Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

282. Telegram From the Consulate in Jerusalem to the Department of State¹

Jerusalem, August 3, 1978, 1605Z

2129. Subj: August 2 Meeting With Begin.² Ref: Jerusalem 2107.³ From Atherton. US Del No. 38.

1. Following is more detailed report of my August 2 meeting with Begin at the Knesset. With Begin were: Yadin, Dayan, Weizman, Evron, Rosenne, Dinitz, Ben-Elissar, Evner, Horowitz, Rubenstein, and Colonel Tehila. With me were Sam Lewis, Sterner, Blackwill, Sherman and Feifer.

2. Begin led off meeting by welcoming me and my colleagues. He noted that we had quite an eventful time in Cairo and asked me to describe my talks with Sadat and Kamel.⁴

3. I said there had been two meetings with Kamel before I saw Sadat. In the talks with Kamel, I had reviewed the Leeds Conference, especially the common ground which we believed could be identified between the Israeli and Egyptian proposals. We also discussed the importance of following up the Leeds talks with a tripartite conference while the Secretary was in the area. We also explained to the Egyptians the latest Israeli formulations on the sovereignty issue which Dayan had presented before the Knesset.⁵ We gave the Egyptians our judgement that these formulations were new and something that they should reflect on. We also explored with Kamel in general whether there were ways in which Egypt’s proposal could be modified, especially its formulation relating to a final solution.

4. I then explained to Begin the general reaction of Kamel to these points. Kamel had not agreed with the US assessment of the Leeds conference. Although he admitted there were some areas of commonality, he dismissed them as unimportant unless there were agreement on a commitment to withdrawal. This would be followed by negotiations on security and peace which could include minor border modifications. Kamel made clear Egyptians know that agreement on these issues would have to be reached before withdrawal could take place. Kamel stressed, however, that agreement on a commitment to withdraw was fundamental. Unless this was achieved, the Egyptians were not interested in exploring areas of commonality. Kamel was also very negative regarding a follow-on trilateral conference. He was annoyed that Egyptian acceptance of such talks was taken for granted in Israeli and US statements. We had discussed this issue at some length. Kamel made the point that there would have to be new elements in the Israeli position before direct talks could be resumed. Unfortunately he considered all the new elements bad. He noted that Egypt is under great pressure from the other Arab states. Public Israeli statements were also making it difficult for Egypt to resume the talks. We reminded Kamel that the statement by the Secretary at the end of the Leeds Conference had been made after consultations with both Dayan and Kamel.⁶ Although Egypt had not formally committed itself to another round, it had left us with the impression that it was positively disposed to another meeting. Despite this, Kamel remained negative on further trilateral talks. I had tried to explain Dayan’s statement as movement in the Israeli position. But Kamel professed to see no difference between “discussing sovereignty” and the earlier Israeli formulation that “the nature of the future relations will be considered.” There should be no discussion of sovereignty because Israel had no valid claim of sovereignty on the West Bank. Kamel said Egypt would have to stay with the language it had put forward in its proposal. If the Israelis were to put forward language such as minor modifications or a unified Jerusalem, he indicated the Egyptians could probably accept such an addition.

5. I noted that at my meeting with Sadat,⁷ as Sadat later announced, I had delivered to him a response from the President to his earlier letter.⁸ I had then reviewed with Sadat the highlights of my meetings with Kamel. I discussed the US assessment of the Leeds Conference, the need for further direct negotiations and reasons why Egypt should take a closer look at the most recent Israeli formulations on sovereignty. In this context, I described my talks in Israel. However, I did not in any way discuss the questions for clarification on certain points that I had raised with the GOI on the Israeli proposal. We considered this a private matter between Israel and ourselves. I also mentioned to Sadat the negative effect Egyptian public statements directed against Begin were having. I noted that Eilts had made much the same point with Sadat on several earlier occasions. I also briefed Sadat on my talks in Taif and Amman.⁹

6. I continued that Sadat heard me out and then went into a long, somber, sometimes emotional, monologue parts of which he repeated to the press later. Sadat stressed that Israel did not understand the meaning of his initiative. According to him, he had offered everything to Israel and had no commensurate response. He explained how Egypt had wanted to see new Israeli positions at Leeds but had only received negative proposals such as equating the retention of territory with security. Sadat said that he would give everything under the sun except land, including full peace and even acceptance of a U.S.–Israel military alliance. At the end of his presentation, Sadat stated there would be no further direct contacts until Israel agrees not to negotiate over land and sovereignty. He excepted from this discussion minor modifications on the West Bank. However, Sadat reiterated he was not cutting his ties with Israel despite heavy Arab pressure to do so. But, the principle of no negotiations over territory would have to be established as a basis for a resumption of talks. I explained to Begin how Eilts and I had urged Sadat not to make this statement and to let the next round of talks take place. I stressed that right from the beginning of the Leeds talks, we had envisaged a follow-on meeting. At Leeds, Kamel had clearly left the impression there would be such a conference. However, our efforts with Sadat were to no avail.

