Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

81. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Jerusalem, August 10, 1977, 9:45 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Israelis
• Prime Minister Menahem Begin
• Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan
• Finance Minister Simcha Ehrlich
• Interior Minister Yosef Burg
• Defense Minister Ezer Weizman
• Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon
• Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
• Ephraim Evron, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Shmuel Katz, Advisor to the Prime Minister
• General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
• Attorney General Bara
• Dan Pattir, Press Advisor
• General Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff
• General Rafael Eytan, Commander, Northern Front
• Americans
• Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• Philip Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Ambassador Samuel Lewis
• Harold Saunders, Director, INR
• William B. Quandt, NSC Staff
• John Crump, Political Counselor, US Embassy
• Colonel Schuyler Bissell, Defense Attache
• Colonel Bruce Williams, Army Attache

Prime Minister Begin suggested that the discussion today begin with Lebanon. General Gur and General Eytan were present. The Prime Minister repeated the point that he had made to President Carter that Israel has no territorial claims against Lebanon; Israel does not want a war to start in Lebanon. Israel will not let the Christian minority down; and Israel will not take the President by surprise on anything it may contemplate doing.² The Prime Minister referred to his having met with two Lebanese delegations in the last two days. He visited the Northern Front and saw the terrain. He referred to the situation in south Lebanon for the Christians and some of the Muslims as “amost desperate.” Their call for help is “a human call which cannot be ignored.” The world should not acquiesce in their destruction. The Christian minority in Lebanon consists of one million people, 600,000 of whom are Maronites. Since 1840, there have been ten massacres of Christians at the hands of the Muslims. In south Lebanon, there are three to five thousand PLO members who are armed and who are bent on the destruction of the Christian minority, which consists of 20–30 thousand people. Villages are shelled every night. After September, winter will begin and it will be very harsh for the Christians. Their houses have been damaged. They need shelters, their children cannot go to schools, and water pipelines have been cut. This is a great human problem. Israel will help them, within limits of their means. The Prime Minister asked General Weizman to describe the situation more fully.

General Weizman stated that there had been three kinds of battles Israel had fought in the last 30 years: major battles, wars of attrition, and infiltration. Since 1948 and 49, there had been no major battles with Lebanon. Nor had there been wars of attrition. But there had been some terrorist activity, especially until two years ago. Now the Syrian army is inside Lebanon. There are two divisions, 40,000 men. The PLO forces are down in the south and number three to four thousand. The Christian minority in Lebanon is located in both the north and the south. It is quiet in the north, but not in the south. The Christians approached us 18 months ago for help, which we gave. We provide them with economic assistance, arms, weapons, and sometimes active support, especially artillery fire from our side. Israel’s main aim is to keep the PLO away from the Israeli border, so that the situation will not return to what it was two years ago. Israel will do all it can to fight the PLO. The minority in the south is mostly Christian; however, there are also some Muslims, and they are in a much worse situation today than they were a few weeks ago. There are direct contacts between this Arab population and Israeli government. This is a new situation. We provide them with medical aid, and we cooperate along the good fence.³ This must continue. They must know that Israel is there to stay as a friendly neighbor. The north is also in touch with the south, and we are in touch with the north. The policy of the north is that the population of the south not be exterminated. They look with favor on our assistance to the south. But if we don’t do more in the next few weeks, one friendly population which is anti-Syrian and anti-PLO, could disappear. General Weizman then asked the Chief of Staff to give details on the Syrian and PLO positions in the south, and to describe the Christian enclaves there.

Referring to a map,⁴ General Gur pointed out the locations of the 40,000 Syrian forces. He described their locations along the coast and in the Beqaa Valley. Their forces consist of armor, communications, and mechanized infantry. They are spread over the entire area, especially in the cities. There are three Syrian brigades in Beirut, a brigade at Tripoli, and another in the Beqaa. They have three to four hundred tanks, plus artillery. They have a headquarters unit in Lebanon. The Syrian forces remain in the same positions as last year. There has been no recent move south. The General then indicated the main PLO forces in the south. They consist of three to five thousand men under arms. Some are near the Israeli border, and some are further away. They can move quickly from one place to another. The Secretary asked about their equipment, and General Gur stated that they have light mortars, heavy mortars, some artillery, light arms, 105 and 155-mm artillery, some guns of 122 mm, and that most of the shelling comes from the latter artillery pieces. General Weizman referred to Lebanese Commander Haddad and his concern that the population in the south would suffer this winter because their homes had been shattered by the shelling.

