Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

279. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, July 31, 1978, 0004Z

17988. For Secretary From Atherton. U.S. Del No. 26. Subj: Meeting With President Sadat at Mamoura—July 30.² Ref: Cairo 17984.³

Summary: (see Cairo 17984).

1. Eilts and I met for two and one-half hours with President Sadat mid-day July 30 at Mamoura Palace in Alexandria. On the Egyptian side were VP Mubarak, PM Salem, Kamel, Maher and El-Baz. With me were Ambassador Eilts, Sterner and Kirby.

2. I began by extending to Sadat the best wishes of President Carter and handed him the letter from the President contained in State 192124.⁴ Ambassador Eilts read the letter aloud to Sadat. Sadat listened carefully but made no comment.

3. I told Sadat that I had had two lengthy and useful meetings with Foreign Minister Kamel ⁵ and that in our second meeting I had reviewed with him the general direction of our thinking about the ways in which we believe the differences between the Egyptian and Israeli positions might be bridged. I stressed that what I had conveyed to Kamel was not the full picture, however, since the details of what the Secretary will bring with him to the area and inject into the negotiations are still being discussed at the highest levels in Washington.

4. I said I would want to make sure that one point which we consider especially important had been clearly understood. The point concerns our view of the need for agreement at the outset on what will be said concerning the end of a five-year period. We believe that at the beginning of the five-year period, there must be agreement that a final settlement will be firmly based on Resolution 242, including commitments to the principle of withdrawal, and to true peace and security. Israel, of course, would prefer to leave questions relating to the final status of these territories open for discussion until the end of the five years.

5. I explained that our ideas derive from several sources: (A) the Israeli plan presented last December; (B) the nine points I presented to Sadat in April which have since been modified to take into account his comments at that time and (C) the Egyptian plan.⁶ We are constructing our proposal on the basis of these building blocks, taking into account Sadat’s concerns.

6. I also pointed out that in our view agreement on West Bank and Gaza issues is not a substitute for a declaration of principles. We see it rather as a supplement to a declaration. I said that we really must deal with both simultaneously; we cannot focus on a declaration without understanding what will unfold on the ground, and we can’t divorce West Bank and Gaza issues from the conceptual framework provided by a declaration.

7. I stressed that we are convinced that the process of turning over authority to the inhabitants of the West Bank will bring about fundamental changes in the political dynamics of the area, and particularly in Israeli views. I added that we had always said that a settlement must be based on 242, including Israeli withdrawal and a solution to the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. It is on this basis that Secretary Vance is prepared to come to the area and participate with the parties in further talks.

8. At this point Sadat said he would like to have from me a report of my talks in Israel and in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.⁷ He made a passing reference in the process to his refusal to receive Begin’s message concerning the El-Arish proposal after it had been previously made public.⁸

9. I told Sadat that I had found the internal debate in Israel very much alive, not only between the opposition and the government but within the government as well. I said that many people there were embarrassed and unhappy about the way his talks in Salzburg with Weizman ⁹ had been handled by their government. I also referred to last week’s Knesset debate, in which the opposition charged that the government was missing a real opportunity for peace. I cautioned, however, that Begin’s parliamentary majority remains as strong as ever, and that there is no sign of a fundamental change in this respect in the near future.

10. I told Sadat that, during my own meeting with Begin, I made suggestions of ways in which Israel might move closer to the Egyptian position, not only as regards the transitional period, but also concerning the more fundamental issues. I said I was struck by the fact that Begin just listened for the most part rather than interjecting his objections on every point as he has done in the past. I pointed out that some people close to Begin were saying that he seems these days to be in a more reflective mood; one associate even described him as “flexible”.

11. I pointed to the three-point formulation approved by the Knesset last Monday¹⁰ as an indication of what I was referring to. I reviewed with Sadat how we had described the initial Israeli response to our questions as disappointing, and how Dayan, after discussing with the Secretary at Leeds a new formulation, had received Begin’s approval to refer to “sovereignty,” something which Begin had never before agreed to do.¹¹ I said I understood that this remained insufficient from the Egyptian point of view, but that it seemed to me to indicate some advance in Israeli thinking and could open up some possibilities. I told Sadat that many people in Israel are interpreting this new formulation to mean that for the first time the Begin government is acknowledging that Arab sovereignty over the West Bank is a possible outcome. Furthermore, this interpretation has been made public and has not been denied by the government. I said that I felt this must be recognized as more than just a semantic change, but rather an effort to Begin to evolve the Israeli position.

