239. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

SUBJECT

  • Atherton’s Meeting with Sadat

Ambassador Atherton reported by secure telephone from Cairo on his talks with Sadat and Kamel.2 The main points are as follows:

Timing of a US proposal. Sadat is not in a hurry. The arms package should be approved first.3 Egypt needs some time to get its relations with the Saudis in shape. Sadat also wants time to ensure full coordination with us. “No proposal would be better than a poor one.”

Declaration. The key is the language on withdrawal, which must make clear that Israel is prepared for full withdrawal in exchange for peace, with “minor modifications” only in the West Bank border.

West Bank/Gaza. Sadat had some reservations about the nine points,4 but felt that the key problem was to be clear about the eventual terms of a settlement (e.g., withdrawal for peace). Sadat wants UN involvement from the beginning.

Egyptian Plan. Within two weeks, we should receive an Egyptian plan for the West Bank/Gaza to transmit to the Israelis.

Kamel Visit. Sadat suggested that Foreign Minister Kamel should visit Washington, perhaps during the upcoming UN session on disarmament.

Next Steps. Sadat repeated his position that a “good declaration” would allow him to go forward in negotiations, with or without Hussein. He increasingly talks of a direct Egyptian role in negotiating the interim agreement for the West Bank/Gaza.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 10, Egypt: 4–5/78. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed at the top of the page.
  2. Atherton met with Sadat on April 23. No memorandum of conversation was found.
  3. See footnote 5, Document 238.
  4. The Nine Points are printed as an Attachment to Document 238.