The Agency memorandum notes that although the opposition parties have the
requisite organization and will to organize a strong campaign, their
economic strength has been so undermined by government policy that
financial assistance of the scope requested is essential if they are to
campaign effectively. The Agency, stating that a substantial popular
vote for the opposition would demonstrate degradation of the UP government’s mandate, estimates that
anything in excess of a 55/45 percent split in favor of the opposition
would represent an opposition victory. It is difficult to predict with
accuracy the results in the Chamber or in the Senate of any particular
distribution of the popular vote; a 60/40 split in favor of the
opposition perhaps could maintain the present opposition majority, which
stands at 93 to 55 in the Chamber (there are two vacancies) and 32 to 18
in the Senate. A vote that would give the opposition a two-thirds
majority in both houses is extremely unlikely. All Chamber seats and
one-half of the Senate seats are to be contested. The opposition, as is
the UP, is campaigning as a
confederation; that is, the component parties are arranging to field an
agreed list of candidates so that their aggregate strength will be
reflected in the election results to the maximum measure.
The risks appear to be acceptable as far as disbursement to the parties
is concerned. [5½ lines not declassified]
That you support in Committee the proposal for financial support to the
Chilean opposition.
Attachment
Memorandum for the 40 Committee2
Washington, October 13, 1972.
SUBJECT
- Chile—Financial Support of Opposition Parties and Private
Sector in 4 March 1973 Congressional Elections
I. Summary
This memorandum proposes that [dollar amount not
declassified] be approved for the support of political
parties and private sector organizations opposed to the Popular
Unity (UP) coalition of President
Salvador Allende during
the period from 1 November 1972 to 4 March 1973, when the Chilean
congressional elections will take place. Funds previously approved
by the Committee for the four opposition parties and for emergency
assistance to [less than 1 line not
declassified] covered a period ending on 31 October
1972.
Budgets requested for the four opposition parties, which will
confront the UP as a single
political confederation, are as follows: [dollar
amount not declassified] for the Christian Democratic Party
(PDC); [dollar amount not declassified] for the National Party
(PN); [dollar
amount not declassified] for the Radical Party of the Left
(PIR); and, [dollar amount not declassified] for the Democratic Radical
Party (PDR). These budgets are
primarily for the campaign period (1 November 1972 to 4 March 1973),
but also provide for subsidy payments to each party [2 lines not declassified]. The budget
requested for the entire private sector is [2
lines not declassified]. Funds provided [less than 1 line not declassified] will be used for
specific activities in support of the overall campaign effort. A
contingency fund of [dollar amount not
declassified] is also included for unforeseen
emergencies.
The requested financial support is considered to be realistic in
terms of the critical importance of the elections and of opposition
needs and capabilities. Although the opposition parties have the
organization and the will to mount a strong election campaign, the
Allende government has
been so successful in undermining the economic strength of
individuals and groups which support the opposition that financial
assistance of the scope requested is essential if an effective
campaign is to be carried out. The attention of the Chilean nation
will be focused al
[Page 634]
most
exclusively on the elections in the coming months, since the vote
will determine whether or not the government has a popular mandate
to continue the implementation of its revolutionary program, or
whether opposition action to force a change in government policies
would have massive popular support.
[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]
This proposal has the concurrence of the Ambassador and the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
II. Political Background
Conditions in Chile continue to deteriorate. Rampant inflation,
economic shortages and outbursts of violence recently raised
political tensions so dramatically that rumors of an imminent
military coup were widely credited. President Allende publicly denounced the
existence of a “September Plan” to overthrow his government, blaming
foreign imperialism and the CIA,
and skillfully exploiting the Kennecott copper issue to mobilize
popular support for his government. The military, however, have
apparently accepted the forced retirement of General Alfredo Canales, who was generally
acknowledged to be the leader of the military coup plotters. If no
new crisis occurs before mid-October the attention of the nation
will thereafter be focused increasingly on the elections, which will
provide a concrete reading of public sentiment for or against the
government at its mid-term point. The extent of popular support
received by the government will determine whether the UP continues to try to implement its
revolutionary program legally. A substantial popular vote in favor
of the opposition would demonstrate that the government has lost the
popular mandate it received in the 1971 municipal election, when the
UP received 49.74% of the total
vote. If the government can in fact be proved to represent a
definite minority of the Chilean people, this would tend to
strengthen opposition determination to force a change in government
policies.