12. I told Sadat that I had to report to him in the frankness which has characterized our relationship that many Israelis refer often to the criticism of Begin which they are hearing from Egyptian sources and they are resentful. Israelis believe that they can criticize their own government “within the family” but that this is something not accepted from outsiders. I cautioned that these attacks are causing people to rally around Begin and his government and are causing embarrassment to his domestic critics. I told him that I expect to be returning to Israel to see if they have reflected further on the points I raised with them, but that I expect they may prefer to wait for Secretary Vance.

13. I then reviewed for Sadat my talks in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. I said I had two primary purposes in each country: to provide our assessment of the Leeds talks and to give them a better understanding of our strategy. I said I also tried to elicit their understanding and support for the events flowing from Sadat’s initiative, making clear that it is not at Israel’s request that we are encouraging the parties to hold further talks. I explained in some detail our reasons for considering these talks essential to the role we have said we will play.

14. I admitted that I did not think I had convinced Foreign Minister Saud to lend public support to our efforts, but stated that he did say that Saudi Arabia would not criticize them publicly. I described much the same reaction from Hussein, who said that although he was not prepared to join the negotiations, he would not criticize our efforts either. I told Sadat that I had explained to King Hussein the important role that we envisage Jordan playing in the negotiations, and that I had urged him to consider what he really needs as a basis for joining.

15. I emphasized to Sadat that the role we intend to play remains consistent with what we have told him in the past. The question now is not what to do but how to do it, and this question assumes great importance in terms of maintaining public support for our course in the United States and of Israeli reactions. I said there must be seen to be a true impasse in the negotiations, something which is not yet perceived by many Americans because there have been so few meetings between the parties.

16. At this point Sadat asked Kamel for his view of our approach. Kamel said that Egypt and the U.S. had a basic difference concerning a US proposal. He described the preliminary ideas that I had given him in our two meetings as, in his view, “a replica of the Israeli self-rule proposal”. He asserted that the US was proposing that the Israelis only commit themselves to negotiate, not to withdraw. He described, as he had with me, his view of the two possible American approaches, i.e., a middle ground proposal presented on a take-it or leave-it basis or a proposal fully acceptable to Egypt presented for further negotiations. Kamel insisted that Egypt cannot go further unless there is an Israeli commitment to withdraw from the West Bank as required by 242, describing this as necessary to bring Jordan into the talks and to acquire the active support of Saudi Arabia.

17. Kamel told Sadat that the US had been trying to attribute importance to the new Israeli formulation. He, however, could see no real change between “sovereignty in abeyance” and “sovereignty discussed after five years”. He described for Sadat how we had reviewed together the Egyptian proposal and he told Sadat that, except for a very few sentences, the US had said it was very good, its only problem being that it is an Egyptian proposal. Kamel stressed that if Egypt got further into the process without a US commitment that Israel will withdraw after five years, negotiations will lead nowhere. I interjected to say that Kamel’s description of the US proposal as one which only asked Israel to negotiate represents an apparent misunderstanding. In our view, I explained, the Israeli commitment must be that negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza will be on the basis of 242, including its withdrawal provision. Kamel replied that Egypt wants to implement 242, not negotiate on its basis, and that the time for implementation is now. I attempted to underscore our commitment to the principle of Israeli withdrawal by reading pertinent portions of the Secretary’s “Issues and Answers” interview of July 23.¹²

18. President Sadat then began what turned out to be a long and clearly rehearsed monologue. He said that prior to Leeds he had said he could not agree to another meeting unless there were new elements from the Israeli side. Now in the letter received today from President Carter he could see very clearly the US desire that another round of talks take place.

19. Sadat said that unfortunately there has arisen in the last week a very dangerous situation. He said that he had thought with his visit in November complexes had been overcome. The Israelis, however, put difficulties in the way, both in the political talks in Jerusalem and in the Military Committee. In all of these meetings, he said, he always tried to make the Israelis put their “real cards on the table”, but they managed to avoid doing so. Sadat said he knew that the main Israeli aim is expansionism and that they will try to use every pretext to achieve this, whether security concerns or whatever. The Israelis desire new borders which can satisfy their old dreams. However, Egypt felt it should push ahead with the peace process despite Israel and its dreams.

20. At Leeds, Sadat continued, there came the moment he had been anticipating. The Israelis laid their dreams on the table instead of beating around the bush. They said they want the land.

