278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1
192124. Subject: President’s Reply to Sadat’s Letter. Ref: Cairo 17776.2
1. Please deliver following letter from the President for President Sadat.
2. Begin text:
Dear Mr. President:
Your letter of July 26 reached me at a time when my colleagues and I are in the process of preparing for a serious further initiative to help achieve peace in the Middle East.
I deeply appreciate having your candid thoughts at this important moment. If we are to be able to reach our common goals, we must know each other’s views. As we work together closely in the days ahead, I know that we will continue to communicate with one another in the spirit of our meetings at Camp David.3
Mr. President, I can well understand and sympathize with the concern that you must feel over the slowness of progress in the negotiations. Your efforts for peace have been unprecedented in the history of the Middle East conflict. They have won you the respect and admiration of peace-loving people around the globe.
Mr. President, I know you share my view that we must persevere together despite the slow pace of progress to this point. Unless we do, we will be playing directly into the hands of those who want to see us fail.
From our perspective, the talks at Leeds Castle were a useful step, even though they did not reflect a change in positions on the most difficult issues. Negotiations moved beyond general principles to explore some of the concrete issues involved in bringing the Israeli military occupation to an end and establishing reliable security arrangements that will help move the situation in the West Bank and Gaza toward peace. Differences clearly remain on important points, but we will not be able to resolve these differences unless we can continue the negotiating [Page 1257] process. Once we have clearly isolated through the next negotiation those issues on which Egypt and Israel can and cannot agree, we will proceed as we have discussed.
As you know, I have committed the United States to an active and effective role in the Middle East peace process. As I write these words, I have our meeting of last February at Camp David clearly in mind. I want to assure you that it remains my firm determination to continue on the course discussed at that time, and that I remain steadfast and unchanged in my views on the nature of a Middle East settlement. It is essential that your willingness to negotiate be obvious in order for me to fulfill this commitment with any hope of success. For us to proceed in a vacuum could result in our failure, and I know that neither you nor we want that result. Therefore, if I am to be able to follow the approach I have outlined, I need your commitment to continuing negotiations. At least one substantive sequel to the discussions at Leeds Castle is of highest importance.
I therefore hope you will agree to have Foreign Minister Kamel and General Gamasy join Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Dayan and Defense Minister Weizman for another round of talks during which it is the intention of the United States to begin to put forward its own ideas. Secretary Vance will be coming to Cairo shortly to discuss with you in detail our strategy, and he will carry with him an important personal message from me to you. However, before I ask him to make final plans for his trip, I hope I can be assured that you will agree to another round of trilateral talks. I understand, Mr. President, the difficulty you have in justifying these meetings and your concern that there be new elements if negotiations are to succeed. I can assure you that we will make every effort to see that new elements are introduced and to help resolve the differences that now exist on several key issues. Our determination is to bring these negotiations to an early and successful conclusion.
I know that you want to give every chance of success to your historic initiative to bring peace to the Middle East. I share the hope that progress toward that goal can soon be made and I hope that we will stay in very close touch in the days ahead. As you so rightly observe, none of us can assume the terrible responsibility of letting this unique chance for peace fade away. I am confident that, working hand in hand, we can reach the goals that have so far eluded us.
Sincerely. End text.
3. After discussing this text with the President, the Secretary asks that you underscore the President’s need for at least one more substantive session such as we are proposing, as the text itself states.
4. In delivering above, you should also find a way to pass to Sadat judgment at high levels here that Sadat’s attacks on Begin, his moves [Page 1258] such as expelling Israeli communications team,4 and other statements giving impression Sadat is closing door to negotiations are having the effect in Israel of strengthening Begin’s support and the effect here of tarnishing Sadat’s previously very bright image. Realize Eilts has already made this point but as new statements are made in Cairo, you should know for your own background that disillusionment with Sadat is mounting here at high levels and in the Congress. In this connection, call your attention to sentence in text saying it is essential that Sadat’s willingness to negotiate be obvious.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2103. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted from a text received from the White House; cleared by David Anderson (S/S), Saunders, and Sydney Goldsmith (S/S–O); and approved by Secretary Vance.↩
- See Document 276.↩
- See Document 211.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 276.↩