Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

85. Memorandum From Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, September 25, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Verification Panel Meeting on PNEs, September 28, 1974

The purpose of this meeting is to prepare the U.S. approach to the PNE negotiations which are scheduled to begin in Moscow on October 7.

For a variety of verification, military, nonproliferation, and anti-TTB reasons, there is a fairly solid bureaucratic consensus against allowing PNEs above the TTB threshold of 150 KT. This consensus is reinforced by considerable congressional opposition to the TTB, based in large part on the belief that allowing PNEs above the threshold is a serious verification loophole and contrary to our nonproliferation interests. Unless the PNE agreement has tight verification constraints and either bans or stringently limits PNEs above the threshold, there will be serious difficulty in getting the TTB and the PNE agreement through the Senate. This difficulty will be compounded if the PNE agreement legitimizes PNEs for excavation purposes, since this would require eventual relaxation and amendment of the LTBT.

Thus, on both substantive and bureaucratic grounds, we should probably go into the PNE negotiations with a tough position. Congressional attitudes will create a difficult problem in balancing what we can negotiate with the Soviets against what will be acceptable on the Hill.

The principal basis for discussion at the meeting is an Issues Paper (Tab B) prepared by the Verification Panel working group. It has a good concise summary (starting at page iv of Tab B) which we recommend you read. Supplementing this paper is a USC paper on “Modification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty to Allow Peaceful Nuclear Explosions for Excavation Projects” (Tab C; the main conclusions of this paper are included in the Tab B paper). The working group paper at Tab B also reflects work done so far under NSSM 202 on nonproliferation.

I. MAJOR ISSUES

The following sections address:

—Alternative approaches to negotiating the PNE agreement called for by Article III of the TTB,

—The need to modify the LTBT if PNEs for excavation purposes were allowed in the PNE agreement, and

—The impact of PNEs on our nonproliferation policy.

In summary:

—Verification of PNEs separates into two sets of problems: (1) Those dealing with PNEs below as opposed to above the TTB threshold of 150 KT; and, (2) Those concerning contained PNEs (for underground applications such as gas stimulation) as opposed to excavation PNEs (for applications such as building canals).

—Below the 150 KT threshold, PNEs can be allowed with proper inspection provisions for excavation PNEs, but these excavation PNEs will be incompatible with the restrictions of the LTBT.

—Above 150 KT, [2 lines not declassified] a ban on these may be negotiable. For excavation PNEs, if the Soviets agree to use very low fission devices, [2 lines not declassified]. However:

• The on-site inspection provisions required are very onerous;

• There remains some possible long-run weapons benefit;

• Such excavation shots will violate the LTBT.

—We should say from the beginning of the PNE negotiations that PNE events which would violate the LTBT would of course not be permitted. We should leave it up to the Soviets to try to get the LTBT modified or to figure out how to do PNE excavations without violating the LTBT.

—U.S. and Soviet actions in terms of the PNE agreement and Article V of the NPT (on provision of PNE services to non-nuclear states) will make a relatively small contribution to our non-proliferation efforts. However, with our general non-proliferation strategy currently under review, we should not let our Article V position crystallize until we understand its role in the general strategy.

—The agenda for the PNE negotiations is uncertain, partly because of a close relationship with other bilateral talks with the Soviets (e.g., on radioactivity criteria for PNEs). We are sorting this out with the Soviets.

A. PNE Alternatives

The basic problem of allowing PNEs above the TTB threshold of 150 KT is that such PNEs fall in one of two troublesome categories:

—The first category is composed of PNE explosions fully contained underground. [2 lines not declassified]

—The second category consists of excavation PNEs, such as for building canals; these explosions necessarily leave radioactive debris on the surface of the earth and in the atmosphere. PNEs in this category are sometimes distinguishable from practical nuclear weapons, but only with onerous and costly on-site inspection which may prove impossible to negotiate. Furthermore, excavation PNEs either below or above 150 KT raise the difficult issue of revising the LTBT.

Because the two PNE categories—contained and excavation—pose quite different verification problems, they are treated in building-block form in the working group’s issues paper. This paper presents four approaches to handling PNEs (see pages 72–84 of Tab B for details):

1. Prohibit all PNEs.

2. Permit contained PNEs up to 100 KT or 150 KT; ban excavation PNEs.

3. Permit contained PNEs and excavation PNEs up to 150 KT.

4. Permit contained PNEs and very low fission excavation PNEs up to a threshold between 150 KT and 1 MT.

1. Prohibit all PNEs. This option is considered largely for the sake of completeness although it could have some tactical value in the PNE negotiations. An argument could be made that banning PNEs would strengthen the nonproliferation regime, remove a major obstacle to the comprehensive test ban the Soviets claim to be pushing, and eliminate a major verification difficulty in the TTBT. Furthermore, given the active Soviet PNE program and the moribund U.S. program, this option would be easy for us to accept. However, the negotiating history of the TTBT, the implied commitment of Article III that some PNEs will be permitted, and the Soviet interest in PNEs make this option an unattractive one except for bargaining purposes. For example, we could put forth this option at the outset of the negotiations as an “illustrative” outcome. The British prefer this option both for substantive and tactical purposes (see our previous memorandum on UK views at Tab H).

