Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–16, Documents on Chile, 1969–1973

12. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State¹

Santiago, August 13, 1970, 1620Z.

3141. For Meyer from Korry. Ref: State 130820.

1. Many thanks for reftel which confirms our total agreement on all points. Hope you will understand why, despite my totally harmonious talks with Crimmins, I wished to have in writing your views so as to avoid my inadvertent risking of the very dangers we both perceive. (I am shamed by this admission of bureaucratic proclivity.)

2. In that connection, the Communist Party’s physical raid on the advertising agency that spearheads the anti-Communist anti-Allende propaganda campaign has bitterly disappointed the PCCh because of its failure to implicate the USG. Therefore it is possible if not probable that as they have often done, (you will recall the anti-Peace Corps campaign here) the Communists will fabricate documents. I intend to get word to Frei of this possibility, of my lack of real concern and of my expectation that he will see to it that this effort is discredited to the maximum extent by those resources he controls.

3. Re Phase Two, I would like to stress that if Phase One continues to be as effective as it is and that if other factors mesh, there will be no rpt no need for any Phase Two since Allende will not be a threat. The election results will determine our actions. Without knowing the results and without really knowing what Frei may be planning, we operate in a vacuum of speculation and theories in which I pump out thousands of words for contingencies without really having any confidence that the contingency will develop (prior or post inauguration) or that it will develop in any of the manners I hypothesize. But because the game may well begin Sept 5th, I hope you understand why I must continue to try to fashion possible models that may or may not be compatible with either the circumstances that prevail Sept 5th or with Washington today. Election Perspectives #5 in the typewriter now should be read in this context. My linkage of option 4 of NSSM study with Phase Two was an effort to knock down any serious contempla-tion of a Chilean military role after an Allende election while weighting the military as one of several factors in the Phase Two time frame.

4. I value your forebearance and trust it will continue to prevail.

Korry

1. Summary: Korry expressed that if Phase I—the 40 Committee’s program to channel covert funding to those forces opposing Allende in the 1970 election—continued to be effective there would be no need to implement Phase II of the program—inciting military intervention to prevent Allende’s Presidency—as Allende would not be elected.

   Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 1, Chile Chronology 1970. Secret; Roger Channel. Reference telegram 130820 to Santiago, dated August 12, is Document 51 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973.