Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

238. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Cairo, April 22, 1978, 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Declaration of Principles and West Bank/Gaza Guidelines

PARTICIPANTS

• Egyptian Side
• Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel, Egyptian Foreign Minister
• Butros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
• Ahmad Maher, Chef du Cabinet, Egyptian Foreign Ministry
• American Side
• Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large
• Hermann F. Eilts, American Ambassador, Cairo
• Michael Sterner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
• William A. Kirby, Department of State, INR

Ambassador Atherton began by stating his understanding that Foreign Minister Kamel had expressed certain reservations to Ambassador Eilts about our “Nine Points” on West Bank/Gaza guidelines,² the substance of which had been conveyed to him by Ambassador Ghorbal. Atherton said he would nevertheless appreciate the opportunity to explain why we believe they can perform a necessary function and to elaborate on them in some detail. Atherton then described the background of Dayan’s visit to the United States beginning April 26, which might require that he spend fewer days in Egypt than he had originally planned.

Atherton assured Kamel that, with the Panama Canal treaties now successfully behind us,³ the Administration is anxious to move ahead with the Middle East peace process. It is for this reason that President Carter and Secretary Vance had asked him to review the current situation—and our strategy—with President Sadat to make sure we share a mutual understanding of what needs to be done next.

Atherton stressed that our overriding objective remains to assure the successful outcome of the negotiations begun by the Sadat initiative. To this end, we have agreed with Sadat on the need for a Declaration of Principles that will provide a realistic basis for further and broadened negotiations. Kamel interrupted to underscore the importance to Egypt of broadening the negotiations to include additional Arab parties.

Atherton explained that it is the U.S.’s judgment that it will not be possible to achieve agreement on principles that call for total withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines or for the unrestricted right of self-determination for the Palestinians, which the Israelis almost unanimously believe would lead inevitably to an independent state. Principles such as these, Atherton continued, when applied to the West Bank and Gaza, provoke security concerns in Israel with which the U.S. sympathizes. President Sadat is also clearly on the record as being aware of Israel’s security needs.

Kamel asked for confirmation that the U.S. still held to its position of foreseeing only “minor modifications” and that this qualification applied only to the West Bank. Atherton assured him this was still our position. Atherton pointed out, however, that in the U.S. view, basic Israeli decisions on withdrawal and Palestinian rights can only be brought about through a steady and phased process of negotiations by which Israel is faced with concrete proposals of an operational nature. We see Israel reaching its most flexible terms on these issues only in the context of detailed negotiations through which it can understand that its basic security concerns can be met, not in a general statement of principles.

Kamel, somewhat exercised, said he didn’t understand how the points Atherton was making fit in with a Declaration of Principles. Egypt thought the starting point of negotiations was the Declaration and that it should be precise. Atherton responded that an agreed Declaration at this point would necessarily have to be somewhat ambiguous and we, therefore, believe that something additional will be necessary to more clearly define the issues germane to the West Bank and Gaza. Kamel asserted that Sadat wants a clear Declaration with no ambiguity. What use would an ambiguous Declaration be for us, he asked? Egypt needs something much clearer than Resolution 242, as the basis on which other Arabs can feel free to join the negotiations. Kamel stressed in particular that the Declaration must be clear on the principle of withdrawal from all territories. In this regard, Kamel noted, he had observed a change in some recent American statements, particularly in Secretary Vance’s comments that there must be some withdrawal on all fronts and in the joint statement issued in connection with President Ceausescu’s visit.⁴

Atherton assured him that there had been no change in the U.S. position on withdrawal and pointed out the distinction between what we feel might be achieved in a final settlement and what is possible in a Declaration. Mr. Vance’s comments had been in the context of our difference with Israel over whether all the principles of Resolution 242, including withdrawal, applied wherever territory was occupied in 1967. The Ceausescu visit statement did not mean we were turning away from the Sadat initiative negotiations toward a return to Geneva, as some had claimed. The U.S. position and its contrast with Mr. Begin’s views that no withdrawal is required on the West Bank had, in fact, provoked an internal policy debate in Israel, which is readily apparent. While this debate has not yet produced major decisions, it has had an impact. We now want to play our cards in such a way as to foster that debate and maximize its impact.