21. Sadat reminded me that the Israelis had told President Carter that they wanted recognition, normalization of relations, secure borders and so forth. This was emphasized by President Carter as important in April 1977 during their first meeting. In November, said Sadat, obviously warming to the subject, “I jumped over all of this. I gave them acceptance in the area, the promise of normal relations, direct negotiations, recognition, security measures, open borders and cooperation. They never dreamt of one-third of what I offered, but they took all that and put it in their pocket (gesturing to emphasize his point). They are always doing that—putting what we offer in their pocket and then asking for more.”

22. Sadat continued: “At Leeds Dayan said there is no substitute for territorial compromise to assure security. To this I say ‘No’! This is the main essence of Israeli intentions which they have tried to hide ever since my initiative. Meanwhile, I have put forward my six points concerning security.¹³ I don’t even exclude the possibility of the US concluding a military pact with Israel. Now I have given everything.”

23. Sadat continued by saying that he was now making his “second initiative”. He said he would never again sit together with Israel at ministerial or any level unless the question of land is declared “beyond compromise.”

24. Sadat referred to Begin’s coming out of the Knesset and saying that Israel will never give Egypt any grain of sand without a price.¹⁴ “So impertinent!” Sadat explained that he ordered the Israeli military group to leave because “I am not ready to have a group here in order to bring such impertinence”.

25. Sadat said “It is my Sinai and I will take it sooner or later. Such arrogance! How can the US allow Israel to use you like this. Before agreeing to anything like security arrangements, I want to be aware of all the arms and security assistance that the Pentagon is giving to Israel.” He recalled here the statements he had made in his July 27 speech¹⁵ about US still providing (twice a day) satellite intelligence to the Israelis.

26. Sadat repeated that he is embarking on his “second initiative”, i.e., to remove the subject of territory from any negotiation. “I will go to the end of the road in terms of meeting Israeli security concerns, but keep the land out of the compromise.” Sadat said he might be able to understand not “giving anything for free” if they were on their own land and he on his, but he said angrily that Begin wants Israel to be a super-state in the area. He referred again to “the Pentagon”, saying that it is providing Israel with security information twice a day, and reiterated his conviction that we are sharing satellite photography with Israel.

27. He underscored his “second initiative” by saying he was willing to give Israel “anything under the sun except land”. He said that for every settlement Israel withdraws from the West Bank, he would provide water for a new one in the Negev from his plans for developing the Sinai. Sadat did affirm that, in accordance with what he termed the interpretation of 242 by all parties, a West Bank settlement could incorporate “minor rectifications”. He also assured me that his second initiative “doesn’t mean that I have cut my ties with Israel, despite urging from the other Arabs”.

28. Sadat was at great pains to explain that he did not want to embarrass President Carter in any way. He recalled that he sent a record of his Salzburg talks with Weizman to the Secretary shortly after his return and said the record would show that Israel is insisting that he agree to end the involvement of the US in the negotiations. He said he might be able to agree to this if Israel were willing to live as a state in the area, but not as a super-state with expansionist designs.

29. Sadat asked that I tell the President to “try to save the image of your country”. He referred again to arms provided to Israel by “the Pentagon”, and to the “many US citizens” who are part of the Israeli defense forces. He said “Try to correct your image and you will find me a friend”.

30. Sadat said that he was not interested in “harassing” President Carter, but that he doesn’t want to see the day when a US plan emerges based on the Israeli proposal.

31. He said (as he did again several times) “This is my last word”. He continued: “I am not thinking of embarrassing my friend, President Carter. Weizman said I should take the credit for a peace settlement, but I said no, I want to pass it on to President Carter. If my decision embarrasses him tell him I have no other choice, and let American public opinion note what the US is doing militarily for Israel.”

32. At one point Sadat said “I might at some point have to tell the Israelis to go to hell. You must ask them if they are ready to drop this land issue.”

33. I assured Sadat that I would report his remarks fully but that I would like to make a few personal comments. I first of all assured him that President Carter fully reciprocates his friendship. I added that I appreciated his frustration at the slowness of negotiations but that I was convinced that they would be even slower if the US were not involved. Sadat picked this up immediately and said, “Yes, the US does have a role, and it should play it now.”

34. I asked to make another personal point. I had said at the beginning of our meeting that I was hopeful, but I don’t see how I can remain hopeful if we can’t together figure out how to keep the peace process alive. I reminded him that President Carter, in the letter I had just delivered, reiterated the commitment he had given at Camp David, but that I did not see how we could play our promised role in a vacuum.

