290. Memorandum of Conversation1
Washington, July 10,
1980
SUBJECT
-
BW: The Sverdlovsk Incident
PARTICIPANTS
-
US
- The Acting Secretary
-
PM—Reginald Bartholomew
-
S/MS—Marshall Shulman
-
USSR
- Ambassador Anatoliy
Dobrynin
Toward the end of a discussion on TNF,2 the Acting Secretary
mentioned that he had one other matter to raise. This concerned the
outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk last spring. The Acting Secretary said
[Page 852]
that we felt that we hadn’t been able to engage the Soviet Government
on this matter to the extent its seriousness warranted. He noted that
Ambassador Earle would meet with
Dobrynin to discuss this
issue in some detail.
Dobrynin
responded by questioning what it was the US wanted, since this was
not clear. He noted that the Soviets have already given us an
explanation of this incident.
The Acting Secretary again stressed the
seriousness we attach to engaging in bilateral consultations so we could
satisfy ourselves on this issue, and not permit this question to
undermine the BW Convention or damage
prospects for arms control generally.
Dobrynin
reiterated that they have given us what they have on this matter,
and that the Soviets have not seen anything from us that would
contradict their explanation. He said that our goal should be preserving
the Convention and prospects for arms control.
Dobrynin
again stressed that what they have heard was based on hearsay, and
that if we have anything else more to say in terms of evidence or proof
would we please tell them.
The Acting Secretary replied by stressing that
Ambassador Earle will provide
information that will underline the seriousness of our concerns.
Due to the press of vacation plans,
Dobrynin
suggested that Ambassador Earle see Vasev
instead and give him a paper, which Dobrynin would then make certain is dealt with in
Moscow.
Dobrynin
stressed that he needed to take something back with him.
The Acting Secretary repeated that this was a
serious political matter, that Ambassador Earle had important things to say about this question,
and that Dobrynin should
definitely try to see Earle
before returning to Moscow.
Dobrynin
said that he understood the seriousness of this issue, but
suggested that it reflected domestic American election-year politics.
But he asked whether we really had something to say. If so, this would
be good. But he did not want to discuss just anything on this issue in a
general fashion. People in Moscow are critical of the way in which this
issue has been the subject of rumor, hearsay, and press reports.
The Acting Secretary said that this issue would be
every bit as serious to the USG if we
were now in the first year of this Administration instead of the fourth
year. He suggested the possibility that the issue might be addressed by
distinguished scientists from each country.
Dobrynin
repeated again that up to now there has been no proof, and there
have been indirect discussions in the scientific community
[Page 853]
which have caused a chain
reaction. There has not been a single additional fact but only
hearsay.
The Acting Secretary concluded this portion of the
conversation by urging Dobrynin
to see Ambassador Earle on the
BW question.
Attachment
Paper3
In March 1980 at the Five-Year Review Conference of the Biological
Weapons Convention, the United States Government reported that it
had initiated consultations with the Soviet Union as the result of
information which raised questions concerning the compliance of the
Soviet Union with the Biological Weapons Convention. We indicated
that we were proceeding in these consultations in a cooperative
spirit and in accordance with the specific provisions of the
Convention; we further indicated our hopes that the Soviet Union
would also proceed in the same manner. At that time, anticipating
that the bilateral consultations would take some time, the USG promised to make a full report on
the results of those consultations to the Parties at a later
appropriate date. This paper constitutes that promised report.