7. I then summed up for Begin my assessment and impressions of Sadat’s position based upon what he had said in public and private. I said I did not think that Sadat has either abandoned his initiative nor said no to more direct talks. Sadat continues to want peace, and he is not back-tracking on issues of normal relations and security. As to why Sadat has taken his present course of action, I attributed this first and foremost to his view that Israel has not fully responded to his initiative. He feels that Israel has discounted and understated its importance. In addition, as in his trip to Jerusalem, Sadat had felt the need to make a sudden move in order to persuade the world that negotiations cannot succeed until certain basic principles are understood, the most important of which from his standpoint is the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war as per UNSC Resolution 242. Also, there is increasing support in the Arab world for the view that the Sadat initiative was a mistake because it did not produce a change in the Israeli position on withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the absence of progress, it is necessary for Sadat to pay attention to the views of other Arabs, especially the Saudis. In addition, the assessment that Sadat’s initiative was a mistake is gaining increasing currency in broad sectors of Egyptian society.

8. I explained that we were still analyzing the situation in the aftermath of Sadat’s decision. My personal preliminary view is that his action is not just tactical. He appears to feel the need to position himself to resist Arab—and especially Saudi—pressures while trying to preserve the negotiating track with Israel opened up by his initiative. But in the process, he has inevitably moved a step closer to their views. I also mentioned to Begin my wrap-up session with Kamel on August 1.¹⁰ I explained that we had reviewed our earlier talks and the message that Sadat was conveying. Kamel broke no new ground or showed any second thoughts. The Egyptians were waiting for the Secretary’s visit as the next negotiating event. I then gave the floor to the Prime Minister.

9. Begin began by saying he had some remarks to make for the record. He noted that the Israelis had some experience with Egyptian negotiating behavior. In the middle of the Jerusalem Political Committee, Sadat decided to call the Egyptian delegation home.¹¹ Various explanations of Sadat’s behavior were presented. One was that Sadat had felt insulted by Begin’s reference to Kamel as a young man.¹² However, Sadat stated just a few weeks ago that the reason he had pulled out the delegation was that at the first session Dayan had said that he “hoped that we shall meet half way.” Begin said he was making this point because we finally had an explanation by Sadat. Nobody—neither the Secretary nor the President—had any idea why he had disrupted the talks. Now we learn why, because Israel’s Foreign Minister said the parties should meet halfway; “but isn’t this the nature of negotiations?”

10. Begin then gave his side of the El Arish affair, saying he would like to present some information for the record. Weizman had met Sadat in Salzburg, and the two of them had talked privately without notetakers. Afterwards, they had dictated the substance of the talks and the minutes were brought to Jerusalem. Begin said he had read them closely and Weizman had reported on his talks to the Cabinet. The proposal was this: Israel should make a unilateral gesture on its own initiative, and place El Arish under Egyptian civil administration. Following this, El Arish would be the site of the next stage of the negotiations. As for Santa Katerina, Sadat also wanted a unilateral gesture. The truth is that two days later, the proposal leaked to the press. Begin admitted this should not have happened. In reaction, Gamasy sent an angry cable to Weizman. The latter’s response was a conciliatory message using the words, “I apologize.” Begin emphasized that in relations between states, the use of this phrase is very important. Begin admitted that the leak was a mishap but in democracy these things happen. Since the leak occurred five days before the Cabinet session, it was known in advance that the meeting would deal with this issue. Begin noted that the decision taken by the Cabinet was unanimous approval of his letter to Sadat, except for one Minister. The letter was then transmitted to Gamasy for Sadat.¹³ Begin said that he did not give the letter to the press following the Cabinet session but only the decision made by the Cabinet, “the press asked for the decision, and I gave it to them.” Begin had stated that Israel could not accept a unilateral step, but was ready for negotiations based upon reciprocity. He had also used a phrase common among American children, “you can’t get something for nothing.” Begin then explained that the Egyptian military had refused to receive the Israeli message because they said it dealt with politics. The letter was then transmitted via the U.S.’ good offices, but when Eilts brought the letter, Sadat refused to open it and gave it back. Begin explained that it had been a fair letter. In it Israel emphasized that, although it was unwilling to take any unilateral steps, it was prepared to negotiate on the basis of reciprocity.

