Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

272. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Kent, England, July 19, 1978, noon

PARTICIPANTS

• Egypt
• Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Foreign Minister
• Ahmed Maher, Foreign Minister’s Chef du Cabinet
• United States
• The Secretary
• Ambassador Eilts, Cairo

The Secretary, who had just come from meeting with Dayan,² told Kamel that he had had a long talk with the Israeli Foreign Minister. The Secretary had told Dayan that the Israelis must face up to the sovereignty and status issues. No solution can be reached until these are resolved. Dayan had to try to put himself in Sadat’s shoes. How could Sadat accept a situation in which it appears that the Israeli occupation continues? This would be unacceptable politically to the Arab world. Dayan, the Secretary said, indicated that he understood the situation. He had acknowledged that the point, when put that way, becomes clearer. Dayan had indicated he would think about it. He would talk to his government. Dayan doubted that there would be any early change in Israel’s views on the status of the territories, but as he had previously indicated, there should at the end of the five-year period be a determination of the status. This, the Secretary noted, was also the thrust of the first question he had asked the Israelis.

Kamel said this was a little more encouraging. He expressed concern, however, that the Israelis will in the transitional period seek to effect a fait accompli by covering the West Bank with settlements. This, Kamel thought, is the Israeli plan. At the end of five years the whole place will be “infested” with Israeli settlements.

Kamel said that he had just received word from Sadat that nothing should be said about further meetings unless something positive comes out of the Leeds meetings. Sadat’s concern coincides with Kamel’s worries. Kamel also expressed concern on Egypt’s image with the non-aligned states if a new meeting is announced in the absence of any progress at Leeds.

The Secretary suggested that, at the conclusion of the meetings, the parties might say that they will report to their governments. Afterwards the Secretary would come to the Middle East in about two weeks’ time. On his part, the Secretary would say that after other parties have reported to their governments, he (the Secretary) expects that they might meet again. Kamel agreed.

Kamel said he thought it was good that the Secretary had told Dayan that the Israelis must confront the status and sovereignty questions. The Secretary noted that Dayan had said this is a matter that should be raised with Begin and the Israeli Cabinet. The Secretary had agreed, indicating these are fundamental issues.

The Secretary noted that Dayan had found the presentation of the Egyptian position lucid and articulate, although Dayan disagreed with some of it. Dayan had described the Egyptian presentation as candid and clear. Kamel noted that the Egyptian delegation is defending a good cause.

The Secretary noted that another point that he had made to Dayan was the distinction between territory and the right to have a limited number of troops on the territory under someone else’s sovereignty. One is a right given by mutual agreement, but the territory belongs to someone else. Kamel asked whether the Secretary was referring to the post-transitional period. The Secretary said both during and after the transitional period. Kamel said GOE had no objection to such an arrangement during the transitional period. What happens afterwards must be left for negotiation. The Secretary said that it is fundamental that there must be withdrawal in terms of sovereignty. This does not mean that the parties cannot have an agreement concerning troop presence. Kamel noted that Dayan had the previous day indicated that the situation should not be like American troops in Germany. He was glad that this distinction had been drawn.

The Secretary thought that Begin’s intentions are quite clear. Maher interjected to say that for Begin the religious and historical argument is the more important. The Secretary agreed, but noted other Israelis are concerned about security. Kamel responded that the GOE accepts this concern and is willing to do its utmost to meet it. GOE believes the Jordanians will be as keen as Egypt about this matter. Even the Palestinians will have an interest in security considerations. The Israeli ambition, Kamel contended, is simple expansion. The Israelis undermine Sadat’s position in Egypt and the Arab world.

The Secretary then reiterated his intention to send Atherton to the area. Kamel said this was agreeable and indicated he would not go to the Belgrade non-aligned conference.³ The Secretary reiterated that, while there had been painful aspects of the meeting, it had been useful. Kamel said he, too, had found it so. He believed the Israelis shared the view. The Secretary noted that questions of the type that had been posed must be put on the table. Kamel agreed that all three parties should do so. The Secretary said this helps him in completing the work according to the strategy that had earlier been discussed with the Egyptians.

The Secretary said he also planned to speak to Dayan about Lebanon prior to the Israeli Foreign Minister’s departure. He would make the point to Dayan that the Israelis should warn the Lebanese Christians not to count on Israeli intervention. Kamel agreed that this was very important. He noted that the situation could explode and engulf the whole area. He wondered whether Begin might be thinking of starting something in Lebanon. The Secretary doubted this. He thought Begin recognizes that if the Lebanese situation explodes, no one can be sure where it will end.

Kamel said that Egyptian delegation might want to sum up its position at the final meeting. The Secretary agreed that this would be useful.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Middle East.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978: Volume II [II]. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eilts on July 27. The meeting took place at Leeds Castle.
2. See Document 271.
3. The Conference of Foreign Ministers of non-aligned countries met in Belgrade July 25–30. During the conference, the Arab League Foreign Ministers met for the first time since Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.