Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

223. Memorandum From Ed Sanders to President Carter and Vice President Mondale¹

Washington, March 6, 1978

Subsequent to the February 7 dinner with the President and the Vice President,² I have become deeply disturbed by what appears to be a pronounced drift in the Administration’s Middle East policy which has resulted in the most widespread Jewish disenchantment that I can recall.

Present Situation

a) There is a widespread conviction that the Administration is deliberately provoking an open conflict with the American Jewish community evidenced by Dr. Brzezinski’s appearances before the Council on Foreign Relations on February 22 and at the White House meeting of February 23 and by press reports such as James Reston’s column of February 23.³

b) Spurred by the Administration’s Middle East arms package,⁴ a deep cynicism is developing as is a potential enduring hostility concerning the Administration’s intentions towards Israel. The present state of affairs is far worse than the emotional reaction to the joint United States-Soviet statement of October, 1977.⁵

c) The prospects for peace in the Middle East are adversely affected by the matters described in paragraphs “a” and “b” above.

Re the Arms Package

Personally, I am deeply disturbed and disheartened by each part of the Administration’s arms package—the sales to Saudi Arabia and Egypt as well as the severe cut in arms sales to Israel. In my opinion, the Administration is engaged in a major arms deal which is bound to deflect attention from the peace process and to harden negotiating stands on both sides while involving the Administration in a heated debate at home. I fully understand that the White House took account of these deficits in arriving at its decision, but I still feel that the wrong conclusions were drawn. (Details of the grounds for my views are set forth in Appendix attached hereto.)

Re the Settlements

The Administration has also involved itself in a public debate with the Israeli government over settlements policy. While I do agree that Israeli policy on this issue, especially its public relations aspects, has been questionable, I believe that there were other means for the United States government to handle the problem.

When Secretary Vance suggested that the settlements “should not exist,” he only made it more difficult for the Israelis to alter their policy and for the Egyptians to accept a compromise should they have been so inclined. In any case, sale of the F–15s to Saudi Arabia provides the best argument yet available to the Begin government for remaining indefinitely in a portion of the Sinai and has clearly improved the receptivity to Israeli arguments here at home.

Re Apparent Administration Hostility

I have been dismayed that Dr. Brzezinski chose to express views which were discerned as openly hostile to Israel at the Council on Foreign Relations on the 22nd and at the White House meeting of Jewish leaders the next day. I was not present at either meeting, but I am mystified at the timing and content of these reported statements. Certainly, they will make the Administration’s efforts at home more difficult and serve to heighten a confrontation atmosphere prior to Mr. Begin’s arrival and increase the possibility of an unsuccessful meeting.

Alternate Arms Policy

First and most importantly, I would delay the whole arms package until the results of the current peace efforts are clearer. The Israeli portion of the package may be consummated at a later date. None of the three governments may be satisfied with this approach, but I believe that it would signal to all of them that our primary objective at the present time is to take advantage of the opportunities set in motion by President Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem. I do not believe that this decision need create the appearance of Administration inconsistency or of a Saudi-American crisis. Since the package has not yet been sent to the Hill, it need only be delayed on the grounds that peace negotiations have become too delicate.

Normalization Plan

A United States-sponsored regional development plan, generally along the lines of the plan that Roger Lewis and I have previously recommended,⁶ should be announced. Such an announcement would make the concept of normalization much more meaningful, and both in the Sinai and the West Bank, normalization can be used as a means of guarantee and assurance for Israel.

In the Sinai, the settlements might well become less important to both sides if a high degree of Egyptian-Israeli normalization occurs. Prime Minister Begin has already conceded Egyptian sovereignty over the area; therefore, we should urge that the settlements should remain in place until a point in time (perhaps ten years hence) when a previously agreed level of normalization had been reached and had worked smoothly for several years. Both the Egyptian and the Israeli governments have been arguing about the future as if it will exist under current conditions. As demonstrated by the electrifying events between mid-November and mid-December, steps towards normalization have a way of altering the atmosphere and opening new psychological vistas. For the Israelis, a degree of security would be guaranteed by an agreement which spelled out specifically that they would not be forced to withdraw their settlements until a defined high degree of normalization had already been reached between the two countries. The Egyptians would not only be able to demonstrate the genuineness of their intentions, but they would know they would gain the return of their land.

