Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

57. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 20, 1977, 10:05–10:40 a.m.

PRESIDENT’S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN OF ISRAEL

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
• Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
• Ambassador Samuel Lewis
• Mr. David Aaron
• Mr. William B. Quandt
• Mr. Hamilton Jordan
• Mr. Stuart Eizenstat
• Mr. Jerry Schecter
• Prime Minister Menahem Begin
• Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
• Mr. Shmuel Katz
• Mr. Hanan Bar-On
• Mr. Yehiel Kadishai
• Mr. Eliahu Mizrachi
• General Ephraim Poran
• Mr. Yehuda Avner
• Mr. Eliyahu Ben-Elissar
• Mr. Dan Pattir

President: I am glad to know that you got a good rest last night. Yesterday must have been a strenuous day, but I appreciate the effort that you have made to come here and talk with us. I also appreciate the books that you gave me last night² and the dedication that you wrote in them. I have also written a book which I would like to give to you, along with another book that contains photographs that have been taken from satellites of different parts of the world.

Prime Minister Begin: Thank you very much for the gracious dedication in your book, Mr. President. It is very moving. I will read the book again.

President: I don’t want to impose that burden on you!

I would like to take the opportunity to summarize the talks and to explore some remaining points. Last night we agreed that the attitude that we would show to the rest of the world would emphasize that the talks had been very fruitful and constructive and we want to be sure that these positive aspects are emphasized. We have no reason to stress any differences that may exist. We obviously have some differences, but we are primarily trying to develop a position for ourselves of significance in the Middle East discussions. Our own security is deeply involved in what happens in the Middle East. Our ties to Israel are very strong. We see the possibility for world-wide disruption if war were to break out in the Middle East and this is a concern that we share with you and with our allies.

We will be quite active this year in working with you and others to get to Geneva. All of the opinions that you have expressed are conducive to going to Geneva. When Secretary Vance goes to meet the Arab leaders, we will have a foundation for discussions leading to peace treaties. One difficult potential problem on the Arab side is the question of a single delegation. I think Sadat and Hussein prefer separate delegations. Perhaps the co-chairmen could call a plenary session and then things could break up into study groups where the substantive negotiations would take place. This seems like an acceptable approach. Your suggestions on this are very good.

If we go to Geneva this October, there are many details that will have to be worked out. Perhaps this could be done in New York at the time of the General Assembly meeting when the Foreign Ministers might meet with us or even together to work out the last differences, so that the parties can go to a conference. We can go to the Arabs in a strong position to urge this procedure. I believe that they will accept.

Secretary Vance: I think that they probably would.

President: I think that our potential to get to Geneva has been enhanced. The remaining problem is Palestinian representation. There are several options to pursue. Some have been discussed here and some we discussed last night. We have mentioned the possibility of Palestinian representatives in a Jordanian delegation, or the possibility that Palestinians might come when the question of refugees is discussed. We won’t try to determine that now. There have been some modifications of the principles that we discussed, and Prime Minister Begin finds the first four acceptable, but the fifth is not.³ We have a difference of opinion on that. We want to keep flexible and we hope we can resolve this in the future.

There are some other items on which agreement is still difficult. There are some Arab attitudes that are unacceptable to Israel and some Israeli positions on withdrawal and on Palestinians and on Jerusalem, as well as Gaza, the West Bank, Golan, and Sinai, that are not acceptable to the Arabs. These are matters that you will need to resolve with your neighbors. We will add our good offices. Perhaps as you get to know each other, maybe there can be some reconciliation. We will try to help, but we will not impose our will.

Let me repeat what I have said before. All of the nations and leaders participating in the Geneva Conference have made strong statements in the past. That includes you and me and others. But I hope and expect that before Geneva we might all be very restrained in our statements, not saying what we can or cannot accept, and that all should go with an open mind. The Prime Minister has asked that we not talk about the 1967 lines with minor adjustments. I told him I would not repeat that phrase. If we need to spell out that principle again, it will only be after I check with him. The Prime Minister understands this. We have asked Assad, Hussein, and Sadat to also restrain themselves. They have generally responded well and have told us of their actions in reply to our requests. I don’t want to imply that they have given up their basic positions, as this will only be possible at Geneva.

