Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

269. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Kent, England, July 18, 1978, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Middle East Discussions at Leeds Castle

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Hon. Alfred L. Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
• Hon. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Hon. Samuel Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
• Hon. Hermann Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
• Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff Member
• Mr. Michael Sterner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
• H.E. Moshe Dayan, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• H.E. Aharon Barak, Attorney General
• H.E. Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to U.S.
• Mr. Meir Rosenne
• Mr. Naphtali Lavie
• Mr. Eli Rubenstein
• H.E. Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• H.E. Usama al-Baz, Under Secretary
• Mr. Abdalrauf al-Ridi
• Mr. Nabil al-Arabi

Secretary Vance began with a review of the similarities that he detected in the Egyptian and the Israeli proposals. In response, Foreign Minister Dayan described the Israeli proposal as not being a “take it or leave” proposition. He stressed that the Hebrew word for “self-rule” was really closer in meaning to “self-governing”. This means that Israel does not want to interfere in the lives of the Palestinian Arabs. Rather, Israel wants to live alongside them. The Israeli proposal deals with the ending of the military regime. The Palestinian Arabs will be able to govern themselves. The situation will be ended where Israel controls the situation through the military regime. After five years, the situation will be reviewed. Minister Dayan said that he was not sure that everything could be foreseen now, but that a start should be made and that the situation should be reviewed later. Dayan went on to say that the Israelis make a distinction among the parties to the negotiations and the parties to an eventual agreement. The negotiations should take place among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Arabs, but an eventual agreement would deal with the relations only among Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Arabs. The four parties would make the decisions and would maybe review the situation, but the actual relations would only be among the three parties.

Attorney General Barak emphasized that the Israeli plan was sui generis and for a sui generis situation. Israel recognizes that there are different claims to sovereignty in Judaea and Samaria. Israel has a claim, but it recognizes that other claims exist. Therefore, the question of sovereignty over the territory should be left open. The Israeli plan deals with the problem of people. It deals with the Palestinian Arabs residing there. It also helps Israel solve its problems. The plan should provide a solution to the problems of the Palestinian Arabs in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. Israel does not want to rule them. They should rule themselves. But this should be done without solving the territorial question. The Israeli approach takes into account existing economic ties. There is also the problem of the Palestinian Arab refugees outside. Israel does recognize that some refugees may come back.

Dayan expanded on the question of refugees. Most of them are not originally from the West Bank and Gaza. Israel is willing to let the West Bank and Gaza absorb some of the refugees, but realistically one should recognize that people are already leaving these areas. Israel has no objection if they can come back and make a living. But Israel does not want to simply see the refugee camps transferred from one area to the West Bank and Gaza.

Attorney General Barak explained that there would be a relationship between the administrative council and Jordan. In addition, the Palestinian Jews would remain responsible for questions of security and public order. These would be Israel’s responsibilities. If there are riots that threaten the security of Israel, then Israel should be able to act. This is a flexible concept, and it would require more careful definition, particularly concerning the concept of public order. For Israelis it is important to be able to go to the West Bank and not feel like they are going to a foreign country. Israelis should be able to buy land freely. They will not expropriate land. State-owned land should be left open. Foreign Minister Kamel asked to which state Barak was referring. Barak said that the land belonged to Jordan before and was now under the authority of the military governor. Minister Kamel asked if this meant that Israel is occupying the land now that it controls these state lands. Barak replied that under international law the occupying authority assumed that responsibility. Kamel said that there was a difference between administration and ownership. Barak explained that Israel did not want it to be forbidden for Israelis to buy land from private owners or to buy land in the public domain. Secretary Vance asked in whom the title of the government land would be vested during the five-year transitional period. Barak replied that there were several possible legal solutions. The land could belong to the military governor or to the administrative council. This would be a political decision. If the land belonged to the administrative council, one would have to answer the question of what would happen if the administrative council refused to sell land to an Israeli? Israel would object to any such prohibition. There cannot be a taboo on selling to Israelis. But the actual ownership of the land can be discussed.

Minister Dayan described the present situation as one in which the occupying authority has taken over the land from Jordan. But the military regime will be abolished, so state-owned lands can then be dealt with through several means. It still needs to be agreed upon. But Israelis should have the right to buy land and to sell and to not be foreigners. But Israel will not use force to get land. The Israelis want to have the same rights as any citizen of Nablus. Attorney General Barak explained that the military governor would delegate his authority to the administrative council. The United States had asked about the evolution of authority as coming from a peace agreement. This is not foreclosed. Minister Kamel said that there were too many open questions. Barak said that this was the reason the parties should sit down and talk.

