Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

107. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 21, 1977, 11:10 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• President’s Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
• Mr. Hamilton Jordan
• Mr. Robert Lipshutz
• Mr. David Aaron
• Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
• Ambassador Hermann Eilts
• Mr. William Quandt
• Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy
• Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal
• Under Secretary Osama al-Baz, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• First Secretary Dr. Mohammed Baradai Executive Secretary of Foreign Minister’s Cabinet
• Minister Counselor Mohammed Shaker, Egyptian Embassy

President: I’d like to begin by outlining the discussion that I have just had with the Foreign Minister,² and the Foreign Minister may correct me if necessary. We have not reached any substantive agreements, but we have had a frank exchange of views. On the specific issue of the PLO, I have asked Foreign Minister Fahmy to encourage the PLO to accept U.N. Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations, with a reservation on the Palestinian refugee clause if they choose. He has been given a text of a statement, and I believe that the PLO could accept that if they were encouraged to do so by Egypt and Syria. It would be a major step. We have an agreement with Israel from 1975 that we will not violate,³ but if the PLO could accept Resolution 242, then we would be ready to start direct talks with the PLO, including with Arafat. Israel will not like that, but they know that we will do it. We hope that Egypt can help. We have had no direct contact with the PLO, but Arafat has used Egyptian and Syrian and Saudi officials to relay information to us. But our position remains clear that we cannot violate our commitment to Israel.

I have been trying to find some way to get the negotiations started without eliminating any matter from the discussions. I want to reemphasize that I am in this to stay and that I will use the full resources of this Government as long as I am President, and will use all legitimate means of influence to work for a Middle East peace. I will try to draw on the friendship that we have with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Syria to help reach an agreement.

We have differences on one key issue. This is the question of how much agreement must be reached before we go to Geneva. The Egyptian position that I have heard from President Sadat and from Foreign Minister Fahmy is that there should be substantial agreement before Geneva. I am eager for that, but I do not believe that any further progress on key issues can be made until Geneva is reconvened, and then there may be a long, tedious discussion that may go on for weeks or months. Israel is very difficult in some of her positions and I can’t tell the Israelis what to do. My influence is based on the support of the American people, the support of Congress, and the support of the Jewish community. Therefore, I must make proposals that are fair. Otherwise, I will have no influence.

The question of how the parties should be represented in a unified or in separate delegations is complicated by Israel’s preference for strict bilateral talks. Our hope is that we can find a solution to accommodate all parties. I have not yet talked to the Syrians or the Jordanians, but I hope that there could be a unified Arab delegation at Geneva, with Palestinian or PLO representatives in the delegation, only excluding visible PLO leaders like Arafat. Others would be ok. There would be opening sessions where we would commit ourselves, along with the Soviets, to stick with the negotiating process and to offer our mediating services. The other parties would make public statements. Then the negotiations would break up into separate groups, in accord with the desire of Egypt and Israel. There would be an Egyptian-Israeli negotiating team to reach a peace agreement or treaty, dealing with territory and the other issues. The same would be done between Syria and Israel on the Golan Heights. Then we would let the occupied territories of the West Bank be dealt with in a Jordanian-Israeli group, with Palestinians in the Jordanian delegation. This group would deal with the status of the West Bank territories, including the possible arrangements for autonomy, a Jordanian relationship, or some division of the area. If Syria and Egypt were to insist on the right of approving any agreement reached between Jordan and Israel, that would be up to you.

There would remain the problem of the Palestinian refugees. Our hope is that if Israel and you can agree to accept negotiations on that issue, there would be a multinational group, including Palestinians and the PLO from various Arab countries. They would negotiate as a team to represent the refugees, to deal with the questions of compensation and return. This would not be part of the peace treaty negotiations, but would be separate and simultaneous. We don’t object to having this done in Geneva, or in Cairo for that matter, but it would be an additional problem.