General Gur then indicated the locations of the Christian enclaves. He pointed to one near Metulla, one in the central southern sector, and one further west. In the southern area, there are seven hundred to one thousand Lebanese fighters with some light equipment. Israel has contacts with these Christian enclaves, and to some Shii elements as well. Their relationship with the Shii is not as close as with the Christians, but Israel visits them and has provided them with some arms. They are all served by the good fence policy.

All of the different factions of the PLO are found in the south, along with some remnants of the Lebanese army. Military activity primarily consists of the shelling of villages. Many houses have been shattered, especially in the central and eastern enclaves. In some places, villagers are under attack from light machine gun fire as well. From time to time, workers are ambushed on their way to fields. The water supply in some places has been cut, as has the electricity. The Christians have suffered 150 to 200 casualties, men, women, and children. This does not include the two big massacres in which 500 to 600 people were murdered. The enclaves are cut off from the north. There is no work because of the fighting. Some work is provided in Israel, but it is not enough. For two years, children have not gone to school. They don’t have electricity or water. They live under permanent fear of massacres such as those that took place in Khiam and Aisha.⁵ They are in for tough times. Morale is dropping. Israel lets the Christians work in Israel, provides medical care, and lets them come to Israel for rest, and this provides some help. Israel’s policy is to help them to fight by supplying ammunition, and to help them maintain their equipment. They do the main fighting, and they fire from their villages when they are under heavy attack by heavy shelling. We use our artillery to stop artillery fire against them. Sometimes at night we send in our forces. We talk and offer moral support and medical help. We encourage them to believe that they are not alone. Last night, a small column was sent in to help one village. In addition to cooperation with the Christians, General Gur stated that there is a separate war under way with the PLO. It is difficult to divide these two aspects of the fighting, but Israel has to take operations against the Fedayeen in their camps. Sometimes Israel has to attack them in their villages, because they cannot be allowed to plan operations. So Israeli policy runs along two parallel lines: help for the Christians and the fight against the PLO.

There is no sign, according to General Gur, of the Shtoura Agreement⁶ in the south. In the last few days, the shelling has increased. The PLO has not begun to evacuate the south. The Syrians appear to have agreed not to implement the Shtoura accord in the south. The fighting goes on and there is a deterioration of morale which may lead to a reinforcement of Israel’s activity in the south. Connections between Israel and the north are mainly on the political side, since there is no fighting now taking place. The amount of money that has been provided in military aid has been close to [dollar amount not declassified]. From January 1st, 1976, to August 1st of 1977, Israel has supplied [dollar amount not declassified] in aid, two-thirds of it to the north, and one-third to the south.

General Eytan continued the briefing, concentrating on the role of the Syrians in the south. He stated that Syrian officers are included along with Palestinians in positions near the Christian enclaves. They provide intelligence officers and gunnery officers. They have brought in 240 mm rockets. These are obtained from Syrian forces. Saiqa units are south of the Litani and Israel knows the numbers of the companies and the names of the officers. Israel has contacts with Shii villages, and many of the Muslim villages along the border are in contact with Israel. Israel provides equipment, communications, arms, and the villagers are allowed to take advantage of the good fence. Israel has had contact with Muslim leaders like Kamal Asad and Imam Sadr, and has had contact with a Druze leader in Hasbaya at his initiative. The pressure on the enclaves is very heavy, especially the shelling. The people there face the problem of survival. If they lose militarily, they face the alternative of fleeing to Israel or of annihilation. They have seen what happened at Khiam. There were 10,000 inhabitants of that Muslim town at the beginning of the war. Then the Palestinians occupied Khiam, and in one day four or five hundred civilians were killed. Now only 200 people live there, mostly old. The Palestinians are inside the town. The Palestinians have thrown the population of the villages out. General Eytan read a list of names of Muslim villages from which the population had been expelled. He stated that if there was resistance, the population was killed. The Shtoura Agreement seems to have given the Palestinians a free rein in the south. The Syrians and the Palestinians have reached an agreement and fighting has increased. Secretary Vance asked a question to clarify what had actually occurred in the last month or three weeks. General Eytan said that there had been no big change, but there had been a cumulative influence on the Christians. They are tired, their commanders have been killed, and their morale is low. General Weizman noted that the main problem was the morale of the population. They wonder if they can keep on going. They asked whether they will continue to be associated with Israel. They cannot see what the future will be and they want to be associated with Israel. Ambassador Lewis asked what form that association would take, and General Weizman said that they want a peace treaty with Israel. This is their real wish and they fear what will happen to them. They want to remain in Lebanon.

