276. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
17776. Subject: Sadat Letter to President Carter. Ref: Cairo 17589.2
1. FonMin Kamel called me late this afternoon from Alexandria immediately after Egyptian NSC meeting and before his departure for Amman in order to say he was sending a letter from President Sadat to President Carter for immediate forwarding. The letter was received 2130 tonight. Text follows:
2. Quote: My dear friend President Carter,
In the light of the latest developments in the Middle East, I wish to exchange my views with you, as has become the regular practice between us, in order to assess the situation and consider what steps can and should be taken to bring us nearer to our common aim: a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the area.
I think that we have now reached important and crucial crossroads, and that it would be useful at this juncture, to ponder over what has happened since my visit to Jerusalem.
The objective of my peace initiative, as I stated in my speech before the Knesset on November 20, 1977,3 was, and still is, to achieve peace. In that speech, I said “I have come to you to build a new life and to establish peace . . . In the history of nations and peoples, there come moments when it becomes imperative for those endowed with wisdom and clear vision, to overcome the past with all its complications and residues, to move towards new horizons. We must all rise above every form of fanatecism, above self deception and above theories of superiority”. I added: “The Arab world is not seeking a durable and just peace from a position of weakness or instability. Rather, it possesses all potentialities of power and stability. Hence, its position stems from a genuine will to achieve peace, from a civilized awareness that in order to avert a definite catastrophe (for all) we have no other alternative but to establish a durable and just peace, a peace that cannot be shaken by storms, or tampered through doubts, or shaken by ill intentions”.
[Page 1246]In that same speech, I stated that peace is possible provided that the Arab territories occupied in 1967 be restituted, and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people be recognized. This has been my constant attitude, which I repeated over and over again: yes to peace, to security, to normal and good neighbourly relations, but land and sovereignty we cannot and will not concede. All my actions have proceeded from my, and my people’s deep and sincere dedication to peace.
Unfortunately, this spirit has not been reciprocated. From the very first moment, it became clear that Prime Minister Begin was unable to overcome his dangerous illusions, and was not ready to face realities and engage sincerely in the peace process. Throughout all the meetings which followed my visit to Jerusalem: at the Cairo prepatory meeting, in Ismailia, in the Political and Military Committees, the attitude of Mr. Begin’s government has been to cling to obsolete conceptions. However, since peace is a cherished goal, we have, at each and every time, overcome our growing doubts as to the real intentions of the Israeli Government, in the hope that they would come to understand that peace is worth giving up ambitions of annexation and expansion. This is, Mr. President, the only obligation we ask of them, and this is what they refuse to commit themselves to. And yet, when you thought that another round of direct negotiations was necessary in order to allow the United States to position themselves, and prepare for playing the active role on which we agreed at Camp David, I agreed to a meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in London, despite my doubts and reservations. I thought it was also a good opportunity to explain directly to the Israelis our plan which deals with the core and crux of the conflict: the Palestinian problem.
This plan, as you know, is based on a true interpretation of Resolution 242, and of the obligations of all the parties as spelled out in that Resolution. It is a translation into the fact of the equation: withdrawal plus security equals peace, good neighbourly relations. This was so clearly obvious that the Foreign Minister of Israel could not, in the presence of Secretary Vance, say that he rejects our plan. But, on the other hand, he clearly stated, also in the presence of Mr. Vance, that Israel does not want to restitute the land, that it wants to continue military occupation, to annex Arab territories, that it wants to deny the national rights of the Palestinian people, and refuses to abide by U.N. Resolutions pertaining to the Palestinian refugees.
Dear Mr. President,
If the aim of the Leeds Castle meeting was to clarify the positions of the parties in order for the U.S. to be able to assume the responsibilities they have agreed to shoulder as a full partner, then I believe that this has been achieved. It would not, in my judgement, be useful to hold a new meeting while the Israeli position remains as it is. The [Page 1247] parties would only repeat their positions, perhaps hardening them in the process, and we would be faced with an even more complicated situation. This is why I feel that, unless Israel shows its sincere readiness for adopting attitudes and policies which can help the peace process a new meeting cannot be justified. All the more so, as Israeli declarations and attitudes have, since, shown that they are decided to continue on this dangerous course. They try to mix the issues, and divert us to side issues. I even sometimes feel that Mr. Begin wants to treat the peace process as a commercial transaction and solve it by barter. This is a distortion of the spirit of my initiative, and will lead us nowhere. We ask for no concessions, the land is ours and we cannot concede it. Peace will not be built on “barter basis” . . . it can only be durable if it is just, and if it creates conditions for good neighbourly relations. Otherwise any agreement would bear the seeds of further strife and conflict. Unfortunately, Israeli statements show that they have not yet come to this logical conclusion, and they adopt attitudes similar to those which make it necessary to withdraw the Egyptian delegation from Jerusalem, in order to deprive Mr. Begin of the opportunity to completely destroy the peace process.4
Mr. President,
Secretary Vance will be coming soon to the area. I will be discussing all these issues with him. But I wanted to acquaint you, in advance, with my present thinking in all frankness and sincerity. I think the peace process can be saved, provided that the Israeli Government can be made to understand that it will not be allowed to continue to exploit the process as a veil for its illegal aims and ambitions. Otherwise, we will all be faced with a situation fraught with great dangers.
It is peace that you and I, Mr. President, are seeking and working for. We are working for the future. If Mr. Begin agrees to look with us in the same direction, we will be very near our goal. If, on the contrary, he chooses to remain prisoner of old ambitions, conceptions and misconceptions, he will bear, before the world and his people, the terrible responsibility of letting a unique chance fade away.
Yours truly
Mohamed Anwar el Sadat.
Unquote.
3. This is the letter that Sadat mentioned to me July 24, that he planned to send to President Carter (reftel). It is self-explanatory.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1948. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.↩
- In telegram 17589 from Cairo, July 24, Ambassador Eilts reported Sadat’s frustration with the Israelis. On July 23, the Israeli Cabinet had rejected Sadat’s request for the return of Al Arish and Mount Sinai as a good-will gesture, but proposed more talks. Sadat told Eilts that there was no point to additional meetings unless Israel introduced a “new element.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1919)↩
- See Document 152.↩
- On July 26, Egypt ordered the expulsion of the Israeli military mission of technical and communications personnel who had been supporting the Military Committee talks since January. (William E. Farrell, “Egyptians Order Israel’s Mission To Leave Today,” New York Times, July 27, 1978, p. A1)↩