Barak explained that the Israeli self-rule plan is not meant to be transitory, but at the same time it is not fixed forever. Rather it is a plan which includes a provision for reviewing all elements after five years. If the question of sovereignty should be discussed, that would be all right. Everything can be reviewed. The plan says that it is open for review, but in this respect it can be viewed as transitional. Security, public order, and other issues can be raised after five years by each party. Israel does not know if the problems raised after five years will be solved. That depends, but everything can be reviewed. Much is left open. There may be defects in the plan as it stands, but these can all be reviewed. The parties should sit down and discuss options. And they should look for political solutions.

Dayan added several additional points. The provisions in the Israeli plan are in the nature of suggestions. For example, Israel has made suggestions on how the administrative council should be elected. But if the Palestinian Arabs don’t want this, that is up to them. That is not an essential point. The essential question that should remain open is the status of Israel in the territories. This involves the right to settle and to buy land, not just for the five years, but beyond. Israel wants to be able to live there. These are the essential questions and the most difficult. Israel is saying let’s have five years, by agreement. Everything will then be subject to review. There are parallels in the Egyptian and Israeli proposals. For example, both agree that it is up to the Palestinian Arabs to assume responsibility in the area and that the military government should be abolished. The same wording is almost used. We also say that it will be some time before the Palestinians can take over entirely, and we both mentioned five years or so. We don’t have the same idea, but we both say that the Palestinian Arabs should run their own lives and that it will take some time to be able to do so. We also agree that some questions should be put off until after five years. We should not have too many open questions. The technical questions are not so important. But there are a few important questions, namely sovereignty and Israeli rights in the areas. Israel does not want to answer all of these questions now, but would like to leave some of them until after five years.

Foreign Minister Kamel expressed his pleasure at being invited to these talks. Egypt willingly came with an open mind and an open heart. He thanked Attorney General Barak for explaining the Israeli position, but noted that all of this had been covered seven months ago. Talks should not take place in a vacuum. The parties are here to implement Resolution 242. The Israeli proposal is not based on Resolution 242 at all. It is completely ignored. This is the main point. Israel’s concern should be security and Egypt’s concern is with Israeli withdrawal. We welcomed talks on the basis of the implementation of Resolution 242. But Israel has made no mention of 242 and its answers to the American questions were not satisfactory. The Minister said that he would ask Under Secretary al-Baz to explain the Egyptian views on the Israeli proposal and to set forward the Egyptian plan based on Resolution 242. The Minister said that he had his reservations about what Attorney General Barak said about sovereignty and Israel’s plans. This is land that is inhabited by the Palestinian people and the right to sovereignty is inherent in the people who live there.

Under Secretary al-Baz then gave an overview of the Egyptian proposal. He expressed a willingness to explore all issues with the Israelis. He noted that the Egyptian proposal starts with the centrality of the Palestinian question. The dispute cannot be solved without solving this question. It must be addressed honestly and squarely. The Israelis seem to recognize this point. If an effort is made to solve part of the problem without the Palestinians, the rest will be vulnerable. The Israeli self-rule proposal is not a valid basis for an agreement. Egypt’s position is not one of absolute rejection. Egypt has tried to study the Israeli proposal, but there are two points that bother Egypt. First, it ignores the territorial question. This is glossed over. The Israelis only deal with the problems of the people, even referring to them as residents only. Minister Dayan said that this use of words had no special meaning. Israel simply wanted to deal with the people whose homeland is the West Bank and Gaza. Al-Baz said this use of words had made the Palestinians very angry. They seem to be only treated as temporary residents. Barak said that the word in Hebrew could be translated as inhabitants. Al-Baz said that this would be a better formulation. In any case, the question had to do with the Palestinian people.

The basic premises of the Israeli approach are not acceptable to the Palestinian people. Egypt wants a solution that can be sold to the Palestinians. Egypt is not going to have to live with Israel in the West Bank and Gaza. And Egypt cannot be the one to impose a solution on the Palestinians. But Egypt can try to help make any solutions attractive to the Palestinians. No Palestinian yet has accepted the idea of self-rule. It is seen as a sham, a hoax. This view is shared by all Arabs. This is seen as a way of avoiding the question of self-determination, a concept that has had legal and political importance since World War II. There seems to be a contradiction in the Israeli approach. They talk of ending their control over the lives of the residents of Judaea and Samaria, but they want to keep the occupation. Israel says it wants to abolish the military government, but it also wants to keep the military occupation. They want to ignore the day-to-day affairs of the people, but they want to control their existence. They want to have a super-imposed presence.

