Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

118. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 30, 1977, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Israel
• Foreign Minister Dayan
• Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
• Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor to the Israeli Foreign Minister
• Mr. Napthalie Lavie, Press Spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Minister
• Elyahu Rubenstein, Foreign Minister’s Cabinet Secretary
• United States
• Secretary Vance
• Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• Alfred L. Atherton, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Arthur R. Day, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
• William B. Quandt, National Security Council Staff
• David Korn, Policy Planning Staff

The Secretary asked Mr. Atherton for a copy of our working paper on the organization of Geneva.² Turning to Dayan, the Secretary said he did not know whether Dayan had gotten yet a response from Jerusalem to our paper. Dayan asked if we had gotten Ambassador Lewis’ report on his talk with Begin on the paper. The Secretary said he had just now gotten Lewis’ report but had not had a chance to read all of it.³ He had been in meetings all day, since 7:00 in the morning. Dayan said he was asking because some of the things he would be saying to the Secretary were in Begin’s presentation to the Ambassador.

Dayan said first he wanted to state Israel’s objections regarding the proposed American-Soviet statement.⁴ Dayan then asked Ambassador Dinitz to give a run down on the cable the Israelis had gotten from Jerusalem on Begin’s meeting with Lewis:

Dinitz said the Prime Minister had told Lewis he wanted to speak as a friend. The United States was going to put out a statement with the Russians which deals with withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories. The Soviet position is known to all the world; the Soviets want complete and total Israeli withdrawal. This is how the world will interpret the U.S.-Soviet statement. The Prime Minister continued by saying that President Carter had told him that the U.S. would not make any more public statements on withdrawal. The U.S.-Soviet statement was not in accord with Begin’s understanding of what the President said. Begin noted further that he had sent a letter to the President a week earlier pointing out that such statements would undermine the Israeli position at Geneva.

The Secretary said that before we went further in discussion of this, there was a point he wanted to make. The Secretary stressed that the language used in our proposed statement with the Russians is precisely the language of Resolution 242; the proposed joint statement does not say withdrawal with minor modifications. Mr. Habib noted that the statement does not say withdrawal from all territories, it says withdrawal from territory. Dinitz said Ambassador Lewis had made this point in his presentation to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, however, had repeated that since the Soviet position on withdrawal is well known, there could only be one way to interpret this. Dinitz said Evron had said that any joint communiqué with the Soviets would be negative and would affect the delicate situation leading up to Geneva. Evron had said that a joint Soviet-U.S. statement was not the best way to advance to Geneva.

The Secretary said he would like to point out two things. The joint statement contains language calling for the termination of the state of war and the establishment of normal, peaceful relationship. It is very positive and a big step forward to get the Soviet Union to say this in a public statement, the Secretary said. The Secretary then read from a portion of the proposed joint statement and pointed out that the language therein was taken directly from Resolution 242.

Dayan then said he wanted to turn to the Prime Minister’s talk with Ambassador Lewis regarding our paper on the organization of Geneva. Dayan said what Begin had told Lewis was very strong, “stronger than what I would have said.” Begin intended to bring the U.S. proposal before the full Cabinet on Sunday.⁵ Dayan said that his feeling was that Begin does not believe that the proposal would be an adequate basis for Geneva, but we will see what the Cabinet says. Dayan said he wanted to explain why he thought the paper was not productive, or counterproductive, but would do so in “his own way.” Dayan said he wanted first to say how he saw negotiations. One thing was sure, the kind of agreement the Arabs had in mind would not be agreed to by Israel. Dayan said he felt the only way to get peace would be a secret exchange of letters through the U.S., not by negotiations in a public forum in Geneva. If Egypt is constantly being watched over by other Arab countries we will not get a peace agreement, Dayan said; it just will not work if they are all together. The only way to get agreement is for Egypt to be able to negotiate with Israel without the Arabs, the Soviets and the PLO present.

Dayan asked if the negotiations in the working groups would be final, “or will they report back to the plenary?” The Secretary asked if Dayan was saying that it is paragraph three of our paper that is of most concern to Dayan. Under this provision Israel and Egypt would negotiate a treaty between themselves and report it to the plenary. Dayan said yes and indicated that this causes problems for the Israelis. The Secretary said this is intended to overcome the objections of some of the Arabs to bilateral negotiations. The Secretary said we feel that there should be more than one party negotiating only on the West Bank and Palestinian issues.