Prime Minister Begin said that the southerners have not asked Israel to invade south Lebanon or to stay, and Israel does not intend to do so. But they do want economic help, they want a link between north and south, since they feel isolated. Begin had spoken to Haddad, who has asked about the future. There has been real deterioration in the last few weeks, and the shelling has become more and more serious. The Christians return fighting and they are very valiant, but they are outnumbered. They want Israel’s help and they want to see some way out of the fighting. The PLO can get reinforcements from the north with Syria’s toleration. The Christians cannot. Israel would like to help, but the Israeli army will not stay in south Lebanon.

Secretary Vance asked for Israeli views on a UN force in the border area. General Weizman said that this was not a military question solely. He doubted that a UN force would be able to prevent PLO activity. UN forces might be helpful to divide the two sides. But for the problems of the PLO in southern Lebanon, it would not be of much help. The Secretary asked whether a peace-keeping force, rather than just observers, would make a difference. General Weizman said that Israel should look after the northern border and should keep it quiet by itself. The Prime Minister referred back to discussions in Washington on this topic, and stated that Israel had no objection since a Lebanese army will take up to one year to create. In the interval, a UN force might be useful. But the three to five thousand PLO men in the south should move north of the Israeli border so that they cannot shell Israel’s towns. Israel must take care of this problem. Israel wants a quiet border. Could a UN force move the PLO out of the border area? General Sharon repeated that on the northern border, Israel has two problems. The moral problem of support for the Christians, and the problem of preventing terror activities against Israel. He could not see that UN forces would prevent terrorist activities and it might make it harder for Israel to take the necessary steps. He saw no advantage to UN troops.

General Dayan said that his view was perhaps that of a minority, but that he would agree that a UN force might help the civilian Arab population in the south. It would not make it easier for Israel to prevent terrorism and infiltration, and it would make it more difficult to retaliate. But if the Syrians, who hold the key, would agree to drive away the PLO and to clear out the area and hand it to the UN, and if there were a real buffer zone from the Israeli border to the Litani, along with local Lebanese police, this might be a relief to the Lebanese population there. The key is to get rid of the Palestinians in that area, and to keep the good fence open to provide medical care and work. Israel would still have the problem of Palestinian terrorists moving through the UN forces, but these would be small groups and would not hurt the local Arab population. Now whole villages are being occupied. Dayan said that he was worried that all villages would be evacuated and once they were deserted, the Palestinians would take over and it would be hard to get them to leave. The whole area could become deserted by civilians and occupied by Palestinians. Then some type of war would be inevitable.

General Weizman said that the association with the Lebanese is deeper than the defense problem. It is not just a matter of infiltration. In the case of Lebanon, Israel has a unique relationship, somewhat akin to the open bridges with Jordan.⁷ The open fence with Lebanon provides direct contact with an Arab population which wants a relationship with Israel and it would be unfortunate if this were terminated. The population wants to talk about a settlement with Israel directly.

Secretary Vance asked General Dayan how the PLO could be persuaded to withdraw north of the Litani if the Syrian forces could not move into the south. General Dayan said that it would only require the Syrians telling the PLO to move. The PLO cannot resist a clear Syrian order. The PLO headquarters are in Beirut and are under Syrian control. If the Syrians press the PLO, it will have to respond. This is the key.

Ambassador Lewis asked if the Litani is an essential line in Israel’s view. He noted that this would be a large area for the UN to control. General Dayan replied that there was need for some physical obstacle, and that the Litani forms such a line. There must be a defense line which will define the area beyond which Palestinians cannot move. Minister Burg noted that the Litani had already been accepted as having some status as a demarcation line in the Arab world.

