Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

222. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, March 5, 1978, 1118Z

2115. From Atherton U.S. Del. 56. Subject: Meeting With Hussein March 4.

1. Summary—Pickering and I met with Hussein Saturday afternoon, March 4, for about an hour. I made presentation along lines of talking points (Amman 2019)² stressing U.S. commitment to continue the peace effort and see it through to a successful conclusion. I emphasized that we are not asking Hussein for a decision at this stage to join the negotiations but said it would be useful for us to know, for our own confidential information only, what Hussein would need to be able to enter the negotiations. I indicated it would also be very helpful to have Jordanian ideas concerning interim arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza. Though quite cordial throughout the conversation, Hussein offered no encouragement and avoided direct response to my requests. He reiterated rather emphatically public Jordanian position that Israel would have to agree to full withdrawal and to self-determination for Palestinians. Evidently questioning our credibility, Hussein took no pains to disguise his skepticism regarding assurances of our determination to see the peace effort through to a successful conclusion; he smiled broadly when I spoke of this, and he later referred to assurances given him by Ambassador Goldberg and other USG officials in 1967, which he obviously felt had not been honored. I replied to this by pointing out that President Carter had spoken quite frankly both to the Arabs, on the need for normal peaceful relations, and to the Israelis, on settlements, on the need for withdrawal on all fronts and on the Palestinian issue, and that successful Middle East peace negotiations are essential to our national interest. Hussein said frankly it would be suicide for him to enter negotiations without assurances that Israel is prepared for full withdrawal and self-determination for the Palestinians. He expressed concern that Sadat’s aim in wanting Jordan as a partner to the negotiations is to improve his (Sadat’s) position. Hussein added fatalistically that either we would succeed, in which case we could count on his participation, or we would fail. If we failed he believed Jordan could also help in trying to put back together a new consensus in the Arab world for peace. He nonetheless said he wished us well and looked forward to continuing dialogue with us. End summary.

2. Present on the Jordanian side in addition to the King were Crown Prince Hassan and Sharaf. Those on our side were Pickering, Sterner, Korn and myself.

3. I led off by conveying greetings from the Secretary and the President to the King. I said that I had been asked to stop in Amman to inform the King where we stood and where we think the negotiations are going, and to get his views about this process and what we should do. I then informed Hussein of my travel plans and said that I expected to be returning to the area, and Amman, at some point following Begin’s visit to Washington. I said I thought the efforts that we have put into the declaration of principles had been useful. We have succeeded in narrowing the differences on language and understand more clearly now where the real problems lie.

4. I said that after Sadat recalled his delegation from the Jerusalem Political Committee meeting,³ there had been a period of disillusionment regarding the negotiations. When Sadat went to Washington he was clearly discouraged and there was a question whether he was prepared at all to continue with the peace process. However, as a result of his talks with President Carter, Sadat was encouraged and agreed that work on the declaration of principles should go forward and that the U.S. should play an intermediary role in achieving a declaration. I said we see the fact that Sadat has recently sent a message to Begin,⁴ and that Begin intends to reply thereto, as an encouraging sign that the negotiations are proceeding. Both Israel and Egypt want to complete work on the declaration. Neither they nor we see the declaration as an end in itself, but we all view it as an essential step toward creating a broader base for negotiation. I said negotiations on the declaration are now at stage where the main unresolved differences concern the Palestinian language. If the Palestinian language could be agreed, I thought other difficulties could be resolved too. I said it was clear that the declaration would not be the far reaching document that President Sadat had hoped for, but it would be an important step beyond Resolution 242. It would add to the 242 negotiation base by recognizing that the Palestinian issue has to be dealt with as a territorial and political problem, not just as a refugee issue. I pointed out that that alone would be a step forward. I said that it seemed evident that the Palestinian paragraph of the declaration will have to be substantially that of the President’s Aswan statement.⁵ Egypt would like a stronger Palestinian paragraph but in the end I thought Egypt would agree to the Aswan language. I said that the Israelis do not accept the Aswan language, but I had told them that in my judgment it would be necessary to agree to the Aswan language if a declaration of principles is to be achieved.

