Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VI, Soviet Union

18. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, March 28, 1977, 5:30–7:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• SALT

PARTICIPANTS

• US PARTICIPANTS
• Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
• Ambassador Malcolm Toon
• Mr. Paul Warnke
• Mr. William Hyland
• Mr. Leslie H. Gelb
• Mr. William D. Krimer, (Interpreter)
• USSR PARTICIPANTS
• Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
• Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers L.V. Smirnov
• Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
• Mr. V.G. Komplektov
• Mr. O.M. Sokolov
• Mr. V. Sukhodrev, (Interpreter)

SALT

Foreign Minister Gromyko opened the meeting by saying that there were many questions to discuss, but he would suggest now to take up SALT. Secretary Vance agreed.

Gromyko wanted to say a few words by way of introduction. If we wanted to waste no time in taking the bull by the horns, we should continue to discuss the subject in further development of the discussions with General Secretary Brezhnev. For objective reasons, the question of curbing and putting an end to the arms race and thereby reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war is the pivotal direction of Soviet-American relations. While this might be repetition, Gromyko thought it should be repeated each day in each city, each village, and at every crossroads. Within the framework of this direction, a central place was held, and understandably so, by the problem of limiting strategic arms. This had been quite correctly stressed at the meeting this morning, and again during his and the Secretary’s conversation at lunch. There was evidently no need to speak at length of the great importance of this problem, and of the fact that both sides, that is the Soviet Union and the United States, must be interested in a solution to this problem in an equal degree. There cannot be a situation where one side would be interested more than the other. In the Soviet view this was the crucial factor that made it possible and necessary to resolve the problem of limiting strategic arms.

It was not fortuitous that the two sides had recognized and adopted the principal of equality and equal security (Gromyko repeated and stressed “equality and equal security”). Furthermore, it would be inadmissable for either side to seek unilateral advantages in this area. It was no accident that this formulation had become part and parcel of the very fabric of the Soviet-American SALT negotiations at all levels, the highest as well as the lowest. All involved in SALT literally lived with this formula. Indeed, any other approach would be nothing but an illusion and fantasy, and a waste of time. Gromyko could use even stronger words, but he was sure that neither side was interested in a different approach. He wanted to emphasize these facts at the very outset of the discussions aimed at accomplishing the task at hand, i.e., limiting strategic arms.

Of course, the very fact that our two countries had engaged in negotiations on a new agreement limiting strategic offensive arms was in itself a significant and important achievement. It might have been conceivable that the two sides, while desiring agreement, had not engaged in appropriate discussions. However, one could hardly conceive of anything like that, because the alternative would have been simply to use our respective mass media to scold each other. That would indeed have been a very gloomy prospect. The fact that we were now engaged in trying to work out a new agreement proved that the first SALT agreements were viable and had proved their practical value. If this were otherwise, both sides would have drawn quite different conclusions.

Gromyko thought the Secretary would recall that in 1974 the Soviet Union and the United States had reached an understanding regarding conclusion of a new long-term agreement limiting strategic offensive arms, and had practically agreed upon the parameters of such a new agreement. The Soviet side believed that what had been agreed upon reflected a mutually acceptable balance of the interests of the two sides, and was fully in accord with the objective of curbing the strategic arms race. It would be hard to find a more precise formulation than the words “mutually acceptable balance of the interests of the two sides.”

Gromyko thought Secretary Vance would agree that an enormous volume of energy, resources and labor had been expanded to achieve what had been achieved. The Vladivostok understanding, as well as the subsequent working out of its specific provisions had required enormous efforts in Moscow, Washington, and then Geneva. He wondered how many people had been involved in these efforts, and how many times the highest leadership of our respective countries had been involved in hammering out agreement.

