Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

163. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 5, 1977, noon–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Syrian Ambassador Sabah Kabbani

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ambassador Sabah Kabbani of Syria
• William B. Quandt, NSC Staff

Ambassador Kabbani noted that he was pleased to have the chance to exchange views at this time. Dr. Brzezinski replied that much had happened in the Middle East and that it was important to compare ideas and to develop a long-range perspective. The President has a very favorable recollection of his meeting with President Assad² and hopes to maintain a close relationship with him. Secretary Vance will be going to the Middle East in part to keep that relationship intact. There are bound to be questions and uncertainties, and we hope to sustain a dialogue and to deal jointly with problems as they arise. Ambassador Kabbani said that Syria is also eager to continue a dialogue and that recent developments in Tripoli indicate that Syria is still hopeful about going to Geneva in an orderly way.³

In response to Dr. Brzezinski’s question about why Syria had not shown more flexibility on Geneva previously, Ambassador Kabbani replied that Syria does want to go to Geneva, but that now Arab unity has been weakened and this will make a comprehensive solution more difficult. Dr. Brzezinski stated that it might have been possible to avoid this situation if more flexibility had been shown earlier. In his view, President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem stemmed from his concern over the lack of momentum toward Geneva, with some parties placing too much emphasis on procedural detail. Ambassador Kabbani replied that Syria had placed its trust in the American efforts and believed that they were sincere, but was somewhat concerned that words were not always followed by actions. The United States, in his view, could not be both mediator and ally in Israel.

Dr. Brzezinski cautioned that it was not possible for the United States to dissociate itself completely from Israel. The United States has a special relationship with Israel based on history, psychology and politics. The United States has a special sense of responsibility to ensure Israel’s existence. The Arabs now no longer seem to question Israel’s existence in any case, and this makes a peace settlement possible. The American relationship with Israel does not preclude close ties to the Arab world, and if there were a comprehensive settlement, the United States could have ties with the Arabs that are as close as those that it has with Israel. Once war is behind us, the area will experience a great period of development and we will want to be closely related to the countries there.

Ambassador Kabbani said that Syria does not object to the special relationship between the United States and Israel, but it does not feel that Israel should be able to impose its views on American policy. Dr. Brzezinski responded by saying that the United States cannot deliver Israel forceably to a peace conference. There will have to be negotiations. We do want Israel to show flexibility and we have offered to examine all issues deliberately, but now we should talk about the future. There seem to be several possibilities. There could be an Egyptian-Israeli arrangement, but one would have to ask whether it would last and whether Sadat would want one in any case. The second possibility is that no agreement will be reached and that there will be a breakdown in the process of searching for peace. This will be very bad and could produce profound disappointment, perhaps leading to hostilities. If a separate arrangement is not likely, and if a breakdown is undesirable for all parties, we should explore a third possibility, which is to build on the recent developments in a positive way. President Assad, in very difficult circumstances, has shown courage in remaining committed to the Geneva Conference.

Dr. Brzezinski urged that Syria consider the possibility of building on the new Egyptian-Israeli relationship. A psychological barrier has now been broken. The Israelis know that some Arabs want peace. Mr. Begin has also indicated that he may be prepared to talk seriously. Now the Israeli government is ambivalent about its policies, and the internal opposition is more moderate. Mr. Peres and Mr. Eban are ahead of Begin. This should be exploited. If there is no separate deal, and if there is no breakdown, then we should try to build on the Egyptian-Israeli relationship as a catalyst, and should try to widen it to include others. The United States feels that Syria has an important role to play. We still hope for Geneva, but we think that even before Geneva important developments can occur.

Ambassador Kabbani noted that the time has now come for the United States and Israel to take major steps. There are no more taboos. The United States is reluctant to impose its views, but the United States must do something. Sadat’s step was courageous. But now Syria wants something from the United States and from Begin in response. The Cairo meeting will only be a show. The Middle East problems will not be solved by this approach. There must be a serious effort to deal with substantive issues. The American role is to explain to Begin what he must do and how a Geneva Conference can be reached. The United States now has the ball in its court. The current atmosphere in the United States is very helpful, because the United States can now do anything. Dr. Brzezinski responded by noting that the American public does expect further progress and signs of Israeli flexibility. Ambassador Kabbani believed that the United States should specifically tell the Israelis what needs to be done. He then asked what was wrong with the Waldheim initiative⁴ or a conference under UN auspices. Dr. Brzezinski noted that Waldheim had planned to invite the PLO and that PLO participation in such a conference did not make sense, given the PLO’s refusal to accept Resolution 242.

