Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

224. Telegram From the Consulate in Jerusalem to the Department of State¹

Jerusalem, March 7, 1978, 0935Z

660. From Atherton. U.S. Del. No. 69. Subject: Meeting With President Sadat March 6.

1. Following is full report on conversation I had with Sadat evening of March 6 at his residence in Giza (Jerusalem 655).² Present on Egyptian side were Vice President Mubarak, Foreign Minister Kamel, Butros Ghali, Ahmed Maher; accompanying me were Ambassador Eilts and Sterner.

2. I first explained to Sadat reasons that had brought me back to Cairo 24 hours earlier than I had expected. We had originally thought we were going to Riyadh first but it turned out that Saud was not there, and it did not seem to me worthwhile making the trip unless I could see him.

3. I then summarized for Sadat the briefing I had given Kamel³ earlier in the day about my last visit to Israel and my stop in Jordan.⁴ I told Sadat I had delivered his letter to Begin,⁵ who had been pleased to receive it. Begin had read it in my presence but had made no comment about its contents. Although Begin obviously disagrees with many points, he did express pleasure in having the personal dialogue with Sadat resumed. I offered the personal comment to Sadat that I thought the fact that he had sent the letter had helped the Egyptian position as far as Israeli and world opinion are concerned. I wanted to make one point clear: the U.S. had not been involved in any way in the preparation of Begin’s response. As I handed him the letter⁶ I said I thought that he would find that it was written in Begin’s usual blunt, direct style. Sadat laid it aside for the moment and asked me to continue my briefing.

4. I said I had had a good talk with King Hussein. He was still supportive of Sadat’s initiative and hoped it would succeed. Sadat laughed and said, “But he doesn’t want any part of the dirty work, right?” I told Sadat we had not really pressed him to join the negotiations at this stage. He was clearly very concerned about Jordan’s position with respect to the rest of the Arabs. I had the impression that he was adopting a wait-and-see attitude about the negotiations. Sadat commented that this was exactly the report that the British had given him. I added that Hussein’s position was that he wanted to know where the negotiations in broad terms would come out before he joined them. He was taking the position that Israel had to commit itself to total withdrawal and self-determination for the Palestinians. I told Sadat that I had tried to make two points with him. First I urged him to keep an open mind about the precise stage at which he might join the negotiations; second, that he should be realistic in his expectation of what Israel can agree to prior to negotiations. While it was reasonable to ask that the negotiations go forward on a good faith commitment to the principle of withdrawal, it was not realistic to expect Israel to spell these principles out in detailed terms before negotiations had even been joined. I told Sadat that I had suggested to the King that he try to maintain a more intensive dialogue with Egypt on the peace process. I said I was taking the liberty of making the same suggestion to him. Sadat did not offer any comment.

5. I said I would try to sum up this phase of my mission now that the time had come to head back to Washington. I would, of course, be reporting to the Secretary and to President Carter. I thought my mission had been useful in preparing the ground work for the Begin visit. On the declaration of principles the Palestinian paragraph was obviously the principal problem. This remained unresolved, but we had had an opportunity to make clear to the Israelis several basic points: that the Aswan formulation had emerged as the only feasible compromise in the declaration of principles; that we considered S.C. Resolution 242 principle of withdrawal to apply to all fronts; that we felt strongly that there should be a freeze on all future settlement activities so as to provide a good climate for negotiations. I said Begin at last knows what the issues are, and I thought that our mission had had the effect of stimulating public debate in Israel. I mentioned the increasing criticism Begin was receiving and cited as an example Abba Eban’s recent article documenting the fact that previous Israeli governments had accepted the principle of withdrawal on the West Bank and Gaza as well as other fronts. Sadat said he had read it and had noted that it was indeed very critical of Begin. I said I thought a full scale debate in Israel on these issues was underway and that this was one reason why we needed a continuation of the negotiating process. This produced its own dynamic in terms of bringing about changes in public and governmental attitudes. During the Begin visit we would clearly want to make a major effort to resolve the declaration of principles, but realistically, even in the best of circumstances, this process could not be completed overnight since it would require extended Cabinet discussions. I said I thought at some point President Carter and Secretary Vance would ask me to return for another mission. Finally, I said that I knew that Sadat’s calm and steady approach to the difficult problem he was facing had been admired and appreciated in Washington. It was very important not to provide any excuse for diversion from the main issues.

