132. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Yigael Yadin of Israel
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Gary Sick, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
- Yigael Yadin of Israel
- His Excellency Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador from Israel
Dr. Brzezinski opened the discussion by noting that Foreign Minister Dayan’s reference to his discussions with the President as “brutal” were extremely unhelpful and were not true.2 Ambassador Dinitz said that he could not believe that Mr. Dayan actually said that; he had been in the meetings and it was not true. He was going to check with his Government. Mr. Yadin noted that he had heard people refer to it as a “tough” meeting. He did note, however, that the Hebrew word which could be translated as “brutal” had quite a different connotation in Hebrew and this might have been the problem. Ambassador Dinitz noted that Mr. Dayan had never used this expression with him in reference to these conversation. Dr. Brzezinski noted that the word “brutal” was carried in quotes in the Post. Moreover, Time Magazine had reported that Mr. Dayan during his trips around the United States had suggested that the President was naive in his Middle East approach and, although well intentioned, would lead to the destruction of Israel by the approach he had adopted about getting a settlement. Mr. Yadin said Mr. Dayan should authorize a retraction of that statement and also should clarify his remarks since Dayan has specifically told him that he was very impressed with the President during his meetings. Ambassador Dinitz indicated that he would make inquiries in Israel.
Mr. Yadin asked how Dr. Brzezinski saw the current situation. Dr. Brzezinski noted that the present situation is uncertain. There is no certainty that the Arabs will accept the working paper which the Israeli Cabinet had just approved, especially the Syrians. It is also uncertain whether the Soviets can play a constructive role in the peace process. [Page 706] Their motives are cloudy in this area. The other uncertainty is what will happen after meetings actually begin in Geneva, assuming that the conference is convened. We must ask ourselves how to make this process work. We don’t want a situation where Israel will be isolated and ganged up on by the United States, the Arabs and the Soviets in a Geneva Conference. We need to talk about the nature of an overall settlement which would give Israel that which it is entitled to, i.e., objective and subjective peace and cohabitation with her Arab neighbors. True peace requires arrangements, military and otherwise, which in the age of nationalism Arabs find very difficult to accept and which we can’t impose on them. We need a more creative search for security arrangements, especially with respect to the West Bank. It is impossible to define Eretz Israel in terms of 19th Century European nation states. The ideal solution would be if the Arabs could have their own passports, move back and forth freely, have some share in political power, a common market type of arrangement with religious freedom and with the possibility of Israelis participating in all aspects of life on the West Bank, which could include some type of Israeli security forces—not permanently and not coming in to police Nablus for example.
Mr. Yadin noted that his own views and the views of his party differed significantly from those of Mr. Begin and his party. However, four months ago he would not have dreamed that Begin could agree to the working paper which he had just pushed through the cabinet. This is a major achievement. If Syria now objects and greater pressure or persuasion is brought to bear on Israel, you can’t really expect that they will move further. The germ of an agreement is there in the working paper to work in the right direction. His (Yadin’s) own view is that Israel and Egypt should work out a preliminary agreement ad referendum, with consummation to come at a later date after other aspects have been solved in order to avoid the kind of fears that would be built up by Egypt moving to an agreement unilaterally with Israel. However, the chronology should be Egypt-Israel first, with Jordanian and Palestine issues coming later, since the Palestine or West Bank issues will be the most difficult. We should aim at the bilateral aspects first and only later move into multilateral aspects of a solution.
Dr. Brzezinski noted that the Arabs fear that Israel is trying to split Egypt away from the Arab camp by dealing with it first; however, it is obvious that even if you start with all four issues, some will move faster than others. Mr. Yadin said he was aware of the fear of the splitting off of Egypt from the other Arabs, but that this should be handled as a first “phase of discussion” not a final decision, like SALT. Dr. Brzezinski said he saw no problem with discussing the Egypt-Israel question first on a de facto basis, but this order could not be formalized. Ambassador Dinitz said he felt the Egyptians would probably like the idea of moving [Page 707] quickly on the Egypt-Israel front. Dr. Brzezinski agreed and noted that an early agreement between Israel and Egypt could possibly provide an incentive for other members to move toward a settlement on other fronts.
Mr. Yadin noted that this incentive would be true in Israel as well, since an early success would build confidence and momentum. He noted that there were very different views within Israel between the government, the Labor Party, and the DMC. We (the DMC) think that any Palestinian entity should be incorporated within a West Bank-Jordanian entity. Eventually this could even be the Hashemite Kingdom of Palestine. However, the key thing is to avoid a third Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan. This process can be a gradual one. Actually, the Begin-Dayan position is not too different from this if one leaves aside final objectives. The stage which they propose as a settlement is in fact a necessary step toward the sort of objective that Yadin and his party favor. The Americans and the Arabs call this an interim step, while Begin and Dayan say this is the final step. But it is a necessary step in either case. There is probably room for negotiation. It does, however, involve military control. Dr. Brzezinski noted that military control gives negative leverage. Israel must understand that settlements are considered signals of permanence and actually interfere with the peace process rather than providing any real security. Mr. Yadin noted that in the recent Knesset the DMC formulation with respect to settlements had stressed the security aspects and had allowed a considerable degree of ambiguity with regard to the PLO. The DMC position is that they want to give back the West Bank but they do not want the PLO to head a state there. If the final arrangements for the West Bank could be put off for some time that could make the job easier. There is a possible consensus within Israel for a West Bank settlement.