35. Sadat responded by saying this was very logical, but that the Arab-Israeli conflict is different from any other problem in the world because Israel is occupying Arab land and intends to keep much of it, which is not acceptable in today’s world. Referring to a subject obviously very much on his mind, he asked that we not put him in the position of receiving letters stating that Israel is not prepared to give something for nothing. He is obviously deeply offended by implication that what he has offered with respect to peace and security is “nothing”.¹⁶

36. Sadat described his frustration with first the Leeds talks, then the Israeli Knesset debate involving the new three-point formulation, and finally and most importantly the Cabinet decision on the El-Arish idea and the manner in which it was made public and then conveyed to him by subsequent letter. He described the current moment as “the final touch of my November initiative.”

37. I told Sadat that I thought he would see that our ideas are close to the Egyptian position in many respects. I said it would be a shame to break off now after coming this close. I meant coming close to presenting our ideas, but he interpreted my statement as meaning coming close to agreement, and dismissed what I said by insisting that the two proposals were never close. He referred to the Israeli strategy as a “cat and mouse game” and said he wondered when they would finally admit it.

38. Ambassador Eilts asked Sadat if it would not be possible for him to say in reply to the Israeli message that Egypt had already offered its quid pro quo in the form of normalizing relations, and to make good use of it in the current context. Eilts said that Sadat could point out that Israel had been offered everything it had asked and that this would be a very strong card to play at this time. Sadat replied that if the parties were to meet now, their positions would be unbalanced, since Begin has stated that he could not give anything for nothing.

39. I pointed out that President Carter feels that he has a very firm commitment to Sadat but that he also feels that if he is to carry out that commitment he needs a negotiating context in which to do so. I added that there may be a serious problem before us. I said that as I read President Carter’s letter, a final decision on attendance at the next round of talks is desired from Egypt before final plans can be made for the Secretary’s travel. I also asked, as I had previously of Kamel, if it might not be possible for Sadat to state that the U.S. sees new elements in the Israeli position and that, on that basis, Egypt would attend further talks.

40. Kamel tried to state that the President had made it clear that either the U.S. make a compromise proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or propose what amounts to the Egyptian position for further negotiations. Sadat, however, cut him off in mid-sentence and said “No! We are dropping the issues of land and sovereignty from the negotiations.”

41. Sadat said gravely that we have reached a “very decisive moment.” He agreed that there was indeed a new development, but that it was a negative one, and referred again to Begin’s sending the Cabinet decision rejecting “something for nothing” through the U.S.

42. Sadat said “We have reached a climax.” He asked that I inform President Carter of his judgment that Begin will never make peace. He added, “When they have the freedom to take decisions like this (referring again to the “something for nothing” letter), I also have the freedom to take decisions.”

43. He said that Israel is like a “spoiled child, wanting to have its own way whatever the consequences for those around it.” He said, however, that he is still optimistic, since the day will come when Israel will realize what it has lost. “I feel from God that in the end I shall win the battle.”

44. Ambassador Eilts asked Sadat to clarify his present thinking on an American proposal. Sadat suggested in response that President Carter would be well advised not to have the U.S. indulge in details. He suggested rather that we switch to broad outlines and ask the parties to negotiate the details.

45. Sadat then suggested what these broad outlines might include at this juncture, citing (A) no acquisition of territory by force; (B) no settlements (reminding us that this has been our position) and (C) security arrangements.

46. I asked Sadat again how we could make our proposal when there is no negotiating context in which to make it; when we had proposed Leeds talks we had said we anticipated a further round in the area as well as a visit by the Secretary. Kamel broke in to mention that his instructions for Leeds said that, if nothing positive came out of the talks in England, he should not agree to another meeting. If the U.S. has ideas, Kamel asked, why can’t it make them without another meeting.

47. Sadat again said “This is the climax.” He added “Take your time in this climax, but don’t do anything that would distort your image here in the area.”

48. Eilts then reviewed the strategy that we have had in mind from the beginning: Leeds, my visit, the Secretary’s trip and another meeting. Hermann¹⁷ said that we have had no illusion that Egypt and Israel alone can make much progress. Without another meeting, however, the U.S. will be seen to be imposing a blueprint in no context. This is why we have concluded that another meeting is necessary. Hermann referred to Sadat’s statement that he is now thinking in broader terms and asked, if there were such a statement based on broader terms, could Egypt agree to attend another meeting?