III. Electoral Background
On 4 March 1973 Chileans will elect all 150 members of the Chamber of
Deputies and 25 of the 50 members of the Senate. During the most
recent Congressional elections, held in 1969 during the Frei
administration, the opposition political parties obtained a majority
in both houses of Congress. Since Allende’s inauguration on 3 November 1970, Congress
has been the major obstacle to the UP’s efforts to impose an irreversible Marxist regime
in Chile, with the opposition parties making effective use of their
legislative control to harass the government and to block the
revolutionary reforms proposed by the UP.
During the municipal elections, held in April 1971 during the
“honeymoon period” which followed Allende’s inauguration, the UP parties received almost 50% of the total popular
vote. The opposition
[Page 635]
will
use the municipal election results as a base from which to draw
conclusions about the March 1973 results, since it is generally
assumed that UP popular support has
deteriorated since 1971. In short, the opposition will claim that
anything in excess of a 55/45% split of the popular vote in their
favor represents an opposition victory. The political and
psychological impact of the election will increase in direct
proportion to the magnitude of an opposition victory. A strong
electoral effort will be needed if the opposition is to attain the
roughly 60% of the vote which it will need to maintain its present
substantial Congressional majority. A few seats may be lost, but if
the opposition succeeds in approximating its present Congressional
strength, it will have proved that the UP represents a distinct minority of the
population.
The optimum opposition goal, which unfortunately appears to be out of
reach, would be for the opposition to obtain a two-thirds majority
in both houses of Congress (100 deputies and 34 senators). Such a
majority would enable the opposition parties to override
presidential vetoes of legislative bills and would theoretically
provide the necessary votes for a presidential impeachment. The
opposition parties would, however, have to obtain at least 65% of
the popular vote to acquire this two-thirds majority. They are
unlikely to achieve this goal, however, unless economic conditions
deteriorate even more dramatically. Since the Allende government will spare no
effort to insure that its working class electorate receives good
wages and adequate food supplies during the pre-election period,
even if government resources are exhausted in the process, it will
probably be able to maintain some semblance of economic stability
during the normally prosperous summer months ahead.
IV. Electoral Data
A. Chamber of Deputies
Following the 1969 election there has been considerable
party-switching. In the opposition, the PDC lost nine deputies to the Unitary Popular Action
Movement (MAPU) and to the
Organization of the Christian Left (OIC), groups which are now part of the UP coalition. In the UP, the Radical Party lost eleven
deputies to the PDR and to the
PIR which are now opposition
parties. The current alignment is 93 opposition deputies to 57
UP deputies. All deputy seats
will be contested in the March 1973 elections.
B. Senate
The Senate is now divided 32 to 18 in favor of the opposition
parties. Of the 25 Senatorial seats up for election, 16 are held by
the opposition and 9 by the UP.
[Page 636]
C. Party Confederations
A recent ruling by the Chilean Electoral Tribunal enables political
parties to form electoral confederations for the March 1973
elections. Both the UP and the
opposition have registered for confederation status, and thus are
eligible to present unified lists of candidates. The number of
candidates on each confederation list cannot exceed the number of
seats to be filled in each electoral district. Extensive meetings
have been held to select candidates for the confederation slates,
but neither the opposition nor the UP has completed this process. This is understandable
for the selection process is delicate both because of the competing
interests of the various parties and the personal ambitions of
incumbent and aspiring candidates. Although it is believed that the
opposition parties will be able to resolve their immediate problems
and to agree on a unified slate, individual party campaigns for
candidates will be conducted separately. The mechanics of the
Chilean electoral system tend to magnify inter-party differences,
even within the same confederation where parties still compete with
each other as well as with the rival confederation. This situation
will plague the UP confederation
campaign as well as the opposition. UP control of the government will probably enable the
UP to orchestrate its campaign
more effectively than the opposition. Similarly, the financial and
material resources available to the government will probably enable
the UP to overwhelm the opposition
if the latter does not obtain external support as proposed in this
paper.
D. Mechanics of the Election
Chile uses the D’Hondt proportional representation electoral system.
Each voter is permitted to vote for only one Deputy and one Senator.
According to the electoral regulations permitting political
confederations, the number of deputy and senate seats won by each
confederation will be based on the total number of votes each
confederation receives. Within each confederation, seats will then
be awarded to those candidates who receive the largest number of
votes in each district. Thus, while every vote for every candidate
counts for a confederation’s overall slate, each party will
obviously be maneuvering to insure maximum electoral benefits for
each of its own candidates. This electoral system creates rivalries
even within individual parties which have more than one candidate on
the confederation slate in a particular district, because they will
also be competing with each other. For this reason, Chilean
politicians tend to campaign individually, and as a result the
parties generally lack the organization and discipline which are
essential to an optimum campaign effort. The combination of the
confederation and D’Hondt system used in Chile also means that the
larger political parties will tend to gain at the expense of the
smaller ones.