Al-Baz said that on these two points, the territory and the lack of self-determination, the Israeli proposal is not valid as a basis for negotiation to solve the problem. There is a third point. Egypt has hoped that it could help solve the problem, by putting forward a proposal of its own. It has tried to build on the positive ideas in the Israeli proposal. Egypt has put forward its proposal in the knowledge that the authority to sign an agreement rests with the Palestinian people, but Egypt wants to help overcome the dilemma that exists. The Arab/Israeli conflict cannot be solved unless the Palestinian problem is solved. But the Palestinians are not yet present. So Egypt must address the problem and take responsibility. It is very hard to get support for the Egyptian ideas, but it is in Egypt’s interests to encourage Palestinian moderates. Egypt wants to encourage Palestinians who will be prepared to co-exist with Israel. Egypt hopes that Palestinians will support the Egyptian approach. Once the Palestinians join the negotiations, it will be easier to get into detailed questions. Now it is important to get the settlement process started. The Egyptian proposals had been made in the spirit of compromise with the objective of finding a settlement. All of the general principles concerning the framework should apply. Egypt is not talking about a separate peace agreement. This is one aspect of a comprehensive agreement. Egypt will not negotiate a separate agreement on the West Bank and Gaza or on the Sinai. This must be an integral part of a comprehensive settlement.

Dayan asked if by comprehensive the Egyptians meant that a settlement must include the Syrians as well. Al-Baz said that the general principles had to apply to that front as well. Al-Baz went on to state that Resolution 242 is already an accepted framework. It exists and it can be used. This should be kept intact, and added to if necessary and improved, but we should start from some common ground. 242 has been accepted by Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and many Palestinians. If we drop 242, there will be a vacuum; and the parties will not meet. Each side has its objections, but the elements of 242, particularly withdrawal and security, must be kept in balance. The Egyptian proposal is based on this balance of 242. It does not try to deal with tangential questions, such as the self-rule proposal does, but only focuses on the essential points. The details should come up after the Palestinians and the Jordanians have joined the negotiations. The focus should be on the essential elements, not on theoretical questions. We should discuss matters in political terms, not from a legal standpoint. The political picture is based on our wanting to reach a solution, not on writing a document which can be defended in a court of law. Egypt wants a real agreement, and not just some publicity in the United Nations or Geneva. There has to be a balance of withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and commitments to meet Israel’s security needs. Your needs are no greater for security than ours, since the Arabs also feel threatened. But with Israel’s history and her militaristic attitude, and the type of society Israel has, Sadat has recognized that for psychological reasons your need for security is greater than ours. So we do try to reassure. We have talked about six points of security: we have suggested demilitarized zones, limited force zones, United Nations forces, early warning systems, such as those in Sinai, a guarantee of innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, and, most important, the normalization of relations and open borders and peaceful coexistence. It is important to eliminate hostilities. (A coffee break of approximately twenty minutes followed. The talks resumed at 11:45 a.m.)

Minister Kamel stated forcefully that the main problem can be solved quickly if Israel commits herself to withdrawal. Then everything else can be worked out. Dayan replied that the problem was not so simple. We are dealing with human beings. He referred to a recent interview by the Iraqi vice president. In that interview, Saddam Hussein said that even if there were peace, Iraq would not accept Israel. There would always be war. So the Israeli leaders cannot tell their people that they can take risks when this is still the concept of the Iraqis. Israelis believe in the honesty of the Egyptians, but they also think that Iraq means what it says. The Syrians have also been reluctant in their acceptance of 242. There are different schools of thought in the Arab world. Maybe the best would be to make a clear decision now, but Dayan stated his belief that it would be better to live together for a few years, and let things change. He mentioned that he had recently met the British general who had been involved in the Suez campaign. He had asked him whether the British would ever go to war over Suez now. The General said that he could not explain today why Britain had gone to war in 1956. So in a little more than twenty years everything had changed. This is the reality of life. It is not practical to try to make a decision in five minutes. The Israeli people won’t agree right now to pack up and leave the West Bank and Gaza while they still read of Arab hostility and hatred. Israelis can’t yet imagine a French-German type of relationship. They have to get used to peace. And they have to change their concept of what is important. Maybe it would be easiest to solve problems quickly, but it is just not feasible. We should remember the British general. He now thinks the whole concept of Suez was wrong.²

Minister Kamel said that the Israelis should listen to radio Cairo not radio Baghdad. Perhaps decisions could not be made overnight, but an agreement could be reached. If the parties simply kept talking about their fears, they would never get anywhere. The Iraqis would continue with their line. Mr. al-Baz said that the Israeli people could be convinced that the Egyptians are prepared to accept them wholeheartedly. This can only be done, however, if there is a fair deal with no grudges remaining. If Egypt were neutralized in this sense, then the conflict would essentially end. The Palestinians and the Jordanians would also end their hostility, and even Syria some day. We could ultimately get them involved, even if not now and not here. Mr. al-Baz said that the Israelis should understand the domestic situation in Syria. Much of the Syrian public opinion supports Sadat, and this will make it easy eventually for the Syrians to join. Egypt has presented valid elements to deal with security. Egypt wants to hear Israel’s reactions to these, and any additions that they might want to make. Egypt is bothered by the lack of any concepts for security other than the occupation of land and territory.

