Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VI, Soviet Union

21. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, March 30, 1977, 11:15 a.m.–2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Berlin, Cyprus, Arms Control, CSCE, Bilateral Matters

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
• Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
• Ambassador Malcolm Toon
• Mr. Paul Warnke
• Assistant Secretary Arthur Hartman
• Mr. William Hyland
• Deputy Assistant Secretary Slocombe
• Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter
• USSR
• Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
• Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers L.V. Smirnov
• Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
• Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
• Mr. O. Sokolov
• Mr. V.F. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

BERLIN

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that if the Secretary had no objections, he would like to say a few words on the subject of West Berlin. He said the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin had been well received in his country. The subsequent agreement concluded between the two German states had been in accord with the spirit of the Quadripartite Agreement. All this had created additional detente elements in European affairs, particularly Central European affairs. But the Soviet side had noted one thing that was probably obvious to the US side as well. Seen from Moscow, for a long time now it had been clear that there were circles in West Germany who would like effectively to nullify the accord on West Berlin. After all, the Quadripartite Agreement stated directly that West Berlin did not belong to the Federal Republic of Germany, and that it was not governed by the FRG. And yet, West German authorities, the West German Government, and West Berlin as well, appeared to act as if West Berlin was some sort of a Land of the FRG. In fact, there was some legislation adopted in which West Berlin was directly referred to as a Land. The Soviet Union had protested against this. The Soviet leadership did not believe that the United States had anything to gain from such a state of affairs, either, although, of course, the Secretary was a better judge of US actions and policy. Gromyko would merely state the Soviet view. He had brought with him a document, translated from German, which was a certificate issued pursuant to an order by members of EEC countries regulating employment rights on the sovereign territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, including the Land Berlin. This particular document was dated October 15, 1968. What was this if not a travesty on the Quadripartite Agreement? How many West German institutions and organizations have established unlawful branches in West Berlin? The Soviet Union had more than once drawn the attention of the US Government, and the governments of other parties to the Quadripartite Agreement, to this situation, but, to its great regret, without any result whatsoever. In some individual cases the Soviet Government had been told that the situation would be studied, examined, etc., but no real steps had been taken. Of course, the Secretary might say that this occurred before the new Administration took office, and that the point of view of the new Administration was different. If the Secretary could say that, Gromyko would take note of it with satisfaction. Up to now, however, nothing new had been said on this subject. What seems to be taking place here, in his view, was some sort of preference in favor of NATO solidarity, over improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. He would ask—was it justified to provide certain West German circles with the opportunity to drive a wedge between our states, and to poison the relations between us? Was this sufficiently justified. The Soviet answer was a clear no. There were higher interests which quite definitely spoke in favor of our doing all we could not to permit anyone to poison relations between us from this West German direction. He would repeat—the Soviet Union stood for strictest compliance with the Quadripartite Accord. No one should be permitted to violate that agreement. This is what he wanted to say to the Secretary on West Berlin.

The Secretary said that he would also like to talk on the Berlin question in general. We believed in general that East-West relations had been improved by the West Berlin accord and by the agreement between the two German states. We would like to see that balance maintained. We believed that both sides should avoid doing anything to disturb that balance. We further believed that Four Power status applied to all of Berlin, not only West Berlin.

The Secretary then raised recent GDR actions aimed at attempting to alter the status of the city.

The Secretary pointed out that the document Gromyko had brought with him was dated 1968, whereas the Quadripartite Agreement had been concluded in 1971. In sum, he believed that both our countries had to see to it that the Quadripartite Agreement was complied with in full measure by all interested parties.

Gromyko said that the same kind of document was being issued today as well. He would ask the Secretary to take note of this fact.

The Secretary said he would take note of it, and hoped that Gromyko would also note the instances the Secretary had raised concerning East Berlin.

Gromyko said that, of course, there were some questions the West Berlin authorities were competent enough to resolve on the basis of the authority they possessed, which would not conflict with the Quadripartite Agreement; similarly there were some questions that could be resolved by East Berlin (as the Secretary had called it), the capital of the GDR, without coming into conflict with the Quadripartite Agreement, and the Soviet Union would certainly not object to such acts. Neither should there be any objections on the part of the Western powers and the US to such acts by the capital of the GDR. The instances Gromyko had cited, however, represented gross violations of the Quadripartite Agreement. He would repeat that there were numerous West German legislative acts which referred to Berlin as a Land of the Federal Republic. He had provided only one example; this situation was not improving. He would hope that the new Administration and the Secretary, personally, would reflect on whether it was really worthwhile to play into the hands of those circles that wanted to inject as much poison as possible into the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States in connection with the question of West Berlin. The Soviet Union favored complete implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement. Gromyko welcomed the Secretary’s words to the effect that he took a similar attitude, but this also should be implemented in practice. This concluded his statement on the subject of West Berlin.

