Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

240. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 26, 1978, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting between the Secretary and Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan

PARTICIPANTS

• Israel
• Moshe Dayan, Minister for Foreign Affairs
• Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
• Aharan Barak, Attorney General
• Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
• Hanon-Bar-On, Minister, Embassy of Israel
• Joseph Ciechanover, Minister for Economic Affairs (Procurement), Embassy of Israel
• Elyakim Rubinstein, Director, Foreign Minister’s Bureau, Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
• United States
• The Secretary of State
• David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (luncheon only)
• Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large
• Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA
• Samuel W. Lewis, American Ambassador to Israel
• Nicholas A. Veliotes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
• Michael E. Sterner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
• William B. Quandt, National Security Council
• David A. Korn, Member, Policy Planning Staff

The Secretary welcomed Foreign Minister Dayan and said we look forward to useful discussions. He asked Dayan if he (Dayan) would like to lead off or if he would like to hear first from Ambassador Atherton about Atherton’s recent talks in Cairo. Dayan thanked the Secretary and said he would like to hear from Atherton.

Ambassador Atherton said he had had many hours of talks in Egypt. On his first day there he had met with Foreign Minister Kamel, on the second day with President Sadat, and on the third day again with Kamel.² Atherton said the reason for his trip was to make sure that we have the best possible understanding of Egyptian thinking. Atherton noted that we had not had comprehensive talks with the Egyptians since early March. Another aim of the trip, Atherton said, was to reemphasize to the Egyptians that the United States continues to support Sadat’s initiative and is trying to get negotiations going again. Atherton said he thought his talks in Cairo had been useful in encouraging Sadat to remain firm and to persevere in his peace initiative.

Atherton said he had tried to encourage the Egyptians to look positively on the proposals put forward by Israel. He had pointed out in some detail that it was not realistic for the Egyptians to say that the Declaration of Principles must call for total withdrawal or for self-determination without qualifications or restrictions. Atherton said he had sought to get Egypt’s reaction to the formulation on Resolution 242 and withdrawal in the Declaration of Principles that the Israelis gave us during Begin’s and Dayan’s visit in March.³ Atherton said he had made clear Israel had not asked us to convey this formally, but he had felt it useful to raise since we understood Barak had discussed it in Cairo and it has subsequently been published in Israel. However, when he raised this subject he found the Egyptians somewhat puzzled. Although we knew that Attorney General Barak had discussed the March 22 text with the Egyptians, Atherton found that they did not seem to have the impression of having been seized of an Israeli proposal. They did not appear to have focused on it. Atherton said he had told the Egyptians that the March text was a serious effort by Israel to bridge the differences. If they did not like the Israeli proposal they should provide counterlanguage. Atherton noted however that the Egyptians had not come forward with counterlanguage. Atherton said Sadat had looked at the Israeli text and had said the main problem he had with it was subparagraph 3(a) which calls for “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the conflict of 1967”. Sadat said he needed something going beyond the language of Resolution 242 on withdrawal.

Atherton said he also tried to get the Egyptians to respond to Israel’s proposal regarding the West Bank and Gaza. The Egyptians up to now have only said they do not like it. However, they told Atherton this time that they will try to put together and give to us, to convey to Israel, a proposal on the West Bank and Gaza. Atherton said we expect to get something from the Egyptians on that, and possibly also on the Declaration of Principles.

As concerns general attitudes, Atherton said he found the Egyptian Foreign Ministry people nervous and concerned that time is running out for the Sadat initiative. However, Sadat himself did not give a sense of being under pressure. He wants to allow time for full consideration of the issues. Sadat was in a good, positive and relaxed frame of mind. Atherton said he had made the point to Sadat that the call for total Israeli withdrawal is not practical. Sadat said he agreed on the need for territorial modifications on the West Bank; he agreed that there will have to be “minor” modifications for security reasons. Nonetheless, however, the Egyptians want to reaffirm in the Declaration of Principles the preambular language of Resolution 242 on the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war. Atherton said he had found Sadat quite positive concerning the concept of interim arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza. He seemed to be open-minded about what would happen in the interim period but wants to know what will take place at the end of the five years. Sadat spoke of the possibility of a local government council, a concept quite like the administrative council in the Israeli proposal. He recognized the need for and says he has no problem with the idea of Israeli military presence during the interim period. He said that if a strong Declaration of Principles is achieved and if Hussein refuses to join the negotiations he (Sadat) would be willing to cooperate in working out with Israel arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza. Atherton noted that Sadat had introduced one new element; he now speaks of the concept of a United Nations presence as part of the West Bank/Gaza arrangement from the very beginning.

