119. Oral Message From Egyptian President Sadat to President Carter1

President Sadat was pleased to receive Mr. Fahmy’s report on the talks in Washington.2 He read carefully what President Carter said and he generally agrees with the President’s approach to the peace process.

As he stated before, President Sadat will be flexible within the limits of the agreement between him and President Carter during the closed meeting which took place in Washington.3

The President would like to share the following thoughts with President Carter:

Apparently, President Carter is suggesting a modification to what was agreed upon with respect to the concept of how the Geneva Conference should function. Instead of going to the Conference only to sign, President Carter is suggesting for understandable reasons, that a certain phase of the negotiations be conducted in Geneva. President Sadat is thinking of following formula to reconcile between the two approaches: Preparatory talks would be held through an intermediary, i.e. the U.S. The purpose of such preparatory talks would be to obtain the agreement of the parties on a paper that outlines the essentials of peace. Once this is achieved, the parties would proceed to complete remaining details of the final phase of the negotiations. President Sadat understands President Carter’s desire to involve the World public opinion, especially in the United States and Europe, in the process of bringing pressure to bear on the intransigent party.

On the other hand, President Sadat concurs with President Carter’s conception as to the procedure leading to the resumption of the Geneva Conference. In particular, President Sadat took note of the following points:

1. Reconvening the Conference this year.

2. Having a unified Arab delegation, that includes PLO representatives other than Arafat, at the beginning of the Conference. Afterwards, negotiations would be held through geographical sub-committees.

3. Approving the procedure of the Conference in the opening session.

4. That the United States undertake to exert all efforts in order to keep the main issues in focus.

To simplify matters for President Carter, President Sadat is ready to agree with the proposals embodied in the American working paper entitled: “Suggestions for the Resumption of the Geneva Conference.”4 However, should the issue of Palestinian representation remain as the stumbling block, resort can be made to the two proposals President Sadat made to Secretary Vance in Alexandria,5 namely:

a) That the Palestinians be part of the Egyptian, rather than the Jordanian Delegation in the relevant sub-committees at the Conference. In this regard, the President wants President Carter to know that such an arrangement is apt to provoke a sharp controversy with Syria and Jordan. President Sadat is willing to handle the situation that may arise if President Carter bears in mind and takes into account the necessity of establishing a Palestinian State. Meanwhile, President Sadat will continue to insist on a formal and well-defined link between the Palestinian State and Jordan.

b) If the above-mentioned option is not accepted, the Arab League could represent the Palestinians in the person of the Assistant Secretary General for Military Affairs, who is an Egyptian, along with some Palestinian representatives.

In so far as the negotiations that precede the Geneva Conference are concerned, President Sadat concurs with President Carter that it might not be practical for the negotiator or the mediator to shuttle between Cairo, Damascus and Tel-Aviv. Therefore, all participants could gather in a neutral city or perhaps in Washington or New York, where the American mediator could go-between the parties in the same manner the Rhodes negotiations were conducted.

In conclusion, President Sadat, who values highly the ties of friendship that bind him with President Carter since they met in Washington, expresses his hope to welcome President and Mrs. Carter in Cairo where both Presidents can pursue their quest for peace and justice.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 76, Peace Negotiations: 10/77. Secret. Sadat sent Carter another oral message on October 3, which reads, “President Sadat agreed with Yasser Arafat today that the Head of the Palestinian Delegation in the Unified Arab Delegation to the Geneva Conference, will be an American professor from a Palestinian origin.” (Ibid.) The American professor was apparently Edward Said.
  2. Fahmy met with Carter and Vance on September 21 and with Brzezinski on September 22. See Documents 107, 108, and 109.
  3. Apparently a reference to the private meeting between Carter and Sadat on April 4; see footnote 2, Document 27.
  4. See footnote 2, Document 118.
  5. Vance met with Sadat in Alexandria on August 1. See Documents 63 and 64.