Prime Minister Begin, in conclusion, stated that the delegation of northern Lebanese had raised the problem of Syria’s desire to take away their heavy weapons. They had stated that if Syria tried to do this, there would be resistance. They cannot give up their heavy arms. If they are deprived of their arms, their lives would be in danger. The Prime Minister asked Secretary Vance, on their behalf, to use US influence in Damascus to advise the Syrians not to take the heavy weapons from the Christians. If they were to do that, there could be new hostilities. The Prime Minister said that he would be very grateful to the Secretary if he would raise this with President Assad. The Secretary said that he would raise this, that he had already talked to Assad about this, and about UN forces in Lebanon. Assad’s view was that if the Lebanese want UN forces, Syria would support them. Assad’s view is that heavy weapons should be removed from both sides, but Secretary Vance said that he would raise the issue again. [At this point, General Eytan leaves.]

Prime Minister Begin then asked General Weizman to outline some of Israel’s urgent defense requirements. He recalled that he had spoken to Secretary Brown and to the President and that he was grateful for the decisions that had already been made. But Israel is worried about arms being supplied to the Arabs in growing numbers and in amounts totalling billions of dollars. General Weizman stated that Israel was grateful for the aid it had received in the past three years. His own impression after returning to the Defense Ministry after seven years of being outside, was that he was very surprised to see how much stronger Israeli forces have become in the last three years. But Israel must also consider its needs for the future, and Israel is surrounded by strong armies. Israel’s adversaries have between four and ten thousand tanks, depending on who is included. It is important for Israel to build its military industry and be as independent as possible. The United States has an interest in Israeli success and in Israel’s ability to defend itself. Israel is grateful for the help being given on the Chariot tank, and for the help on the Kfir.⁸ At present, Israel has a substantial military industry, but has problems of exporting arms because of the possible US veto. The Israeli aircraft industry will face a crisis if this situation continues. For example, if Ecuador cannot buy Kfirs, would it be possible for Israel to build its own aircraft with no US components in order to keep its industry going? This would not be the F–16, but it might be in the American interest for Israel to build its own aircraft. This would require access to export markets.

Secretary Vance asked what it was that Israel wanted the United States to consider. Was this a question of supporting the aircraft industry to meet internal Israeli needs, or to meet export needs? General Weizman said that the answer was both. For example, he asked, to what degree could Israel develop a relationship with Iran? The requirements of the Israeli air force are not enough. What is the future of the weapons industry in Israel? Iran, he said, very much wants a deeper relationship with Israel. The Secretary said that he would be very glad to discuss this. Iran was a different case from that of Ecuador. Therefore, US policy is also different. In Latin America, we would not agree to sell advanced weaponry, but that is not the case in Iran. Prime Minister Begin asked whether the supply of Soviet MIGs to Peru made a difference, and the Secretary said that it did not, since we would not agree to sell advanced aircraft to Peru either. General Weizman said that he would like to clarify this when he visited Washington so that Israel could cooperate with the United States. Ambassador Lewis clarified the discussion by saying that Israel wanted help to export arms, as well as subsidies on some items like Chariot tanks which were uneconomical otherwise. General Weizman said that this was a subject for discussion so that a future problem could be avoided. Some of the problem is due to American restrictions, which Israel accepts. The Prime Minister noted that 15,000 workers in Israel work in the aircraft industry. If markets can be found, they can continue in their jobs. Secretary Vance reminded the Prime Minister that Ecuador had tried to buy F–5’s, and that the US had refused to provide them. They may acquire aircraft from the French, but this will be their choice.

General Weizman then turned to immediate problems. He said that Israel appreciated the help on Chariot tanks, and the promises of helicopters and more ammunition. Israel has to consider a future fighter plane for its air force. Presently, Israel is focusing on the F–16. Israel would like to discuss how the United States sees the future of the Israeli air force. The F–4 is on the way out, and the F–15 is expensive. Israel wants to do some of its own work in order to keep its air force as strong as it is today. The problem for the future on the F–16 involves the numbers and whether or not there can be co-production. Israel would like a decision in the relatively near future.

Chief of Staff Gur said that Israel’s primary defense requirements now necessitate $1.5 billion per year in FMS financing. Israel also requests approval of the remaining items on the consolidated list; a decision on the F–16; a decision on Spring Flower;⁹ assistance in research and development in order to upgrade Israeli technology.