Atherton assured Kamel that President Carter remains committed to the strategy that he and Sadat previously agreed on. The United States plans to put forward its own proposals, and we are tentatively thinking of doing this about mid- or late May. Congressional consideration of the aircraft package will have a bearing on the exact timing.⁵ In any event, Atherton emphasized, it is crucial that there be full understanding between the U.S. and Egypt both on the Declaration and the West Bank Gaza Guidelines. He said he would like to elaborate a bit on the US view of the relationship between these two documents.

The United States understands that Sadat’s original concept was that a Declaration of Principles should serve as the vehicle for major Israeli decisions on withdrawal and self-determination. Realistically, however, we are going to have to settle for a document that has some element of ambiguity on these issues.

Kamel broke in to reiterate rather strongly that Egypt cannot afford to come out with ambiguity on the issue of withdrawal. Atherton pointed out that Begin speaks in terms of no withdrawal on the West Bank, and the United States has accordingly had a major disagreement with Israel on that point. The principle of withdrawal, however, is different than the precise location of the final border, which can only be agreed to through the continuing process of negotiations.

Atherton reminded Kamel that the United States has held for more than ten years that Resolution 242 permits some modification in the 1949 Armistice Lines so far as the West Bank is concerned; it is this special situation of the West Bank and Gaza which we believe necessitates looking beyond the Declaration on issues such as withdrawal and self-determination. It becomes impossible, in fact, to discuss the Declaration divorced from an understanding of its practical implications on the ground. We therefore want to look closely at both a Declaration and what lies behind it—a set of principles governing negotiations on the West Bank/Gaza and Palestinian issues.

Atherton urged that Kamel consider the advantages of an interim arrangement which would introduce a buffer of time before the achievement of a final settlement. During that time, Israel would become more confident that its security concerns can be met and therefore more willing to be forthcoming in terms of withdrawal. That time would also allow a consensus on the future to develop among the Palestinians, who today express a multitude of different views.

Atherton continued by saying that the United States would like to begin showing a real prospect for change in the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza. Thus far, the only negotiating proposal that offers to do that is the Begin Plan.⁶

Atherton then described the vicious circle in which the negotiations are currently trapped: the Jordanians and Palestinians are unwilling to enter into the negotiations on the basis of what the Israelis have put forward so far; the Israelis see no need to modify their current position in the absence of any Arab counterproposal. To make any U.S. proposed compromise on Declaration language with respect to withdrawal and the Palestinian issue meaningful to all parties, we believe it will be necessary to elaborate on what will actually happen in the West Bank and Gaza. It is not very effective, however, for us to propose language on these issues with only the Israeli self-rule plan tabled; therefore, there is a real need for further Egyptian views, especially on interim arrangements.

Stating that he sensed Kamel thinks that there is something new in what he has said, Atherton assured him this was not the case. Kamel said his only worry is Begin’s new interpretation of 242 on withdrawal,⁷ because of which Egypt must now be very careful. Atherton responded that the U.S. shares Egypt’s misgivings on this score, to the point that it was not even possible to agree on a statement at the end of Begin’s visit to Washington last month.

Atherton then discussed the shortcomings of the Egyptian paper on the West Bank and Gaza which Sadat had given him on March 6,⁸ underscoring the fact that Sadat has asked that we keep it to ourselves and that we had done so. He made the following general observations:

—The emphasis in the March 6 paper is on the final settlement rather than on the provisions for an interim regime.

—Such a paper would not enhance the internal debate in Israel; on the contrary, it could well rally support around Begin.

