Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

270. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Kent, England, July 18, 1978, 8 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Egypt
• Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Foreign Minister
• Ahmed Maher
• United States
• The Secretary
• Ambassador Eilts, Cairo

The Secretary said he wished to discuss with Kamel how we might proceed. Instead of a large meeting, he thought there should be a bilateral meeting with Kamel and then with Dayan. Early in the afternoon there might be a trilateral meeting with three on each side. Kamel was agreeable.

The Secretary noted that we are moving down the track we had agreed upon. We should not allow ourselves to be diverted. He would come to the area in a few weeks. Kamel said this was agreeable, but then raised the idea of a Foreign/Defense Ministers meeting. He was doubtful about this.

The Secretary indicated his view that such a joint meeting was desirable. He noted that the parties are getting into technical security questions. Kamel wondered whether the joint presence of Dayan and Weizman might not complicate the talks. If technical aspects of security need be discussed, the Egyptian side could include military experts. If the Secretary believes that it should be at the minister level, he would ask Sadat. But, Kamel emphasized, GOE does not want to give the impression that the talks are shifting from the West Bank to Sinai.

Kamel said he would rather postpone any announcement of another meeting until the Secretary comes to the area. In this connection, he had just received new instructions from Sadat not to fix a date or place for another meeting unless the Leeds talks have a positive outcome. Kamel noted that this does not exclude another meeting, since the Secretary believes it will be helpful. He reiterated that it could be announced when the Secretary comes to the area. The Secretary said he also hopes to visit Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

The Secretary said that at such a meeting he would table the US proposal. Kamel suggested that just before the Secretary’s arrival or after he arrives, he might ask the parties to have another meeting. The Secretary noted that if it looks as though no negotiating process is coming out of the Leeds talks, this could give us some difficulties with American public opinion. We will go forward with the mutually agreed upon strategy. It would be helpful if it could be announced at the end of the meeting that he planned to visit the area in two weeks and expects that the parties will meet again. Kamel said that if such an announcement comes from the Secretary, this is agreeable. The Secretary thought he should meet the press for the record and answer questions rather than having a statement. Each delegation could then deal with its national press.

Kamel noted that Egypt has had ample experience with Dayan. Within two weeks, the Israelis will have leaked all kinds of stories. This is embarrassing for Egypt. He promised the Secretary that when the USG invites Egypt, it will attend. In the meantime, however, he asked, “let us save our face”. The Secretary noted that a cable could be sent to President Sadat.

Kamel asked whether, when Atherton comes to the area, he will be talking about the US proposal. He hoped that it would be close to the Egyptian views. The Secretary said it will be close, but there will also be some differences.

Kamel then asked what happens if the Israelis refuse the American proposal once it is tabled. The Secretary said that President Carter intends to make a speech to the nation explaining the proposal. We will also have briefed the Congress. The objective will be to get congressional and American public support, including from leading members of the American Jewish Community. Conceivably, however, the Israelis will still not respond. If that happens, we are thinking of taking the matter to the UNSC. He hoped, however, that a strong USG position might make this unnecessary. Kamel expressed agreement.

The Secretary noted that there will for a time be a counterreaction in Israel. The immediate reaction will be negative. But if there is a strong body of support in the United States for the US proposal, he hoped that the Israelis will eventually come around.

Eilts pointed out to Kamel that we will need Egyptian support in this effort. Kamel assured the Secretary this will be forthcoming. He expressed concern, however, about Egypt’s isolation and the efforts of the Rejectionist Front.² The Secretary asked about the strength of the latter. Kamel observed that Egypt cares a bit for Syria, but is not concerned about the others. In the Arab world, Egypt cares most for the Saudis and Jordan. If they will support Egypt, the others will follow suit.

The Secretary asked whether Numayri is supportive. Kamel said Numayri is still with Egypt. He then spoke about his talks with Saud bin Faysal. The latter had argued that Begin will not show any more flexibility and that the Sadat initiative should be ended. The Secretary observed that the Saudis have no comprehension of American Congressional requirements. Kamel agreed and recalled he had told Saud bin Faysal that Egypt would attend the conference not for Begin, but for the United States. GOE must help the United States to consolidate its public opinion. After the Israeli replies to the American questions had been received, Saud bin Faysal had noted, “you see what has happened”. Kamel had insisted that the Saudis give the Egyptians opportunity for another round of talks. Saud bin Faysal had not commented on this.

The Secretary described Saud bin Faysal as important and able. But Saud does not understand how to mold US public opinion or deal with Congress. Kamel agreed. Saud bin Faysal, he observed, had said that if the Sadat initiative is jettisoned, this is not the end of everything. The Arabs could collectively, and in accordance with the Rabat Conference, go to Geneva.

Speaking personally, Kamel said that he feels humiliated. He described himself as a proud man. The Egyptian people had placed all their hopes in the United States. If something is not achieved in a reasonable period, Egyptian relations with the Saudis and other moderate Arabs will suffer. Egyptian relations with the Soviets, Kamel said, are “zero”. Hence the United States is the only one left to whom the Egyptians can look for help.

The Secretary assured Kamel that we will help. He had told Saud bin Faysal that we have never failed the Saudis, we will never fail Egypt. On timing, we have worked this out with Sadat and are on schedule. The Saudis should not tell us what the timetable should be.

Kamel referred to Sadat’s idea of sending Egyptian troops to the West Bank. (He did not like the idea.) He contended that the Israelis wished to isolate Egypt and eventually get the United States out of the negotiating process. Kamel said he was tough and could endure anything if there is prospect of success. He cared for his country and for Sadat. If anything happened to Sadat, Egypt is in trouble. The Secretary again assured him that we are on the time schedule which had previously been discussed.

Kamel referred to Dayan’s statements earlier in the day. Dayan had not hidden the fact that Israel wants to keep the West Bank or divide it with the Palestinians. The Secretary said it was important that the Egyptian position had been tabled. Dayan had heard it from us, but not directly. Kamel called Israel “expansionist” and “racist”. He likened Begin to Hitler. As with Hitler, appeasement of Begin is bad.

The Secretary noted that Senators Ribicoff and Javits had stressed the need to get talks started again. Kamel observed that if nothing happens, the Soviets will be strengthened in the area. He also expressed his concern that a “group of officers” might stage something in Egypt. The Soviets, he noted, are after Sadat. They are working with Qadhafi and others to this end. If Sadat is strongly backed by the United States, Kamel thought the President would be able to carry the day. The Secretary assured Kamel that we strongly support Sadat.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978: Volume II [II]. Secret; Exdis. The meeting took place at Leeds Castle.
2. See footnote 3, Document 78.