Mr. al-Baz invited Israeli comments on these points. In the Egyptian proposal, Egypt is expressing a readiness to assume its obligations. Will Israel accept her obligations and withdraw? Does Israel envisage an eventual withdrawal, even if not now? When would this happen? There is an obligation stemming from Resolution 242 and from international law for Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza. Israel has the rights of an occupying power, and we want now to end that occupation. Occupation is the highest form of violence, because it is collective violence; and it creates tension. It is therefore very costly, and Egypt wants to end this form of violence. This will provide an incentive for the Palestinians to change their resistance from a violent means to a political means. The extremists will lose support. Israel is going too far in its interpretation of its legal rights as an occupying power. Israel has administrative control over the occupied territory so that it can eventually turn that territory over to others intact. There have been many resolutions protesting any demographic changes. Israel is in these territories temporarily, not in perpetuity. If Israel is to stay in perpetuity, then it is annexation. The Palestinians will not accept coexistence with Israel if there is annexation, nor will the other Arabs. One element of the Egyptian draft involves the idea that there should not be an abrupt or chaotic transfer of authority. Egypt is not seeking a sudden change or a violent change. Egypt has accepted the idea of gradual transformation. Most Arabs were surprised that Egypt would accept a five-year transitional period, but Israel wants an orderly change which will eliminate the prospects of chaos. If Israel has ideas on how to make the transfer more orderly, Egypt is willing to listen. But there is one overriding factor. This temporary arrangement during the five-year period must be replaced by a final agreement which is acceptable to the Arabs and Palestinians. The Israeli occupation must end and there must be withdrawal. Matters would evolve gradually and we could get things to work simultaneously. But we must see the end of the tunnel. Incentives must be provided to the moderate elements to be cooperative. The third point in the Egyptian proposal refers to enlarged talks, which would include Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians. There are a number of points on which these talks would concentrate. Egypt wants the cooperation of the Palestinians in these talks.

Dayan asked if Mr. al-Baz was referring to the inhabitants of the area or not necessarily so. Al-Baz replied that the Israelis have said that there is room for the Palestinians to be absorbed in the West Bank and Gaza. It is immaterial to speak now of which Palestinians would negotiate. The West Bank and Gaza would be represented by people who opt to go back to that area. Egypt is speaking of those Palestinians who accept to be part of the peace process. They either now live in the West Bank and Gaza or they plan to do so in the future. They should have a role. Some issues cannot be dealt with in their absence. They will be needed for the implementation of any agreement. Egypt would like to know if there are other issues in addition to those mentioned in the third point of the Egyptian proposal that should be dealt with in the enlarged negotiations.

It is also envisaged in the Egyptian proposal that both Egypt and Jordan would continue to assume certain responsibilities—Egypt in the Gaza Strip, and Jordan in the West Bank—along with the Palestinians. This is meant to facilitate the transition. The last paragraph also says that Egypt and Jordan will guarantee security arrangements. These would be continuing arrangements. This goes beyond Egypt’s commitment to help with the interim administration. As a guarantor, Egypt would be legally bound to uphold the agreement. If Israel has a guarantee from the Arab states most directly involved, this should provide an element of reassurance. So this is seen by us as an added element of security. Egypt and Jordan can keep the Palestinians from violating the agreement.

Mr. al-Baz suggested that the two proposals be examined. There are some areas of agreement. In order to narrow the gap further, the essential aspects will have to be dealt with first. This involves providing security for Israel and withdrawal for the Arabs. If there is such an agreement, then it will be easier to narrow the gap on the other details. The parties should not beat around the bush on minor details. The Egyptian proposal focuses on ending the occupation and providing security for Israel which will lead to real peace. Egypt is convinced that the continuation of the occupation is a threat to peace. The occupation now stands in the way of peace. It is a continued source of insecurity. The recurring theme in the self-rule proposal is the continuation of Israeli control. There is no assurance that the situation will ever change. Israel is committed to a review, but this does not rule out an Israeli veto. So Israel can perpetuate the status quo if she wants. When Israel talked about future relations in its answers to the Americans, what does this mean? Is this only the status of the people, or is it the territory, or is it a combination?

Foreign Minister Dayan congratulated Mr. al-Baz for the clarity of his presentation. He then asked a question based on the assumption that Egypt and Israel might reach agreement on the Palestinian issue whether it took five minutes or five days. Would Egypt be prepared to sign a peace treaty with Israel concerning Sinai and the West Bank and Gaza, or just Gaza, even if Jordan does not join the negotiations? Is Egypt ready to make two peace treaties, one for Sinai and one for the West Bank and Gaza, or just Gaza? Foreign Minister Dayan also asked if the Egyptians are ready to accept Israel’s proposal on the Sinai as a basis for negotiation, or is it absolutely unacceptable?

