111. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
134109. Subject: Technical Penetration. Refs: Moscow 11770, Moscow 11786.2
1. Do not repeat not attempt to penetrate any barriers. We believe risks of such attempts outweigh potential gains.
2. In order to hold detailed discussions with other agencies we would like to leave all discovered equipment in place for additional 24 hours if post can devise means of protecting all devices which would not further alert Soviets. This would preclude barring Soviets from change room.
[Page 360]3. If such means cannot be devised all discovered equipment on our territory should be removed and secured with as much of the cabling on our territory as possible. Before cutting cables perform tests to detect DC voltages, audio or RF on cables as time permits before Soviets are additionally alerted. This has been cleared at policy level in Department but not with Ambassador Toon, who is unavailable.
4. Advise us of all actions taken by the close of business in Moscow on Friday.3
5. Please include comments on apparent usage of tunnel or equipment, i.e. any indications of frequent and recent use or disuse. Also indicate if possible use could be determined for three cables entering tunnel beyond bend, i.e. multiple pair cables suitable for microphone system, power cables, coax cables, etc.
6. Based on your actions we will further advise by the COB in Washington on Friday.
7. Assume you will take whatever measures are possible to preclude inadvertent publicity.
8. Would appreciate Embassy recommendation on protest.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 152, USSR: Technical Penetration of US Embassy in Moscow, 5–6/78. Secret; Niact Immediate. Sent via the SY Channel. Drafted by Maclyn Musser (A/SY/OPS/T); cleared by McCall and in substance by Shulman and Luers; approved by Musser.↩
- Telegram 11770 from Moscow, May 25, is Document 108. Telegram 11786 from Moscow, May 25, is Document 110.↩
- May 26.↩