Specifying certain portions of the Egyptian Plan, Atherton pointed out that para 1B (saying withdrawal must be to the 1949 Jordan-Israel Armistice Line) would appear to be a retrogression from Sadat’s own statements that he would not rule out minor modifications in the West Bank border. Furthermore, para 2A (asserting the right to self-determination “without external interference”) will be taken as a codeword by the Israelis for an independent Palestinian state. Moreover, there is no acknowledgment in the paper that either the terms of a final settlement or the arrangements during the interim period must take into account Israeli security concerns.

Picking up Ambassador Atherton’s point about self-determination, Kamel reminded him that the Aswan language⁹ covering Palestinian participation was a U.S. proposal, not Egyptian. He asked Atherton to bear in mind that the Egyptian Plan was a counter to the Begin proposal. Kamel suggested that the U.S. take the Egyptian plan and modify it as it had done with the Begin Plan in the Nine Points. Atherton asserted that this would be easier to do if the Egyptian paper dealt more with transitional arrangements. Kamel responded by remarking that Egypt must speak in generalities concerning the West Bank.

Atherton reiterated that the U.S. believed that, before it could come forward with a position of its own, it would need an Egyptian proposal for the West Bank and Gaza which is cast in as positive terms as possible in order for it to be regarded as a valid and serious negotiating document, while still maintaining Egypt’s positions on the basic issues. Kamel wondered how much further Egypt could go, bearing in mind that it was not mandated to speak for the Palestinians. He referred to the Egyptian reference to the 1949 Armistice Line, and said that the U.S. might propose “minor modifications.” He also read from the portion of the Egyptian draft dealing with transitional arrangements and said that Egypt could not be more specific on an interim period. Kamel wondered why Egypt should allow the existence of the Begin Plan to drag it into areas it can’t go into.

Ambassador Eilts pointed out that the Israelis would consider the March 6 Egyptian plan a retrogression from what Sadat had already said to Weizman. Sadat, for example, had mentioned to Weizman the possibility of having a local council to decide on West Bank or Gazan affairs. Kamel asked if it would help if the Egyptian plan spoke of a council. Atherton affirmed that it would, observing that that was the sort of thing the Israelis would have to take seriously and react to. Eilts reminded Kamel that a council was Sadat’s idea, not that of the United States.

Atherton told Kamel that the second thing he had been asked to obtain was as precise an understanding as possible of what Egypt would ultimately be able to accept regarding the West Bank and Gaza. This would be solely for the information of the President and the Secretary. Kamel suggested that the Egyptian bottom line on these issues would be conveyed by Sadat the following day.

Atherton said that, this being the case, it would be useful to go over the Nine Points drawn up by the United States, bearing in mind that these had already been discussed at Camp David by President Carter with President Sadat,¹⁰ who had indicated at that time that they were generally acceptable to him. (Atherton then went over the Nine Points together with the U.S. rationale for each—see attachment. Maher took detailed notes.)

In response to the first point, dealing with the establishment of self-rule for a transitional period, Ghali expressed his frank concern that, having agreed to an interim arrangement, Egypt would then be asked to forego a final settlement. Atherton subsequently pointed out that, in the U.S. view, “transitional” clearly implies a period leading to a qualitatively different situation.

Concerning the second point, describing the Palestinians as participants in the negotiations but not signatories to an agreement for a interim arrangement, Ghali expressed some confusion about the Palestinian role. Atherton explained that authority for an agreement could not derive from the Palestinian representatives since they would not be representative of a state. Their involvement as negotiators, however, would involve them in the overall process of determining the future of the West Bank and Gaza at an early stage.

After hearing Atherton’s explanation of the third point, dealing with the governing authority and its responsibilities during the transitional period, Kamel wondered why there is no mention of a role for the United Nations. Atherton expressed the belief that UN involvement would inevitably complicate the process from the outset, with the need for a Security Council resolution as only one example. Ambassador Eilts observed that there was no reason why an Egyptian proposal couldn’t propose a role for the UN. On the same point, Maher asked who the U.S. foresaw as participating in the voting for the self-governing body, pointing out that the status of Israelis living in Jewish settlements on the West Bank should be clarified in this regard. Atherton accepted this as a valid point.