Dayan said that the two parties had been in contact for months. Israel had thought that her proposal on Sinai would be acceptable to Egypt as a fair basis for negotiation.³ If not, Israel is prepared to withdraw its proposal and to start again. If Egypt does not accept the proposal, Egypt should tell Israel so and they can start fresh without this proposal. Minister Kamel replied that the parties were tackling the Palestinian question, the West Bank and Gaza, and that it was therefore not appropriate to talk about the Sinai. He requested that the discussion continue to focus on the West Bank and Gaza.

Dayan returned to his first question. If Jordan does not join the negotiations, but Egypt and Israel have reached agreement, will Egypt make a peace treaty with Israel concerning the West Bank and Gaza? Mr. al-Baz replied that we should cross that bridge when we come to it. It is a hypothetical question. Diplomats must work with possibilities. Everything is possible. But we should work on the assumption that Jordan and the Palestinians, and ultimately the Syrians, will be joined in the negotiations if we establish a framework that will be attractive to them. Egypt will sign an agreement at some point, a peace treaty, and we are still talking now of future negotiations among the four parties. If we get there and Jordan does not cooperate, then we will have to consider our course of action. This also applies to the Palestinians, but there is no reason for them to refuse to join. Jordan’s goal is to get security also. Jordan will be under a moral obligation to help facilitate the achievement of peace in the West Bank. King Hussein is favorable to this. There is no reason now to think that Jordan will be uncooperative, nor will the Palestinians. They both aim to end the conflict. Egypt’s obligations will not end with the signing of an agreement. If Egypt and Israel can reach preliminary agreement, then Egypt will work to bring in the others. Minister Kamel said that the only thing that prevents Jordan from joining the negotiations would be a lack of Israeli commitment to withdrawal. If Israel gives such a commitment, Egypt can guarantee that Jordan will be there. This will be very important. Israel should not worry about their joining the negotiations.

Attorney General Barak noted that when he had last seen Sadat and Gamasy, he had gained the impression that Egypt was prepared to sign an agreement on the Palestinian issue, and that then would make it possible to sign an agreement on Sinai as well. Barak said that he had the impression that al-Baz was saying that Egypt’s position had changed. He asked for clarification. Al-Baz said that agreements could be signed more or less simultaneously. The time of signature was not so important. If an agreement could be reached on the West Bank and Gaza, an agreement on Sinai would not take long to negotiate. In Egypt’s proposal, Egypt will be involved in talks among the four parties on the West Bank and Gaza, while simultaneously being involved in negotiations on the Sinai front. There doesn’t have to be any rigid link between the signing of the documents. Secretary Vance tried to clarify the area of discussion by saying that he had the impression that if there were an agreement on the West Bank and Gaza, Egypt would contemporaneously negotiate and sign an agreement on the Sinai. Minister Kamel said that after the Jordanians and the Palestinians join the talks, then Egypt will proceed with the Sinai negotiations. Al-Baz said that a Sinai agreement might be ahead of the other agreement, but in any case this would not be a problem.

Dayan said that it was possible that Jordan might not want to sign until Syria signs. Jordan would not want to betray Syria. The situation might develop where agreement is reached, but Jordan is not ready to sign a peace treaty because of Syria. Then Israel would ask if everything depends on reaching a peace treaty with Syria. This is different from agreeing that the principles would apply to the Syrian front. Israel is worried that Egypt would then say that there could be no agreement on the Sinai without the Palestinians, there can be no agreement with the Palestinians without Jordan, and there can be no agreement with Jordan without Syria. Kamel replied that Jordan will join the negotiations if Israel commits itself to withdraw. Jordan is not tied to Syria.

Dayan asked about the stages of negotiations on the Palestinian question. Egypt seems to want an agreement in principle first, then discussion on details. At the outset, after the first stage of agreement, the Israeli military regime is to be abolished. Does Egypt envisage two different kinds of agreements between Egypt and Israel after the principles have been worked out? Will the final details only be worked out in a peace treaty, or is it enough to have agreement on principles first and on the mechanism by which further negotiations will proceed? Dayan also noted that in the six points of security for Israel, there was no provision for Israeli forces in the West Bank. Suppose Israel says that she wants some Israeli forces in the Jordan Valley and in Gaza, under Israeli command. Then we may not reach agreement, but we should have some mechanism for eventually agreeing. But you see these troops as a form of occupation. If we can’t reach agreement because of differences such as these, will this block a peace treaty? Would the peace treaty be the final stage in the negotiations? When will the Palestinians be committed to a peace treaty? We are not talking about a state or a government, so what is their signature worth, and who will they be? Who will represent the Palestinians? After five years, Egypt will leave and Jordan will give the West Bank to the Palestinians. The Palestinians will be the neighboring state in the Egyptian concept. Maybe you see the Palestinian Arabs as the party for making peace with Israel. At what stage does that happen? Can security be discussed during the five years? What kind of agreement will be reached at the end of the five years? Should a peace treaty be signed with Palestinian Arabs at the end of this period? Now Israel is negotiating with Egypt, not with the Palestinians.