I think one last point I should mention is that I have agreed to contact General Secretary Brezhnev with your requests concerning the Jewish prisoners in the Soviet Union.⁴

Prime Minister Begin: May I give you a list?⁵

President: We have done this in the past and we will do it again. We will raise these specific names with him in a quiet way. We want to do it on a confidential basis so that if he agrees to let them go, he can handle it however he thinks best.

I think that you enjoy, and that I also enjoy, substantial confidence among our own peoples. This gives us a degree of flexibility because of the attitudes of our people and your people. I think we can lead Americans and Israelis toward the acceptance of agreed principles that in the past would have been difficult. You have shown great leadership in helping to establish Israel. Now, you, and to a lesser extent myself, have a chance to insure Israel’s right to live in peace for the next thousand years. The people of Israel are willing to accept the idea of accommodation with the Arabs and I am eager to help. If you want to call me, or write to me, or send a message, I would consider it an honor and I would like to do the same with you. If I say something that bothers you, you can let me know, and I will do the same. This won’t be in the spirit of criticism, but rather to avoid misunderstandings. We cannot espouse the Israeli position as our own. We can only help to bring you and the Arabs together if we have the trust of all parties. We won’t reveal your confidences to them, or their confidences to you, without permission. This is my interpretation of the present circumstances. If you have a different view, I hope that you will point it out. I would welcome your comments.

Prime Minister Begin: Thank you, Mr. President. I think now we have a greater measure of understanding and agreement. It is important to know that we have made progress. First, we agree that there should be an added session of the Geneva Conference, preferably in October. Second, we agree that after the opening of the Conference, we need to have some instrument for quiet negotiations in which all of the issues involved in peace treaties can be clarified. This may mean the establishment of mixed commissions, or committees, with rotating chairmanships. Third, we agree that the goal is the conclusion of peace treaties. If we add Lebanon, there would be four peace treaties signed which would end the state of war and start the era of peace. Fourth, if there is difficulty in reconvening the Geneva Conference under UN Resolution 338, which refers to Resolution 242, we should look for alternative ways to keep momentum. I have made two suggestions: one involves US good offices to set up mixed commissions; the other is proximity talks. These are not just procedural proposals since they also bear on substance. Form can create substance, just as quantity can change to quality. In this case, form is substance, so we have reached a large measure of agreement, thanks to the President’s attitude.

The Foreign Minister of Israel will come to the United States for the UN General Assembly in September and he can come to Washington and the President has agreed to see Mr. Dayan. He is a very able Foreign Minister and you will hear his outlook. Until then, Secretary Vance will visit the Middle East and he has agreed to go to the Arab countries first and then to come to Israel on August 7th or 8th. This will give us time to prepare documents on topics like security and so forth. So in the next weeks and months, we will try to keep momentum. We hope for a response on the other side. We do not see any reason that they should not respond positively. We are offering free negotiations in which nothing will be precluded. We will be careful not to make any slips of the tongue. All of the questions that are put to me on the territorial issue will be covered by a response that says that this is something which will be dealt with in the final peace treaties that are to be negotiated and that no details will be revealed until that time. We are aiming for open negotiations and we will bring proposals, just as the other side can bring proposals. There will be no prior conditions demanded or given. I will be able to withstand pressure to go into any further detail. We will keep our position until Geneva. This may lead to the kind of political truce that I have suggested to our neighbors. We will go to Geneva with an open mind. Before then, some of the instruments should be elaborated, especially dealing with the nature of the open session and the committees. This is the essence of my proposal.

I will also take up your concern about overflights of Saudi Arabia when I get home. I have to check with the Defense Minister. I assure you that we will do all that we can.