Dayan said he felt that a United Arab Delegation would tie Egypt’s hands completely. All the Arab delegations will try to tell the Egyptians what to do. Dayan said he thought Israel and Egypt might be able to negotiate something, but not in Geneva. Of course what is agreed upon could be signed in Geneva. But if Egypt is bound by a United Arab Delegation we won’t be able to make any progress, Dayan said.

Dayan said the other point he wanted to make concerns Jordan. Ambassador Lewis had pointed out that the Jordanians did not want the Palestinians in their delegation, Dayan said. Jordan does not want an independent Palestinian state, Dayan said, but will go along with a Palestinian entity. Dayan said that at Geneva the Jordanians will have to have Palestinians who can work with them when they negotiate, even if these Palestinians are not well known members of Jordan’s delegation. We will need to tell the Jordanians, Dayan said, that they should take Palestinians who have ties with Jordan, the “right kind of Palestinians.”

Regarding Gaza, Dayan said in his talks with the Jordanians it was clear that what they really have in mind is getting an outlet to the sea in Gaza. To justify that they would have to give Jordanian citizenship to the 400,000 Palestinians in Gaza. This, however, would create the problem of having more Palestinians in the balance against the East Bank Jordanians. Returning to the question of Palestinians at Geneva, Dayan said he believed that the Mayor of Gaza could be a member of the Jordanian delegation, since he is someone with whom the Jordanians can work. He was one of the few who went to Amman to congratulate Hussein on the 25th Anniversary of his coronation. Dayan repeated that if the Palestinians in the delegation can’t work with Jordan it would be impossible to get the right sort of agreement. If there are Palestinians from outside the West Bank you won’t get anywhere. Dayan mentioned that the Mayor of Bethlehem was one who could work with the Jordanians. I am for the Palestinians being active in seeking a solution, Dayan said, but we will need the right Palestinians. Dayan said he feared that if there is a United Arab Delegation, the other Arabs will tell the Palestinians which way to go and “we will not get where we want.” Dayan reiterated that the Palestinians must be from the West Bank or Jordan. For example, he understood that the Jordanian Ambassador to the U.S. was a Palestinian. The Secretary and Mr. Habib said that the Jordanian Ambassador to the UN is also a Palestinian. Dayan said they can be on the delegation.

Dayan said the last point that he wanted to make concerned the PLO and Israel. “The Israelis will hang me when they hear what I say,” Dayan said, but he wanted to suggest something. Dayan stressed that Israel cannot agree to having the PLO at Geneva. But in fact almost all the Palestinians say they support the PLO. Perhaps we could find one who would object publicly to the PLO, Dayan said, but he would not represent anybody. Dayan said that while Israel could not accept the idea of having the PLO at Geneva, he thought he could try to persuade Begin to accept someone like the Mayor of Ramallah, even though the man would publicly announce that he is representing the PLO. (At this point in the conversation Dayan seemed to be saying that Israel might accept PLO affiliated Palestinians if the word PLO is not mentioned.)

Dayan said that unless the refugee problem is solved outside of Geneva there will be problems concerning the PLO on this score also. He remarked that if Israel were to pull out of the West Bank tomorrow and a PLO Cabinet were to come into being it would not be able to find enough room to settle the refugees in the West Bank. The PLO’s answer to the refugee question would be that they must return to Israel. Therefore, Dayan said, it is important to get agreement concerning settlement of the refugees in other countries, for otherwise the PLO will simply press for them to return to Israel.

Pointing to a copy of the U.S. working paper on the table in front of him, Dayan said he did not think this was the way to peace. Dayan said Syria, the PLO and Russia should not only come to terms with Israel, they must also want peace. An atmosphere of peace does not exist in Syria or among the PLO, Dayan said. He was not sure about the Soviets. Dayan said what he had heard is that the Soviets want an independent Palestinian state in order to have a satellite or to continue the conflict. But, Dayan repeated, he was not sure about the Soviets.

Dayan said perhaps there would be a way for Israel to go ahead and make an agreement with Egypt. Perhaps not publicly, but there might be a situation where we could not come to terms with Syria or the PLO or the Russians, but we could get an agreement with Egypt. Israel might not be able to make peace with Egypt, Dayan said, but it could make progress toward peace. In closing Dayan said he wanted again to stress that no Israeli government could accept the PLO being part of the Arab delegation at Geneva. What you should do, Dayan said, is to get Palestinians from the West Bank or Jordan, who can work with Jordan, for the delegation.