Gromyko said it would not be out of order to recall that both in Vladivostok and during subsequent negotiations the Soviet Union, in a search for mutually acceptable solutions, had taken serious and important steps to meet the US side halfway. If necessary, he could mention some of these steps now. In response the Soviet side had heard statements to the effect that these steps were indeed helpful, and Secretary General Brezhnev had been told that these were major steps toward resolving the problem. After hearing that, the Soviet side believed that things were moving toward conclusion of the new agreement. He could tell the Secretary a great deal about the conversations held between our respective representatives on this subject. He could tell a great deal about the concessions the Soviet side had made in order to meet the US position, concessions within the framework of the governing agreed principles. Much could also be said about all the things the Soviet side had heard about the obstacles in the way of reaching agreement. He would prefer to emphasize, however, that the road traveled was indeed a long one. Of course, Secretary Vance was new to these negotiations; they had been conducted by the previous Administration, by the former Secretary of State and by the former President. But he would ask the Secretary to look at the situation from the viewpoint of the Soviet side. How should it be assessed? Should everything that had been achieved be thrown away? Now the Soviet leadership was talking with Secretary Vance; should it assume that when another new Administration came into office the results of these talks would be discarded? What was needed here was a maximum degree of stability and reciprocity. At the theater last evening Gromyko had said to the Secretary that there were many keys to resolving numerous other world problems, but they were all locked in a box to which there were only two keys, and we could lay our hands on those many keys only by opening the box with these two keys, keys of keys as it were. He would point out that the Soviet leadership had remained the same, it had not changed; neither had the Leninist foreign policy of the USSR changed in the meanwhile. In fact, however, he thought that people on the US side had not really changed either. He did not believe those who would assert that the best thing the United States could hope for was a nuclear war. That was completely out of the question. But, he would also have to note that the recent period had been marked by no headway at all, by something one might call a freeze. General Secretary Brezhnev had spoken about that quite unambiguously. The Soviet leadership was convinced that in the absence of such a freeze the new agreement could have been achieved at least a year ago; he repeated “at least a year ago.”

Gromyko pointed out that, surely, no one could comment on Soviet foreign policy better than the Soviet leadership itself. There was surely no need to rely on newspapers, magazines or the radio for information about that policy. The Soviet leadership had stated repeatedly, and Gromyko wanted to state this once again right now, and most emphatically emphasize, that the Soviet Union wanted to conclude a new agreement. Given a mutual desire to do so, this could be done, especially since the questions remaining unresolved so far had already been very carefully discussed, and in some cases formulated most specifically. Secretary Vance would know the formulations Gromyko was referring to. There were serious people here who had taken part in the work and were well acquainted with the specific formulations and various legal clauses, as well as the additional fundamental understandings, which had been reached as a result of discussions at the highest level, and between the delegations in Geneva. Successful conclusion of this work and conclusion of the new agreement would not only constitute an important step forward in itself, but would also open up possibilities for working out more far-reaching measures to limit strategic arms. After all, the understanding reached in Vladivostok would clearly show anyone who took a look at it that it contained some bridges leading to negotiations on follow-on agreements: these bridges were not bad at all.

At this time Gromyko felt he had to tell Secretary Vance that what was needed now was for the sides to try and implement the understandings already reached, and not at all to narrow the framework of the new agreement being worked out, or to add new issues which would only cause additional complications. He thought the Secretary might already have drawn that conclusion from what had been said this morning.

How should the task of limiting strategic offensive arms be accomplished? Gromyko thought it was clear that US authorities were well aware of what work still had to be accomplished, and of the fact that time was short.

In recent letters to President Carter ² the Soviet leadership had once again set forth in detail its position on the questions remaining unresolved so far. The Soviet side therefore proceeded from the premise that the present discussions would proceed in a specific manner, and that efforts should be focused above all on finding mutually acceptable solutions to these unresolved issues.

This was the preliminary statement Gromyko had wanted to present with regard to these issues; he would now propose to give the floor to Secretary Vance and would be pleased to hear US considerations.

Secretary Vance thanked Gromyko for his remarks and said that at the outset he would like to indicate his agreement with what Gromyko had described as central to the relations between our two countries. He would also agree that he shared Gromyko’s view about both countries being equally interested in achieving a new strategic arms limitation agreement. Further, he would also state that we believed the principle of equality and equal security to be fundamental to our task, and that it had to form the basis for our strategic arms limitation talks.

