Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

95. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 30, 1977

SUBJECT

• Human Rights

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President outlining a number of steps we might take in the human rights field.² At Tab A is a new version of the PD we worked on last summer.³ It now includes a directive to channel foreign assistance, insofar as possible (i.e., within the restrictions of statute and previous Presidential directives) to countries with a good record of observing human rights. The PD is included not because it contains so much new policy, but because I have come to believe that it is important to bureaucratic morale. The lack of a PD is more and more often cited as the reason for the lack of direction in our human rights programs. In short, there is a vague feeling in the bureaucracy that something is missing, and perhaps issuance of the PD will allow us to go on from here to fill in some of the other gaps.

The reason for all the delay in getting this package to you is that I have been struggling to find some answers to what I see as the major problems of our human rights policy. We have pursued the policy on many fronts. We have:

—taken innumerable diplomatic initiatives expressing concern over general conditions or specific offenses and encouraging specific improvements (prisoner releases, elections, etc.);

—pushed countries to accept visits by investigatory or observer teams from various international agencies;

—worked to strengthen the human rights machinery of both the UN and the OAS;

—made a fairly large number of general public statements on human rights, though only a very small number of country-specific statements;

—signed three international human rights treaties (though we have done nothing on ratification of any); and

—steadily pursued an honest review of implementation of the Helsinki Final Act at Belgrade.

But without any doubt, the major instrument of our human rights policy has been our foreign assistance programs—both bilateral and multilateral, and it is here that the major problems have arisen. Even without the present statutory requirements, foreign assistance—especially through the IFIs where our vote is often irrelevant—is a crude instrument for pursuing a human rights policy. The legislation adds many complicating factors, of which the worst are: defining what makes a “gross and consistent” violator of human rights; and, deciding when aid “serves the basic human needs” of the recipients.

Because of the Administration’s reluctance to judge any country (except perhaps Chile) a “gross and consistent violator”, there has been a consistent tension between our policy and Congressional expectations. This has fed Congress’ suspicions that, but for its pressure, the Administration would renege on its commitment to human rights. (I know this is hard to believe given the President’s deep personal commitment to this policy, but it is what the human rights advocates in Congress believe.)

Rather than make a sharp and clear determination that a small number of countries are “gross violators”, the Administration has turned instead to treating a large number of grey area countries as more or less under the requirements of the law prescribed for gross violators. This leads to an uneven policy, uncertain signals being sent out, and enormous dissension within the government. It also creates a huge workload, since a policy level group must review every loan and grant to each of more than 30 grey area countries.⁴ The group often finds itself debating whether building a particular road, for example, serves the basic human needs of the population (is the ability to get goods to market a basic human need?), or what fraction of a certain loan to Argentina is going to bring potable water to poor people in Buenos Aires versus what fraction will be spent on a computer system to improve billing. There are also more basic questions—is “basic human needs” the actual services (food, shelter, health care) or is it the money to buy those things? If it is the latter, then any loan which increases employment, or even contributes to long term economic development, would have to be considered to serve the basic human needs of the people.

In the absence of clear determinations or rigid criteria for ranking countries, we are inevitably led to comparisons of the countries in the grey area. But how can you usefully compare El Salvador to Romania, or Guinea to Korea? Counting instances of torture or numbers of political prisoners and executions quickly becomes ludicrous. Each country is so different in its culture, its internal and external threats, its economic status, its political traditions, its relations to the US, and its reaction to outside pressure, that the task is impossible to accomplish to anyone’s satisfaction. Finally there are questions we have not even begun to address, such as what compensating value should we place on good observance of economic rights (distribution of wealth particularly) in the same country where political rights are very poor—Korea, USSR, Iran, etc.

I have gone into this at such length because this is the aspect of our policy most visible (and sometimes most important) to other nations and most open to criticism. I can’t help feeling that until we solve these problems everything else is just tinkering at the margins.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memorandum at Tab 1 to the President.⁵

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 19, PD/NSC–30. Unclassified. Inderfurth initialed the memorandum. Brzezinski drew an arrow to Tuchman’s name on the first page of the memorandum.
2. Tab I, attached but not printed, is an undated draft memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter containing Brzezinski’s additions to the text. The final version is printed as Document 96.
3. Attached but not printed is an undated version of the draft PD. For additional information concerning the draft PD, see footnote 2, Document 76.
4. The list of countries for whom assistance has been reviewed at the policy level (there is a working group that reviews every loan) includes: Argentina; Benin; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Cameroon; Central African Empire; Chile; Costa Rica; Ethiopia; Guatemala; Guinea; Haiti; Honduras; Indonesia; Jamaica; Kenya; Korea; Laos; Lesotho; Liberia; Malaysia; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mexico; Nicaragua; Niger; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Romania; Rwanda; Senegal; Sudan; Tanzania; Togo; Upper Volta; Uruguay; Zaire. [Footnote in the original.]
5. Aaron added the following handwritten comment: “ZB—good points. Why can’t we decide who we want to support give them 80% of our aid and divide the rest among the grey area or give nothing to the 16 baddies? PD looks all right but might be stronger on aid reorientation for the good guys. DA.”