The fourth point, saying neither Israel or Jordan would assert any claims to sovereignty over the West Bank during the interim period, was especially vexing to Kamel, who asserted that there is no doubt that sovereignty resides in the Palestinians. Atherton responded that most people would agree that there is at least doubt on the sovereignty question. Legal studies by the U.S. indicate that the issue of sovereignty over the West Bank remains unresolved. Ghali pointed out that to deny Palestinian sovereignty over the West Bank is to fly in the face of Arab thinking over a thirty-year period. Kamel, observing that “the United States is too soft on this fellow Begin,” said that he would “have to hide” if sovereignty were dealt with in this manner.

Kamel insisted that the withdrawal aspect of the sixth point is inconsistent with 242. Why, he asked, should there be negotiations over the issue of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank? Such negotiations should be restricted to defining the “minor modifications.” “We’ll get nowhere with this,” said Kamel. Atherton explained that negotiations would clearly be necessary to define the modalities of Israeli withdrawals. That is the intent of this language, and perhaps there is a semantic problem with the current wording. Atherton told Kamel that, in any case, this point would cause a major explosion in Israel if aired there today.

Maher also commented on the sixth point, asking what was meant by the long-term relationship of the West Bank to Jordan and Israel and making it clear that he was concerned primarily by the implication that the U.S. might envisage a political relationship with Israel. Atherton explained that, although both Egypt and the U.S. had expressed a preference for a West Bank linked with Jordan, the dimensions of such linkage would have to be specified through negotiations. It also seemed logical that there be at least economic relationships with Israel. Kamel summed up his reaction to this point by describing it as “too far away from what I thought would be coming from you.”

Kamel reacted to point 8.d., regarding reciprocal rights of residence for Palestinians and Israelis, by saying, “If you didn’t tell me these were American ideas, I would have thought they are from Begin.”

Summing up his reaction to the Nine Points, Kamel observed that if such an American proposal is put forward “it’s the end of Sadat, it’s the end of Egypt.” If the problem is really that there is only one plan on the table, Kamel continued, Egypt will take another look at its proposal. He expressed his hope that, in that case, the U.S. would take an Egyptian revision as seriously as it does the Begin Plan.

Atherton pointed out that, in order to have an impact on the negotiations, an Egyptian proposal would have to be made available to Israel. There would be the obvious possibility that it would then become public. It would in any case be very helpful if, when the U.S. presented its own proposal, the Egyptian plan were in the public domain as the Israeli plan already is. Kamel readily indicated that he understood this. Atherton offered to make himself and his delegation available to work with the Egyptians to help them in trying to produce a revised proposal.

Kamel said that Egypt will ask the U.S. to convey its proposal to Israel after the Begin visit. All Egypt wants, he said, is that after the five-year period the Palestinians rid themselves of the Israelis in every way. He suggested that it would be a good idea, after they had seen President Sadat, to sit down together and work on an Egyptian proposal. In doing so, Kamel urged, the U.S. should bear in mind not only the effect on Israel but on the Arabs as well, especially the Palestinians.

Atherton then reviewed the status of negotiations on the Declaration of Principles, observing that, in contrast to the West Bank/Gaza Guidelines, considerable work has already been done on a Declaration. It is important to know as precisely as possible, however, what will ultimately be agreeable to Egypt. Kamel confirmed that Egypt had been made aware of the latest Israeli thinking on a Declaration, but volunteered no specific reactions.