49. Sadat replied that we both have been waiting for new elements. He said that if this happened, “we will study it.” He reminded us that at one point he had alluded to new Israeli elements only because the Secretary asked him to. He then repeated that in the last ten days there have indeed been new elements, but negative ones. First the Leeds talks, with Dayan’s insistence on territorial compromise, and then the Israeli Cabinet’s “something for nothing” decision conveyed through the U.S.

50. Sadat seemed to sum up his current thinking by saying that all he is asking for is a statement to the effect that, in accordance with international legal principles, there should be a balance in the negotiations. Land occupied after 1967 should be dropped from the negotiating context and the parties should sit together in the presence of the U.S. to discuss peace and security measures that will satisfy both sides. Regarding security measures, Sadat said “Things which today seem impossible could become possible.” He also said that, in making such a statement, the U.S. can feel free to insist on any conditions relating to security assurances and normalization of relations. Sadat reiterated that he would advise the U.S. not to indulge itself in details but to deal in broad outlines.

51. Ambassador Eilts observed that it was obvious that Begin’s letter concerning the El-Arish/St. Catherine proposal had upset Sadat.¹⁸ Eilts said he was surprised at this, since that letter reflected an attitude which Sadat had continually been attributing to Israel. Sadat replied that the difference is that “we are now at a turning point.”

52. I said at the end that I agreed with Sadat we were at a decisive moment. I hoped Sadat would reflect on what he planned “to declare,” as he had said, at his press conference after our meeting, and not close the door to further talks. Eilts expressed the hope that Sadat would not say anything that would adversely affect the excellent image he has developed among the American people. Sadat replied that he had in effect already declared his position; “This involves the destiny of the Egyptian people.”

53. In concluding, Sadat told me I would be welcome anytime in Egypt or in his house—whatever happens. He added that he would continue to cherish the close relationship that he has with his dear friend, President Carter, and the American people.

54. Department repeat at its discretion to Embassy Tel Aviv and other posts.

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1981. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. No memorandum of conversation has been found.
3. In telegram 17984 from Cairo, July 30, Ambassador Eilts summarized the meeting with Sadat, which Eilts described as “cordial, but tough.” He noted that Sadat “was very forceful in expounding his position” and that he insisted that Egypt would “not attend another conference with Israelis at any level until and unless they forego in advance claims to Arab land or sovereignty.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1976)
4. See Document 278.
5. Atherton and Eilts first met with Kamel on the evening of July 28; a summary is in telegram 17968 from Cairo, July 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1956) Atheron and Eilts met again with Kamel on the afternoon of July 29; a summary is in telegram 17973 from Cairo, July 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1964)
6. For the Israeli plan, see the Attachment to Document 177 and footnote 6, Document 180. For the U.S. nine points, see the Attachment to Document 238. The Egyptian plan refers to Sadat’s six-point proposal. See footnote 2, Document 259.
7. For Atherton’s meetings in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, see Documents 274 and 275. For his meeting in Israel, see Document 277.
8. See footnotes 5 and 8, Document 277.
9. See Document 265.
10. See footnote 7, Document 277.
11. See footnote 8, Document 277.
12. The transcript of Secretary Vance’s July 23 interview on the ABC News program “Issues and Answers” is in the Department of State Bulletin, September 1978, pp. 13–16.
13. Of the six points, three specifically address security concerns.
14. Begin made the statement on July 24 commenting on the Cabinet’s rejection the previous day of Sadat’s request that Israel return Al Arish and Mount Sinai. (“Israel Says It Would Discuss Status Of West Bank and Gaza in 5 Years,” New York Times, July 25, 1978, p. A1)
15. On July 27, Sadat gave a speech at Alexandria University. Ambassador Eilts provided an analysis of the speech in telegram 17913 from Cairo, July 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780310–0318)
16. A reference to Begin’s comments following the Cabinet’s July 23 rejection of Sadat’s request that Israel return Al Arish and Mount Sinai. Begin ruled out unilateral moves and said, “Nobody can get anything for nothing and this is going to be the policy of Israel.” (William E. Farrell, “Israel Turns Down Appeal From Egypt For Friendly Move,” New York Times, July 24, 1978, p. A1)
17. Hermann Eilts.
18. St. Catherine’s Monastery is located at the foot of Mount Sinai.