If orders are now placed for F–16s, General Gur stated, the first ones would not arrive until 1980. If there is a delay in the decision, they will arrive later and there could be troubles. Regarding Spring Flower, Israel has received no positive answer, despite the fact that there is no new technology involved. Israel is not asking for new technology, and would be thankful for an answer to this two-year old request. It is an expensive item but is important for Israel. Assistance in research and development is also important. The consolidated list, which was earlier accepted by the United States,¹⁰ has been referred to as a problem as to time table. Israel follows closely what the Arabs are receiving and feels that it cannot afford to fall behind. General Weizman concluded by reminding the Secretary that the 1974 agreement stated that financial assistance up to the level of $1.5 billion would be provided,¹¹ and that now this has declined to $1 billion. He stated that the United States now has a bit of a problem since we have to figure out how to finance the things that have already been decided upon. The Secretary replied that the figures as he knew them were that the United States would provide $1 billion in FMS, and $785 million in supporting assistance for this year. The Prime Minister said he had asked Ambassador Dinitz to raise this question. The Secretary asked if this was a new question, rather than an old commitment. Begin said he had raised it with the President, and the Secretary replied that this was not a past commitment. The Prime Minister said that this was true. Ambassador Dinitz reviewed the issue by stating that he had raised the question of $1.5 billion in FMS for the next fiscal year. He would not define this as a new request. When the discussion of Israel’s annual requirements had arisen after Sinai II, the estimate of both governments was that Israel would need $1.5 billion annually. Israel has not received this amount, and the issue has been discussed in the past. The Prime Minister said that Israel is now formally requesting that amount.

General Weizman then indicated a chart¹² of American aid to Arab countries. General Gur reviewed the table which showed a total of $14 billion in arms transfers to Arab countries from the United States between October 1973 and 1977. He emphasized the Saudi increase in forces and the building of three new airfields in the north which are aimed at Israel. The base at Tabuk was termed a real threat. Israel views infrastructure as equally menacing as the equipment that the US provides. He reviewed the dollar transfers to each of the Arab countries and expressed special concern with the buildup of the Saudi naval force in the Red Sea. He was particularly concerned with the Egyptian acquisition of American arms, because Egypt already has the infrastructure to make use of the arms. A very large force can now be concentrated in Egypt. He described Jordan’s army as one of the most modern in the Middle East, consisting of a four-division structure, two mechanized and two armored. The first Hawk missiles¹³ have also arrived in Jordan and will be deployed in a few months. This constitutes a considerable threat to Israel. The Secretary stated that he did not want to comment on the details of the presentation, and the Prime Minister summarized by saying that Israel needs more equipment.

General Weizman referred to the base at Tabuk in Saudi Arabia. He said it is becoming important for Israel to watch developments there.

Prime Minister Begin then referred to the question of settlements in the territories and asked the Attorney General to read a memo¹⁴ on their legality. He said that Israel does not want to be accused of violating international legality, which Israel holds to scrupulously. The Attorney General reviewed the legal situation concerning the settlements as he saw it. It is contended, he stated, that Israeli settlements in the territories are in violation of international law. There is nothing in customary law to that effect and nothing, including the 1907 Hague convention¹⁵ on that topic. However, the claim is made that Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention¹⁶ is relevant. Israel’s position is that the Fourth Convention has no applicability to the administered territories. The establishment of new settlements is not forbidden. The Article does forbid deportation of the civilian population from occupied territories, and the occupying power should not transfer into the territories its own population. From a reading of the Convention, it is evident that it is meant to prevent deportation or displacement. Movement of people into the territories is prohibited to the extent that it displaces the local population. Reading from Lauterpact,¹⁷ the Attorney General stated that it is clear that the prohibition is on displacement of the local population and this is rooted in the World War II experience. Since no Arab inhabitants have been displaced, Israeli settlements are not illegal. The Secretary stated that we have taken a different position on this issue and our legal advisers have reached different conclusions.