Minister Kamel said that the Palestinians should be part of the negotiations from the beginning, after the abolition of the military government, and after the Palestinian council is formed. The Palestinian authority will have two roles. They will administer the West Bank and Gaza, and they will delegate representatives from the council to represent them in negotiations. They will participate in the negotiations working on the time table of withdrawal. By then adequate security measures should also be in effect. The Palestinians should be in the negotiations along with Egypt. Dayan asked if there would be any agreement reached before the abolition of the military regime. Minister Kamel said that we should get Jordan involved first, and then the Palestinians later. He replied positively to Minister Dayan’s question concerning whether this would take place before the abolition of the military government. Dayan summarized by saying that he understood first there would be agreement between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt, the Jordanians, and the Palestinians. Then there would be negotiations which would then lead to abolition of the military regime. But he did not know what kind of peace agreement there would be. Would there be an agreement first, or just a set of principles? Would the military government be abolished first, before a peace agreement, or later? How many agreements does Egypt envisage?

In reply, Mr. al-Arabi put forward Egypt’s ideas on how to carry forward the negotiations. Egypt has presented its plan as a basis for initial agreement. Then Jordan should join the negotiations. This would provide the basis for a preparatory meeting to agree on certain kinds of arrangements. The transitional period would not start immediately, but rather there would be a preparatory phase involving only Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. During this phase, the parties would decide on when the transitional period would begin; when the military government would be abolished; a UN role in the election of the Palestinian authorities; and an introduction of UN forces. All this should be discussed before the transitional period begins. In the next phase, there would be the transitional period, the elections, and the Palestinians would send their representatives to a meeting of the four parties—Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians. That would be the sequence of the negotiations. Minister Dayan asked whether the first stage was to get an agreement on general principles. Is Israel correct in assuming that until general agreement is reached, there would be no abolition of the military government?

Mr. al-Arabi explained that the first step was to reach general agreement on principles. Then Jordan would join the negotiations for a preparatory phase. The Palestinians would not be part of these discussions. They would try to reach agreement on when the transitional regime should begin, how elections should be carried out, and what the UN role would be, and how to end the military rule. After agreement had been reached among these three parties, then the Palestinians would join the talks. Minister Dayan asked a further clarifying question as to whether the negotiations on security would take place after the election of a Palestinian authority and the abolition of military rule. Will there be a peace treaty among Egypt, Israel, and Jordan after the abolition of the military regime? Mr. al-Arabi asked whether Israel would want to sign a final peace treaty before knowing what the security arrangements were. Mr. Kamel said that he envisaged an agreement among the three parties which would lead to negotiations on a final peace treaty. Dayan said that in his view Israel would be prepared to sign a peace treaty as long as Israeli forces still remained in control. Israel could sign a peace treaty as long as it was understood that no withdrawal would take place until Israel agreed.

Mr. al-Arabi said the end of the military rule must be the end of military occupation. During the preparatory phase, decisions should be made on what happens to Israeli military forces in the next stage.

Dayan asked whether the end of the military regime also means withdrawal, with only security arrangements for Israel to be agreed upon later. He tried to summarize his understanding that there would be three agreements. First an agreement in principle just with Egypt, then an agreement which would include Jordan on how to begin the transitional regime, but this would not include full peace treaties. Then there would be a final peace agreement including arrangements for security, the time table for withdrawal, and so forth. Mr. al-Arabi confirmed that this sequence is what Egypt has in mind.

Dayan asked about the reference to UN General Assembly Resolutions concerning the refugees in the Egyptian proposal. Israel also has claims for its refugees. Israel does agree that representatives of the Palestinian refugees should be involved in talks concerning the refugee problem. But for the first time Egypt is referring specifically to UN Resolutions. How does Egypt see the refugee problem being solved? Israel will not be bound by UN Resolutions on refugees. Israel only accepts Resolution 242 which refers to the refugee problem. Why is it necessary to refer to the UN Resolutions which Israel will not support? Minister Kamel asked why Israel refused to be bound by UN Resolutions on the refugees. Dayan replied that there were many resolutions of the UN which Israel did not accept. Kamel said that he assumed that the problem for Israel was only one of security. Dayan said that this was not true. Arafat has his own plan that all the refugees should go back. He wants one state for everyone. The Palestinians would be a majority under his concept, and this would mean the end of the state of Israel. Israel does not reject the idea of some kind of compensation, although it should be for Jewish and Arab refugees, and Israel does not reject the idea of repatriation of some individual Palestinian Arab refugees. Israel assumes that if many Palestinians wanted to return to Israel that this would change the nature of the state and Israel would become a bi-national state. Dayan personally favors solving the refugee problem. There cannot be a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict without solving the refugee problem. But this cannot be done at the expense of Israel. Most of the refugees should be resettled in Arab countries, such as Jordan. And they should not go back to Israel. If this is an essential point of the Egyptian proposal, it would add a new dimension.