The Soviets, of course, are co-chairmen at Geneva, and we will have to work out with them anything that we agree to with you. I cannot accommodate the wishes of all the parties and I cannot assure the success of these negotiations, but it is my belief that this is the best approach. Once Geneva is reconvened, we can use our full resources and offer our services as an intermediary. We want to insure the success of the negotiations and we don’t want any issue left out. I hope that we could get your agreement, even if this arrangement is not your first preference. I also hope that Jordan might agree to this arrangement, and maybe Syria. Perhaps we might meet again to discuss this and I might talk again to Foreign Minister Dayan. If I could say that you were willing to accept this, it would help. If there is an alternative, I just don’t know it. I would like your help on this.

Foreign Minister Fahmy: I concur with almost everything that you have said. You are familiar with the details. But the people in the Middle East are giving you trouble, but you have no choice but to deal with the problem. You have our full faith and you know the depth of the US-Egyptian relationship. Egypt is ready to cooperate to the fullest extent possible. We still believe that you will continue to serve as a mediator and that you will be informed of the positions of the parties. We know that you can use your influence on Israel and on us to bridge gaps informally. Once we are close to a final settlement, then we can go to Geneva to deal with the final substantive questions, but not with just procedure.

Egypt went to Geneva even when Syria did not go in December 1973. We would go again if we were convinced that it would serve the cause of peace. But to have Geneva, you have to agree to prepare it carefully, and we are not in a hurry. It would be bad to go if careful preparations had not been made, since then there would be no substitute, except your influence, if Geneva were to fail. Political auctioneering might then take place at Geneva, and we would be stuck in a precarious situation of no peace and no war.

There is no problem in the way of reconvening Geneva, except for the question of the PLO. To make the PLO go, the PLO must accept Resolution 242. But you must also make Israel accept the PLO. It doesn’t matter whether the PLO representatives are well-known or junior. No one should be inspecting credentials. If we start inspecting credentials, I would have some questions to ask Begin about his. But how can the PLO go? We have to press the PLO to accept 242 with a reservation, and you have to press Israel to accept the PLO. Otherwise, there will be no Geneva.

The only alternative is for you and the Soviets to address an invitation to the PLO, and if they decline to accept, then we will go without them. The PLO and the Soviets know our position on this. If the PLO refuses to go, the Soviets will go without them. This is the same as our position. It would be the responsibility of the PLO if they chose not to go. And then we would go even if they refused.

So there are many ways to solve the problem. I have spoken to the PLO and I have told them that they should not bother so much with any specific formula. Beginning the dialogue with the United States would be fifty percent of the solution of their problem. But they are a group with many tendencies and they are manipulated by some countries in the area and some outside. There are many ways to solve the problem, and it is up to you to make the decision. My advice would be for you to continue to contact them informally and to offer them some reassurances. There would not have to be any announcement. Both Presidents Nixon and Ford promised to do this. It would be best for you to be able to get first-hand information about the real situation in the PLO.

The other way would be through formal contacts with the PLO if the PLO has accepted 242. I have been exchanging with Cyrus Vance many formulas and I have discussed these with the PLO, including Arafat. The most difficult part for the PLO to accept is the phrase concerning the right of all states in the area to live in peace. This will be seen as the PLO recognizing Israel before the PLO has been recognized itself. And then there is the idea of a co-trusteeship for the West Bank under Israel and Jordan. They need to have some sort of assurance of a homeland or an entity of their own and they need to know that you support that. For them to recognize Israel without any recognition in return, simply to get to Geneva, is a big gamble. No one knows what will happen in Geneva.

