Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

83. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Jerusalem, August 10, 1977, 3:45–4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Israeli
• Shimon Peres, Member of Knesset and former Prime Minister
• Americans
• Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• Philip Habib, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
• Ambassador Samuel Lewis
• William B. Quandt, NSC Staff

Secretary Vance began by briefing Mr. Peres on the points that he had covered in his talks with various Middle East leaders during his trip. He began by emphasizing that two alternatives on Palestinian participation had received serious consideration. First is the possibility of Palestinians being represented in a Jordanian delegation. Second is the possibility of Palestinians being represented in a unified Arab delegation. The second alternative has most support among the Arabs, since the Jordanian alternative appears to be unacceptable to the PLO. Mr. Begin, however, would accept the Jordanian alternative provided that no known PLO members are included. The idea of a unified Arab delegation has been accepted by all of the Arab leaders with the exception of Egypt. President Sadat prefers a separate delegation for Palestine, headed by the Assistant Secretary General of the Arab League. That delegation would include representatives of several Arab countries, as well as Palestinians, and possibly some West Bank mayors. The other Arab leaders do not support the idea, and the Secretary offered his opinion that President Sadat would quite likely go along with the idea of a unified Arab delegation, provided that it would break up into bilateral negotiations at Geneva, possibly with the exception of the Palestinian issue where several Arab parties might be represented. Israel’s position on this remains negative. The Secretary made it clear that the Arabs do not accept Mr. Begin’s formula of Palestinians within the Jordanian delegation.

On the question of possible talks between the United States and the PLO, the Secretary said there had been much confusion and misinformation. The United States is not considering any amendment to Resolution 242. Nor is the question of Palestinian participation at Geneva a topic for the United States to decide unilaterally. This has been covered in the Sinai II commitment and in the commitment of December 1973.² The only issue at stake at present is whether the United States will talk to the PLO. The President said that the United States would talk to the PLO if the PLO would change its position on Israel’s right to exist. Mr. Peres asked whether that involved recognition of Israel, or acceptance of Resolution 242. The Secretary replied that we would require a clear acceptance of Resolution 242, which would include recognition of Israel’s right to exist. We would view that as superseding those provisions of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel’s existence. This question was raised in each of the capitals visited by the Secretary, and some language that the PLO might use was produced during his trip. It was not, however, acceptable. The United States has been told that the PLO may issue some statement. The US position remains that the PLO must accept Resolution 242 first, and then we would be prepared to talk. Geneva is a separate issue.

On substance, the Secretary described several principles that had been discussed with Arab and Israeli leaders. He read each of the five principles to Mr. Peres, and noted that all of the parties agree on the first two. On the third principle, the clause on normalization of relations with Israel has given the Arabs some difficulty. Some object to the wording, some would like some mention of timing, but there has been some progress among the Arabs on this question. On the fourth principle concerning withdrawal, all of the Arabs say that withdrawal must be to the 1967 borders, with only minor modifications. This principle has not been acceptable to Mr. Begin. On the fifth principle, there has been the most controversy. All of the Arabs agree that there should be a Palestinian entity and self-determination for the Palestinians. They differ on their views of when such an entity should come into being and what its relation should be to its neighbors. All of them favor some form of transitional administration, under the UN or otherwise. There is some question of what the plebiscite should cover. Israel’s position is a flat rejection. Mr. Peres asked whether the question of a trusteeship had arisen. Secretary Vance said that the question had been discussed in terms of an international transitional administration. He had tried to get ideas on this, while personally promoting the idea of some form of trusteeship. Mr. Peres asked about the possible link between a Palestinian entity and Jordan and the Secretary replied that President Sadat would like to see this happen before Geneva, while others believe it should happen afterward and that it is for the Palestinians themselves to decide. The United States favors a link to Jordan. Jordan itself supports the idea of some type of transitional period and a plebiscite.

Mr. Peres asked the Secretary how he now sees the situation. The Secretary said that there had been enough general discussion, and that everyone understood the general positions of the parties. It is important now to get increasingly concrete. Each party should begin to spell out what it wants in a peace treaty, what it is prepared to put into such a treaty, and then the United States could begin to act as an intermediary between the parties. This way some progress could be made. If we remain only at the level of generalities, we will get nowhere. Mr. Peres asked whether the Secretary believed that Geneva could still be convened. The Secretary answered that a Geneva conference by the end of the year was possible. Talks would begin in September at the General Assembly, with the Secretary moving among the parties. He would try to narrow the differences between the parties. Mr. Peres asked if the Arabs agreed to the idea of beginning with an attempt to clarify the meaning of peace, and then going to the question of borders. The Secretary said that he believed that was the case, although they would emphasize that all the elements of a peace treaty would have to be dealt with. The Secretary said that he hoped that this would also be Israel’s attitude, and that he would be talking to the Prime Minister about this again in the evening.³ He would propose to move quietly and privately between the parties. He hopes thereby to keep momentum in the peace process.

Mr. Peres referred to the Palestinian question as the toughest issue, the stumbling block. He said that he was surprised by Jordan’s attitude, since both Israel and Jordan are threatened by the Palestinian state. The Secretary said that the Jordanians feel that in any election they would have a good chance of winning and that a Palestinian entity would choose to affiliate itself with Jordan. Mr. Peres expressed his skepticism about that judgment, saying that the Palestinians in the administered areas were very emotional and if there were free choice, they would not vote for Jordan. He asked if the idea of a Jordanian-Israeli trusteeship had any merit. The Secretary said that it is not an impossibility, but that the Arab side has not yet endorsed the idea.