The Secretary wanted to take a minute or two to review the history of our efforts on strategic arms limitation, and then he would go on to the specific question of the Vladivostok understanding. When we began the process of negotiating strategic arms limitation a number of years ago, we had several purposes in mind: to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, to enhance strategic stability, and to reduce the level of arms on each side so as to build up confidence between our states. We had made progress toward achievement of this goal. We had concluded the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement, and had also reached an understanding at Vladivostok in 1974. It was quite true that the principle of parity had been established in that understanding. Since that time a great deal of useful work had been accomplished in Geneva. At the same time, we had to recognize that over the past two and a half years two important problems had emerged, which had not yet been resolved. These were the Backfire and the Cruise Missile issues. Neither of these had been resolved in the Vladivostok understanding, nor had they been resolved since that time. It was precisely for this reason that US President Carter had proposed, as a method of most rapidly resolving the problem before us for the immediate future, that these two issues be set aside, and that agreement be reached on the basis of the aggregate numbers agreed upon in Vladivostok, at the same time resolving other issues, such as MIRV verification, data base and concealment. Such an agreement would be wholly consistent with the Vladivostok understanding. The Secretary had read the history of the negotiations and had also consulted with the former Secretary of State. On the other hand, President Carter felt that there was another alternative, a bold one to be sure, that would achieve significant further progress along the lines of the real substance of arms control. This alternative the Secretary would call a comprehensive approach. It had several significant advantages which he would like to sketch out for Gromyko, after which he would hand him the proposal briefly summarized on one piece of paper. First, it would provide for significant arms reduction for both sides. Second, it would be a genuine step in setting limits on the quantitative and qualitative aspects of armaments. Third, it would represent a major political achievement and would provide for new formulations improving Soviet/American relations. In the eyes of the whole world it would be regarded as an exercise in political wisdom by both sides. Now the Secretary proposed to run through the details of this Comprehensive proposal (see Attachment I).³ Having done so, Secretary Vance handed Gromyko the comprehensive proposal in both languages and said he would be prepared to answer any questions and to discuss its provisions in any way.

Gromyko said that as far as this new proposal was concerned, having just now received it from the US side, he would have to defer his response to one of our subsequent meetings during these talks. Since it had been presented as an official proposal of the US, he would provide an official response during the Secretary’s stay in Moscow.

On a separate piece of paper the Secretary also presented the details of President’s Carter alternative idea of setting aside the unresolved issues and concluding the new agreement on the basis of the Vladivostok understanding (see Attachment II).⁴

Gromyko said that he would like to address the Cruise Missile issue in specifics. We had a document which had been signed by both sides and registered agreement in the form of an Aide-Memoire dated December 10, 1974.⁵ No indulgences of any kind had been provided there for cruise missiles. When discussing the issues at Vladivostok, no distinction had been made between cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Indeed, it would make no difference to people whether they died as a result of a cruise missile attack or a ballistic missile attack. After the Vladivostok meeting some people had tried to draw a distinction between these types of missiles. The Soviet side had pointed out that it would be inconsistent to pose the question in that fashion. On his side there was no need to study the history of the negotiations leading to the Vladivostok understanding, because he and others were living participants in those negotiations. Thus, both he and Brezhnev were quite certain about how things were discussed and accomplished there. Neither Brezhnev nor Gromyko, nor other Soviet participants, needed to be reminded by reading briefs, about how things were resolved in Vladivostok. Anyone who tried to adjust this matter retroactively would find that such attempts would hardly strengthen his position. Furthermore, he would point out that in a message to President Carter the Soviet leadership had set out its positions quite concretely and very carefully on the whole complex of questions related to cruise missiles. Gromyko said he would have to repeat that the Soviet Union could not agree to exclusion of these missiles from the Agreement which was now in process of being worked out; in other words, that cruise missiles should remain outside of limitations. In effect, what would be the practical value of any agreement if cruise missiles remain outside restraints? There could only be one answer to this question: the new agreement would continue to exist by itself, while the race in strategic arms would continue in a new channel. Such an agreement would in effect sanctify the further development of the arms race and would in no way be conducive to finding a solution to the task at hand, i.e., the task of limiting strategic arms. Finally, in purely practical terms there were no grounds whatsoever to believe that, if we deferred the cruise missile issue for the time being, it would lend itself to easier solution at some time in the future.