The Secretary said that the US took its responsibilities in West Berlin very seriously, and had given great attention to the Quadripartite Agreement and would continue to do so in the future.

Gromyko said that practice would show whether this was indeed the case.

The Secretary hoped the same would apply to East Berlin.

CYPRUS

Gromyko suggested to take up the question of Cyprus. He asked if the Secretary would like to be first to speak. How did he assess the present situation? The Soviet Union did not want to see any hostilities in that area, and therefore hoped the US position was similar.

The Secretary said he would be happy to take up the Cyprus question. He personally had been involved in Cyprus problems over the years, particularly during the period of time in 1967 when he, together with others from the United Nations, was involved in resolving the dispute that existed at the time, in order to avoid a conflict between Greeks and Turks. It was with concern and sadness that he had seen the conflict break out in the early 70’s. Since then a number of efforts by various countries and by the United Nations were made to try and find a way to resolve such conflicts. Recently, in an effort to offer our good offices and help the United Nations in their efforts to resolve the dispute, we had sent a mission to Cyprus headed by Mr. Clifford.² Mr. Clifford had discussed the issues that divide the Greeks and Turks, in particular with the Archbishop and Mr. Denktash,³ to see whether or not common ground that would settle the dispute could be found. In so doing, he had indicated that he had no wish to do anything that would not be helpful to UN Secretary General Waldheim’s efforts to settle the intra-communal dispute. Clifford had reported the results of his discussions with Cyprus leaders to Waldheim and had offered our assistance. As Gromyko undoubtedly knew, the intra-communal talks were about to begin in Vienna today,⁴ and it was the Secretary’s understanding that the parties had new proposals on the table that would be helpful. As he understood it, one side would put forward a new proposal to resolve the territorial question, and the other a proposal to resolve the question of governmental structure. If these proposals were actually discussed, then perhaps we would see progress. This was in the hands of the Secretary General, as an overseeing party to the discussion. We believed we should leave matters in his hands, while supporting his efforts.

Gromyko remarked that while Waldheim was overseeing matters he was, of course, in no position to decide anything.

The Secretary agreed that that was correct. The ultimate solutions should be worked out by the parties. Therefore, he thought we should see what comes out of the Vienna talks and then decide.

Gromyko asked if he could take it that it would be correct to state that the new Administration in the US favored preservation of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign, and integrated state.

The Secretary answered: “You can.”

Gromyko took that to be a very good response; it indicated that our positions had much in common. He would ask another question—would the US Government agree that no foreign troops should be based in Cyprus, that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots live in peace, that they maintain order with their own small forces, or was its position that foreign troops should be retained there indefinitely.

The Secretary said that the first was our view. However, the question of British bases on Cyprus would have to be worked out between Britain and Cyprus.

Gromyko said that that was another question. He had asked whether the US believed that ultimately there should be no foreign troops in Cyprus.

The Secretary said he clearly agreed that there should be no Greek or Turkish forces in Cyprus. That had been our position from the beginning.

Gromyko said that this response drew our positions closer together. By way of information, he told the Secretary that recently Foreign Minister Caglayangil of Turkey had visited Moscow. He had touched on the Cyprus question. Gromyko did not know where he had obtained that information, but on the territorial question he had said that in general Greek Cypriots—Archbishop Makarios—were closer to accepting the idea of 30%–31% of territory for the Turks. If that was really so, the Turkish Foreign Minister had said, then the Greek and Turkish positions on the territorial question were not all that far apart. Gromyko was saying this to the Secretary for the sake of information, but could not go into further detail, since this was not a subject for discussion between Turkey and the Soviet Union. He felt it would not be out of place if our two countries could assist and advise the two communities, although it would be they who would have to arrive at a final settlement.