Mr. Peres stated that his party opposes the idea of a Palestinian state. It would be uncontrollable. The problem is not so much the PLO, but rather what they represent. Any step toward a Palestinian state would create an impasse. It should be avoided. Mr. Peres stated that he continued to believe that step-by-step diplomacy may offer an alternative to the overall solution. A comprehensive settlement is accepted 50 percent by each side. The Arabs accept the terms on territory, and Israel accepts the terms involving peace. But neither side accepts the other’s view. These are not issues that can be resolved in the next few months. The Arabs will not accept diplomatic relations with Israel, or if they do, they will ask too high a price. Israel will not be prepared to go back to the 1967 borders. It may be desirable to continue pursuing the idea of full peace, and if the Arabs do agree on it, it may make the situation easier. It may help to avoid the terrible alternative of military action, which would extract a heavy price and would lead nowhere. If the time has come for peace, this would be an important achievement. It would create a bridge, but there is not yet any road connecting to the bridge if the peace concept is accepted. Mr. Peres said that his own idea was that the comprehensive approach should not be seen as an all or nothing idea, since some compromise may be required later.

Concerning Jordan, Mr. Peres stated that it may be important to have a thorough discussion with King Hussein. The King’s idea that Jordan could win a plebiscite is false. The King is being misled by his own advisers. Jordan could not accept a Palestinian state, and secretly may hope that Israel will prevent it from being created. It is worse for Jordan than it is for Israel.

Mr. Peres suggested that it would be best to continue working on the peace concept and to try to push it as far as possible. Then Israel should turn east for some form of joint venture with Jordan concerning the administered territories; then south for a partial agreement with Egypt; and then to the north, for some form of agreement with Syria. The Syrians are more patient today because they are involved in Lebanon. Egypt, however, may want Syria to go first. Above all, the situation should not evolve into an either/or choice. Some areas of basic disagreement cannot be overcome. Israelis are united on their opposition to a Palestinian state and on not returning to the 1967 frontiers. On the rest, the various parties have differences. If there is a change on the Arab side regarding peace, these differences would come to the fore. Sadat may be willing, but his hands are tied; Hussein may be willing, but his hands and his legs are tied; Syria does not seem impatient. Mr. Peres expressed his surprise at the strong Saudi support for the PLO.

The Secretary replied that the Saudis feel that the current PLO leadership is the most moderate possible. Alternative leaders would be more radical, and radicalization might endanger Saudi Arabia. Mr. Peres replied that King Hussein had been able to manage the Palestinians quite well. He stated that the West Bankers might oppose the King in a vote, but they realistically favor a link to Jordan. The younger generation is more pro-PLO than the older generation. The most responsible leaders want some link to the King. Secretary Vance asked how a free vote among West Bankers would go today, and Mr. Peres said they would vote for the PLO. Maybe this would not be the case in Bethlehem. There might be a split in Hebron. But the King’s chances are not good. Mr. Peres said that if he were a Saudi, he would not worry so much about Arafat, and would worry more about the effect of creating a Palestinian state. Secretary Vance summarized Mr. Peres’ view by saying that he appeared to believe that we should try for a comprehensive settlement, but that we would fail, and then we should try to negotiate partial agreements with Egypt and Syria, while putting the West Bank question off. Mr. Peres replied that even the failure of the comprehensive approach contained the nucleus of an advantage. It might bring the Arabs closer to the concept of peace, which has never been done before. It might serve as a good starting point, since peace would no longer be a dirty word. But we should be careful not to inject the idea of a Palestinian state, since that would kill the comprehensive option as well as any partial settlement alternatives. It would create an irreparable situation. The United States should be very careful in dealing with the PLO. Israel can negotiate with Egypt, and can talk to Jordan. Negotiations with Egypt might even help the dialogue with Jordan. This is the most that the Begin government can do. Mr. Peres said that he would have done it differently, but that he agrees with the present government in their stands on borders and in opposition to a Palestinian state.

Secretary Vance asked him how he saw the border in Sinai, and Mr. Peres said that it was useful to make a distinction between sovereignty and military presence. There may be a possibility of returning ownership to the Arabs, but letting Israel keep some positions. There has been some previous discussion of this point. Israel might keep the Strait of Tiran under its control, while allowing Egypt to keep Suez under Egyptian control. With Egypt, an understanding can be reached. Egypt does want peace. A mistake was made at Rabat,⁴ but now Egypt is prepared to accept the King as a brother and a partner. Saudi pressure could help to modify the Arab position on the PLO. Mr. Peres thought that Saudi Arabia’s influence was very substantial, and that Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia together could influence the PLO. Saudi Arabia has better leaders today than in the past. The Secretary agreed that the present Saudi leadership was thoughtful. Mr. Peres said that they clearly want the Soviets out of the area, and they should realize that the PLO is an entry point for the Soviets. In concluding, the Secretary expressed his hope that negotiations would proceed, and that the parties would be prepared to submit concrete ideas to him in the weeks ahead. The meeting ended at 4:15 p.m.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 50, Middle East: 7–9/77. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the King David Hotel.
2. See footnote 5, Document 80.
3. No record of this evening conversation has been found.
4. See footnote 8, Document 6.