Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

241. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 27, 1978

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Dayan

PARTICIPANTS

• Israel
• Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister
• Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador
• Hanan Bar-on, Israeli Deputy Chief of Mission
• Joseph Ciechanover, Director of Military Mission
• L.E. Rubinstein, Assistant to the Foreign Minister
• Aharon Barak, Attorney General
• United States
• The Secretary
• Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA
• Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., S/AA
• Samuel Lewis, Ambassador to Israel
• Michael Sterner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
• David Korn, S/P
• William Quandt, NSC
• Nicholas A. Veliotes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

Settlements

The Secretary asked Dayan to clarify the current Israeli settlements policy. Dayan replied that in the Sinai there would be no new settlements, but a “filling out of existing settlements” which were previously approved. He noted that nothing had changed in this respect since their last discussion. On the West Bank, he merely said that there was “nothing new.” (He obviously meant there was nothing new since the last time he discussed this with the Secretary.) The Secretary asked if the decisions had been made by a full Cabinet meeting. Dayan replied that each settlement would require a Cabinet decision—each decision would be taken by the Cabinet committee on behalf of the entire Cabinet. No longer would the decision be taken by the “Ministry.” (This was an obvious reference to the fact that Arik Sharon would no longer be able to make virtually unilateral decisions.) Dayan continued by recalling that he had previously told the Secretary that there would be a certain number of settlements established in military camps. So far, the GOI was implementing this previously approved plan. He then made some unclear statement about the possibilities of one or two settlements in military facilities being turned into civilian settlements at some point in the future.

The Secretary reiterated our great concern about all new settlement activity. He asked Ambassador Atherton to describe the Egyptian view on settlements. Ambassador Atherton said that the Egyptians made no distinction between new settlements and additional settlers in existing settlements. They are very much against any new settlement activity and wish to have all action concerning settlements frozen.

Dayan stated that he hopes there will be an Egyptian-Israeli negotiation on settlements. However, unless or until this happens, the GOI will only go so far as to not establish new settlements in the Sinai. He repeated that Israel wants to negotiate this issue with the Egyptians.

Next Steps with Egypt

The Secretary asked Ambassador Atherton to present his views on where we go from here with Egypt. Ambassador Atherton stated that he could, of course, suggest to the Egyptians the Israeli proposal for direct bilateral negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza focusing on details (as previously explained by Barak). He was very pessimistic, however, that Sadat would accept such negotiations without knowing the answers to some key questions beforehand, especially as concerns the question of how the sovereignty issue would be handled after the five-year interim period. He believed Egypt would take the position that Israel must be prepared to say that, at the end of the five-year period, Israel would not assert a claim to sovereignty. He noted that Sadat recently said to him that the Israelis must agree in advance to remove any claims to sovereignty. Atherton recapitulated that he believes it would be worth making a pitch to Sadat on the Israeli proposals but that he really needed at least the answers to two questions we posed to Dayan in order to have something “new” with which to go back to Cairo. The Secretary endorsed Ambassador Atherton’s remarks noting that if we could get satisfactory answers to the two questions from the Israelis we would be prepared, at least initially, to put them forward as our proposals rather than as firm Israeli positions. Atherton added that, above all, we need something to reassure the Arabs about the future status of the West Bank and Gaza. In answer to a question from Attorney General Barak, he specified that this meant the sovereignty issue.

Dayan agreed to pose the two questions with the Cabinet and asked for precision about Sadat’s position on withdrawal and self-determination. Atherton replied that Sadat wanted total withdrawal with two very important qualifications:

—there could be minor modifications in the 1967 line,

—and Israel’s withdrawal would be contingent on agreement on such modifications and on the Arab parties agreeing to sit down with Israel to negotiate security arrangements satisfactory to Israel.

Complete self-determination is Sadat’s preference, but he has made clear that he would accept limited self-determination along the lines of the Aswan formula.² The Secretary continued that this is Sadat’s private position but in public he sticks with the total self-determination formula. Atherton cautioned the Israelis to hold this information closely so as not to embarrass Sadat. Dayan asked if total withdrawal also includes the Golan. Atherton replied in the affirmative, emphasizing that in Sadat’s view this would have to be within the context of Israeli security arrangements.

There was a brief discussion about the best arrangements for discussion with Prime Minister Begin. The Secretary outlined the proposed schedule and Dayan said he would discuss it with the Prime Minister and then pass the Prime Minister’s views to us through Ambassador Dinitz.

