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  4. Document 220

220. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting1

Washington, February 27, 1978, 3:30–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Israeli Arms Requests—Matmon C

PARTICIPANTS

  • State
  • Under Secretary Philip Habib
  • Under Secretary Lucy Benson
  • Defense
  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan
  • Assistant Secretary David McGiffert
  • JCS
  • General David Jones
  • Lt. General William Smith
  • CIA
  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • [name not declassified]
  • OMB
  • Mr. W. Bowman Cutter
  • Mr. Randy Jayne
  • ACDA
  • Mr. Spurgeon Keeny
  • Dr. Barry Blechman
  • White House
  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Mr. David Aaron
  • NSC
  • Mr. William B. Quandt

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Policy Review Committee met under Secretary Brown’s chairmanship to discuss the Israeli Matmon C request.2 Matmon C is a ten-year procurement program for modernization and expansion of all branches of the Israeli armed forces. It will cost approximately $10 billion, and the Israelis are counting on us for $1.5 billion of FMS financing per year. The program envisages expansion of Israeli ground forces by two additional divisions, heavy reliance on high technology, and is derived from an analysis of a maximum Arab military threat.

1. General Response to Weizman. During Weizman’s March 7–10 visit, Secretary Brown will inform him that the United States cannot commit itself to Matmon C in its entirety. We need a clearer idea of Israel’s planned force structure and the strategy that lies behind future force development. We also need a clearer sense of priorities among the [Page 1023] various items requested. When we have that information in hand, we will be prepared to make decisions on a case-by-case basis, against the background of our long-standing commitment to maintain Israel’s security and her ability to deter Arab military threats.

2. Funding. There was agreement that we should stick with $1 billion in FMS for FY 1979. We should make no multi-year commitment, and we should make no commitment to fund everything that we agree to sell to Israel. As in the past, Israel will have to use some of her own resources to finance her military requirements.

3. Level of Response. Matmon C can be broken down into several categories for analytical purposes: follow-on support requirements; items for modernization of forces; high technology to enhance force efficiency; and force expansion. There was general agreement that we should be prepared to make positive decisions concerning follow-on support and should consider requests in the other categories on a case-by-case basis.

4. Weizman Visit. Weizman made it clear that he would like to be able to leave Washington with some positive decisions concerning Matmon C. Several possibilities were suggested. State is inclined to recommend positive decisions in the near future on an ammunition package and FLIRs. There was some discussion of the use of FMS financing for Kfirs and Chariot tanks, and most of the agencies were negative to this point. Nonetheless, the precedent already exists for using FMS funds in this way, and there are arguments in favor of a positive response. On the whole, it was felt that political considerations should guide any such decision.

5. Co-production. All of the agencies represented took a negative position on large-scale co-production projects with Israel. Defense suggested some possibilities for limited co-assembly, or for production in Israel of the avionics to be used on the F–16. This will require further consideration.

6. Secretary Brown’s Meeting with Weizman. Defense, State, and NSC will prepare a basic strategy paper for Secretary Brown to use in his talks with Weizman.

It was the consensus of the PRC that decisions on Israeli military requests should be discussed further against the background of political developments in the Middle East and in U.S.-Israeli relations. On military grounds alone, there are no urgent decisions which need to be taken. The consensus of the intelligence community remains that Israel has a significant margin of military superiority over the Arabs and that this will continue through the early 1980’s regardless of how we respond to Matmon C.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of Information/Legal, Kimmit, Arms Transfer File, Box 22, Israel: 9/77–12/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.↩
  2. See footnote 5, Document 130. A February 1978 U.S. Government review of Israeli Defense Force requirements and Matmon C is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 1–3/78.↩