The Secretary said he would like to respond to some of Dayan’s points. On Dayan’s point about the possibility of negotiation of a separate peace with Egypt, the Secretary said that he did not think that Israel could negotiate a separate treaty with Egypt without there at least being a Geneva Conference. The Egyptians could not do it without Geneva, the Secretary repeated, but even with Geneva he was not sure how good the chances were. Then on the question of Palestinians in the Jordan delegation, the Secretary said he did not think the Jordanians were saying there would not be Palestinians in their delegation. The Jordanian Ambassador to the UN may be on the Jordanian delegation at Geneva, and there may be some West Bank Mayors. But they will be very careful what they do. The Secretary said the Jordanians will not have Palestinians in their delegation in a formal sense, because that would run counter to the Rabat Summit decision and would create internal problems in Jordan.

The Secretary said we agree with Dayan that the problem of the refugees has to be dealt with. Regarding Soviet motives, the Secretary said he did not know whether the Soviets want peace in the Middle East or are simply trying to gain a foothold and to radicalize the area through failure of the peace negotiations. “I can’t read their minds,” the Secretary said, but to the extent that the Soviets act responsibly you have to accept that as reality. So far they have acted responsibly, the Secretary said, but I don’t know what is in their heart.

The Secretary said that our paper on the organization of Geneva represents the President’s view on the best way to get a conference. We are asking all the parties to take these views and study them, and give us an answer. The Secretary cautioned that we do not want anything to get into the press about the paper. He explained that he was concerned in this regard about Dayan’s statement that the Prime Minister would be submitting our paper to the Cabinet on Sunday. If the Cabinet takes it up, the Secretary said, he hoped it would be on the basis that they are looking at the paper only as a suggestion. Mr. Habib interjected that it would be better if the Israeli Cabinet did not take the paper up at all. The Secretary said he agreed; he hoped that the paper could be kept between the President and the Prime Minister. He did not see why the Cabinet had to get into the act at all at this point. Mr. Habib said this is very important. If the paper is taken up by the Cabinet there will be no possibility to make modifications later.

Dayan said he wanted to return to the question of an Israeli-Egyptian agreement for a moment. He had noted that even when the Arabs speak of a peace treaty they still don’t want diplomatic relations. Dayan said he felt the only way for Egypt to negotiate peace with Israel would be through the United States, in a very small group and not publicly. But, Dayan said, maybe you are right when you say it can’t be done without Geneva. Regarding Jordan, Dayan repeated his view that the Palestinians chosen must be able to work closely with Jordan. This must be done if we really want the West Bank to have close contacts with Jordan. Dayan said as far as Israel is concerned, the peace negotiations must be very strictly and clearly defined and the terms of Resolution 242 must be adhered to. And, Dayan observed, Resolution 242 does not mention the Palestinians. The Secretary said he wanted to understand clearly what Dayan meant. Was he saying that the Palestinian question could not be taken up at Geneva? No, Dayan replied, we are ready to deal with the Palestinian question. The Secretary observed that that in itself is a deviation from the strict terms of Resolution 242, since as Dayan had said 242 doesn’t mention the Palestinian problem. Dayan replied that the party with whom Israel would negotiate on the West Bank is Jordan, not the Palestinians. When Israel goes to Geneva it would say that the West Bank negotiations are with Jordan. But of course, Dayan remarked, the substance of the West Bank question is the Palestinian question. The Secretary replied that the Jordanians would tell Israel that they can’t negotiate regarding the West Bank without the Palestinians and that the Palestinians cannot be part of the Jordanian delegation. Dayan said that he would try to find a formula for this. For example, he would not want to discuss the future of the West Bank with the Jordanians without the participation of West Bank Palestinians. But, Dayan added, you must realize that I am more flexible on this than others.

Dayan noted that the American paper says that Israel should accept PLO at Geneva. He said he did not know what could be done about this, but he did know that no Israeli Government could accept the idea of having PLO at Geneva. Regarding the Secretary’s concern over submission of the U.S. paper to the Israeli Cabinet, Dayan said he could ask the Prime Minister not to do it if he could say there is no hurry. The Secretary replied that what we are trying to do is find our way through a difficult set of problems. For this, we need to get Israel’s response as soon as possible. The Jordanians would be coming in tomorrow to give us their response and others would come in after that. Dayan said perhaps he had not expressed himself properly. What he meant to say was that if he could tell the Prime Minister that Israel had not yet been asked to give a final reply and that the paper still might be changed, then perhaps they could avoid giving it to the Cabinet. The Secretary said Dayan could say that at this point the President would take Prime Minister Begin’s views as being those of the Israeli Government. The Secretary indicated that there might be further changes, and therefore it would be correct to say the paper is not final. The Secretary said Dayan could say that the matter remains under discussion. Dayan replied that in that case nothing should be said about agreement between Israel and the United States. If it comes out that you are defining our position, Dayan said, the Israeli Cabinet would object strongly unless it had been consulted.