The Secretary said it was his understanding that the Turkish Cypriots’ position was that they wanted to get 30%–31% of the territory, while the Greeks were prepared to give something closer to 20%. He would predict that they would finally compromise on 26%–27%.

Gromyko said that had also been his impression after his talk with the Turkish Foreign Minister. He had suspected that 30%–31% was more wishful thinking than reality.

To finish up with the Cyprus question, Gromyko said the Soviet Union would hope that the question would be settled and would no longer be a problem. He felt that, in general, the Turks were inclined to take the road toward solution. He believed that if both sides were flexible, we could be optimistic about the future. However, no one should interfere with them, although the US and the Soviet Union should assist and prevent any outside interference. As for military bases, and foreign troops, ultimately these should leave.

NUCLEAR NON-FIRST-USE

Gromyko wanted to say a few words regarding the Non-First-Use proposal. Why had the US Government (the Ford Administration) so quickly declined the Warsaw Pact proposal that an attempt be made to reach agreement between the participants in CSCE, which included Warsaw Pact countries, NATO, the US, and Canada, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons? What was the explanation for such haste and a lackadaisical response? It was no secret, of course, that it was the US that insisted that NATO take this attitude.⁵ Not even the proposal to discuss this question thoroughly in a group of experts had been accepted. After all, both of us had followed similar procedures in the past. This had been the case when the NPT was discussed between our two states for approximately four years before it finally came to drafting. Gromyko had taken part in these discussions. He would ask the Secretary to take a further look at this problem.

The Secretary replied that it was his understanding that what had happened when this proposal was rejected last year had not been a US decision, but one taken at a Ministerial meeting of NATO member countries after thorough discussion in that group. As he understood it, the decision to reject was based on the grounds that NATO was not prepared to renounce use of any means to repel an attack upon one member of NATO. This was his understanding of what had happened.

Gromyko said that the Warsaw Pact proposal was aimed precisely at preventing a nuclear attack on any country. Would it really have been harmful if a preliminary meeting of experts, including representatives of NATO and the US and representatives of the Warsaw Pact powers, had met for the purpose of a preliminary study? Perhaps some sort of variant might have emerged that could have been useful. After all, should the Warsaw Pact powers also follow such a practice when NATO had a proposal to make—reject it out of hand and allow NATO to learn about that from a radio broadcast? Was this really the best way to proceed? He did not think so. There had to be some degree of responsibility.

The Secretary said that rather than single out one single weapon as a subject of focus, it would make much more sense to reduce forces across the board, in order to increase overall security. This was precisely the purpose of the Vienna MBFR negotiations. It would seem to him that there were items of greater priority, for example, real progress in the strategic arms talks and at the ongoing discussions in Vienna. He would put that ahead of attempts to resolve the more abstruse question of Non-First-Use. The other negotiations dealt with tangible matters, proposals at the table, and they should be brought to fruition.

Gromyko wondered why the Secretary would call that proposal abstruse. After all, we were negotiating on specific types of arms, such as chemical weapons, bacteriological weapons, environmental modification for military purposes. Just yesterday, he and the Secretary had talked about banning weapons of mass destruction. If we did not at least try to look at these things, what would diplomats be doing? Would some just drink coffee, some others tea, and all of them eat caviar, if any remained; was that all? These were not very strong arguments. He said he would conclude from the Secretary’s words that he stood on the same position as his predecessor. He was saying this with sadness and regret. The problem remained, and we might perhaps be forced to return to it some day. He would like to hope that this was not the Secretary’s final word on this subject.

The Secretary said he would only note that there were already obligations under the UN Charter not to use force. Why, then, should these obligations be brought into question by a new document limited to CSCE participants? However, he would reflect on it.

Gromyko wanted to refer to conclusion of an international treaty on non-first use. A majority in the United Nations favored conclusion of such a treaty, and this was not fortuitous. It was an expression of a general yearning of people for a true and lasting peace. He would ask the Secretary if that proposal would not be in accord with the interests of peace, with the interests of those governments that wanted peace? This was a proposal not to use force under any circumstances. In other words, it would provide for an obligation of states in treaty form to resolve disputes by peaceful means only. The Secretary might say that the UN Charter already contained such obligations. There was a great deal in the UN Charter, but all of it in general terms only. The only thing missing from the Charter was a mention of God, and Gromyko recalled a fervent plea in favor of such mention by one of the representatives. After all, treaties existed in order to make more specific the obligations arising out of the Charter, and to translate Charter provisions into specific undertakings by states. Would it not have been useful to have experts examine the question? Would the United States be poorer if it had sent some people to Moscow, Geneva or Washington to discuss the proposal? As things stood now, the whole world agrees, but the government of the United States says no. There are other countries that follow US lead. The Secretary was a member of a new government. Would he not agree that there was something here to think about, to take a look at? He called upon the Secretary to do so.

