133. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
17348. Subj: Letter From President Sadat to President Carter—Egyptian Reaction to U.S. Working Paper. Ref (A) State 246490, (B) Cairo 17194, (C) Cairo 17082.2
1. As I was leaving Fahmy’s apartment this morning after a sharply abbreviated meeting to discuss two other matters (septels), one of his aides rushed in bringing an envelope. Fahmy gave it to me, explaining it was Sadat’s reply to President Carter’s latest letter (Ref A) and transmitting a working paper (WP) reformulation which he, Fahmy, had drafted on Sadat’s instructions. As it turned out, the WP reformulation was not included in the envelope and I subsequently had to get a copy from his staff at the MFA. Since he was short on time and the reformulation was not included in the envelope, there was no opportunity to discuss the matter. As we were riding down the elevator together, Fahmy did make a few scattered observations, which are being reported by septel.
2. Text of President Sadat’s letter to President Carter follows: quote:
Dear President Carter,
I received with thanks your letter dated October 14, 1977, and I concur completely with your assessment of the situation and that we should tackle the real issues in a pragmatic manner concentrating on the substantive rather than the procedural aspects.
I am greatful (sic) with your assurances anew that you are still committed to what we have agreed upon when we met in Washington [Page 711] so far as the questions related to peace, Israeli withdrawal, security arrangements and the question of the Palestinians.3
I share your views that we should have succeeded in achieving greater progress so far as the substantive issues are concerned but I am aware of the various difficulties which made it impossible to reach that desired goal.
I have examined thoroughly the working paper which I have received enclosed with your above mentioned letter. Moreover, I have discussed its contents with Yasser Arafat where I have noticed that he is forthcoming.
You may recall however that after convening the National Security Council of Egypt I have conveyed to you my agreement on the original American working paper which was handed to Minister Fahmy during his visit to Washington.4 Furthermore my approval of that paper was conveyed to almost all the Arab heads of states, and as such I am still committed to the main substantive parts of that paper.
I have in the meantime noticed that in the new working paper5—which was leaked by Dayan as an Israeli paper in the Knesset—there is a serious departure from the original paper to the extent of amending some of the basic points contained in the original, in addition to some new points of procedural character to which I do not attach great significance.
As you most properly (sic—probably?) know Minister Fahmy conveyed our views to Secretary Vance through Ambassador Eilts on both the substantive and procedural points. In the light of my far reaching talks with Arafat I attach herewith a reasonable pragmatic formula which I believe could tremendously enhance the chances of convening the Geneva Conference later this year without prejudice to the position of any of the parties concerned.
Having said that, I would like to emphasize that Arafat is still committed to what he told me concerning the representative of the Palestinians at Geneva, as was conveyed to you through Minister Fahmy.
In concluding, I would like to convey to you my warmest thanks and deep conviction that you will use your influence through discreet diplomacy in order to reach an acceptable and constructive compromise and that you personally and the United States will continue to [Page 712] play a major role towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
Sincerely
Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat
Unquote.
3. Text of Fahmy’s attached WP reformulation is given below: Quote:
Working Paper on Suggestions For the Resumption of the Geneva Conference
1. The Arab parties will be represented by a unified Arab delegation for the opening sessions at Geneva. The delegation will include not well known members of the PLO.
2. The working groups or subcommittees for the negotiation of peace treaties will be formed as follows:
A. Egypt-Israel
B. Syria-Israel.
C. Jordan-Israel.
D. Lebanon-Israel.
E. The West Bank, Gaza, the Palestinian question, and the question of refugees will be discussed among Israel, Jordan, Egypt, the Palestinians and perhaps others as determined at the opening sessions of the Geneva Conference.
3. The agreed basis for the negotiations at the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East are U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
4. The working groups or subcommittees will report to the plenary. Unquote.
4. Egyptian public media announced noon today that President Sadat’s reply to President Carter’s latest letter had been given to me earlier in the morning.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–1905. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- Telegram 246490 to Cairo, October 14, is described in Document 131. In telegram 17194 from Cairo, October 17, Eilts summarized his meeting with Fahmy, in which he stressed the “overriding need to break shackles of procedural details so that we can get to Geneva.” Fahmy indicated that he and Sadat “would go to Geneva without 242, a [working paper] or anything.” The stumbling block was persuading the PLO and Syrians that the working paper represented a document they could find acceptable. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–1934) In telegram 17082 from Cairo, October 14, Eilts reported on Fahmy’s preliminary reaction to the working paper, which included several concerns over language. Despite these reservations, Fahmy noted that Egypt did not want to “be ‘fussy,’” and it shared Carter’s desire to facilitate an early reconvening of the Geneva Conference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–1943)↩
- See Documents 25 and 27.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 118 and Document 119.↩
- The new working paper included the revisions made after Carter’s meeting with Dayan on October 4. See Document 124.↩