If they cannot have secret contacts with you, and if agreement cannot be reached on the formula, the only way to proceed is for us to do something in the UN Security Council on Resolution 242. We would not ask you or the PLO to do anything. We are ready to request a Security Council meeting, after talks with you, which would aim at one simple question, not at a full discussion of the Palestinian issue. The simple question would involve a short draft resolution which could get unanimous approval, perhaps with the United States position being a question. But you could at least abstain and not veto the resolution. We will not do anything unless you agreed and unless you had approved the text in advance. The resolution would be very simple. It would have a preamble which would reaffirm UN Resolutions 242 and 338 without any changes. In the operational part, we would use the kind of language that you have formulated on a Palestinian homeland, making clear that the issue is not just that of refugees. It would not be difficult to get Security Council approval of all this, with the exception of your position. If you would go along, then there would be no need for you to chase after the PLO and you would not have to make any concessions or change in your position. The majority of the Security Council would pass the resolution. There would be no change in UN Resolution 242, and you yourself have said that this is not just a refugee problem in that there is a political problem to be solved as well. This would identify the crux of the conflict, and without recognizing this, there can be no final settlement.

President: There would be no amendment?

Fahmy: On the contrary, we would reaffirm Resolutions 242 and 338, with one addition. We would use language that you would agree upon concerning a Palestinian homeland.

President: It would be my intention if Resolution 242 were amended to veto a new resolution, but if you and Cy Vance can work out language, and if there is no modification of 242, I would consider it, but I would have to see the language first.

I would like to say a few words. I have gone far beyond my predecessors and I have gone now as far as I want to go in laying down the terms of a settlement. The suggestions I have offered are:

1. Withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories, with only minor modifications in the 1967 line;

2. The establishment of a Palestinian homeland, which is significant for the Palestinians and the Arabs, and which the Israelis have taken exception to;

3. A comprehensive peace, a real peace, which would not be just an end of belligerency;

4. An offer to meet with the PLO if they accept reasonable terms and accept Resolution 242.

I think that if you and Saudi Arabia and others, including the Syrians, can help, we could get the PLO to accept.

Foreign Minister Fahmy: If the Syrians could be sure of getting Golan back, then they would press the PLO.

President: I can’t guarantee the outcome of Syrian-Israeli negotiations, and I cannot predicate our talks with the PLO on guaranteeing the location of the Syrian border. We have a difficult problem now concerning the status of the Geneva Conference, we have to keep looking for a solution. You say Geneva should be for ratifying an agreement. I think we need Geneva to get the process started. Geneva can do both. We can go to Geneva, get agreement on that, then organize groups, negotiate on a bilateral basis, and reconvene Geneva to ratify the agreement. That would be no problem, but we need to break the deadlock to get talks going. The talks may go on for months. I will commit myself and I will offer my services as a mediator, and I will actively participate as long as there is hope for an agreement, even if it takes years. We are prepared to stick with the negotiations. If there were a full commitment to Geneva, we would be able to rally world opinion behind the process and press hard for success. But it is not possible to marshal that support now. The Europeans, for example, are reluctant to speak out, but once we go to Geneva, then any country which appears to be an obstacle to peace will be condemned by world public opinion and by American public opinion.

I want to say a word about the question of the PLO and their refusal to accept 242. It would be best if we could have direct discussions with the PLO. I agree that it is not really important whether Arafat or his representative participates, but this is important to Israel. I wish this were not the case, but I think we have come up with a possible resolution of this difficult question by suggesting a multinational approach to the refugee problem, in contrast to the discussions over the West Bank and the Palestinian homeland. These two issues should not be combined. There is no way of getting the Palestinians in Kuwait and Lebanon, for example, into the peace negotiations without causing problem. If Assad says that there can be no peace between Syria and Israel, unless the West Bank problem is solved, so be it. But let the Jordanian and Palestinian negotiators talk with Israel, and if Syria cannot accept the outcome, let Assad refuse.

Fahmy: Assad’s position is tactical, not strategic.

President: I understand.

Fahmy: The problem is that the Palestinians will never accept being part of a Jordanian delegation, or that Jordan should speak on their behalf, whether this takes place in Geneva or elsewhere.

