59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel1
173913. Subject: Israeli Settlements. Ref: Tel Aviv 5442.2
1. FYI: While I can appreciate that Begin will be under great pressure to go forward with a settlement program on the West Bank, I believe that the consequences for the negotiations of any settlement construction will be so negative that we must plainly and strongly oppose settlements of any number or type. While 6 settlements within existing military installations may evoke somewhat less reaction than twice that number outside of such establishments, the difference in effect will not be nearly so significant as the negative consequences either would have.
The Arabs are aware that Kiryat Arba started with settlers being accommodated in a military installation, and the controversial settlement at Qaddum also involved this device.3 End FYI.
2. You should therefore convey the following points from me to Dayan:
—We fully understand that Begin can anticipate pressure to proceed with settlements, and we appreciate that Dayan has endeavored to find some way of mitigating the effects of such a program on the peace process. We have very carefully considered the idea that Dayan has proposed.
—I would be less than candid, however, if I did not say frankly to Dayan that in our view any settlement development would have a seriously negative effect on the peace negotiating process. Particularly coming at this time, any new settlements, wherever located, would tend to confirm the fears of the Arabs that the new Israeli Government intends to pursue an essentially annexationist policy with regard to the West Bank. Our task of maintaining Arab confidence in the negotiating [Page 370] process will be difficult enough as it is, and a new Israeli settlement program of any kind could make it impossible by prompting the Arabs to insist on advance commitments with respect to Israeli territorial positions which Israel does not want to discuss prior to Geneva.
—We believe that nothing should be done on the settlement program which will have an adverse effect on the peace negotiations. We would be unable to avoid saying so publicly as well as privately. While I much appreciate Dayan’s coming to us in confidence on the subject, therefore, I can only respond that we believe there should now be a moratorium on any Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, as the President told the Prime Minister.4 I very much hope that the Israeli Government will find the strength to resist these pressures that work at cross-purposes with our common search for a peace settlement.5
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0131. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Arthur Day (NEA); cleared by Atherton, Habib, and Robert M. Perito (S/S); and approved by Secretary Vance. Repeated on July 26 to the White House.↩
- Telegram 5442 from Tel Aviv, July 25, reported on a meeting between Foreign Minister Dayan and Ambassador Lewis during which Dayan requested the U.S. reaction to a proposal he wished to make to the Israeli Cabinet limiting any new settlements to six military settlements placed within “existing Israeli military cantonments.” Dayan suggested to Ambassador Lewis that Begin could not politically afford to suspend all settlement activity before the Geneva Conference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0135)↩
- Kiryat Arba and Qaddum are both in the West Bank.↩
- See Document 52.↩
- In telegram 5570 from Tel Aviv, July 25, Ambassador Lewis reported that he believed Begin was “shocked” and “affronted” by Secretary Vance’s public reaction to the possibility of Israeli plans to build new settlements. Begin stressed “that he had violated no commitments.” Lewis noted that Begin agreed that there would be no decisions on settlements before Secretary Vance’s August trip to Jerusalem. Then, Begin would “explain precisely what the new settlement decisions are likely in subsequent weeks—and why he must take them.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 48, Israel: 7/77) On July 26, Begin recognized three settlements on the West Bank that had previously been declared illegal. Vance “immediately condemned” the action. (“Israel Legalizes 3 Settlements On West Bank,” New York Times, July 27, 1977, p. A1) In telegram 5857 from Tel Aviv, July 27, Lewis reported that most Israelis were surprised by Begin’s decision. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770284–1080) Carter also criticized making the settlements permanent or establishing new settlements in his July 28 news conference. See Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, p. 1366–1374.↩