In answer to a question from Dayan, Atherton reiterated that having the answers to the two questions would make his next visit to Cairo much more useful. Dayan suggested that Atherton go to Cairo and take the line that Israel recognized that these two important questions must be answered. The Israelis, however, might need some time to consider them and and suggest the answers could be the subject of direct negotiations with Egypt. In the meantime, Dayan continued, Israel would like to know the answer to the following: If the Israelis are forthcoming with “satisfactory” answers to the two questions, would Egypt be prepared to go forward with direct negotiations for a bilateral agreement and also be prepared to be Israel’s negotiating partner for the West Bank and Gaza if Hussein refused to enter the negotiations? Dayan added that if Sadat was not prepared to go into both negotiations Israel would not think the answers to the questions were “so urgent.”

The Secretary replied that we would reflect on the suggestion and we would also be prepared to discuss it and the two questions with the Prime Minister. Dayan noted that if Prime Minister Begin were more forthcoming than he has been concerning the answers to the two questions he would be delighted. He then said he wished to make the following statement to clarify his position:

—Affirmative answers from Sadat concerning his willingness to go ahead with bilateral negotiations and to be Israel’s negotiating partner for Judea and Samaria would create a radically different position in Israel as concerns the answers to the two questions we pose.

—Without this affirmative answer Israel would find it difficult to answer the two questions satisfactorily.

Assistant Secretary Saunders noted it would help us in our reflections to have the Foreign Minister’s views on the possibility of obtaining satisfactory answers to the two questions. Dayan replied that the Israeli Cabinet would have to review the situation, and make a decision. He would then communicate this decision to us through Ambassador Lewis.

The Secretary stated that it was his personal view and concurred in by Ambassador Atherton, that satisfactory answers to the two questions would open prospects for real progress with Egypt. Dayan noted that it would be useful for us to discuss the issues with Prime Minister Begin. He would be delighted if the Prime Minister would be in favor of satisfactory answers since then the Cabinet would approve also.

Dayan suggested that the United States explore with Sadat the idea of secret Israel-Egypt talks to discuss the outstanding issues (this was an obvious reference to the ideas that Barak had discussed with Gamasy). The Secretary said that we would have to reflect on this. He also noted that it would be useful to discuss the sovereignty issue with Prime Minister Begin should he so desire. Ambassador Lewis asked if the Israelis contemplated the issue of Jewish settlements would also be discussed during the five-year period. On the assumption that everything is negotiable, Dayan said he would think the issues of sovereignty and of an Israeli security presence would be discussed. Dayan made clear he was not addressing the question of how the issues might be decided. He believed that Israeli security and settlements were prime candidates for discussion and “understandings.”

Palestinian Refugees

Dayan asked whether the Secretary agreed that the question of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and elsewhere should be discussed during the interim period. The Secretary answered in the affirmative and agreed with Saunders that this would require a forum broader than that envisaged under the Begin Plan³ since it impacted on so many other players. Dayan noted there were two views on the Palestinian refugee problem. First, to postpone it or, second, address it in another forum. Dayan’s preference was to find a mechanism for discussing the refugee issue as soon as possible “in all of its aspects” since it was a key factor (he noted that the Jewish refugees⁴ would also be discussed), and as far as Lebanon was concerned, it was the key factor. Dayan said he did not know what Sadat’s views might be. Saunders expressed the view that the approach Dayan preferred was a good one but that we all had to recognize we had an uphill struggle in the Arab world in discussing the Palestinian refugee issue in rational terms. Dayan said he wasn’t sure he could agree with Saunders. He cited the situation in Lebanon which was forcing the Lebanese to face the facts—noting that the GOL had expressed itself as in favor of abolishing the Shtaura and Cairo Agreements.⁵ He added that if you solve the Palestinian problem, you solve the Lebanese problem. He also pointed out that the Jordanians would want to settle the Palestinian issue since they had 500,000 refugees. He thought it was worth raising as soon as possible, as Lebanon and Jordan, and maybe even the Saudis, would have an interest.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Executive Secretariat, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance Nodis Memcons, 1978. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Veliotes. Sent to Cairo for Ambassador Eilts, Tel Aviv for Ambassador Lewis, and to Ambassador Atherton. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Conference Room.
2. See footnote 5, Document 187.
3. See the Attachment to Document 177 and footnote 6, Document 180.
4. A reference to Jewish Arabs who had been expelled from their home countries after Israel’s founding in 1948.
5. The Cairo Agreement was brokered by Egyptian President Nasser between Yassir Arafat and Lebanese General Emile Bustani on November 2, 1969. It established the boundaries by which Palestinian guerrillas in Southern Lebanon could operate under Lebanese authorities. For the Shtaura Agreement, see footnote 2, Document 76.