The Secretary said he would be happy to give new thought to this matter, because he preferred to negotiate rather than reject. He would see if further discussions could be productive.

Gromyko asked that the Secretary’s representatives at whatever level was appropriate inform the Soviet Union when the time came.

ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITIES

The Secretary said that in this connection he wanted to raise the issue of placing limits on the anti-satellite capabilities of both sides. We had noted that such capabilities were in the process of being developed. We firmly believed that an attempt should be made to stabilize the strategic situation by discussing such capabilities, and were prepared to enter into discussions with the Soviet Union concerning their limitation. In the interim, he would suggest that it would be useful to exercise restraint in testing anti-satellite systems.

Gromyko said he could not say that no problem existed in this area. He would be prepared to examine any proposal the United States could submit.

The Secretary thought that was good, because he believed it important that we do this.

CIVIL DEFENSE

The Secretary raised the question of civil defense preparations. As Gromyko knew, there was concern in the United States over what appeared to be a civil defense program in the Soviet Union. It would be constructive to exchange information and see if we could not reach agreement on mutual restraint in this area in the future. At SALT both sides had acknowledged that limitation on active ABM defense of the territory of a country was a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and reducing the risk of nuclear war. The Secretary thought that the same logic may apply to a broad expansion in the field of civil defense. Therefore, we should discuss this question.

Gromyko asked whether Mr. Schlesinger,⁶ upon returning from China, had not tried to scare public opinion in the United States on the basis of a civil defense program in China?

The Secretary said that Schlesinger had not tried to do that, but that he had seen the preparations there.

Gromyko asked if that meant the United States was afraid only of the Soviet Union.

The Secretary said the United States had not expressed fear in the sense in which Gromyko used that word, but we did believe this to be an important aspect of strategic equality. We should not ignore such a factor and discuss limitations that would be in our mutual interests.

Gromyko said that in his view activities in the field of civil defense were not a problem of first-rate importance. In terms of strategic stability they were not significant. He did not think that anyone would deny the truth of such a view. Pursuing the question in these terms might complicate the process of reaching agreement on really important problems—the number one problem—limitation of strategic arms. This did not mean that the Soviet side would be afraid to discuss this question. If the United States attached importance to it, Soviet and American specialists might be instructed to consider specific proposals.

The Secretary said that was good and very productive. He recalled that when we had suggested discussing ABM limitations, it was said that they were defensive weapons and did not affect the strategic balance. It developed, however, that both sides later agreed that ABMs had an impact on that balance. Therefore, it would be useful to discuss civil defense and its effect on the strategic balance.

WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

Gromyko said that for a long time now discussions in the United Nations and elsewhere had dealt with the possibility of convening a World Disarmament Conference.⁷ The Secretary should not believe that the Soviet Union alone was interested in convening such a conference; it did not expect any profit out of such discussions. The Soviet Union had favored this idea for a long time because it believed that implementation could be an important landmark on the road toward disarmament. First of all, he would have to explain that it often happened that people mixed up two things—a World Disarmament Conference and a Special Session of the UN General Assembly to discuss disarmament. It might be asked what was the difference? The Soviet Union was not opposed to holding such a session, and in fact had voted for the corresponding resolution, but it believed that this would not remove the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference. What could a General Assembly session accomplish, even with the best intentions? It could adopt recommendations and pass resolutions but, according to the UN Charter, the nature of such recommendations and resolutions was that a government might accept them, or might not, or might simply pigeonhole them. Gromyko was afraid that such would be the result of a special General Assembly Session on Disarmament; already the Soviet Union had voted for it. A World Disarmament Conference was quite another thing. It would be held on an entirely different basis from the standpoint of organization and procedure for taking decisions. The juridical effect of decisions adopted would also be different. At a special conference, decisions could be worked out by minorities as well, including the major powers, and then converted into an international agreement. Success at such a conference would be determined simply by the wishes of the parties, and not by the number of votes in favor. The procedure for taking decisions at a conference would be totally different. Often people did not understand this difference, but the difference was great indeed. It should not be precluded that at a conference a limited number of states could take a position to conclude an agreement, and such an agreement would become an effective international document, whether or not a majority of states signed. Gromyko did not want to prejudge the special General Assembly session, but would ask the Secretary to reflect on the possibility of convening a World Disarmament Conference following the special General Assembly session. It could not possibly be detrimental to the United States or the Soviet Union, since no one could impose anything on anyone else by a majority of votes.