[Page 637]
E. The Campaign
The opposition parties will differ in their campaign styles. The
PN can be expected to adopt the
strongest anti-government line, emphasizing its anti-Communism and
doctrinaire differences with the UP
program, while the PDC will
concentrate its attack on the government’s method of governing,
inefficiency, and failure to carry out its promises. Both opposition
Radical parties will focus on issues designed to induce further
defections from the original Radical Party’s clientele. In spite of
the divisive factors which will hinder opposition efforts to
organize a unified campaign, the opposition parties are making an
attempt to coordinate their activities. The opposition confederation
has established a joint electoral commission which has almost
completed the selection of candidates and which will meet regularly
to coordinate propaganda and to try to insure that none of the
parties sponsors legislation or makes public statements which are
objectionable to other members of the confederation.
F. The Role of the Private Sector
Private sector organizations have helped to create or to dramatize
issues which have damaged the prestige and popular support of the
Allende government. They
can help to mobilize popular support for the opposition
confederation and to insure a maximum voter turnout for the
opposition. Financial support to these organizations will also
assist them in defending what remains of private enterprise in Chile
for as long as possible. [5½ lines not
declassified]
G. Contingency Fund
Because of the extreme importance of these elections, a contingency
fund of [dollar amount not declassified] is
deemed desirable to handle emergencies. Expenditure of this
contingency fund would be subject to the approval of the
Ambassador.
V. Proposal
It is proposed that [dollar amount not
declassified] be approved for passage to four opposition
political parties and [number not
declassified] private sector organizations for the 4 March
1973 Congressional election campaign. In addition to the campaign
budgets, funds are also requested to permit financial subsidies to
the political parties in the immediate post-electoral period [less than 1 line not declassified] to keep
them viable while electoral results are being assessed and a future
course of action is being determined. The dollar costs shown in the
budgets, which are attached as annexes, are calculated on the basis
of the current black market rate of approximately 300 escudos to the
dollar.
[Page 638]
The funds requested are considered sufficient to provide each of the
four opposition parties with a sound basis for conducting an
effective campaign. These funds will be supplemented by money
obtained by these parties and the individual candidates through
their own fund-raising drives. A large portion of the funds expended
in political campaigns in Chile has traditionally been raised by the
individual candidates.
The four political parties differ in their approaches to providing
direct campaign assistance to individual candidates. The PDC is concentrating its campaign
appeal on broad target sectors such as neighborhood, labor and
campesino groups, and is allocating relatively few funds to specific
candidates. The PN has taken the
approach that candidates will receive materials and services from
the party rather than being provided with direct financial aid. The
PIR and PDR, which lack nationwide
organizational structures, allocate larger amounts of funds to their
individual candidates.
[4 lines not declassified] will be provided
for specific activities designed to undermine the popularity and
prestige of the government and to mobilize electoral support for the
opposition political confederation.
[Page 639]
A contingency fund, which will not be expended without the
Ambassador’s concurrence, is included for unforseen emergencies.
The following is a summary of the financial requirements of the
political parties and private sector organizations. [1 line not declassified]
|
Political Parties
|
|
[dollar amount not
declassified] |
|
PDC
|
[dollar amount not
declassified] |
|
|
PN
|
[dollar amount not
declassified] |
|
|
PIR
|
[dollar amount not
declassified] |
|
|
PDR
|
[dollar amount not
declassified] |
|
|
Private Sector
|
|
[dollar amount not
declassified] |
[less than 1 line
not
declassified] |
[dollar amount not
declassified] |
|
[less than 1 line not
declassified] |
[dollar amount not
declassified] |
|
[less than 1 line not
declassified] |
[dollar amount not
declassified] |
|
|
Contingency Fund
|
|
[dollar amount not
declassified] |
|
|
[dollar amount not
declassified] |
VI. Funding and Security
[3 paragraphs (47 lines) not declassified] All
the political parties and private sector organizations are
conducting fund-raising campaigns, and will intensify their
fund-raising efforts as election time draws near.
VII. Coordination
This proposal has the concurrence of the Ambassador and the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
VIII. Costs
The cost of this proposal is [dollar amount not
declassified]. These funds are not available within the
Agency budget and would have to come from the [less than 1 line not declassified].
IX. Recommendation
It is recommended that the 40 Committee approve the proposal as set
forth in Section V above, authorizing a total of [dollar amount not declassified] which consists of [dollar amount not declassified] for the
support of the PDC, PN, PIR and PDR; [dollar amount not declassified], [less than 1 line not declassified] and [dollar amount not declassified] as a
contingency fund.
[5 annexes (13 pages) not declassified]