Quite the contrary would be the case. Experience showed, and as a practical politician, Secretary Vance would realize this, that when a new type of weapon was developed, and particularly deployed, it was by no means easier to limit that type. It was more difficult, and sometimes quite impossible. If we looked back a few years, we could see that at that time it would certainly have been easier to ban both conventional and nuclear arms, it would have been easier to resolve the matter then, rather than now, when the whole problem had become much bulkier. He would even say that it was now ten times or even a hundred times more difficult to ban nuclear weapons than would have been the case thirty years ago. The same thing would happen with cruise missiles. Taking into account what has been said, and earlier detailed discussions between the two sides, in the course of which outlines for a possible solution to this problem could be discerned, the Soviet position on cruise missiles was as follows:

Air-to-surface-cruise missiles—heavy bombers when equipped with air-to-surface cruise missiles with a range between 600 and 2500 kilometers should be regarded as strategic delivery vehicles equipped with MIRVs and should accordingly be counted within the 1320 ceiling established for such vehicles. That ceiling had been agreed upon by both sides in Vladivostok. In this connection, a B–52 carrying such cruise missiles would be counted as one missile equipped with MIRVs, while a B–1 would equal three missiles equipped with MIRVs. In an aside Gromyko commented that he was talking about the US side’s beloved B–1.

The Secretary asked why the B–1 would count as three missiles equipped with MIRV’s.

Gromyko explained that this was due to the qualitative difference between the B–1 and the B–52. This fact had been widely written about in the US press, and was no big secret. At the same time, the new agreement should provide a full ban on air-to-surface cruise missiles with a range of more than 2500 km, and there should be a ban on air-to-surface cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km carried by aircraft other than heavy bombers.

Gromyko went on to say that the agreement should also ban submarine-launched cruise missiles and cruise missiles on surface ships, as well as land-based cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km. In the Soviet view the solution of the cruise missile problem on this basis would promote more effective limitations of strategic offensive arms and would create good prerequisites for their subsequent reduction.

Gromyko wanted especially to emphasize once again the readiness of the Soviet side, expressed in the course of previous negotiations, to count among the numbers of missiles equipped with MIRV’s, i.e., within the 1320 aggregate, all intercontinental ballistic missiles of those types which had been tested with MIRVs even just once. (Gromyko emphasized “even just once”). He added, however, that this was conditional upon satisfactory resolution of the cruise missile and Backfire issues, as well as the other major items in this context. This was precisely what Gromyko had told Kissinger in Geneva,⁶ and Kissinger had appeared to have been interested. In fact, he had said that this presented a major concession on the part of the Soviet Union, one that would be duly appreciated. Unfortunately, the Soviets had yet to see the day when this concession was taken into account. Gromyko would say something to the Secretary that he had also said to Kissinger: it was not an easy matter for the Soviet side to go along with such a definition of MIRVed ICBMs, because there was a great difference between testing a missile once or 100 times. Still the Soviet leadership had decided to go along with this and to regard each missile which had been tested just once with MIRVs as falling within the 1320 aggregate.

Gromyko turned to the Backfire bomber issue. If one were to formulate politically what the US had proposed, he would say that the US wanted to give the Soviets something that did not belong to the US in the first place. In elaborating the deferral proposal the Secretary had said that the US was prepared not to discuss the Backfire at all provided, etc.

Secretary Vance remarked that the Backfire constituted a serious problem.

Gromyko said that Soviet side viewed this quite differently. He had been present in Helsinki when General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford had a conversation. He thought Kissinger had been there too. Brezhnev had asked President Ford who it was in the United States that kept giving the President deliberately falsified characteristics regarding the Backfire. Moreover, when Kissinger had been in Moscow in January 1976, Brezhnev had given him some data regarding this bomber, that is official data characterizing various parameters, particularly range.⁷ Brezhnev had at that time said that he was presenting the data on an official basis, and that Kissinger could so refer to them in this record. Gromyko could clearly state that the Soviet Union had no intention of using the Backfire as a strategic bomber. It certainly must have taken a great deal of inventiveness to come up with the reaction that the US had come up with. The Soviet side was now told that the Backfire had in-air refueling capabilities and, therefore, could reach the territory of the United States, although it might have to refuel more than once. Well, in that case all American Phantoms and other planes could also be regarded as strategic weapons. This single counter-argument alone makes present US arguments completely untenable. And yet, the US position has remained unchanged. Was the new Administration trying to uphold the honor of those who had misinformed it in the first place? If someone had given the US Government information to the effect that the Backfire bomber was a strategic bomber, he was completely mistaken. The Soviet Union certainly denied that the Backfire bomber was a strategic weapon. It had no strategic capabilities, nor did the Soviet Union intend to give it strategic capabilities. On more than one occasion the US side had been informed that the Backfire was a medium range bomber. This fact was also well-known to the US side. The fact that this question had been raised again was, in the Soviet view, simply the result of the unwillingness of the United States to move forward in the strategic arms negotiations toward a successful outcome. Repetition of incorrect facts even 100 or 1000 times would not change the situation one iota. Therefore, it was now necessary to do away with this issue once and for all, and to remove it from the agenda. (Gromyko emphasized “once and for all”).