6. At this point Sadat picked up Begin’s letter and read it through carefully. He put it down, took off his glasses, and after a long pause said, “Well, it’s the same old argument.” He said he thought Egypt should have its arguments ready on certain points since Begin could well raise these with President Carter in Washington. Begin would try to exploit this exchange while he was in Washington. The main points in Begin’s letter must be answered. Turning to Kamel Sadat asked him to prepare a reply which could be ready for me to deliver the following day.⁷

7. Sadat said he noted Begin’s “keen interest” in the negotiations being resumed in both the political and military committees. “I have no objection to this, none whatsoever.” But, asked Sadat rhetorically, are we going to start these talks up from a vacuum and with no guidelines, just so we can say that the negotiations are underway? But in principle, said Sadat, he had no objection to resuming the talks.

8. I said I would be happy to convey to President Carter anything that Sadat wished me to say. Sadat said he would prepare an answer to most of the important points in the Begin letter. One response would be sent to Begin; a second to President Carter.⁸ Sadat asked me, whether I absolutely had to leave Cairo that evening. I explained to him that I had to allow a day for the possibility of visiting Saudi Arabia, and therefore, had advanced my last stop in Israel and now had scheduled appointments with both Dayan and Begin the following day. If delivering the letter was the only problem, I thought this could equally well be sent to me by Flash telegram by Ambassador Eilts. Sadat indicated he understood and that there was no problem about my adhering to my original plan.

9. After another reflective pause, Sadat said he would be very patient. Begin was obviously playing for time. He was trying to adopt a hard-line to see if it would produce results. Sadat understood his tactics, and he would be patient. He would be preparing the response to Begin, he looked forward to receiving a report from us in due course on the Begin visit, and he said I would always be welcome whenever the President and Secretary asked me to come back out.

10. Speaking to Sadat, Foreign Minister Kamel said as he had explained to me earlier, he hoped the Begin visit would be the turning point in the peace process. “Begin must be brought back to earth.” Kamel said that the US positions have now been well-defined on a number of issues. It was now vital for the US to hold firmly to these positions and to make them stick with Israel. Begin had introduced totally new elements in the peace process—such as that the principle of withdrawal would not apply to the West Bank and Gaza—which were very dangerous.

11. Sadat said the Foreign Minister was quite right. Even Mrs. Meir didn’t go as far as Begin. He said he would recommend in his message to President Carter that he adopt the style of Eisenhower in 1956. Eisenhower had ordered not only Israel, but also the British and French to withdraw from Egypt and he had done this on the basis of armistice agreements and not real peace which was now being offered. Today President Carter could offer Israel the full peace that Egypt promised. This would be a strong peace because the commitments would be from Egypt, which was the main power in the region. Last April Sadat had told President Carter that he couldn’t agree to full peace for Israel. “Now I have come much farther than Carter asked.”

12. Sadat said he recalled the summer of 1976—“America’s darkest hour” when the country was being wracked by Watergate and was still suffering from the Vietnam complex. Even Kissinger was being attacked viciously. Yet in spite of these circumstances Ford had achieved the second disengagement agreement the terms of which gave Egypt the strategic passes and the oil fields in the Sinai. Sadat said he wanted President Carter to know this. When he had dined in the White House he had Congressman O’Neill to one side of him. O’Neill told him, referring to Carter, “This is the strongest President we have ever had.” Sadat thus anticipated that President Carter would be very firm with Begin. Carter was on solid ground. He could appeal to the nation if necessary. Sadat said he would have no objection to the US concluding a defense pact with Israel in the context of a peace settlement.

13. Sadat then related how he had then met in Europe on his return from the US with the leading European Jewish financial supporters of Israel. Goldman had told him not to heed Begin since they were supporting Sadat. Goldman had said this even though Begin was in Europe at the time and had given these men strict instructions not to meet with Sadat. Goldman had said we must not lose this opportunity for peace. Rothschild had sent Sadat a secret message saying that he was the grandchild of the Rothschild who had built Israel, but that he wanted Sadat to know that he was completely behind him. Sadat said his friend the Austrian Prime Minister Kreisky had organized this meeting of European Jewish financiers. They had made it clear that they were committed to Israel but were also beginning to make Israel realize that it had to do its part for peace. He had had a similar meeting with influential American Jews while he was staying at Blair House.⁹ He had met Klutznik who had brought with him nine of the elite of Israel’s backers. Sadat said, “They asked me what did I want? I told them nothing—just to tell Begin the same thing they were telling me.” Sadat asked me to tell President Carter we should not lose this opportunity. He is the first President who can deliver real peace for Israel. It was an opportunity which would not repeat itself. As Sadat had said in his letter to Begin, he was ready to establish peace based on all the principles of good neighborliness. But such a peace must be also based on the principle that one side would not trespass on the other’s land.

