62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel1

179491. For Ambassador only. Subject: Exchange of Messages Between Begin and Carter.

1. Following, which is strictly for your information, is exchange of letters between the President and Prime Minister Begin. Begin’s message was delivered by Dinitz to Habib July 30. President Carter’s response delivered to Dinitz July 31 by the Secretary.

2. Begin text:

“Dear Mr. President:

I was asked by the Prime Minister to urgently transmit to you the following message, to which he would very much appreciate an early response from you:

‘Dear Mr. President,

In the course of our conversations you were good enough to assure me, both at the meeting in the Cabinet Room and privately,2 that you will refrain until you consult with me from the use in public of the term “Israeli withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967, with minor modifications.”

This important pledge was given by you, Mr. President, in response to my argumentation, which I venture briefly to recapitulate, as follows: If the President of the United States or his authorized representative declares in public that Israel should withdraw to the pre-“Six Day War” lines, with minor modifications, such a declaration will of course be duly noted by the Arab rulers. What in these circumstances would then be left to negotiate about? Let me add in parentheses, that [Page 373] on Israel’s side that was a war of most legitimate self-defense. But to continue: if this public declaration is then followed up by an American statement that the ultimate boundaries should be determined by the negotiating parties themselves, the contradiction implicit in these two declarations is obvious and inescapable.

Yesterday I instructed our Ambassador in Washington to clarify with the Secretary of State, before the Secretary sets out on his visit to our region, whether your undertaking would be treated as binding in his talks in the Arab capitals.3 The reply was that Secretary Vance and his advisors will not initiate such a statement in the course of their talks in Cairo, Damascus, etc., but if asked they will answer that American policy, the nature of which is known, has not been changed. It may, I think, be assumed that they will be asked.

It follows, therefore, that while the concept of “minor modifications” as an element in American policy will not be publicly announced it will on the eve of the Geneva Conference be conveyed to the Arabs privately. This in essence reflects an unequivocal contradiction.

I am further informed that the Secretary will in his talks with the Arab leaders bring up points IV and V of the proposal presented to us in Washington, as well as several procedural suggestions which we indicated to be unacceptable to us.4 In the result, when we come to the Geneva meeting, for the success of which we all devoutly hope, the following scenario may be anticipated: three or four Arab states will in unison demand a total withdrawal of Israel to the lines of June 4, 1967, coupled with the creation of the so-called Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip; a Soviet co-chairman will unreservedly identify himself with the Arab position; and last, but not least, there will be an American co-chairman who, on the territorial issue, basically supports that position.

We promised one another, Mr. President, to conduct our dialogue with complete candor. It is therefore my duty to say that whatever the odds, the Israel delegation will unflinchingly stand by the principles which I had the honor to outline in the course of our unforgettable nocturnal conversation upstairs in the White House.5 For us it is not a matter of policy but of life. It is much more than a rhetorical question if I add further: is it fair to the little embattled country which bears the second name of the struggling Jacob? The ideas which we brought to Washington are fair to all concerned. Let there be negotiations for the conclusion of peace treaties between Israel and her neighbors; and let [Page 374] those negotiations be free—free from preconditions, free from prior commitments, and also free from an “externally devised formula for a settlement.”

Mr. President, you were gracious enough to tell me that I might write to you at any time I might deem it necessary. I now avail myself of that privilege. You will, I am sure, appreciate the importance and urgency which I attach to this message, coming as it does as Secretary Vance is about to embark on his important visits to the Arab countries and to Israel.

Allow me, Mr. President, to pay my respects to your wife and to your mother.

Very sincerely and respectfully yours,

Menachem Begin

Prime Minister’

Respectfully yours,

Simcha Dinitz

Ambassador”

End text.

3. Begin text:

“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of July 30 concerning certain issues which came up during the course of our recent conversations. It is important that we understand each other and I am responding with the same complete candor which you so rightly cited as an essential element of our dialogue.

As I said to you I hope we might all be very restrained in our public statements and actions. I reaffirm that I will not speak publicly of Israeli withdrawal to 1967 lines, with minor modifications, without prior consultation with you. That pledge holds for me and members of my administration, and will be honored by Secretary Vance during his forthcoming trip to the Middle East. You agreed not to make a public issue of our reticence on this issue. However, we cannot but respond affirmatively if we are asked privately by the responsible Arab leaders if we still adhere to our historic position in this regard. To do otherwise would and could be taken as a retreat from a long-standing American position and an act of bad faith on my part. As you know from our conversation, our position has not changed.

You also raise some questions regarding points 4 and 5 of the principles Secretary Vance and I presented to you for comment. As I indicated, our purpose in discussing these principles was directly related to our efforts to bring the parties closer on matters of great significance to the search for a just and lasting peace. It is only proper that we put [Page 375] them forward to the Arab leaders in the same words and in the same spirit, to secure their views as Secretary Vance indicated to you we would do, and to understand their disagreements and objections. The same applies to any of the various suggestions we offered as a means of overcoming procedural obstacles.

I do assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, that when we discuss the five principles and the several procedural suggestions, we shall do so in a positive manner designed to bring the parties together while still remaining aware of the differing views that are held strongly on both sides.

If we are to be useful to all parties, before and during Geneva, we must be in a position to review matters of substance in a realistic manner with all those responsible. We shall do so in a manner which respects the views of all and keeps option open, but allows for bridging gaps and overcoming obstacles on the way to a peaceful settlement.

One of the most positive results of our talks, as I reflect on them, is that we agreed it is possible for Israel and the United States to have differences of opinion without in any way weakening the ties between our two countries.

Thank you for writing, Mr. Prime Minister. I value and rely on our exchanges to help me understand where to go and what to look for in the exercise of the responsibilities that fall upon the United States. You can be sure we shall not exercise those responsibilities lightly or without due regard to the sensitivities and concerns of others.

With warmest best wishes to you and Mrs. Begin from Rosalyn and myself. My mother also appreciates your kind thought.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

End text.

Vance
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0084. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Thomas Martin (S/S–O), and approved by Atherton. Repeated on August 1 to the White House.
  2. For this Cabinet Room meeting, see Document 57. For the private conversation, see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 57.
  3. July 29. No memorandum of conversation of a meeting between Vance and Dinitz was found.
  4. See the Attachment to Document 52.
  5. See footnote 2 above.