After a short break, Prime Minister Begin resumed the discussion by concentrating on the PLO. He stated that any form of acceptance of 242 will not negate the Palestinian Covenant. Israel’s position is that it would be a sad day to see a representative of the United States talking to the PLO. The President had told Prime Minister Begin that he would take the sincerity of all sides into account. The participation of the PLO in negotiations is out of the question. The possibility of an American representative seeing the PLO as part of bilateral talks is a grave matter and Prime Minister Begin asked the Secretary to reconsider the US policy on this. An announcement by the PLO would not change anything. The PLO, he said, is an implacable enemy of the Israeli people. The PLO almost destroyed Lebanon. The real question is how Jews and Arabs can live together. There is a human problem of refugees. This wound which was opened in 1948, not because of Israel’s fault but rather because their leaders asked them to flee, should now be resolved. Israel will contribute as much as possible to a humane solution. There are some 450 thousand refugees under our jurisdiction. General Dayan corrected the Prime Minister to say that there were 190 thousand only. The Prime Minister said that much had been done in Gaza and that thousands of homes had been built there. General Weizman said that by building homes, Israel was trying to persuade the refugees to move out of camps. Prime Minister Begin said that the Arab countries should take care of their refugees, and that this was a problem that should be solved so the Jews and Arabs could live easily together.

General Dayan expanded on the refugee question, saying that unless it were solved, no real settlement of the conflict was possible. One could see in Lebanon and in Jordan, and to some degree in Kuwait, the nature of the problem. The question is where the refugees will settle permanently. There is no other solution than for them to settle in their respective countries. Some may claim compensation. Even a Palestinian state in the West Bank cannot absorb the one half million refugees now in Jordan. None of the refugees come from Nablus, and they are not wanted there. Dayan once tried to convince the Gazans to move to the West Bank, and offered to build them accommodations, but they would not move and they would not have been welcomed. Israel wants to solve the problem and to provide the refugees with a normal status. They should move out of the camps, should get work, and should obtain citizenship. Israel can deal with the 190 thousand refugees in Gaza. Israel can give them accommodations, and can end the camps. Whoever wants to claim Israeli citizenship can do so. They will not be pressured and citizenship will not be imposed on them, but this is Israel’s obligation to give them the option. Now there is a problem of Palestinians in Lebanon. Should they stay or should they move? In Jordan, there are about one half million Palestinians. Jordan wants them to stay. They have citizenship and they are working. It is mainly a problem of getting them out of camps. General Dayan asked if the Secretary thought that discussions on the refugee question could take place before Geneva. Israel feels that this is a main problem and is ready to do its share along with the others to solve the problem.

Secretary Vance said that he thought it could be discussed, but if this were done in a structured way, in a formal group, then the chances of agreement would be less than if it were discussed quietly through proximity talks. He could not guarantee that the talks would take place, but this and many other topics could be discussed before Geneva. General Dayan wanted all parties to know that this is a top priority problem from Israel’s point of view. The conflict will go on if it is not solved. The Palestinians will continue to claim their rights. Israel is ready to do its share and will grant citizenship to those who want it in Gaza. Jordan will not be able to solve the problem without American economic help.

General Dayan then turned to two additional issues. First was the question of Arab views on external guarantees in the event of a settlement. He asked what the United States had in mind for its own role and what the Arab reaction had been. Secretary Vance said that this had been suggested by some Arab leaders but had been excluded from the draft principles at the Prime Minister’s request. Most of the Arab leaders feel that some sort of external guarantees are desirable or necessary once a final peace treaty is reached. If there is a peace treaty, then such a treaty might be reinforced if guarantees are written into it. There are several alternatives. The Security Council could issue a guarantee, or third parties could do so. The Secretary said he had not pressed the issue, but it should be raised at Geneva. General Dayan asked whether there was any clear American thinking on the US role. Does the US want to be a party to this? The Secretary said that frankly, if it is necessary to get a final signature on a peace treaty that is otherwise acceptable, the United States would be prepared to help give such a guarantee. There is a question of Congressional approval. The Secretary’s feeling is that if there were a peace treaty, and the parties were to agree, Congress would endorse guarantees. President Assad, when he talks of the future, generally mentions that he sees external guarantees of a final peace treaty. His view is the clearest on this. General Dayan stated that this was a complicated issue. When demilitarized zones are mentioned, there must be some way to check them and to supervise them. Israel had a bad experience from 1957 to 1967 over Sharm al-Sheikh and UNEF.¹⁸ The Secretary reminded him that that was a General Assembly, not a Security Council action. Mr. Evron noted that when the Indians and Yugoslavs decided to quit UNEF, it was not a legal question. General Dayan asked about what the American position would be. This was not a legal question as much as a political problem. Nasser had not asked the UN to leave Sharm al-Sheikh, and in fact had wanted them to stay there. Secretary Vance said that if the Security Council had provided a guarantee, UNEF forces could not have been removed without Security Council action. General Dayan said that Ralph Bunche could have asked for a Security Council resolution, but he did not, and the forces then left. Bunche had said that all of the forces should leave or none should. Then Nasser faced the UN with a fait accompli. Prime Minister noted that guarantees had not worked in the past and that the UN had not been able to guarantee freedom of passage. President Eisenhower had made a commitment on this, and President Johnson had explored the possibility of an international force, but it had never been formed. Israel was left with the closure of the Strait of Tiran. Then the Six Day War occurred. Guarantees had not worked.