5. I said that I expected the Palestinian paragraph of the declaration to be one of the main issues to be discussed during Begin’s visit. The other main issue will be Begin’s interpretation that Resolution 242 does not apply to all fronts. I said we have made it clear that we totally disagree with Israel on this and that the principle of withdrawal on all fronts is universally accepted. There must be a change in the Israelis’s position on this issue if there is to be an agreement on the declaration of principles and movement on the negotiations. I cautioned, however, against expectations that these issues would be resolved during the Begin visit. Begin would not be able to make decisions in Washington on his own: he would have to return to Israel and consult his colleagues. But we hoped that the talks in Washington would help move forward the decision process.

6. I said in addition to the above-mentioned issues we would also like to get into the questions of future interim arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza. I noted that it seems generally accepted that there will have to be interim arrangements. The final solution cannot be achieved in a single leap. So far there is only one proposal on the table: that is Begin’s self-rule plan.⁶ We realize that Begin’s proposal is not acceptable to the Arabs as it stands. We hope to get a dialogue going on interim arrangements. I noted that the Egyptians are reluctant to get into the issue by themselves. They feel they have no mandate for the West Bank and would like to get Jordan’s views. The Egyptians would like discussions on the West Bank and Gaza to include Jordan and the Palestinian representatives. I said it would be very useful if Jor-dan could give us some of its ideas regarding possible interim arrangements.

7. I said another issue I had been instructed to raise was the very important question of Hussein’s views regarding the circumstances in which he would ultimately be prepared to join the negotiating process. I said we know that ideally Jordan would like to get a commitment in advance from Israel to full withdrawal and self-determination for the Palestinians. We assume Jordan would want to put these positions forward in negotiations. But it is not realistic to think that commitments of this precision and importance could be obtained in advance of actual negotiations. I said it would be helpful for us to hear for our own confidential information only what Hussein’s thoughts are on the sort of reasonable assurances that he would need to enter the negotiations. I asked if a declaration of principles would be sufficient in itself, and if not, would agreement by Israel to the principle of withdrawal from the West Bank be helpful? What kind of undertaking from the U.S. would Hussein see as desirable? In this connection, I stressed that the administration has made a firm commitment to stay with the negotiations until they reach a successful outcome.

8. Returning to the question of interim arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza, I said we have some ideas of our own on this subject but do not feel that we have sufficient understanding of those of the other parties. I said we think that several things are needed: a buffer of time, arrangements that would satisfy Israel’s security needs so that Israelis could accept the idea that they could withdraw without endangering their security, and the emergence of a responsible Palestinian leadership. I said we do not agree with Begin’s view that Israel has a claim to sovereignty over the West Bank, but we do think Israel has a right to assurances regarding its security, as does Jordan. I said Sadat feels it very important to find a basis which would make it possible for Jordan to join the negotiations. I said Sadat’s insistence on this demonstrates his adherence to the cause of a comprehensive settlement. If he had other things in mind he would not need to seek Jordan’s participation. I concluded my presentation with a renewed request for indications of Hussein’s thinking about what would be required to facilitate Jordan’s joining the negotiations when the right time comes and for Jordan’s ideas on future interim arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza.

9. Hussein asked me to convey his warmest greetings to the President and to the Secretary and to express his admiration for the President’s continuing efforts towards peace in the face of great difficulties. Hussein said he welcomed continuation of work on the declaration of principles and hoped that it would be successful. He was pleased that the declaration would go beyond Resolution 242 and contain a paragraph on the Palestinian issue. However, he said Jordan has only one position. That position continues to be that there must be total withdrawal and Palestinian self-determination. Hussein said nothing could make Jordan pull back from those two demands. Hussein said he supports President Sadat’s effort; but he also stressed the importance of preventing division in the Arab world.

10. The King said he saw a problem in my reference to the role of the U.S. as “middleman” (actually I had used the term intermediary). For us, Hussein said, the U.S. must be more than the middleman. In view of Israel’s intransigence, he could not see how the U.S. could be effective if it tried to play the role of middleman. The U.S. should play an active and positive role in bringing agreement.

11. Hussein took no pains to hide his skepticism about our pledges of determination to see the peace effort through to a successful conclusion. He smiled broadly when I mentioned this subject, and in the course of the conversation referred pointedly to the assurances that had been given him in 1967 by Ambassador Goldberg and other senior USG officials concerning Jordan’s territorial integrity and the fact that the U.S. had told Jordan 242 meant Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Hussein said that in 1967 Jordan had accepted Resolution 242 and had committed itself to continuing to play a moderate role, but now the interpretations that he was hearing were “not as clear” as the ones we had given him in the fall of 1967. Hussein added that Jordan had tried with the Israelis, but to no avail. It had not even been possible to achieve a disengagement agreement between Jordan and Israel in 1974. Hussein said he was ready to shoulder his responsibilities, but “frankly it would be suicide for us to do so” without being sure that the Israelis are ready to withdraw. Commenting on my remark that Sadat very much wants Jordan to join the negotiations, Hussein expressed some concern that Sadat’s real aim in seeking Jordan’s partnership might be to improve his own position.