14. Sadat said the second point he wished to make to President Carter concerned the serious situation in Africa. Mengistu had now openly declared that he had Soviet and Cuban troops fighting for him. Sadat had wondered whether Washington fully realized what an unprecedented step this was for the Soviets to take and, therefore, how dangerous it was. In 1970, when Israeli war planes bombed a factory and killed 70 Egyptian workers, Nasser had asked the Soviets for SAM 3 missiles and for Soviet crews to operate the missile sites until Egyptian crews could be trained. The Soviets at first refused which had caused a great strain on Egyptian/Soviet relations at the time. The story indicated how reluctant the Soviets have been up to now to send Soviet troops outside the Warsaw Pact. Their presence in Ethiopia was a very dangerous development. Sadat said he wanted me to tell President Carter that his conflict with Israel was secondary to the danger presented by the growing Soviet presence in Africa. “Within a few months” said Sadat, “you will see the Sudan being attacked.” Once the fighting in Ogaden was settled in Ethiopia’s favor, next Eritrea would be pacified. Then the Soviets would launch an attack from two sides on the Sudan; from Chad on one side where they were enjoying the cooperation of Qaddafi, the other from Eritrea. Sadat said if this happened he would join battle with the Soviets whatever the consequences. He expected that within a few months he would be fighting the Soviets in the Sudan.

15. Sadat said he was not asking the US to send soldiers. He was only asking for a policy from Washington that would enable America’s friends to fight the Soviets. He did not want to be like President Siad abusing the US for failure to send arms to support Somalia. He could understand the US position of not wishing to supply arms as long as Somalia was fighting beyond its borders. But Sadat wanted President Carter to make Begin understand that we must have peace in the Middle East so that this new danger could be confronted. Sadat said he was taking great risks but he would “never be a deserter.”

16. I told Sadat that as I had once before remarked to him, I thought history would prove that he was right in his Middle East initiative. I then said that there was one other thing that I wanted to mention to him. On my previous visit I had mentioned that we would welcome Egyptian ideas on arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza. Sadat said he had a paper which he was ready to hand over to us with the understanding that it was strictly for our information alone.¹⁰ He then read the paper out loud, and then said he wanted to make two additional points. First, Egypt was ready during the interim period to have responsibility for security in the West Bank placed in the hands of Israel, Jordan, local Palestinians, and the UN; in the case of Gaza, in the hands of Israel, Egypt, local Palestinians and the UN. Second, he wished to confirm his assurance to President Carter when he was in Washington that he would be willing to see Israel maintain security positions of its own in these areas during the interim period. Sadat said his ideas had been cast in the form of a “general outline” because Egypt could not speak for the Palestinians in terms of detailed peace proposals. It could, however, speak within the context of the Arab summit strategy. Sadat said he felt his outline was consistent with this strategy. With it, “we have discharged our obligation to the Arabs.” Sadat said Hussein had come to visit him after his trip to Jerusalem. He had told him then to take his time about getting into the negotiations. But he did not want Hussein to think he could not get anywhere without him. He understood Hussein perfectly. He was playing a double game between Syria and Egypt.

17. The meeting broke up with Sadat saying I would be warmly welcomed whenever I returned on my next mission.

Newlin

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2741. Secret; Immediate; Exdis (Handle as Nodis). Sent immediate for information to Tev Aviv, Amman, Cairo, Jidda, and Damascus.
2. Telegram 655 from Jerusalem, March 6, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number].
3. Atherton’s meeting with Kamel is reported in telegram 659 from Jerusalem. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2724)
4. Atherton last met with the Israelis on March 2. A summary of his private meeting with Begin and Dayan is in telegram 619 from Jerusalem, March 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850059–1744) Atherton met with King Hussein on March 4. See Document 222.
5. An incomplete text of Sadat’s letter to Begin is in telegram 6642 from Cairo, March 1. In the letter, Sadat addressed Israeli security concerns and argued, “The entire problem can be solved in a few days if we agree on the elements of a settlement.” He concluded by stating, “If you are ready for real peace, I am, as I have proved, ready too.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071–1509)
6. The text of Begin’s letter to Sadat is in telegram 2941 from Tel Aviv, March 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137–1969) In telegram 2976 from Tel Aviv, March 6, Ambassador Lewis described Begin’s letter as “vintage Begin: argumentative, sanctimonious, insensitive, and plaintive—in short, Begin at his worst.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137–1975)
7. Sadat delayed his response by a few days. On March 10, he responded with a letter which is in telegram 7884 from Cairo, March 10. In his letter, Sadat complained to Begin about his “legalistic arguments that are not only easily refutable, but which also seem to indicate that the new spirit created by my peace initiative has not found its way to the decisions and attitudes of the Israeli Government.” Sadat added that “we could endlessly engage in legalistic debates on all the matters you raised,” but he concluded that “what I want to concentrate upon is the new spirit and facts that have been created by my peace initiative.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850059–2157)
8. No letter to Carter has been found.
9. This meeting occurred on February 6. (Washington Post, February 7, 1978, p. A9)
10. See Document 225.