Dayan noted that Atherton had said that Sadat was concerned about what would happen after five years. Dayan asked what Sadat wanted. Atherton said Sadat thinks there should be a reversion of the West Bank and Gaza to Arab authority in the framework of an entity linked with Jordan. In other words, the sovereignty question should be resolved in an Arab framework, once security problems have been worked out. Atherton said Sadat sees security problems being dealt with during the five year period; then at the end of that time links should be established with Jordan. Dayan said in other words Sadat wants Israel to agree now to complete withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and a return of Arab sovereignty over the area. Israel should take away its troops and its settlements. The five years would be just to prepare this. Dayan repeated that if he understood correctly, Israel was being called upon to agree now to turn the West Bank and Gaza back to Arab sovereignty in five years. Atherton said the commitment that Sadat wants to withdrawal would be conditioned on Israel being satisfied during the five year period that security arrangements and border modifications are satisfactory. Atherton said his discussions with the Egyptians had not gotten into the question of a continued Israeli military role after the five year period, but that is not ruled out. Sadat is prepared to be one of the parties to the West Bank/Gaza agreement and he hopes that Jordan and the Palestinians will join in too. He thinks that during the five year period it should be possible to work out satisfactory security arrangements.

Barak asked what role Israel would have after the five year period. Atherton said only whatever is agreed upon as part of the settlement. Sadat does not envisage any Israeli governmental authority or anything other than what is worked out for security purposes.

The Secretary asked if Dayan would now like to put forward his views. The Secretary said he would be particularly interested in hearing anything Dayan would care to say about the new Israeli formulation on Resolution 242⁴ and in having Dayan’s thoughts on interim arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza and on what would happen at the end of the five year period. Dayan said he would prefer to start with arrangements for the five year period and what would happen during the five years, and then go back to the wording of the Declaration of Principles. After all, Dayan said, the wording of the Declaration will have to reflect agreement that is reached on the substance of the matter. Dayan said there are two practical issues. The first is whether Israel can reach agreement with Egypt on the West Bank and Gaza or not. If so, then agreement can be reached on the wording of the Declaration of Principles. The second is if Israel and Egypt reach agreement and Jordan does not join in, will Sadat make a peace treaty with Israel on Sinai and how far will Israel have to go regarding the West Bank and Gaza? If there is no Jordanian partner what will happen next? Dayan said that before pursuing these questions he wanted to ask Attorney General Barak to report on the conversations that Weizman and Barak had had with Sadat earlier this month.⁵

Barak said Weizman and he had met for two hours with Sadat on the first day of their visit to Egypt and that same evening he had had a long discussion with General Gamasy. Then on the second day they had another meeting with Sadat. Barak said he would first summarize the end result of their talks. First of all, they found Sadat unwilling to have a separate peace agreement with Israel. Sadat clearly stated that a bilateral agreement is out of the question. However, Sadat is ready to sign a bilateral agreement with Israel if he can go to the Arab world and say he has gotten Israel to agree to full withdrawal. As far as the Declaration of Principles is concerned he needs two basic elements. One is the principle of full withdrawal which he emphasized is very important for Egypt. Barak said Sadat stressed, however, that withdrawal will be subject to taking care of Israel’s security needs. In other words, Barak said, total withdrawal would be subject to negotiations on Israeli presence for military purposes. Sadat’s second basic element was self-determination and a plebiscite which would lead to some kind of link between the West Bank/Gaza and Jordan. As concerns Sinai, Barak said, Sadat does not care if Israeli settlements remain as long as there is no Israeli police force to protect them. The settlements can stay and the settlers can become Egyptian citizens. Barak said Sadat acknowledged he could not expect Israelis to stay under these conditions. Barak said he and Weizman had asked about the possibility of an exchange of territory. Sadat had rejected this outright, saying Egypt is not willing to exchange its territory. Gamasy had said the same thing. Barak said he had asked Gamasy about the possibility of linking the Rafah approaches area to Gaza. Gamasy replied that that was a very interesting idea but it would require consideration. The Secretary asked Barak what he had in mind. Barak said the idea was simply to let the Rafah area be a part of Gaza and whatever happens in the West Bank and Gaza would happen in Rafah.