The Secretary quite agreed that a World Disarmament Conference was a noble objective for the future. On the other hand, there were so many pressing things now, that it was above all necessary to show the world that we could make progress on such practical things as strategic arms limitations and in the Vienna MBFR talks. We should deal with things on the table before talking about a disarmament conference. Both the Soviet Union and the United States had stated that they would actively participate in the special General Assembly session, but it was our view that we should give priority to the things already on the table and before us.

Gromyko believed that efforts to convene a World Disarmament Conference would not in the least degree interfere with efforts to resolve other disarmament problems. He also thought the world was entering a phase where we had to take up many things in several arenas, because now the world had become so complex that we had a good one hundred years of work ahead of us. In any case, parallel efforts would have to be applied. That was all he had to say on the World Disarmament Conference.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Gromyko said that he would like to instruct his representatives in Geneva to suggest that the CCD start drafting the text of an agreement on chemical weapons, provided the United States agreed of course. In the process of drafting, some problems might simply disappear. So far the CCD had indulged in philosophical discussions. This is all he had to say on the subject. (He remarked that this was the briefest statement he had ever made on any issue.)

The Secretary agreed that some progress had been made through discussions between technical people in this area. We were ready and willing to join with the Soviet Union in this initiative. We would see if working on the text of an agreement might not change our respective stand on issues on which we had different views, although our goals were the same.

Gromyko said we should instruct our representatives to get to work.

BELGRADE

Gromyko wanted to present a brief formulation of the Soviet position with regard to the forthcoming Belgrade Conference.⁸ The Soviet Union believed that it was necessary to gather in Belgrade not in order to quarrel, not to launch all sorts of allegations against each other, not to present lists of alleged unlawful activities or crimes of one state against another, or lists of violations of some sort of provisions. It was necessary to gather in Belgrade in order to demonstrate a positive spirit of cooperation and detente, to promote implementation of all the obligations of the Final Act of the CSCE, and to table appropriate proposals toward that goal. This was the Soviet view of the purpose of the Belgrade meeting. He would like to hear US views on this score.

The Secretary replied that our view was also that we should not go there to quarrel, or for purposes of confrontation. We should review how well the Final Act was being implemented, what was being done on Baskets I, II and III⁹ viewed in that light. A limited number of new proposals might also be considered, but our emphasis should be on how well the Final Act commitments were being implemented.

Gromyko asked if it would not be good to take all the Baskets out and burn them before Belgrade so that they not stand in the way. Otherwise, we might run the danger that these Baskets would be the most popular items. He had taken note of the Secretary’s statement regarding the review. Of course, it would be difficult to object to the Secretary’s views, because each participant was free to act as he wished, but the important thing was how this should be done. A review might take the form of sharp criticisms of the other side, which then would not remain in debt, and then this might be followed by the third, fourth, or fifth and finally thirty-fifth party to the Final Act. Was this really needed? The Soviet side saw the major purpose of the conference in carrying out the review in such a way as to consider the future. If constructive proposals were made that are in accord with the spirit of the Final Act, this would impart a constructive character to the conference. The Soviet Union, for its part, intended to raise certain matters, some new and some already mentioned. It would act fully in accord with the spirit of detente and in the direction of improving Soviet-American relations.

The Secretary said that we also wished very much for a constructive intent and purpose. He said we would conduct ourselves consistent with that purpose.

MARITIME AGREEMENT

Gromyko took note of the fact that the protocol on maritime shipping had finally been agreed upon. That was a positive fact.

The Secretary said he, too, was pleased that the maritime agreement had finally been concluded.¹⁰

CIVIL AVIATION

Gromyko noted with regret that the aviation question so far had not been resolved. However, it was necessary to apply further efforts to finding a solution to this matter, too.