President: [To Secretary Vance]⁶ Are you going to Saudi Arabia on your trip?

Secretary Vance: Yes.

President: Good. Could we get your reply before the Secretary goes?

Prime Minister Begin: I’ll try. By next Tuesday,⁷ I can talk to my Defense Minister and I’ll try to have a reply for you by next Thursday. I will send it to you personally and I hope we can respond. I hope that you have read the document I left with you last night.⁸ It is an amazing document. We will go on trying to contribute to your national security.

I talked to the Secretary of Defense and I raised some of our urgent requirements. He promised that before I left he might be able to give me some answers. This would be part of our ongoing relationship. Mr. President, you want to see a strong Israel. I remember your view on reassessment. We are grateful for your words. If you can take decisions now, we would be very grateful. I would be able to bring good tidings to my people who expect it. They would have a feeling that we could work together. As I told the Secretary of Defense, the Arabs have more than 10,000 tanks.

President: I will try to get my decision to you this afternoon on some of these items, probably not on all.⁹

Prime Minister Begin: I will say at the press conference that we have had talks in the best possible atmosphere, that there was no confrontation, and that there were only differences of opinion that are normal between free men. If there are disagreements, I will say so, but I will also say that I see you as a great friend of Israel.

President: I hope that whenever you can mention UN Resolutions 242 and 338, you will do so. As far as our agreement that I will not mention minor modifications in the 1967 lines, I hope you will not say that you have my commitment not to talk about that. I will go over your military requests. Secretary Brown has been with Congress this morning on Korean issues and I haven’t had a chance to see him.

Ambassador Dinitz: I would like to raise one additional point concerning the financing of our military requests. One billion dollars in FMS credits is no longer enough to cover our needs. We had assumed that we would have one and one-half billion dollars for the next three to five years. In fiscal years 1977 and 1978, one billion dollars was appropriated or is now pending. At the request of our Prime Minister, I would like to raise the question of increasing the FMS credits from one billion to one and one-half billion dollars, which we think is the minimum necessary.

President: I’ll consider that.

Ambassador Lewis: I think this has been a splendid meeting.

Prime Minister Begin: We will work with Ambassador Lewis in full confidence. Have you seen anything on Ethiopia in the last few hours?

Secretary Vance: We have nothing new, but we will be looking at this very carefully, and then we will talk to Prime Minister Begin.

President: Ethiopia has just received an enormous shipment of Soviet arms.

Secretary Vance: We are putting together all of our information on this.

Prime Minister Begin: I hope we can keep in touch on Ethiopia.

President: We have also observed a buildup on the Egyptian-Libyan front, and there have been some border clashes. We are monitoring this. Let me ask you if you have found our presence in Sinai and our reconnaissance role satisfactory?¹⁰

Prime Minister Begin: It is very useful, and they are doing very well. I saw the commanding officer there, and he is of Polish background. He is a very good man.

President: The Poles are taking over. (Laughter). I want to express again my personal warm feelings for you. I think we have developed a relationship on which we can build and I am very proud of it.

Prime Minister Begin: I am also proud and it has been a very good day.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 7, Israel: Prime Minister Begin, 3/21–22/78: Briefing Book [II]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House.
2. See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 54.
3. See the Attachment to Document 54.
4. A reference to the Israeli Government’s continual requests that the U.S. Government insist that the Soviet Union allow the emigration of Soviet Jews.
5. The list is not attached and has not been found.
6. Brackets in the original.
7. July 26.
8. Neither of these Israeli papers has been found.
9. On July 22, the Carter administration announced agreement on the Israeli use of $107 million of U.S. military assistance to coproduce the Chariot tank, part of a military aid package of $250 million. (Bernard Gwertzman, “Israelis Allowed To Use U.S. Aid To Develop Tank,” New York Times, July 23, 1977, p. 1)
10. A reference to the U.S. Sinai Field Mission. See footnote 6, Document 4.