General Dayan repeated that Israel rejected any contact with the PLO, but stated that Israel does want to talk to the Palestinian Arabs in the administered territories about how to develop a modus vivendi. In Gaza, one half of the population consists of refugees. They work in Israel and he sees no solution other than their being combined with Israel. They should have work and they should have places to live. In Jerusalem and in the surrounding areas, the people are also tied to Israel. If the people in Bethlehem were asked to be cut off from Jerusalem or to be tied to Jerusalem and to Israel, they would choose the latter. Israel wants to be associated with these people. Israel wants to discuss with them not a Palestinian state and not territory, but how to live together as neighbors. Through open bridges and their contacts with Israel, they can have the autonomy that they want, their own culture, and their way of life. General Dayan said that he was pleased to have read in Dr. Brzezinski’s meeting with former Minister Eban that Dr. Brzezinski viewed the Jordan River as Israel’s military boundary.¹⁹ Israel wants to live together with the West Bank and Gaza. This is a very general idea and Dayan had no practical proposals to make. But he emphasized again that he wanted to discuss how Arabs and Israelis could live together.

Prime Minister Begin added to General Dayan’s remarks by saying that he would propose that the Arabs in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza should have full cultural autonomy. Israel would not interfere in their lives. They would have schools based on their own heritage. They should have the free option of citizenship in Israel. Now in Judea and Samaria the Arabs are citizens of Jordan. Israel will not force its own citizenship on them, since that would be wrong. But Israel is prepared to give them options. If they ask for Israeli citizenship, Israel will grant it. They will be entitled to vote in Knesset and will have full equality. There are now in Israel 100,000 Jews [Arabs?], who are permanent residents, but who are not citizens. They enjoy all rights except voting. If they become citizens, then they vote; if they are resident non-citizens, they have all rights, but they do not vote. There should be complete equality of rights for Arab and Jewish residents, and Arab and Jewish citizens. Israel has proved that Arabs and Jews can live together. Israel will not interfere in their lives.

Turning to the topic of minor modifications in the 1967 lines, Prime Minister Begin repeated that in his private talk with the President and his talk in the Cabinet Room²⁰ he had asked that no statement be made by the President or his representatives in public that the United States supported the idea of withdrawal to the 1967 lines with only minor modifications. When the Prime Minister reported this to his colleagues, one of them had raised the question if this was also binding in talks the Americans would have with the Arab leaders. Prime Minister Begin could not answer the question, but he felt that the President had not made a commitment to that effect, so he sought a clarification before Secretary Vance’s trip. He asked Ambassador Dinitz who got a reply to the effect that the President and the Secretary of State would not raise this question at their initiative, but if they were asked, they would say that US policy had not changed. Prime Minister Begin said he did not know what had happened since then, but he would like to explain his concern. He asked that Secretary Vance raise this with the President as a most serious issue since it touched on peace negotiations. The Prime Minister said that his motivation stemmed from the concern that if the US said it supports only minor modifications in public, and the Arabs hear this, they will know the official policy of the United States. What would be left to negotiate? Maybe then the Arabs would hold out for only one half of minor modifications. Egypt does not even agree to minor modifications in its border, so there is little to negotiate. When the policy of the United States supports the 1967 lines, but then says the boundaries are to be determined in negotiations, the question arises of what is left to negotiate. The Prime Minister assumed the President’s pledge was binding in talks with the Arab leaders. If the Arabs hear the US view in public, it leaves no room for negotiations. Because this is a serious issue he had decided to write a personal letter to the President and he received a quick gracious reply.²¹ Now the problem is that the President said that his commitment had not changed and that the United States would stand by its historic attitude in any official reply that it gave if asked about borders. The Prime Minister said that he would like the Secretary to tell the President again that on the eve of negotiations that the United States should not repeat its policy regarding only minor modifications in the 1967 borders or the negotiations might collapse in advance. On the eve of negotiations, the Prime Minister requests that the United States repeal that policy. This has been a difference since 1967. Maybe the United States cannot do it, but he asks that the United States stand for negotiations of peace treaties between the parties and that the United States refrain from declaring any point of view on the territorial issue, stating that this is solely a matter for the parties to negotiate. The United States should not prejudice the outcome of the negotiations and should open the way for proper, free negotiations without any “externally devised formula.” The use of the word minor modifications in the 1967 borders is precisely such an externally devised formula.