Dr. Brzezinski noted that there seems to be an impression that the United States is pushing for an independent Palestinian state. Mr. Yadin said that that is in fact the view in Israel. Dr. Brzezinski noted that the President had said and that he had said that that was not in fact the U.S. objective. Ambassador Dinitz noted that even if that is not the U.S. intention, the natural trend is there and visible in the series of statements on homeland, entity, Palestinian rights, and so forth. Dr. Brzezinski said that it is the US dilemma that we must bring to public attention all of the issues which must be solved in a settlement but that we cannot spell out all of the details of the shape of a final settlement. Mr. Yadin noted that there is the feeling that the United States is pushing Israel toward a PLO Palestinian entity. This has created a violent reaction within Israel. Anything which can be done to ameliorate that situation would be helpful.
Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Yadin himself actually viewed the PLO as a monolithic band of brigands and terrorists. Mr. Yadin noted [Page 708] that in contrast to Begin’s prohibition against having any dealings with the “so-called PLO,” the DMC position was not to have any dealings with “an organization officially committed to the destruction of Israel and terrorism,” thus leaving some latitude and ambiguity if the PLO should change its position. Dr. Brzezinski said he saw the PLO as an amalgam of different forces, some of whom were killers who were not even very brave. Others were radical, but nationalist in their objectives. And others were quite moderate. The name of the game is to strengthen the moderate factions. Mr. Yadin noted that if the PLO should declare that it will remove the famous clauses in its Covenant there might be some possibility. He noted there was a theoretical clash between objectives. For example, if Arafat took over Amman this would in some respects be a good thing since the Palestinians would then have their “entity.” But of course it would be bad since it would also result in the replacement of Hussein who is a good friend both of the United States and even of Israel. Dr. Brzezinski noted that excluding any dealings with the PLO may mean that no negotiations will be possible with the moderates in the Palestinian camp. It simply is not useful at this time to spell out precisely who will attend a Geneva Conference or how they participate. Mr. Yadin noted the irony that the DMC and Labor parties are now attacking Begin for being a “dove.”
Dr. Brzezinski asked whether he believed that Begin would be able to seize the opportunity to make peace if circumstances permit. Mr. Yadin felt that if this involved an independent entity on the West Bank, the answer was no. However, he thought the combination of Begin and Dayan was the best possibility currently available for acceptance of a peaceful settlement. Maybe peace is possible if things run along their normal course and the less difficult issues are tackled first.
Ambassador Dinitz noted that Dr. Brzezinski had said some time ago that it would be better to keep the Palestinian issue on the back burner. Dr. Brzezinski noted that it is not undesirable to solve what can be solved first and that it would be counterproductive to try to solve the hardest issues first. But that this could not be formalized. For example, if there is an impression that the Egyptian situation is iced and if Israel proceeds with more settlements, that will suggest that Israel is in fact exploiting the Egyptian situation.
Mr. Yadin noted that perhaps the Americans have overlooked the importance of the clause in Begin’s platform which calls for no extension of Israeli law to the West Bank so long as peace negotiations are in process. It is important to stress this clause with the Arabs because it is real and important.
Dr. Brzezinski noted that in his view if one wished to create or devise a foreign policy which was wholly counterproductive and harmed one’s own interest as much as possible, one would do just what the [Page 709] Arabs were doing for a number of years. There is no way to insure that the Arabs won’t revert to the irrationality of the past. However, it is only within approximately the last three years that the Arabs have shown any skill in their foreign policy and in the process they have succeeded in putting Israel on the defensive in a number of cases.
Mr. Yadin wondered what the Egyptian reaction to the working paper would be. Dr. Brzezinski noted that they feel uneasy and due to the heavy publicity on the US-Israel side, they feel that the situation is “precooked.” Mr. Yadin noted that prior to the leaks in Israel the essential elements of the working paper were leaked to the New York Times by a senior US official. Dr. Brzezinski guessed that Egypt and Jordan would go along with the paper.
Ambassador Dinitz said that it is necessary to tell the Syrians that Israel has moved in their direction in accepting the working paper, but they cannot move toward a more radical position. He saw the US-Soviet statement as encouraging the Syrians to take a harder line and to press for more concessions from Israel.
Mr. Yadin wondered what he should tell the press on the subject of the Palestinians. He and Dr. Brzezinski agreed that it would be useful to stress that the United States is not pressing for an independent Palestinian entity and to reiterate that the talks with the President were not “brutal.”
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 67, Middle East: Peace Negotiations 1977 Vol. II. Top Secret. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.↩
- The Washington Post reported on October 14 that Israeli newspapers quoted Dayan as characterizing his October 4 meeting with Carter (see Document 124) as “brutal.” (H.D.S. Greenway, “Dayan Makes Plan Public,” Washington Post, October 14, 1977, p. A1)↩