Atherton said that the United States understands the importance that the Egyptians attach to the language in paragraph 4 of their February 23 draft regarding the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, but that the U.S. considers this unattainable.¹¹ The Israelis, he noted, see this phrase as prejudicing their ability to ask for modifications in the West Bank border through negotiations, and in this respect we think they have a good point. Kamel observed that “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” is one of the principles mentioned in 242. Atherton noted that it is mentioned only in the preamble and the U.S. cannot support lifting one principle from the preamble of 242 for enshrinement in the Declaration of Principles. Maher asked why citation of this principle would necessarily preclude agreement on minor modications. Atherton responded that in theory it would not, but Israel is afraid that an Arab negotiator would use it to support the necessity for total withdrawal from the West Bank. He then read to Kamel some informal alternative formulations for withdrawal language, promising to provide them in solely “non-paper” form the following day for his staff to study more closely but emphasizing these were not proposals and had no official status within the USG.

Atherton then asked whether Egypt might agree to delete the word “legitimate” before “rights” in the Palestinian paragraph. He observed that, because of the way it has been used in the past, the phrase has become a red flag for Israel. Kamel rejoined that that flag has already been raised, citing the use of “legitimate rights” in both the U.S.-Soviet Joint Statement of last October¹² and the Aswan statement. Atherton pointed out that there is a difference between language that can be obtained in a negotiated agreement and that which can be used in a unilateral statement. Kamel confirmed that Egypt would adhere to the Aswan language as its ultimate position on the Palestinian paragraph, but inclusion of “legitimate” was essential.

Atherton reiterated that any U.S. proposal for a Declaration of Principles cannot be viewed in isolation, but rather as an integral part of our overall proposal which will also include the ideas we have talked about for interim arrangements on the West Bank and Gaza. He stressed that our consultations with Israel on the Declaration have not been completed, and that we would like to get as clear an idea as possible as to what will ultimately be acceptable to Egypt. Once we come out publicly with our proposal there will be little if any possibility of introducing changes, for if we were to make changes at the behest of one party the other would also insist on changes.

Atherton urged that Kamel bear in mind that it will be no easy task to bring Israel to agree to the text we have in mind. It includes certain language and concepts to which Israel takes strong exception, for example:

—the concept that there must be withdrawal wherever territory was occupied;

—the term “legitimate rights”;

—the term “Palestinian people,” instead of “Palestinian Arabs”;

—it does not explicitly limit participation in the determination of their future to residents of the West Bank and Gaza, as does the Israeli draft;

—it calls for fulfillment of Resolution 242 “in all its parts,” a phrase to which the Israelis have interposed objection and have not included in their draft.

Atherton noted that, if we are going to expend the effort necessary to get Israeli agreement to our text, it is important that we have some assurance that Egypt will be able to support it.

Ambassador Sterner summarized our approach by saying that it seems necessary to confront the reality that it is impossible to achieve a final agreement at this time. We are therefore thinking in terms of a process that begins with a Declaration that will inevitably be somewhat ambiguous on key issues. He urged that Egypt look, however, at the political dynamics that would be set in motion by our proposal. It is these dynamics which in time will make a final settlement easier to achieve, and they can best be activated by a realistic set of West Bank/Gaza Guidelines.

Atherton closed by stressing that our consultations on the Declaration and the West Bank/Gaza Guidelines must be kept absolutely secret. He pointed out that it would be extremely harmful to our efforts if it became known that the U.S. and Egypt were consulting with a view to coordinating positions to the extent possible.

Attachment

Paper¹³

Undated

THE NINE POINTS: AS PRESENTED IN EGYPT BY AMBASSADOR ATHERTON APRIL 22–24, 1978

1. A self-rule arrangement would be established for a transitional five-year period.

—“Transitional” nature of five-year period clearly implies that it will be followed by a qualitatively different situation.

—During the transitional period, Palestinians will exercise a greater degree of autonomy than ever before.

—Five years is a reasonable period to allow Israel to acquire confidence in the new situation, including confidence in the elected West Bank/Gaza Palestinian leadership; to be persuaded that its security concerns can be met without its retaining permanent control; and to negotiate a final settlement.

2. Authority for this interim arrangement will derive from agreement among Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. The interim agreement will be negotiated among representatives of these states and of the Palestinians in the area.