The Prime Minister stated the Soviets identify with total Israeli withdrawal. Israel has showed the United States what the consequences of full withdrawal would be during the Prime Minister’s visit to Washington. Israel cannot accept a return to the 1967 lines. If the Arabs receive Soviet support and the support of the United States, Israel’s position will be awkward. The Prime Minister requested that during the coming talks in September and at Geneva, the United States should say that the negotiations should take place between the parties and it is up to them to decide where to fix their boundaries.

Secretary Vance said that before his departure, he had participated in the response to Prime Minister Begin’s letter. A serious discussion had taken place and it was decided that, if asked, the Secretary would have to say that the United States had not changed its position on the question of borders. The United States could not equivocate nor could it avoid telling the truth. That would be immoral. The question did arise in each of the countries as to whether the United States had changed its position on borders. The Secretary had responded that the United States had not changed its position. He had no other alternative. He said that he would raise the question again with the President, and he would report fully on his discussions in Israel. The Prime Minister said that he would be grateful for that. The Prime Minister in closing said that he was impressed by the atmosphere of the talks and that Israel would make an effort in the weeks ahead. The Secretary thanked the Prime Minister and said that he appreciated the frankness and the friendliness of the discussions, and said he would report to the President in detail. The meeting adjourned at 12:10 p.m.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 50, Middle East: 7–9/77. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Prime Ministry.
2. See Document 53.
3. See footnote 9, Document 7.
4. No map is attached or has been found.
5. Khiam and al-Aisha are two Lebanese villages where Arab Muslim militants killed Arab Christian villagers in 1977.
6. See footnote 2, Document 76.
7. See footnote 8, Document 7.
8. For the Chariot tank decision, see footnote 10, Document 57. On July 6, the Carter administration announced, after a review of its original decision to block Israel from selling 24 Kfir fighters to Ecuador, that it continued to oppose the sale. (Bernard Weintraub, “U.S. Again Blocks Israeli Sale of Jets to Ecuador,” New York Times, July 7, 1977, p. 4)
9. Not further identified.
10. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 254.
11. Of the $2.2 billion in emergency military aid to Israel that Congress approved in November 1973, $1.5 billion could be an outright grant.
12. The chart is not attached and has not been found.
13. A surface-to-air missile system first developed in the 1950s to provide defense from aerial attack.
14. The memorandum is not attached and has not been found.
15. The 1907 Hague Convention was the second Hague Convention, the first being signed in 1899, which sought to establish the laws of war and war crimes in international law. Adopted on October 18, 1907, the second convention expands on the 1899 convention with a special emphasis on naval warfare.
16. Adopted on August 12, 1949, the Fourth Geneva Convention focuses on the protection of civilians during wartime and under military occupation by a foreign government. Article 49 refers to displaced persons during wartime having to be transferred back to their homes once hostilities have ceased. This became known as the “right of return.”
17. Sir Hersch Lauterpact served as a judge on the International Court of Justice from 1955 to 1960.
18. The United Nations deployed the UNEF to act as buffer between Israel and Egypt after the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. In May 1967, Egyptian President Nasser expelled the UNEF from Egypt.
19. Not further identified. Brzezinski wrote in his memoirs that he met with Eban on a trip to Israel in the summer of 1976. (Power and Principle, pp. 83–84).
20. There were discussions in the Cabinet Room on July 19 and 20; see Documents 52 and 57. Begin is likely referring to his private meeting with Carter the evening of July 19; see footnote 3, Document 54.
21. For both Begin’s correspondence and Carter’s reply, see Document 62.