The Secretary thought that some progress had been made on civil aviation and looked forward to resuming negotiations in the near future to bring this matter to a satisfactory conclusion that would be acceptable to both sides. He would suggest that in the meantime the status quo of scheduled service be maintained, and that discussions be picked up as soon as possible, to reach a final agreement.

Korniyenko asked the Secretary to explain the meaning of the status quo. Some discussion followed as to whether this meant to maintain two scheduled flights a week for each airline, or whether the normal April 1 schedule of four weekly flights each would go into effect. The problem was not resolved and remained to be taken up at another level.

CONSTRUCTION OF EMBASSIES

Gromyko noted with satisfaction that agreement had been reached on the construction of the respective embassies.

The Secretary said he, too, was pleased.

SOVIET MIG–25 DEFECTION¹¹

Gromyko said the Soviet leadership had been very much affected and even hurt by the US Government’s direct attitude in connection with the well-known incident involving the Soviet aircraft in Japan. This was not even a matter of the pilot, although they did not believe one word of the version spread in the West about the pilot. It was a question of the aircraft itself. Did the strategic services of the United States think they would improve their strategic situation by disassembling the aircraft? Did they really see an advantage to be gained here? Their actions were a blow at the spirit of confidence and trust in the relations between our respective governments, and had poisoned the general climate. Gromyko would tell the Secretary directly that the Soviet leadership had been amazed and surprised how these two factors could be likened. Could familiarization with this aircraft by the Japanese and Americans change the strategic situation between our countries? “Nonsense. Utter nonsense.” Supposing the Soviet Union had an opportunity to dismantle a US plane, say a Phantom, could dismantling it and crawling all over it improve the strategic situation of the Soviet Union? “Nonsense.” In that case, why was it necessary to poison the relationship between us? It had seemed like a small matter, but in fact it was a major one. This was what the Soviets wanted the new US Administration to know, as something to be borne in mind in the future. He did not think that this had increased confidence.

The Secretary said he had taken note of the Minister’s statement. He understood that this matter had been raised with President Ford, and followed by a subsequent exchange of correspondence between the President and General Secretary Brezhnev.

ADVANCE NOTIFICATION

The Secretary said that, as Gromyko knew, President Carter had communicated to General Secretary Brezhnev his desire to see if we could enter into an agreement about advance notification of missile firings. The object of this was to be a confidence-building arrangement. It would further the objectives of the Measures Agreement¹² and would be a simple and constructive move. What we had in mind was notification, some 24 hours in advance, of dates and times and places of ICBM launchings. We believe this would prevent misinterpretation of test launches during periods of tension.

Gromyko said he had asked his colleagues whether this question had been raised earlier. He ascertained that it had not been discussed with US representatives previously. The USSR announces all launches which land in areas outside of its territory. The Secretary knew this, surely. As for launches of strategic missiles within limits of national territory, there was no need to announce them, since such launches are carried out into areas that could not cause concern to the United States. The regions where they landed were known. At the same time, he would make the additional point that the Soviet side would be prepared to consider notification in individual cases, when launches made even within national territories might, in the view of the launching side, be misinterpreted by the other. He would suggest that this question could be considered in more specifics within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission which was meeting in Geneva now.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 3/28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on April 12; reviewed by Hyland; approved by Twaddell on April 12. The meeting took place at the Kremlin.
2. Clark Clifford, special envoy to the eastern Mediterranean.
3. Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, and Rauf Denktash, Vice President of Cyprus.
4. Reference is to intracommunal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
5. See Flora Lewis, “NATO Bars Reds’ Bid to Ban Atom Strike,” The New York Times, December 10, 1976, p. 1.
6. Schlesinger traveled to China in September 1976 to meet with Chinese leaders.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Document 321.
8. See footnote 7, Document 2.
9. Basket I dealt with European security; Basket II, cooperation in economics, science, technology and the environment; and Basket III, cooperation in humanitarian affairs. See footnote 5, Document 4.
10. Reference is to the Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters between the United States and the Soviet Union, January 1, 1976. The Agreement dealt primarily with shipping concerns.
11. For an overview of the Soviet defection, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 290.
12. The Accidents Measures Agreement of September 30, 1971, provided that the “Hot Line” would be used for urgent communication pertaining to nuclear weapons. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 197, footnote 3.