—The authority for the interim arrangement, including for whatever governing body may be established, will derive from an agreement to which Egypt and Jordan are parties (as the pre-1967 governing authorities in Gaza and the West Bank) rather than from the will of the Israeli government.

—Representatives of the Palestinians will be involved in the process of determining the future of the West Bank and Gaza from an early stage of the process.

3. The interim agreement will provide for self-rule by an authority freely elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The agreement would define the responsibilities of that authority.

—The fact that the governing authority will be composed of officials freely elected by the inhabitants, rather than selected by the military government, injects participation by Palestinians at an early stage of the process that will determine their future.

4. Neither Israel nor Jordan will assert their claims to sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza during the five-year period.

—This will assure that Begin will not be tempted to succumb to pressure from his more fanatic supporters to assert the traditional Herut claim of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank.

5. Israeli forces would withdraw to limited and specified encampments.

6. During the five-year period, in order to implement UN Resolution 242, negotiations will be conducted and agreement will be reached among the West Bank/Gaza authority, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt on Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, on secure and recognized final boundaries, including possible modifications in the 1967 lines, on the security arrangements which will be part of the final settlement and on the long-term relationship of the West Bank and Gaza to Israel and Jordan.

—In order to forestall undue delay by any party in moving toward a final agreement, negotiations must take place in order that “agreement will be reached” within five years.

7. The agreement negotiated by the parties will come into effect by expressed consent of the governed to the substance of the agreement.

—This assures that no agreement can come into force in the absence of a positive expression of consent by those to be most affected by it.

8. During the interim period the negotiating parties will constitute a continuing committee to reach agreements on:

• a. Issues arising under the agreement regarding the conduct of the interim regime, not resolvable by the West Bank/Gaza authority;
• b. The introduction of UN or Jordanian military presence on the West Bank and Gaza;
• c. Provision for an economically practicable level of resettlement in the West Bank and Gaza of Palestinian refugees;
• d. Reciprocal rights of residence in Israel and the territories for Palestinian Arabs and Israelis, and for land purchases with Israeli citizens and West Bank/Gaza residents entitled to buy land either in the West Bank/Gaza or in Israel.

9. A regional economic development plan would be launched, including Jordan, the West Bank/Gaza authority, Israel and Egypt.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 10, Egypt: 4–5/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Kirby. The meeting took place in the Foreign Minister’s office. Atherton visited Cairo from April 21 to April 25.
2. The initial version of the Nine Points is printed as Document 210.
3. After much controversy, the Senate voted to ratify the first Panama Canal treaty on March 16 and the second on April 18.
4. A reference to a U.S.-Romanian joint declaration issued after an April 13 meeting between Romanian President Ceausescu and Carter at the White House. One paragraph of this joint declaration addressed the Middle East. The text reads, “To encourage efforts aimed at a just, comprehensive and lasting peaceful settlement in the Middle East, based on Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied as a result of the 1967 War, respect for legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and insurance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of all states in the region. To this end, they expressed themselves in favor of negotiations among all the interested parties for solving the Middle East situation, with appropriate representation of the Palestinian people.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, p. 745)
5. See footnote 5, Document 215. Vance announced on April 28 that the administration was sending Congress formal notification of its proposal to sell aircraft to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, p. 801)
6. See the Attachment to Document 177 and footnote 6, Document 180.
7. On April 16, the Israeli Government issued a statement that Resolution 242 would serve as the basis for negotiations with Israel’s Arab neighbors, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. (William E. Farrell, “Israelis Attempt To Reduce Friction With U.S. on Talks,” New York Times, April 17, 1978, p. A1)
8. See Document 225.
9. See footnote 5, Document 187.
10. See Document 211.
11. No February 23 draft of a declaration of principles has been found. Telegram 5532 from Cairo, February 20, transmitted an Egyptian draft that includes the language “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and in full respect of the rights to sovereignty and territorial inviolability,” but it is in the first paragraph. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850059–2018)
12. See Document 120.
13. Secret; Nodis.