11. Begin termed Sadat’s fury astonishing. “Israel has done nothing wrong.” Sadat had made a suggestion which Israel had not agreed to. Begin stressed that the GOI was willing to negotiate and say what it wanted. However, Sadat was insulted because Israel was suggesting negotiations. Begin made the point that he had not reacted to Sadat’s insulting comparison of him to a thief who steals a cow and then asks for ransom. Begin said that Israel was willing to negotiate over El Arish. But, although Sadat may be able to dictate in Egypt, he cannot do so to Israel. Israel is prepared to negotiate, but will not accept ultimatums. “If Sadat doesn’t agree to negotiations, where is the progress?” Begin said he was prepared to tell this to the world. Begin said that Sadat claimed to have been insulted by Dayan talking about “compromise.” Sadat, therefore, demands that Israel not mention compromise or else Egypt would not resume talks. Begin noted that in Israel the Labor Party was always saying that if the government had only proposed territorial compromise, there could be an agreement with Egypt. But, Begin continued, we see that the mere mention of this phrase makes Sadat furious. But, everything Israel has done has been a compromise: its proposal on Sinai is a far-reaching compromise, its autonomy plan is a compromise, and leaving the sovereignty of Judea and Samaria open is a compromise. “What could be better?” Begin then noted that “everybody makes compromises, but for Sadat, you must make a commitment not to mention compromise.” Begin said that Sadat wants to dictate to Israel. Begin said that even Yadin’s party, the DMC, would not accept this. Nobody in Israel, except for the Communists, would accept such Egyptian terms. On the other hand, Israel wants to engage in negotiations.

12. Begin said it should be made clear to Sadat that his word may be sacred in Egypt, but it is not in Israel. It was preposterous for Sadat to think that either his government or any Israeli government would agree to exclude territory from negotiations.¹⁴ The territorial question of Judea and Samaria was a matter of “life and death” for Israelis. Begin said that Sadat’s fiat is not the Ten Commandments nor the teachings from Mount Sinai. Begin termed Sadat’s whole position “curious.” “It is not negotiations.” In order to talk with Egypt and to have the honor of sitting with an Egyptian representative, Israel has to give up talking about compromises on territory and sovereignty. Begin termed this “absolutely irrational and unacceptable” and that “this would have to be made clear to Sadat.” He told how he had been silent about Sadat’s insults and explained that Israel had all the good will in the world. Begin claimed not to feel Sadat’s insults even when he is called a thief who demands compensation from his victim. Begin noted that Sadat was not presenting a pretty picture of him to the Egyptian people. In addition, Begin recollected a recent Egyptian cartoon in which he had been pictured taking LSD.

13. Moving to policy, Begin stressed that Israel welcomes the Secretary and would like to see a trilateral conference take place at Um Khushaiba (the SFM). If the Secretary can succeed in getting Israel and Egypt together, Israel would be glad. However, Begin stressed that he refused to give up the essence of negotiations, i.e. the principle of compromise. Israel would accept no preconditions for negotiations.

14. Weizman then asked, “as a practical man,” whether the date of October for the renewal of UNEF had been mentioned by Sadat. I explained that Sadat has often made clear he feels that October is an important date by which he must make important decisions. However, this was not a central issue in our discussions. Sterner noted that the subject had just come up once in the course of the talks in Cairo. Begin interjected that October is very clear in Israeli minds. The Sinai Agreements were to continue in force until superseded by another agreement. I agreed with Begin on this point and stated that the language in the Sinai Agreement was very clear. On the other hand, Begin noted that Sadat can say he doesn’t agree to a renewal of the UN forces in the Sinai. Rosenne then stated that there was a commitment by Egypt if UNEF were withdrawn as a result of a Soviet veto in the Security Council, that it would agree to an enlarged UNTSO to fulfill the functions of UNEF. He also noted the agreement between Israel and the US which stated that, unless there was agreement by both sides on the withdrawal of UNEF, the US view was that the agreement should remain binding on all parties.¹⁵ I then stated that we had already told Sadat that the US does not agree with his interpretation of the Sinai Agreement. I said there was no doubt in our mind on this question. Begin then asked Dayan if he had anything to add.

