaves outside that line a settlement, the Israeli Government will move such a settlement. He repeated this flat assurance. He then went on to say, however, that he, Dayan, would not have joined any government which prohibited settlement in the historical areas of Judea and Samaria. (Begin interjected to say “and I would not have formed such a government.”) Dayan then said that there had never been an Israeli Government which did not authorize new settlements, that the ongoing settlement process of the land is and will remain a fundamental principle for the Jewish state.
9. Dayan concluded this discussion by arguing that in his view the Arab reaction to the sort of carefully limited settlement plan they have in mind will not be anything like that which we have predicted. He insisted that the major issue for the Arabs is the taking of new lands from Arab hands, and that no such thing would be occurring. We left the issue at this point with my promising to take it up again with the President, but leaving no doubt that we would continue to be extremely concerned should new settlements occur. Unquote.
End this portion of text.
Note from Embassy Tel Aviv:
Remaining seven paragraphs of message pertain to conversation on South Lebanon and Ethiopia.
In the interest of expediency, we have chosen not to repeat the remaining portion of the message.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850106–1900. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.↩
- Telegram 5958 has not been found. For another account of this conversation, see Document 89.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- See Document 81.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 59.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 59.↩