Barak said the above summarized the overall two days of talks. Now he would focus on the first day. During the conversations on the first day Sadat said there should be a Declaration of Principles and then others will join in the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza. But if Syria and Jordan decline to enter negotiations he will negotiate for Jordan on the West Bank and Gaza. The Secretary remarked that that is consistent with what Sadat had told Atherton. Barak said Sadat had described the West Bank/Gaza regime in the following terms. He spoke of elections to elect a legislative body and administrative body; Barak noted that Gamasy, however, had spoken only of an administrative body not a legislative one. The administrative council would have two elements. One would be the representatives of the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza and the other representatives of Israel to be appointed by the Israeli Government and representatives of Jordan to be appointed by Jordan, and if Jordan does not join in the arrangements Egypt would appoint these representatives. The Secretary asked if Sadat had spoken of representatives or a representative. Barak said Sadat did not go into the question of numbers. Continuing, Barak said this body would have both legislative and executive power. The Israelis had pointed out that they would be in the minority in it and Sadat had said that that problem would be taken care of. For matters of day-to-day living the council would act according to majority vote. However, for certain “vital matters” Israel would have a veto. Barak said during his talks with Gamasy he had tried to get more specifics on this. He had asked, for example, whether immigration would be a procedural or a vital matter. Gamasy had said immigration would be a vital matter. Barak said he and Weizman had raised the question of relations between the West Bank/Gaza council and Israel in regard to the movement of people and goods. Sadat had said he favored free movement of people and goods. He had been told by Gaza Arabs that they favor freedom of movement. The question of buying and selling of property was also raised, Barak said. Sadat said he had no problem with this; if some Arab wants to sell his property, why not? However, Barak said, Gamasy did indicate that there would be a problem in this matter but he said an effort would be made to find a way to solve it. As regards Israeli military forces, Sadat had said they can stay but only in military bases and only as required for Israeli security. Sadat had said Israel can have military camps on the Jordan River.

Barak said Weizman and he had raised the question of what would happen if Arab terrorists organize in Hebron and Nablus and attack Israeli settlements. Gamasy had said this would be a problem for the police to handle. Sadat had spoken of the possibility of a combined Israeli-Arab police. Barak said they had asked what would happen in the case that the police do not act against terrorists. Would the Israeli Army have a role? Gamasy had said they would have to find a legal way of doing this. Barak said he had pointed out that Sadat’s plan is entirely for the Palestinian Arabs. What about the Palestinian Jews? Sadat had replied that his plan would apply to all people living on the West Bank. Sadat and Gamasy has made clear that this plan would apply also to Gaza but they strongly insisted that no buffer be created between Gaza and Egypt. The Secretary asked what was meant by this. Dayan said Gamasy knows of Israel’s concept of a buffer in the Rafah area between Gaza and Sinai aimed at preventing passage of Arab arms between the two areas. The Egyptians had said there could be Israeli military camps in Gaza but Israel cannot have a buffer between Gaza and Egypt. Gamasy wants Gaza and Egypt to have a direct connection. Ambassador Lewis asked if Gamasy had excluded immigration or border control between Egypt and Gaza? Barak said immigration would be a matter for the council to decide.

Barak said this in a nutshell is what was discussed during the first day of the Weizman visit. Barak said Sadat had not talked about a plebiscite or a referendum. The Secretary asked if Sadat had not been speaking of the foregoing in terms of interim arrangements. No, Barak replied, what Sadat had outlined was intended as the final settlement. Barak said the Egyptians envisaged secret negotiations between Israel and Egypt to work out the details of arrangements for Judea and Samaria. From this document the Declaration of Principles would emerge. In other words, the Declaration of Principles would be the outcome of an understanding on what would take place in regard to the West Bank and Gaza. Sadat had said the Declaration of Principles must say total withdrawal subject to provision for Israeli security. Mr. Sterner asked if anything had been said by the Egyptians about minor border modifications. Barak said the question of border modifications had not arisen. After a Declaration of Principles was agreed upon Egypt would invite the other Arabs to join. If they did not join then Sadat would go ahead and finalize with Israel the agreement. The Secretary asked if it was Barak’s understanding that if Jordan came into the negotiations it would be asked to review the agreement on the West Bank and Gaza and could suggest modifications therein. Barak said he had not raised this question.

Barak said the above covers the first day of discussions. At the close of the first day he (Barak) had been very happy. He had wondered what was really different in the Egyptian plan from the Israeli West Bank/Gaza plan. In some aspects, Barak said, he felt the Egyptian plan was even better than the Israeli plan. Then, however, came the second day of talks. At the beginning of the second day Sadat told the Israelis that after the meeting the previous day he had met with a delegation from Gaza. Barak said Sadat told them what he had told the Israelis, and “they did not accept it”. Barak said Sadat said the Gazans rejected Sadat’s West Bank/Gaza proposal because it was not satisfactory on the matter of self-determination. The Gazans had insisted on self-determination and therefore Sadat had said that self-determination must be a part of the five year arrangements. Barak said the Israelis had responded that it is better to agree now not to agree on what will happen after five years. They said Israel proposed that agreement be reached now on proposals for interim arrangements but that there be no agreement at this stage on what would happen after five years. Barak said Sadat had replied that he would be thinking about the Israeli proposal. Barak said the Israelis assume that they will get an answer from Sadat on this in their next meeting. The Secretary asked if Sadat had suggested that he had to withdraw what he proposed on the first day for both the interim period and for the post-interim period or was he saying only for the post-interim period? Did he say he could not stand by what he said on the first day because of the Gazans? Barak said that was not clear. Barak added that Sadat also seemed to withdraw during talks on the second day from his position that he would step in if Jordan did not accept a role on the West Bank. Atherton said that in his recent talks with Sadat, Sadat had been explicit in saying that if Jordan did not come in he would act in Jordan’s place.