Gromyko now turned to the question of mobile missiles, in part because Secretary Vance had raised it, and in part quite independently. In July 1975 the Soviet side had proposed that the sides refrain from the deployment of mobile missiles for the term of the new agreement. This was intended to apply to mobile land-based ICBM launchers as well as to ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km on all aerial systems except heavy bombers, and on all sea-based systems except ballistic missiles on submarines. The Soviet Union was prepared to consider the US proposal on mobile ICBM’s, but Gromyko would say in advance that he would categorically object to discussing this ban in the context of the missile complex which the US side called SS–20. The SS–20 complex was not a strategic one. It had been developed and was being deployed to carry out missions of medium range and to replace other systems. A problem could arise in the view of the US side as to the difference between the SS–16 ICBM launchers and the SS–20 MRBM launchers. Gromyko would tell the Secretary at once that SS–16’s were not being deployed, and that the Soviet Union did not intend to deploy them provided, of course, that a new strategic arms limitation agreement was achieved. Gromyko wanted to put the Secretary’s mind at ease; the question of the difference between SS–16’s and SS–20’s should not arise at all.

Gromyko said that he now wanted to turn to another issue which was of exceptional importance. This was the requirement that the new agreement include provisions on non-transfer of strategic arms to third countries and non-circumvention of the agreement through third countries or in any other manner. Secretary Vance would certainly be well aware that the Soviet side attached a great importance to inclusion in the agreement of an obligation not to take any actions which would result in the provisions of the agreement being weakened or circumvented or reduced to zero through third states or in any other manner, and also an obligation not to transfer strategic offensive arms to third states.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union proceeded from the premise that for the duration of the new agreement the US side would not only not build up forward-based systems which, due to their geographic location were capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union, but would also take steps to reduce them. As far as Gromyko knew, and he would wish that he was mistaken, every time that this issue had been raised, US representatives would make no comment and would provide no indication of the possibility of solving the question in this way. He had to tell the Secretary quite frankly that the question did arise in the minds of the Soviet leadership, and that perhaps it should be reviewed in terms of including in the new SALT II agreement an obligation to that effect, that would be imposed on the US side. The Soviet leadership was now asking itself whether in proposing that the United States merely make a statement to the effect of not building up forward-based systems the Soviet Union had not asked too low a price.

Gromyko now wanted to say a few words on the subject of reduction of strategic offensive arms. Secretary Vance had mentioned it in his presentation. However, even if he had not mentioned it, the Soviet side had intended to present its position. The Soviet position on the reduction of strategic offensive arms was crystal clear. He could not say that during the talks in Vladivostok or immediately afterwards either side had suddenly seen in a crystal ball how this question could be resolved in a way that would be acceptable to both sides. The Soviet Union was in favor of beginning discussions on the reduction of strategic offensive arms quite promptly after conclusion of the SALT II agreement; (he repeated “after conclusion of SALT II”). This position had been communicated to President Carter, to the Delegation in Geneva, and at meetings here in Moscow. The Soviet side had said that it would be possible to reduce the aggregate number of strategic weapon delivery vehicles on each side after entry into force of the SALT II Agreement and on condition that the SALT II Agreement resolved the cruise missile issue. The Soviet side had not completely precluded the possibility of discussing and realistically considering such reductions even before expiration of the Interim Agreement. Of course, this referred to reasonable and acceptable reductions, and not to such as might be announced for the sake of public opinion or a section of public opinion. It was quite obvious, however, that to reduce, and especially to establish sublimits for, numbers of landbased strategic ballistic missiles and sea-based strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, without taking into account strategic stability, would result in infringement of the principle of equality and equal security. Factors influencing stability included the difference in the geographical situation of the two sides. Gromyko doubted that anyone could deny this fact. The existence of US forward-based nuclear systems and of US aircraft carriers based near Soviet territory, the existence of nuclear arms in the hands of US allies, were other such factors. Gromyko would ask the Secretary not to assume that the Soviet side could ignore or overlook them. They were there and they caused concern. Gromyko said that both he and the Secretary were alive today, but they must know that in time other people would take their places. We had to provide for the future today. Therefore, the time would inevitably come when these questions would have to be taken up, especially in the light of the new proposals the US side had tabled today.