15. Dayan jokingly said that one doesn’t argue over information. He then recollected that at Leeds, there had been two proposals on the agenda. Each party could ask for any clarifications it desired. Dayan’s comments on territorial compromise were in response to questions. But, as a point of fact, Dayan had not proposed territorial compromise. The only official Israeli proposal was the self-rule plan. For Kamel to say that Dayan had proposed territorial compromise was inaccurate. Dayan had proposed that the question of sovereignty remain open. The Egyptians had wanted this issue decided now, but Dayan said Israel had not claimed that the West Bank and Gaza were under Israeli sovereignty. He merely said that Israel had a right to claim this. Israel did not submit a proposal on sovereignty. It simply said that the question should remain open. If Sadat wanted to discuss sovereignty, as far as Israel is concerned, “it is open to discussion.” Dayan understood the Egyptians had decided against going on with the trilateral talks. Whatever their reasons, Israel cannot impose its will on them. Dayan felt that the Saudis were behind Sadat’s decision. The Saudis believed that Sadat should not continue with his initiative. Sadat’s current position has nothing to do with what Dayan had said at Leeds or Israel’s treatment of the El Arish issue. The Saudis are trying to unify and reconcile the Arab world. This is what they had told Atherton in Taif. The Saudis have their influence on Sadat and had a say in his decision. I explained to Dayan that I had told the Egyptians that I thought they had misinterpreted his position on territorial compromise. As for the Saudis, they had told me they would not disagree with Sadat’s continuing direct talks or a trilateral discussion if progress were being made. Also, the Saudis would not be opposed if talks were held based upon the understanding that land was not the basis for negotiation.

16. Yadin then suggested we take a look at Sadat’s statement. He proposed that we take Sadat at his word that he does not want to negotiate over land and sovereignty. Yadin inquired whether the question was put to Sadat that this is precisely the spirit of the Israeli proposal. The essence of the autonomy plan was deferring negotiations over sovereignty and land. I explained that we have tried very hard over the past few months to get the Egyptians to take a good look at the self-rule plan. Yadin reiterated that the Israeli proposal falls within Sadat’s formula. He suggested that the Israeli proposal could enable Sadat to resume talks, “unless his formula is a dictate.” Yadin argued that the self-rule plan could allow Sadat to claim that he is not negotiating over these issues. I explained that this is not how the Egyptians see the Israeli proposal. Begin interjected that the Egyptians call the Israeli plan camouflage for its conquests. Yadin then asked how Sadat can retreat from the corner he’s backed himself into. I replied that Sadat would say that we have to go back to 242 and the principle of withdrawal.

17. Begin inquired what is there to negotiate about when Sadat says we should make a commitment not to discuss land and sovereignty. There could still be a discussion of security, but this would be determined by the demand of the Egyptian President. Begin said this is unreasonable. When Sadat was in Jerusalem, he said let’s put our cards on the table, but Sadat is not willing to let us lay our cards down. Talks at Um Khushaiba are important to Israel, “but not at Sadat’s price.” Begin said he would not exacerbate the situation. For the present, he would not trade insult for insult. He then adjourned the meeting as scheduled in order to hold a Ministerial Security Committee session on developments in Lebanon.

Newlin

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033-0269. Secret; Immediate; Exdis (Treat as Nodis). Sent immediate for information to Cairo and Tel Aviv.
2. No memorandum of conversation has been found.
3. Atherton’s first report of the meeting is in telegram 2107 from Jerusalem, August 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033–0266)
4. See footnote 5, Document 279.
5. See footnote 7, Document 277.
6. See footnote 5, Document 273.
7. See Document 279.
8. The text of Sadat’s letter to Carter is in Document 276. The text of Carter’s letter to Sadat is in Document 278.
9. See Documents 274 and 275.
10. The wrap-up session with Kamel is described in telegram 18176 from Cairo, August 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2029)
11. See Document 198.
12. See footnote 3, Document 198.
13. See footnote 5, Document 277.
14. See footnote 2, Document 280.
15. This was expressed in a letter from President Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 231.