President: I am not asking that. I want you to agree that this would not be a problem for Egypt, and let me worry about King Hussein and President Assad.

Fahmy: President Sadat has talked about a link between Jordan and the Palestinians, but at Rabat King Hussein spoke for six hours. No one listened to him at all, even though he gave a wonderful speech. As soon as he was done, the decision was taken that Yassir Arafat and the PLO should be the sole representative of the Palestinians. King Hussein said that he would withdraw from the question of the Palestinians. If this question is not solved, there will be a new Arab summit and it will be even more rigid.

President: The problem now is not just with Israel, but it is a problem among the Arabs. I am trying to do four things:

First, I am trying to protect American national interests which require peace in the Middle East and avoidance of war. This is different from drawing lines on the map. Our interests are not those of a bystander or of a mediator only.

Second, I am trying to negotiate between Israel and the Arab parties, including the Saudis.

Third, I am trying to work out differences among the Arabs themselves. Each of the Arab countries has a different position.

Fourth, I am trying to negotiate with the Soviets so that they can be part of the format for Geneva, but without giving them a major say in the negotiations.

This is very complex. I want you to trust me enough and be flexible while I try to get the negotiations started. In return, I would give my word that the United States is in this to stay, that we will be fair, and that we will not tell you one thing and the Israelis something different.

When we gave five principles to the parties, we gave the same ones to everyone. We put our ideas in writing. We welcomed your reactions and your expressions of concern. We did the same with all of the others. We are trying to see if there can be an agreement and where the differences are, and we will keep coming back to you until we see a narrowing of the differences. We wouldn’t be afraid at a later stage to say what we think is fair. This might be some months off. We would take a stronger role then to propose the terms of a settlement and I am willing to do that. But it is better for you to negotiate your differences than for us to impose an agreement. It would be a mistake for the Arabs to believe that we can control Israel. I cannot control Begin or the Israeli people. I have influence that can be used, but I need the support of Congress, the American people and the American Jewish community. I have no embarrassment in saying that we are even-handed. I have made this clear. Some of my positions have been unpopular in Israel, but I am very eager for an agreement. You have offered to trust me to resolve the final differences, and now I am also asking you to trust me on this less significant problem of simply getting to Geneva.

We will try to open discussions with the PLO, and we will be talking with the Syrians and the Jordanians and perhaps again with Dayan. I want to ask you to be accommodating.

Fahmy: We have full confidence in you, but we cannot do the impossible. We can do a great deal. When we said that we should prepare for Geneva, it is not that we are afraid to negotiate with the Israelis. The first armistice agreement was negotiated between Egypt and Israel. Syria ran away from it and then followed only later. I hope that you understand that we do not want Geneva simply for the sake of Geneva. I have been to Geneva. I am not afraid of going. But from my experience, I do not want to go there just to sit and listen to a lecture by Dayan who is just speaking to his own people.

President: I imagine that Egypt did the same.

Fahmy: No, we thought Geneva was serious. I had to give a rebuttal to the Israeli speech at Geneva. We want to prepare the substance of an agreement. We have had negotiations at Kilometer 101. Now we need a framework and then we will need to work out the details over months and it will be very difficult.

President: Where do you see the negotiations actually taking place? We will be prepared to be a mediator and to take part constantly. There was the example of Rhodes. But it is not practical for the U.S. negotiator to be flying from one capital to another. It would be better if you were all in the same place. And if we could go from one to the other party.

Fahmy: When we reach that stage, we can agree to find a solution.

President: Would you agree to talk in Jerusalem?

Fahmy: That is not exactly neutral territory, but if Israel were to declare that it were neutral, I would go tomorrow!

President: So you would prefer a neutral place. Could this be in Geneva?

Fahmy: We would continue to have contact through diplomatic channels and I could come here.

President: But once Geneva begins, then what happens? Where would you meet?

Fahmy: I would stay in Geneva. If the negotiations are seriously under way, I will stay there and I will move my Foreign Office there. I am only Foreign Minister for this one problem.