Ambassador Kabbani made the observation that Sadat, in going to Israel, had criticized former Arab concepts of non-acceptance of Israel. Israel should now reexamine its own positions on how to deal with the Arabs and the Palestinians and should do some self criticism of its own. This would pave the way for a breakthrough. He was critical of the American insistence on adhering to the terms of the Sinai II agreement. Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States cannot repudiate an agreement made by a previous Administration. The United States has tried to be flexible, and a formula has been developed that would allow for Geneva with Palestinian participation. We should not reopen this issue. Instead, we should try to exploit what has happened and to bring others into the process. The alternative to joining the process would be for Syria to stay on the sidelines with the Soviet Union, and this would not be good for Syria. The greater the flexibility that Syria can show, the more pressure it will bring on Israel. Dr. Brzezinski urged that the Syrians show the same political imagination that President Sadat has shown. He urged that the parties not worry about working papers, and that instead they should declare their willingness to go to a Conference. If Syria refuses to go, it will be labelled the intransigent party. Whoever is labelled the intransigent, whether it is Begin or the Syrians, will be isolated. Within Israel, there is a mounting cry for greater flexibility. The United States will not try to impose its views, but it will encourage flexibility and moderation, but Syria also has a role to play in bringing this about. Ambassador Kabbani replied that Syria had dealt with Israel for thirty years and had seen no indication that Israel was willing to change its approach to dealing with the Arabs. Israel must now give something. The American role should be to remind them of this fact. Dr. Brzezinski agreed that Israel would have to respond to Sadat’s step, but that the United States will not impose its will on Israel and then deliver Israel to Syria. The parties instead will have to discuss and negotiate. Ambassador Kabbani felt that the discussions should begin from the basis of the principles that the United States itself had enunciated regarding withdrawal and a Palestinian homeland.

Dr. Brzezinski called President Sadat the first Arab leader to recognize the importance of public opinion in both the United States and Israel. Sadat is now the most popular Arab leader in the United States. By contrast, Syria is making it easy for Israel to remain in a rigid position. Syria is not viewed as being sufficiently flexible in its own views. It is important to learn to play a political psychology game. Begin himself is a master of this art. But Sadat has now put him on the defensive. If you want Israel to be flexible at Geneva, you don’t have to give anything away on substance, but you have to show a flexible attitude. Ambassador Kabbani noted that President Carter had referred to Egypt, quite correctly, as the largest Arab country. If Egypt gets nothing from Israel, how can Syria expect anything. Egypt has to show some results. Sadat can only hope to represent the other confrontation states if he gets something.

Dr. Brzezinski agreed that there was a need for flexibility on the Israeli side. If that occurs, Syria should join the process. Ambassador Kabbani said that Syria has been flexible, but there are real problems that must be faced: continued occupation of Arab territory, settlements, and refugees. These are real problems, not just psychological problems. In Damascus alone, there are 150,000 Palestinian refugees. They would not understand an attitude of flexibility unless something were specifically done to improve their lot.

Dr. Brzezinski said that he was aware of these facts and that he appreciated the position that President Assad has taken in difficult circumstances. He expressed his hope that the two Presidents would remain in touch through Secretary Vance during his upcoming visit, and through any other means that the Syrians chose. Ambassador Kabbani concluded by expressing his hope that the two governments would continue to stay in touch.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 67, Middle East: Peace Negotiations 1977 Vol. II. Secret. The meeting took place at the White House in Brzezinski’s office.
2. See Document 32.
3. On December 2, Arab leaders from Libya, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Southern Yemen, and the PLO met in Tripoli for a two-day meeting to address possible action to take against Egypt after Sadat’s visit to Israel. Leaders proposed economic and diplomatic sanctions, but by the end of the meeting, the five countries and PLO representatives agreed to a mutual defense accord and a “resistance front.” (Marvine Howe, “Arab Meeting Fails to Forge Joint Front Against Sadat Moves,” New York Times, December 5, 1977, p. 1) The final communiqué, or Tripoli Declaration, issued on December 5 did not directly oppose a negotiated settlement, reportedly at Syrian insistence. As a result, Iraq walked out of the conference. (Marvine Howe, “Hard-Line Arab Bloc Is Formed at Tripoli,” New York Times, December 6, 1977, p. 11) Egypt responded to the conference’s measures by breaking diplomatic relations with Libya, Syria, Algeria, and Southern Yemen.
4. The Waldheim initiative refers to U.N. Secretary General Waldheim’s attempt, beginning with a trip to the Middle East in February 1977, to reconvene the Geneva Conference under the auspices of the United Nations. A major aspect of the initiative was the intent to include Palestinian negotiators, although they would not necessarily be PLO members.