Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

273. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the White House¹

London, July 19, 1978, 1740Z

Secto 8070. White House for the President and Dr. Brzezinski only. Subject: Leeds Castle Talks.

1. The first full day of talks at Leeds Castle was considerably more serious and useful than I had anticipated, but it is clear that wide gaps remain. If anything, the candor of the discussion served to illuminate the width of the gaps between them. The setting was particularly conducive to informality, and the talk was as frank and open on the key issues as any I have heard between these parties. I had several chances to meet with both Dayan and Kamel before the talks really began. By then, both sides were prepared to make a serious effort to explain their approaches to the West Bank/Gaza problem.

2. During six hours of talks on Tuesday,² the Egyptian and Israeli delegations went into substantial detail, with only occasional interventions by me, concerning their proposals. Dayan led off with a clear statement that the Israeli plan was not a “take it or leave it” proposition. He emphasized Israel’s readiness to negotiate. He then talked realistically about the basic approach of his government, breaking no new ground, but indicating a willingness to explore many ideas at great length. His bottom line, however, remains that Israel must maintain a security presence in the West Bank/Gaza and that Israelis must have the right to settle and acquire land there. When Kamel asked him, Dayan said he did not believe the Israeli Government could separate security in the West Bank and Gaza from retention of territory. On the right to settle in those areas, he said they must not be treated as foreigners in their historic homeland. At the same time, he insisted that Israel does not want to run the lives of the Palestinian Arabs and went so far as to say that he was prepared to recommend abolishing the military government even if there were no agreement. As usual, Dayan tried hard to find out if Egypt would sign an agreement concerning Sinai and the West Bank/Gaza if Jordan did not join the negotiations. He did not get a clear answer. Kamel simply said that Jordan would join the negotiations once Israel agreed to withdraw.

3. The Egyptian side performed remarkably well, largely due to the efforts of Under Secretary El-Baz, who made a thorough presentation of the thinking behind the Egyptian proposal. By contrast, Kamel spoke only rarely, and as the day wore on he became increasingly exasperated with Dayan’s positions when it became clear that the present Israeli Government does not contemplate giving up a claim to these territories. On the whole, the Egyptians indicated a forthcoming attitude on security arrangements, and presented their concept of a three-stage series of negotiations dealing with the West Bank. These would begin with Egypt and Israel working out broad guidelines. In a second stage, Jordan would join the negotiations to establish the transitional regime, and finally, after the election of a Palestinian council, Palestinian representatives would be included to negotiate the details of a final peace treaty. The Egyptians talk of negotiations on (A) abolition of the military government and election of the Palestinian council, and (B) withdrawal and security arrangements going in parallel. The Egyptians are particularly sensitive to seeing the military occupation ended because they see Begin’s self-rule plan as a means of perpetuating the occupation under another guise.

4. The Israelis were generally impressed with the degree of seriousness demonstrated by the Egyptian delegation. Several of them termed the talks the best that had taken place to date. Both sides have put on the table the hard issues on which they disagree—primarily withdrawal and settlements. However, neither side was in a position to negotiate on them, and the Egyptians felt frustrated that they found no give in the Israeli position. Kamel himself became very emotional toward the end. Kamel basically feels that continuing negotiations of this kind will not produce a change in the Israeli position. Nonetheless, I feel that a useful step has been taken in getting each side to explain in depth its fundamental positions. The quality of the dialogue was surprisingly high and, with one exception, the talks were conducted with tact and restraint on both sides.

5. Wednesday morning I met separately with Dayan and Kamel,³ and we held a summing-up session together this afternoon.⁴ I arranged with them arrangements on follow-on contacts. They will do what is necessary to enable us to come forward with ideas to help break the deadlock. We agreed to say publicly that the Foreign Ministers will report to their governments and that I anticipate there will be further meetings when I go to the area in about two weeks.⁵ Atherton will precede me to help prepare for the next round of talks.

6. In sum, these talks have been substantively useful, but the gaps remain wide. In my statement to the press I will draw a distinction between the quality of the exchanges and the fact that negotiations will continue, on the one hand, and the fact that no progress was made in narrowing the gap between them, on the other. However, I will note that the holding of these serious talks is in a sense progress and that we will have to wait until the next meeting to see whether there has been progress. By that time the parties will have been able to reflect on what has been said and make modification in their proposals. Dayan said at our wrap up session that he expected they would have changes to meet some of the concerns raised by the Egyptians.

7. Since our purpose was to achieve this kind of exchange rather than to conduct hard negotiations in which Sadat and Begin would have to be involved, I believe we achieved what we set out to do. For the Egyptians, withdrawal, the end of occupation, and settlements are central preoccupations. For the Israelis, peace, security and an acknowledgement of special rights for Israelis and for security in the West Bank/Gaza are the key. There are common elements in their approaches to an initial five-year period, but they differ fundamentally on what comes thereafter. We have a lot of hard work ahead.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1656. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.
2. Tuesday was July 18. See Documents 268, 269, and 270.
3. Wednesday was July 19. For Vance’s meeting with Dayan, see Document 271. For Vance’s meeting with Kamel, see Document 272.
4. No memorandum of conversation has been found.
5. A full transcript of Vance’s July 19 press conference is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, September 1978, pp. 39–41.