Barak said because of what happened on the second day the whole scenario became very uncertain. It became unclear to him what the procedure would be, whether the Declaration of Principles would come first or agreement on the West Bank and Gaza would be first. Barak remarked that in the discussions he had described the general comments came from Sadat and the more detailed ones from Gamasy. Gamasy’s scenario on the first day was to sit down and discuss agreement on Sinai and on what would happen on the West Bank and to say from this would emerge the Declaration of Principles. Then the others come in, and if no one comes in Sadat will go ahead alone. Atherton asked if it was absolutely clear that when Sadat talked about the administrative council he was talking about final arrangements and not about interim arrangements. Barak said that was clear to him. It was his (Barak’s) understanding that Sadat was talking about final arrangements. The Secretary said that if that were the case representatives of Israel and Jordan would sit permanently on the administrative council. Ambassador Lewis asked if there was no discussion of review after five years. Barak said no, there was none, neither on the first day nor on the second day. Ambassador Atherton said that in his talks with Sadat, Sadat had seemed to be thinking of arrangements for the interim period along the lines that Barak had described in his report on the first day’s conversation. But he was thinking of some act of self-determination at the end of the five year period. The Secretary said he thought the concept of developing the end results first and going on from there to drafting a text of the Declaration of Principles is a good one. Ambassador Atherton said that, with regard to his discussions with the Egyptians concerning the latest Israeli draft Declaration, it was clear to him that the Egyptians did not think they owed the Israelis further answers.

The conferees then adjourned to the 8th floor to lunch.

The following substantive points were touched on during luncheon conversation.

The Secretary told Dayan that his stopover in Cairo on his way back from Africa had been only a very brief one and took place late at night. He had told Foreign Minister Kamel that Kamel should not bother to come to the airport but Kamel had insisted on coming and they had had a forty-five minute talk.⁶

Dayan said that, with regard to Lebanon, Waldheim had been quite specific in assuring Israel that the order had been given to the UN troops not to allow the PLO to return to southern Lebanon. Not only were the UN forces to prevent hostile actions from southern Lebanon but they were also not to allow the PLO to come back. The Secretary said it was his understanding that the UN would have observers in two areas north of the Litani. Mr. Saunders noted that this would be largely a symbolic presence and the Secretary agreed. Dayan said the question is whether the UN troops, in particular the French, are there to fight or are “just there”. Dayan noted that the Lebanese at first said that they wanted to send two battalions to the south and then reduced that to two companies. Later they said they couldn’t send any forces because they could not control the roads between Beirut and the south. Dayan asked if the Syrians didn’t control the roads between Beirut and the south. The Secretary said there is a small area north of the Litani that is not controlled by Syria. He asked Mr. Saunders exactly how large this area was and Mr. Saunders replied ten or eleven kilometers. The Secretary noted that the problem with the Lebanese army is that there is no Lebanese army at this point. Dayan said if the Syrians wanted to be helpful they could solve the problem. The Secretary said thus far the Syrians have been unwilling to do so. Mr. Saunders said we have talked to the Syrians about moving their forces down to the Litani but they do not want to do it as long as Israel remains in occupation of southern Lebanon. The Syrians don’t want to seem to be cooperating with Israeli occupation. Mr. Saunders noted also that Israel had earlier objected to Syria moving its troops all the way to the Litani. Dayan said he thought it very important that at least some Lebanese forces be in the south with the UN. As it is now, the Lebanese are not involved at all. Mr. Saunders said we agree entirely and Ambassador Parker has made every possible effort to persuade the Lebanese Government to send troops south.

The Secretary asked Dayan what Israel’s time schedule is for withdrawal. Dayan said the Israelis have agreed to meet with Siilasvuo sometime this month or early next month to review the situation regarding UN forces and to discuss what would be the final phase of withdrawal. The Secretary said it was his understanding that 3,340 UN soldiers are in place now and the number will be moved up shortly to 4,000.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 49, Israel: 3–4/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Korn. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Conference Room.
2. See Documents 238 and 239. No memorandum of conversation has been found for Atherton’s meeting with Sadat or the second meeting with Kamel.
3. See Document 234.
4. See footnote 7, Document 238.
5. Weizman and Barak visited Cairo March 30–31.
6. No memorandum of conversation has been found. Vance left Southern Rhodesia on April 17.