12. I thanked the King for his candor and for his expression of good wishes for the success of our efforts. I said I wanted to be sure that His Majesty understood that we were not asking him for a commitment now for joining the negotiations. Hussein said he understood this. I said we would, however, like to know that he was keeping an open mind concerning this possibility and, as I had said, it would be useful for our own private guidance to know what conditions and assurances might be necessary for him to make the decision to join. I reiterated that we are aware of Jordan’s position concerning total withdrawal and self-determination for the Palestinians, and we are not asking Jordan to abandon these claims in negotiations. I had to say, however, that we did not think Jordan could expect to get Israel to accept its position before negotiations, though we do think it realistic to expect agreement from Israel to negotiate concerning withdrawal and the participation of the Palestinians in the determination of their future.

13. I said that regarding Hussein’s remarks on the U.S. role as “middleman”, we see ourselves not as passive but as active intermediaries. When the time is right we will be prepared to put forward our ideas. I noted that the President had not hesitated to speak frankly to both sides, to the Arabs concerning the need for true peace and to the Israelis concerning settlements, the Palestinian issue, and the need for withdrawal on all fronts. In regards to the settlement issue, I explained that the recent Israeli Cabinet decision signifies at least a partial freeze on new settlement activities.⁷ I said we of course would have preferred a total freeze but pointed out if the U.S. had not clearly stated its views on the settlement issue, the Israeli position would have been much worse. I noted in this connection that there is a process of rethinking going on in Israel today. Begin’s Cabinet is clearly divided on the settlements issue and there is much criticism in the press of the Prime Minister’s position.

14. I said to sum up there were a few points I would like to emphasize. The first was that we feel the peace process has begun and real negotiations are underway. Second, we are committed to remain engaged in this process. The President has given clear evidence of his commitment, and our national interest makes it essential that there be successful negotiations. I noted that we are fully aware of the implications of failure of the Sadat initiative. Third, we know where we are going. We will adjust our strategy when necessary, but our goals are clear. The Begin visit is part of that strategy, and it will be followed by further efforts. We will be working for a declaration of principles and also on interim arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza looking towards a final settlement and a solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.

15. Hussein thanked me for my presentation. He said all he could say at the present time was that he thought Jordan would have to sit and wait to see what would happen. He added fatalistically that either we would succeed, and in that case we could count on Jordan’s participation at the appropriate time, or we would fail and Jordan would then be ready to help to try to pick up the pieces. Pickering reminded Hussein that he had frequently said that he recognized that peace is a process into which the Middle East must enter but that there is no solution that is risk-free.

16. In closing Hussein again thanked me for coming and he said he agreed that we should continue the dialogue. He looked forward to seeing me when I next come to the area.

17. Before meeting with Hussein I had a brief talk with Crown Prince Hassan during which I went over in summary the main points of the presentation that I later made to Hussein. Hassan indicated a bit more flexibility than Hussein regarding Jordan’s role in the peace process but said nothing specific on this. He pointed out that Jordan bears a heavy burden and is isolated in the Arab world as a result of its moderation but added that criticism for Jordan’s entry into the peace process would depend on the extent to which the process itself looks credible. Everything would depend, Hassan reiterated, on how credible the US role and the process itself appears. Hassan noted that it would of course be very difficult for any Arab country to come forward on the basis of the Begin plan alone. He stressed the importance of getting a broad Arab consensus for the U.S. effort. In this connection, he indicated that Boumediene had told the Jordanians that he is keeping an open mind with regard to the peace negotiations. Boumediene had indicated that he would not reject a settlement based on Resolution 242 and would not oppose a solution solely on the grounds that it resulted from Sadat’s initiative.

Pickering

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–1553. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent immediate for information to Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and Damascus.
2. The talking points are in telegram 2019 from Amman, March 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
3. See footnote 4, Document 198.
4. See footnote 5, Document 224.
5. See footnote 5, Document 187.
6. Attached to Document 177.
7. See footnote 2, Document 221.