I believe a similar formula could be applied on the West Bank. As self-rule for the West Bank similar to that envisioned by Prime Minister Begin was being instituted, a Jordanian presence could be recreated step by step while normalization was occurring in phases. For example, as telephone, telegraph and direct air service was begun between Tel Aviv and Amman, the Jordanians would conduct local elections. Only after full Jordanian-Israeli normalization would the final determination of the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip occur.

I am not suggesting that the United States should be this specific in recommending detailed plans, but I am recommending that we should have this type of compromise for use at an appropriate time. Indeed, it is my view that public proposals by United States officials only interfere with the negotiations between the parties themselves.

Conclusion

I have discussed all of the foregoing with Roger Lewis, and he concurs completely. We believe that on both the level of obtaining peace in the Middle East and on the level of domestic political support for the Administration, steps of the nature outlined above should be taken promptly. A failure of action will be materially harmful to the chances for peace and for success of the Administration domestically. We feel that unless the situation is defused, the Administration may become involved in a potentially irreversible confrontation with the Jewish community (which, among other things, may hurt Democratic candidates in the November Congressional elections).

Roger and I, as people who are committed to helping the President and the Administration, ask you to consider taking these steps. We ask this as people who respect and appreciate the President’s and the Vice President’s dedication to all of the things which are important to us as Americans and as Jews.

Attachment

Appendix⁷

Undated

Grounds for Views re Arms Package

First, it gives both sides a reason to harden their position. Since the military balance will now be less favorable towards Israel, Jerusalem can reasonably make the case that it requires larger amounts of territory for its security. Since the Arabs will be stronger by comparison, they have less incentive to compromise. Arguments that the Saudis will not transfer weapons to the Egyptians (e.g., their F–5Es) simply ignore past Arab practice and the high level of already existing Saudi-Egyptian military cooperation (e.g., the training of Egyptian pilots on Saudi F–5Es).

Second, the F–15s and F–16s were explicitly promised to Israel in return for her concessions in Sinai II. Why should Israel take any future guarantees from the United States seriously when we undercut a public promise?

Third, the package approach implies that all three claims are equal, which I would reject. Since 1955, the United States has wisely refrained from offering the sale of offensive weapons to Egypt. I see no reason why we should alter this policy now especially in the light of the French sale of jets to Cairo. It would have been more in keeping with our stated objectives to reward President Sadat with wheat instead of with weapons.

As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, I wonder whether the full implications of the decision on F–15s have been sufficiently examined. By making Saudi Arabia into a confrontation state, the possibilities of Saudi involvement in any war in the area are intensely increased. By raising the possibility of such a Saudi-Israeli conflict, we escalate the risks and complications for our own decision making process and thereby increase the possibility of falling ourselves into the abyss. At a minimum, we increase the possibility of escalated United States involvement in a highly volatile area.

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Collection, Geographic File, Box 12, Middle East—1/78–9/78. No classification marking. A typed note at the top of the page reads, “The President has seen.” Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote, “Zbig.” Ed Sanders was appointed a special adviser on Jewish affairs to Carter in July 1978. Previously, he had been President of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) from 1975 to 1976 and the Deputy National Campaign Director for Carter’s 1976 Presidential campaign.
2. Apparently a reference to February 8, when Carter hosted a private dinner from 7:28 to 10:23 p.m. in the White House family dining room for Jewish leaders. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation has been found. According to Carter’s diary, he met with Philip Klutznick, Sanders, Max Greenberg, Alex Schindler, Richard Maas, Frank Lautenberg, Ted Mann, Arnold Picker, and David Blumberg. Carter wrote that he “spelled out the relative flexibility of Sadat’s position and the intransigence of Israel. With the exception of Schindler, who always acts like an ass, the rest of them were constructive.” The group discussed “the illegal settlements, the short time frame in which to negotiate, and the need for Israel to recognize that UN 242 applies to the West Bank/Gaza Strip.” (White House Diary, p. 171)
3. Apparently a reference to a James Reston editorial in the February 24 issue of the New York Times. In it, Reston states that Carter’s closest advisers were urging him “to insist on his compromise policy in the Middle East, even at the risk of infuriating Israel and its supporters in Congress.” (New York Times, February 24, 1978, p. A27)
4. See footnote 5, Document 215. The number of aircraft slated for sale to Israel was just over half the amount requested in Israel’s Matmon C military modernization plan submitted in October 1977, which requested 150 F–16s and 25 F–15s. See Document 220.
5. See footnote 3, Document 165.
6. Not further identified.
7. No classification marking.