Secretary Vance said he had a few comments to offer. First on cruise missiles: He would note that cruise missiles were not included in the Vladivostok accord. He had read the record of the negotiations there and had also spoken to some people who had been present, including the former Secretary of State. As a result, he concluded that the question of cruise missiles was not included in the Vladivostok understanding; it had dealt with air-launched ballistic missiles only, which had also been referred to in the Communique. He also concluded that it was only after Vladivostok that the cruise missile issue had been raised. Nonetheless, we had taken care of Soviet concerns by including a ban on cruise missiles with a range of more than 2500 km in our comprehensive proposal. In addition, a part of the overall package we had proposed, and it was a package, took into account Soviet views on the Backfire bomber. The Backfire bomber represented a serious problem for the United States. Its range and bomb load were substantially greater than those of medium bombers. The Secretary wanted to assure Gromyko that the Backfire represented a most serious problem in the US. Therefore, what we had suggested in the package proposal represented a substantial move on our part. As for mobile missiles, there remained the question of how we could confirm the fact that SS–20 missiles could not be converted to intercontinental range by adding a third stage. On the question of non-circumvention and non-transfer to third countries, the Secretary understood that this was one of the remaining items to be resolved at SALT II negotiations. Other such items were the problems of MIRV verification and data base. Concerning our proposal to reduce the numbers of aggregates for both sides, the Secretary did not think that this was an infringement of the principle of equality and equal security. He intended to speak further on this subject at tomorrow’s meeting. He noted that Gromyko had raised the question of forward-based nuclear systems. He would point out that such systems were not an appropriate subject for negotiation within the SALT framework, any more than were Soviet IRMB’s or MRBM’s. These were all European weapons which had not been considered at SALT to date.

Gromyko said that if he were to comment on all of the comments the Secretary had made, he would probably be repeating himself in large measure. He did not want to lose time needlessly. There was no need for him to read the record in order to answer the question whether or not cruise missiles were singled out as an exception to the limitations provided for at Vladivostok⁸ for the simple reason that he had been present there and knew what had gone on. The discussions there were held in a very narrow composition with only President Ford and Secretary Kissinger on the US side, and Brezhnev and Gromyko plus Mr. Sukhodrev, the interpreter, on the Soviet side. Therefore, he would reaffirm the statement he had made a little while ago, i.e., that there was no basis for singling out cruise missiles in a separate category. In fact, we had two documents which had come out of that meeting, the two Aide-Memoires dated December 10, 1974, which had been exchanged between the US and the USSR and indicated that cruise missiles had not been singled out for an exception. Gromyko suggested that the meeting now be recessed until the following morning.

Secretary Vance agreed, but had one comment: The December 10, 1974 Aides-Memoire referred to air-to-surface missiles and not to cruise missiles.⁹ Such was his understanding on the basis of his conversation with the former Secretary of State.

Gromyko pointed out that former Secretary of State was not the only person who had been present at Vladivostok; others had been there too.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer; reviewed in draft by Hyland; approved by Twaddell on April 12. The meeting took place in the Kremlin. In Secto 3022 from Moscow, March 28, Vance summarized his meeting for Carter and Christopher. The telegram is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Hunter/Rentschler Trips/Visits File, Box 17, 3/25–4/2/77 Vance Trip to Moscow: 3/28–31/1977.
2. See Documents 12 and 14.
3. Attached but not printed is an undated document entitled “Comprehensive Proposal.” See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 157.
4. Attached but not printed is an undated document entitled “Deferral Proposal.” See ibid.
5. See footnote 4, Document 1.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 159.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 117.
8. For the memoranda of conversation from the Vladivostok meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 90–93.
9. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 97.