President: But you will be tougher than President Sadat!

Fahmy: It may appear that way, but I carry out his instructions.

President: I had no doubt about that. Is there anything in what I have said that you cannot accept?

Fahmy: I can’t speak for Jordan or Syria, and it does not much matter whether there is one Arab delegation or four. Assad favors a single delegation, not for the sake of the Palestinians, but for different reasons which I explained to you. In his interview with the New York Times,⁴ he spoke in favor of an Arab League delegation for the Palestinians, but when Secretary Vance conveyed this idea to him, he claimed that he had never heard it before, even though we mentioned it to him in 1974. Now he says he favors it. Secretary Vance had already heard this idea from Sadat before Assad said it, but I don’t want to claim authorship of the idea, but I want to note that the Syrians are just using this tactically. You should also know that the Jordanians are not on such easy terms with the Syrians and that the Jordanians have their own independent position.

President: We want to remove unnecessary obstacles. When we talk to the Israelis, they say that they might accept certain things but that the Arabs won’t. I just want to know what the Israelis will accept and then I will try to get what the Arabs will accept. But I want to know if I can get your commitment and then you should let me worry about the others.

Fahmy: We won’t say that to you. When we want to go ahead with negotiations, we will do so, despite the risks. Let me focus on the PLO problem. If you want to solve the Middle East problem, focus on this. If you get the PLO out from under Syria and the Soviets, you should do so.

President: We are trying.

Fahmy: You need to free them from their prison and then they will be very forthcoming.

President: Suppose that the PLO does accept 242 and we meet with them and Arafat says to me, Mr. President, you can speak for us.

Fahmy: We would accept! In discussions in 1974, Arafat said that if I could get him five kilometers, he would put up his flag and then proceed peacefully after his other objectives. But Israel refused. Henry Kissinger knows all this. But how do you reach the PLO?

President: You can help us there. The PLO can accept 242 if they want to meet with us. This may only be 50% of the problem, as you said, but the second 50% cannot be solved if they remain isolated and if they are the only ones refusing 242.

Fahmy: The PLO is no longer calling for the destruction of Israel. I have gotten good language from them, but you insist that they explicitly accept Resolution 242 and recognize Israel.

Secretary Vance: The whole purpose of this is to take care of the problem of their statements on the destruction of Israel in their covenant. It is critical that we have this acceptance of the right of all states to exist in peace. Otherwise, we will remain bound by the Sinai II agreement. We cannot go back on that.

Dr. Brzezinski: They don’t have to make any mention of Israel, simply the right of all states to exist in peace.

Fahmy: But that means Israel.

Dr. Brzezinski: But they could also read it to mean their own state if they wish.

Fahmy: If you can guarantee a Palestinian state, I’ll get their signature tomorrow.

Dr. Brzezinski: We can’t prejudge the outcome of the negotiations and we cannot ally ourselves with their position.

Fahmy: I am not their representative.

President: There are many ways to prevent progress if that is the objective.

Fahmy: But we are discussing very weak language. The PLO reservation about Resolution 242 is that 242 is not tied to the Palestinian question or the national rights of Palestinians and does not call for a homeland for the Palestinians. The language that I have gotten from them already shows that they accept Resolution 242, but you insist that they do it explicitly and that they recognize the right of all states to exist in peace, but what assurances do they get? The Syrians say that Secretary Vance was only prepared to propose a co-trusteeship of Israel and Jordan for the West Bank. This is what the Syrians had told them.

Secretary Vance: That is not true.

Fahmy: I know that, and I have told them that. But even if you cannot give them any direct assurances, President Carter could give President Sadat a message that he supports a Palestinian homeland in the West Bank and Gaza with just minor rectifications in the border.

President: I can’t give that commitment.

Fahmy: Then the PLO has nothing in hand. I have told them that talking to the United States would help solve fifty percent of their problem.