Mr. al-Baz termed this a very useful exchange. He said that Egypt sees the UN Resolutions as a valid basis for a solution. Egypt can discuss modalities for implementing these UN Resolutions, including numbers, procedures, and any restrictions. But if these resolutions are not valid, Israel has a duty to explain why. The United States has submitted ideas of its own concerning refugees. This was even part of the Rogers’ proposal of December 1969,⁴ where both parties were urged to accept that the refugees from the 1967 War would have the choice of repatriation or compensation. Both parties should agree on mutually acceptable means and on numbers who should be returned. This is an example of how the refugee problem could be agreed upon between Egypt and Israel. Dayan reminded Mr. al-Baz that Israel had rejected that approach at the time. Israel does not want to accept it now either. Israel does accept 242, including a just settlement of the refugee problem. But Israel does not want to accept any other UN Resolutions.

Mr. al-Arabi said that there was a question of both refugees and some displaced persons who had left the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. They should be allowed to go back. Egypt is referring to UN Resolution 194 which talks about repatriation and compensation. What can be discussed are the modalities and the numbers, but not the principle. The Palestinians’ own representatives should participate in these discussions. Dayan said that he agreed that displaced persons from the West Bank and Gaza might be allowed to return to the West Bank and Gaza as individuals. Many of them still have relatives. But those who came from refugee camps in Jericho should not simply be returned to their refugee camps. What is the purpose of moving people from one refugee camp to another? If people can be absorbed, that is one thing. But if one is speaking of moving refugee camps that is another. If Palestinians live in Jordan now, it would make more sense to help them resettle in Jordan and to stop being refugees, rather than to bring them back as refugees to Jericho.

Dayan then explained Israel’s view on the nature of future relations after the initial five-year period. The relations among Jordan, the Palestinian Arabs, and Israel will have to be decided. Israel has proposed an autonomy plan. If after five years they say they want a tighter relationship to Jordan, and they don’t want to have their own ministry of education, and they want to be tied to the Jordanian ministry of education, Israel would have no objection. That is the nature of relations that can be decided. Theoretically they can do this with Israel as well, or they can keep things as they are. In some areas, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians should try to work together, such as in agriculture. Negotiations should be worked out among the four parties but the nature of relations only deals with Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Arabs. This is on the assumption that the Palestinian Arabs will accept Jordanian citizenship to the Palestinians in Gaza. Israel assumes that the Gaza Palestinians will also be linked to Jordan. It will be up to the three parties to decide the nature of the relations. Maybe there will be something like a common market. Maybe they will prefer some ties to Israel, or will want to keep their autonomy.

Mr. al-Baz noted that the Israeli approach does not cover the question of ending the Israeli occupation. This is one form of relationships. Israel is now occupying the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli concept presupposes the continuation of the occupation and precludes any form of self-determination. It seems to emphasize the continuation of the status quo. It deals with only some kinds of transactions. Does Israel see its relationship to the West Bank and Gaza as that of a neighbor or as an occupier?

Minister Dayan said that the Israeli proposal does not imply the perpetuation of the status quo. But self-determination is excluded if it involves the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. This is not one of the forms of relations they can choose. Mr. al-Baz asked whether this was simply the present Israeli position, or whether Israel would always exclude an independent Palestinian state. Dayan said that Israel would give an answer after five years. At the end of five years, an independent Palestinian state should be excluded, but other kinds of relations between Israel and Jordan and the self-governing authority could be considered. Mr. al-Baz asked whether a state federated to Jordan was also excluded, and Minister Dayan said it would be excluded if it were really a state. Mr. al-Baz asked whether this meant it would be excluded even if it were not a fully independent state. Dayan said that Israel had not looked at all possibilities, but self-determination should not lead to an independent state. Instead, the parties should deal with the kinds of relations between the West Bank and Gaza, and Israel and Jordan. Secretary Vance asked a clarifying question, saying that he did see that a confederal or a federal solution was the same thing as an independent state.