Dayan said before leaving he wanted to ask about U.S. guarantees. We were supposed to get from you a draft of what you had in mind concerning guarantees, Dayan said. Mr. Habib replied that we could of course give Israel copies of security treaties that we have, but what we would rather do is take the time to draw up for the Israelis something that would fit their particular situation and would be meaningful. The Secretary said we should be able to give you something by the middle of next week. Dayan said he would like to be able to tell Prime Minister Begin just what sort of thing the Americans might propose. The Secretary said we would shoot for Wednesday.⁶

The Secretary said he would be talking to Sharaf tomorrow and would discuss with Sharaf the matters Dayan had raised concerning the West Bank. Dayan said if you can clarify what King Hussein has in mind we would appreciate it. The Secretary said our Ambassador will be talking to King Hussein when he gets back to Amman and will be able to give us a clear picture.

Before Dayan departed, the group discussed what should be said to the press. Dayan said he would, of course, not mention our paper. The Secretary said we should say that we have had further discussions regarding the problems involved in the Middle East conflict and the convening of Geneva. However, if word of the paper should get to the press, we should say that we are exchanging working papers only, not proposals. We will say we are dealing in suggestions, Dayan said.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Trips/Visits File, Box 107, 9/19/77–10/25/77 Vance Meetings with Middle East Foreign Ministers: 9–10/77. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s suite at the UN Plaza Hotel.
2. In telegram Secto 10003 to Tel Aviv, September 29, Vance forwarded the text of the working paper on suggestions for the resumption of the Geneva Conference, which listed three points. First, “The Arab parties will be represented by a unified Arab delegation for the opening sessions at Geneva. Within the delegation there will be Palestinians, who may include not well-known members of the PLO.” The second point read, “The working groups or subcommittees for the negotiation of peace treaties will be formed as follows: A. Egypt-Israel, B. Syria-Israel, C. Jordan-Israel, D. Lebanon-Israel, E. The West Bank, Gaza, The Palestinian Question and the Question of Refugees will be discussed among Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians and perhaps others as determined at the opening sessions of the Geneva Conference.” The third and final point read, “The working groups of subcommittees will report to the plenary.” The telegram noted that the paper would be given to the Israelis, Egyptians, Jordanians, and Syrians in New York on Thursday, September 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0823)
3. In telegram 7457 from Tel Aviv, September 30, Ambassador Lewis reported that Prime Minister Begin told him “in most unequivocal terms imaginable that Israel would not attend Geneva Conference if any, repeat, any PLO members took part.” He also rejected other aspects of the working paper, including paragraph 2E, which implied a “co-equal status for Palestinians,” and paragraph 3. Lewis described the meeting as “somber, with Begin showing heavy physical and emotional strain.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850106–2167)
4. The final version of the joint statement, which was released on October 1, is in telegram Secto 10023, Document 120. According to Brzezinski’s memoirs, Vance “personally” showed the draft joint statement to Dayan “a day or so before its issuance.” (Power and Principle, p. 108) According to Vance’s memoirs, he had raised the issue of a U.S.-Soviet joint statement prior to a Geneva Conference on May 19 when he met with Gromyko in Geneva. During the summer, he “kept the Soviets generally informed of progress in the negotiations to head off attempts by them to interfere,” but he also noted that he believed the Soviets ultimately had to be included in the process. On August 29, Vance met with Dobrynin, who reported that Gromyko “would like to discuss the possibility of a joint statement on the principles of a Middle East settlement.” Over the next few weeks, Vance and Dobrynin discussed a draft text. Finally, on September 30, Vance and Gromyko met in New York and agreed to a final text, which was released publicly on October 1. (Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 191–192) A copy of an undated Soviet draft of the joint statement with a handwritten date of 9/11/77 is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 107, 9/15/77, Strategy for the Next Round of Middle East Talks [II]: 9/77.
5. October 2.
6. October 5. They discussed U.S. guarantees on October 4; see Document 124.