Dr. Brzezinski: That’s just the point.

Fahmy: We can talk to them on your behalf.

Secretary Vance: If we say that we are prepared to put the Palestinian question on the agenda for Geneva, and that it will have to be dealt with . . .

Fahmy: But Resolution 242 only deals with the refugee problem. If we could agree on a formula, and would not need to embarrass you . . .

Secretary Vance: Let us look at some language and we will see what can be done.

Fahmy: You can’t prevent it in any case. All you can do is judge how you would vote on a resolution.

President: I am going to have to go soon, but I would like to ask a question. Is there anything you cannot accept if we do get Israel, Jordan and Syria to accept this proposal.

Fahmy: If the PLO accepts, then none of the other parties can object. The problem is the PLO, not Egypt or Syria. Syria only wants you to stop the Israelis in Lebanon. I have received a cable about this today, asking you to use your influence.

President: We should like to have more meetings, and I would like to try to understand further your position. I would like you to agree now on the arrangement that I have outlined. Once we have gotten agreement on Geneva this year, the US and the Soviet Union would call for a reconvening of Geneva, with a joint Arab delegation, with Palestinian PLO representatives, but not Arafat, and we would try to do as much as possible to outline the procedures before hand. Then, negotiations would split up with individual negotiating teams. There might be a multinational group on refugees. The Palestinians, including the PLO, should be part of the Jordanian delegation to negotiate the boundaries of the West Bank and the status of that entity. If you don’t like the final agreement, you can withhold your agreement. But we need to start the process.

Fahmy: If the PLO gets an invitation, we are ready to go to Geneva.

President: But there can be no separate PLO delegation.

Fahmy: If a single Arab delegation helps to solve the PLO problem, I’ll accept it.

President: Let me worry about them.

Fahmy: You should meet them.

President: If they accept 242, we will.

Fahmy: If the PLO accepts, there would be no problem. If they go to Geneva, it doesn’t matter how many delegations there are, but there will be problems.

President: We have enough to worry about already.

Fahmy: If you solve the PLO problem, neither Syria nor Egypt can refuse. If you issue an invitation with the Soviets to the PLO, and if they decline, then we will still go to Geneva.

President: If we can talk to Arafat, he might even agree to decline in advance.

Fahmy: We need to all be very practical. I’ll convey your determination to President Sadat.

Secretary Vance: I want to make one point clear. I think it is impossible to have a Palestinian element in a unified Arab delegation that includes well-known PLO members, whether it is Arafat or others. If they are not well-known, then it could be put together.

Fahmy: How would you classify well-known? Arafat won’t go in any case, since he thinks he is the head of state.

President: We should put this all down in writing, and give you an outline of our views, and we would like to let Foreign Minister Fahmy have a copy. He can then go over it with President Sadat, and if there are changes, we will have to go back and talk about it again. I do want you to be able to trust me on this question.

Fahmy: We hope that you will come up with fair peace proposals.

President: Prior to Geneva, our positions will remain general, as they have been, but as negotiations go ahead, then we will press for more specific decisions. We will put our ideas together on both the major and minor points.

Fahmy: We are prepared for Geneva, and we don’t insist that we have draft agreements in advance and there will be plenty of room for real negotiations.

Secretary Vance: We actually may be able to get some drafts.

President: I urge you again to stay flexible.

The meeting ends at 12:10 p.m.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Trips/Visits File, Box 109, 2/3–4/78 Visit to President Sadat of Egypt: Briefing Book [II], 2/78. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
2. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Fahmy from 10:30 to 11:09 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of this discussion has been found.
3. A reference to the U.S.-Israeli memorandum of agreement signed on September 1, 1975. See footnote 12, Document 103.
4. The interview took place in Latakia on August 26. See John B. Oakes, “Assad Favors Peace With Israel, But Rejects Any Closer Relations,” New York Times, August 29, 1977, p. 1.