Dayan said that he could repeat what Israel’s answers to the American questions had been. Israel could talk about relations with Jordan and Israel and the autonomy. But a Palestinian state could not be accepted. Concerning the occupation, Dayan said that if Israel were to withdraw from all of the Arab inhabited centers, and if Israel did not interfere in the daily lives of the Palestinians, but if there were some Israeli soldiers who stayed behind and there were no other forces and if these forces were just there to protect Israel, and to man watch stations, but not to enter Nablus, this would mean an end to occupation.

Mr. al-Baz asked whether Israel had in mind technicians, or actual military forces. Dayan said that for the early warning stations, technicians would be enough, but along the Jordan River, Israel would need to have some forces. Israel has to have some place where it can control the movement of people. This can either be on Israel’s boundary between the West Bank and Gaza, or Israel can check movements beyond those lines. If there is going to be free movement between the West Bank and Gaza and Israel, there must be a checkpoint somewhere beyond the green line. Mr. al-Baz asked whether only Israel could perform that function. Dayan said that he could see no other solution. Foreign soldiers and the UN could not provide a solution. Maybe there could be mixed groups, but Israel should not count on Norwegians to protect her security. At some point, Israel has to protect her own borders, otherwise she would have to put up barbed wire and check everyone who came across her borders. Or there can be free movement and checks could be instituted further out. Minister Kamel said that this could only be done during the transitional period. Dayan said that this was not what Israel had in mind. He did say that this was not a take it or leave approach. It is Israel’s best understanding of what is required. Egyptians could make other suggestions, however. Israel feels that if her forces withdraw from the inhabited Arab population areas and if the military regime is abolished, this is a proper interpretation of 242 and it involves withdrawal.

Mr. al-Baz said that the Israeli proposal did not contemplate withdrawal in the West Bank and Gaza. Dayan said that it was correct that Israel makes a distinction between the population and the land. Israeli Jews must have the right to settle. They should not be considered foreigners and Israeli forces should be able to protect them. They should not come under the authority of the administrative council. Mr. al-Arabi said that Israel was asking for extraterritorial rights. Dayan replied that this was not the Israeli idea. He reviewed areas in the West Bank and Gaza where Jewish claims went back well beyond 1948. He noted that Jordan had seized the West Bank by force, and that Israel had taken it back again in 1967. That does not mean that Israel has to give it all back to Jordan. Israelis lived in the Gush Etzion area before 1948, and then Israelis had to leave. Now they have returned. The same is true in the Jewish quarter in Jerusalem. The Israelis lost it, then they recovered it. Dayan said that Jews living in Hebron should not be under the authority of the Palestinian council or under Jordan. He also noted that Gaza has no corridor to Hebron, that the people from Gaza should be able to go freely to Hebron and elsewhere. What sense did it make to link Gaza to Jordan and not to allow Israeli settlers to be linked to Israel. Both peoples will have to go through each other’s territory freely. Israeli forces should be there to protect Israelis, not to interfere in the lives of the Palestinian Arabs and Israeli citizens should not be under the authority of administrative autonomy. The Arabs should have their own educational system. The Jews won’t want their education controlled by the Jordanian minister of education. They will be linked to Israel. Dayan does not believe that having settlements linked to Israel is the most difficult of the problems. Nor does he believe that Jerusalem is the most difficult problem. The real question is whether Israel will have some rights in the West Bank and Gaza. Minister Kamel asked whether these were rights to occupy the area? Dayan said that Israel did not want to occupy the area, but Israelis should be able to buy land and to live there. Israeli settlers and soldiers should have a right to be there. This is not in order to rule the Arabs, but just to be there. Mr. al-Arabi asked if Israel would accept the Palestinians to go back to their homes in Israel.

Dayan said that there are two sovereign states in the area, Israel and Jordan. East of the green line and west of the river is an in-between area. It is a very complicated situation there. Israel and Jordan can be compared in terms of their rights in this area. But there should not be a third state. If there is not going to be a Palestinian state, then for the first few years Jordan and Israel should both deal with this area in between them. There have been four wars in thirty years. A line cannot be drawn to divide this area between Israel and Jordan. There is no line which can easily divide the area. What Israel proposes to do is to find a modality whereby Arabs and Jews can live together. Israel doesn’t want to interfere in the lives of the Arabs, but it does want to keep its soldiers there. Then after five years all options can be reviewed.

Mr. Kamel said that all of these Israeli ideas preceded Egypt’s balanced proposal based on Resolution 242. This is what ought to be accepted now. This would allow for the security needs of both sides to be met and some progress could be made. Secretary Vance suggested that the meeting adjourn for now and that the talks be resumed later in the afternoon. (The talks ended at 1:40 p.m.)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978: Volume II [II]. Secret; Nodis. The meeting, which took place at Leeds Castle, ended at 1:40 p.m.
2. Not further identified.
3. Regarding the Israeli proposal on the Sinai, see footnote 6, Document 180.
4. See footnote 9, Document 21.