(S)
The basic obligation of the BWC, set
forth in Article I, provides that parties undertake “never in any
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or
retain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever
their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities
that have no justification for prophylactic, protection or other
peaceful purposes.” The Convention also provides, in Article V, that
Parties undertake to consult and to cooperate with one another “in
solving any problems which may arise” relating to the application of
the provisions of the Convention. (S)
Early in 1980, the United States Government became aware of an event
which apparently happened in the city of Sverdlovsk in the Soviet
Union during the spring of 1979. Information concerning this event
raised questions regarding the compliance of the Soviet Union with
the obligations it had undertaken in Article I of the Biological
Weapons Convention. On the basis of the evidence then available, it
was decided that the matter would be raised with Soviet authorities
pursuant to Article V of the treaty. The timing of the request for
information from the Soviets was complicated by the fact that,
purely by coincidence, the
[Page 854]
long-planned Five-Year Review Conference of the parties to the
Biological Weapons Convention had convened in Geneva and was in
session at that time. (S)
The USG raised the matter in Moscow
on March 174 and informed the participants in
the Geneva Conference of that action. The USG further promised to report the results of
consultations with the Soviet Government to the parties to the
BWC. In responding to the
USG demarche, the Soviets
acknowledged that a number of deaths had occurred due to an anthrax
epidemic in Sverdlovsk in April 1979, but asserted that it was the
intestinal form of anthrax resulting from contaminated meat. The
USG again raised the issue with
the Soviets on March 28 and proposed expert consultations as called
for in Article V. The Soviet Government repeated its earlier
explanation and denied the request for consultations. Most recently,
in June, the USG reiterated its
concerns to the Soviets and re-emphasized its interest in pursuing
expert consultations as provided in Article V. The Soviet Government
has again repeated its simple denial and refused its request for
consultations to resolve the issue. (S)
The concerns which originally led the USG to raise this issue with the Soviet Government are
as follows:
There is located in the south of Sverdlovsk a military facility which
is subordinate to the section within the Soviet Ministry of Defense
which is responsible for biological and chemical warfare. This
facility is contained within a heavily secured perimeter and
operates in secrecy. It includes structures, including animal pens,
which suggest that it is engaged in research and/or production
activities involving biological effects on living organisms. Other
physical characteristics of the facility include structures suitable
for storage of explosives. The facility was built before 1972 (i.e.,
before the signature of the Biological Weapons Convention), and it
remains in active use up to the present time. (S)
According to reliable reports, during the first weeks of April 1979,
at least 40 persons died in Sverdlovsk after experiencing pulmonary
and other symptoms normally associated with inhalation anthrax. Many
additional cases were reported in the following weeks, and a large
hospital in Sverdlovsk became devoted exclusively to the treatment
of anthrax cases—under military control and strict secrecy. (S)
Anthrax is an animal disease caused by a bacterial organism which may
infect humans who are exposed to it. There are three forms of
anthrax, which are distinguished by the manner in which the spores
enter the body. Cutaneous anthrax, the most
common form, is caused when spores enter through a cut in the skin
of a person handling contami
[Page 855]
nated animals or animal products. Intestinal anthrax results from the consumption of
contaminated meat. Inhalation anthrax is
caused by airborne spores entering the lungs. (Spores in animal hair
or hides can become airborne in industrial processing of
contaminated material.) Cutaneous anthrax is readily diagnosed,
easily treated, and not usually fatal when treated. (Untreated cases
result in death about 20% of the time.) The intestinal variety,
however, often results in death. Inhalation anthrax is almost always
fatal. Anthrax organisms which are ingested or inhaled are
transported within the body to lymph glands (in the abdomen and in
the chest, respectively) where they multiply and produce a toxin
which spreads through the body and is difficult to arrest. These
forms of anthrax are more difficult to diagnose, but are readily
indentified and distinguished from each other in clinical diagnosis.
A principal difference between intestinal and inhalation anthrax
which assists in clinical diagnosis is that the former type is
usually characterized by abdominal distress and the latter by
respiratory distress. Both varieties produce cyanosis, general
toxemia, and death within about a week of exposure. (S)
The initial victims of the Sverdlovsk outbreak resided or worked in
the immediate vicinity of the military facility described above.
Many reports indicate the widespread belief in Sverdlovsk that the
outbreak of anthrax was indeed caused by an accident at that
military facility. The reported locations of the initial victims,
near the facility, suggest that the disease could have reached them
by an airborne cloud emanating from the facility. Meteorological
data for the most likely dates of such an occurence are consistent
with this possibility. (S)
Official Soviet explanations of the outbreak as initiated by
anthrax-infected cattle are not credible because of the large number
of victims and the contrary clinical reports indicating symptoms of
inhalation anthrax rather than intestinal anthrax. Furthermore,
decontamination measures taken by Soviet authorities, including the
spraying of buildings and terrain with disinfectants, were more
consistent with a response to an airborne infection than with a
response to the pres-ence of contaminated meat. A quarantine of the
affected region of Sverdlovsk was established and transportation out
of the city was controlled. (S)
The information which gave rise to the USG’s concerns has come from a variety of sources,
including extremely sensitive technical and human intelligence
information. The USG will not
jeopardize these sources and methods of intelligence collection.
Consequently the USG cannot
elaborate further on its understanding of the events in Sverdlovsk
or on the origins of its information. (S)
Although this evidence is less than conclusive, the USG believes that it raises questions
serious enough to warrant pursuit of the issue
[Page 856]
under Article V of the Convention.
Despite three formal overtures from the USG, the Soviet Government has declined to cooperate
and consult as provided in Article V. The US Government regrets that
its concerns have not been allayed. (S)
The USG has attached great
importance to seeking a resolution of this issue which would enhance
confidence in the BWC, in contrast
to one which could result in complications for future cooperation
among nations in the vital sphere of arms control. The furtherance
of the arms control process has been a common objective of
fundamental importance to both the US and the USSR. It is hoped that the Soviet
Government will respond to this report in a manner satisfactory to
the other parties to the BWC so
that the viability of the Convention, and the broader process of
arms control so vitally important to the security of all the nations
of the world will be enhanced. (S)