2. Permit contained PNEs up to 100 KT or 150 KT; ban excavation PNEs. [6 lines not declassified] Thus, it is essential that the PNE agreement restrict contained PNEs to no more than the TTBT threshold of 150 KT. Beyond this, it would be desirable to further constrain contained PNEs to 100 KT to compensate for the additional verification uncertainties that arise in one-shot contained PNE applications off-site as opposed to the calibrated and repeated weapons tests at test sites. In any event, information exchange requirements would be greater than in the TTBT to compensate for those uncertainties (e.g., location, time, and expected yield of PNEs should be provided).

This option, at either 100 KT or 150 KT, would allow most or all contained PNE applications of interest to both sides. However, it would ban excavation PNEs—in which the Soviets have a great interest—and is undoubtedly non-negotiable.

3. Permit, in addition to contained PNEs, excavation PNEs up to 150 KT. This option is essentially what we tried to negotiate in Moscow. A 150 KT limit for excavation would increase the number of explosives and the costs for large-scale projects. For example, the Pechora-Kama Canal would require yields up to 400–600 KT for maximum efficiency. Also, increasing the number of explosives for each project means increasing the amount of radioactivity released into the atmosphere and beyond national borders in violation of the LTBT (this is discussed in more detail below). [2 lines not declassified] Thus, using more devices for a given job increases the LTBT problem.

Because the seismic yield measurement of an explosion depends greatly on the coupling of the device with the soil, it would be necessary to have on-site inspection to verify the depth-of-burial of the device. If the device were buried at very shallow depths, the seismic yield of a 300 KT device might be like that of one at 150 KT. [2 lines not declassified] On-site inspection would also be highly desirable to limit the possibility for weapons effects tests, for example, on missile silos or other military structures.

A limit of 1 MT per salvo of simultaneous PNE excavation shots would be prescribed [2 lines not declassified]. While not absolutely mandatory for verification reasons, it would be desirable under this option to require that excavation PNEs be very “clean” (this is discussed in detail in Alternative 4 below). This requirement would be verified by on-site inspection.

4. Permit, in addition to contained PNEs, very low fission excavation PNEs up to a threshold between 150 KT and 1 MT. In order to minimize radioactive contamination and fallout, excavation PNEs are especially designed to be very “clean”. [11 lines not declassified] This size and weight discrepancy would permit allowing clean excavation PNEs above the 150 KT threshold, without major risk of disguised weapon development, as long as the following conditions were applied:

a. [1 line not declassified]

b. On-site inspection is allowed to verify this fission yield by radiochemistry sampling (molten rock, with trapped radioactivity, would be collected in the field and analyzed in a laboratory back home).

c. A limit of 1 MT per explosion and 3 MT per salvo were applied to limit their military utility yet allow almost all practical excavation applications (in practice, we would try to negotiate lower levels for added assurance and greater political acceptability).

d. On-site inspection is allowed also to assure the validity of seismic yields by verifying the depth-of-burial.

Even with these conditions, which would be difficult to negotiate and onerous and costly to implement (some $200,000 inspection costs per event; $5–10 million for the Pechora-Kama Canal project), excavation PNEs would permit the obtaining of data on very clean, high yield explosions which could in the long term have relevance to weapons design technology. Unless the U.S. pursued a PNE excavation program, this might become a significant real or imagined asymmetry. For example, it would cater to those who argue the reality of surgical removal of Minuteman. The “clean” weapons would be used to minimize fallout fatalities and reduce the risk of U.S. retaliation.

B. LTBT Issues

Allowing excavation PNEs raises the issue of amending the LTBT, which could be the most difficult issue in the PNE negotiations. The LTBT (Tab E) prohibits radioactivity debris from crossing beyond national boundaries and applies to any underground nuclear explosions. Any large-scale excavation project—such as the Pechora-Kama Canal—will certainly violate this provision of the LTBT even under the Soviet interpretation, which is somewhat more lax than ours (the Soviets assume that a violation arises only if solid radioactivity crosses national boundaries whereas we consider gaseous radioactivity sufficient to constitute a violation). For this reason, the Soviets have over the past five years engaged us in technical talks aimed at getting up technical criteria for “safe” radioactivity levels resulting from excavation projects. These talks are scheduled to resume in November. Technical solutions (setting maximum radioactivity release limits) are in sight but opening up the LTBT to amendment or reinterpretation is a political can of worms. Internationally, many countries are likely to insist that any relaxation of the LTBT be tied to agreement on a CTB. (A majority of the 105 LTBT parties must agree to any amendment. It is conceivable but very difficult politically to “reinterpret” the LTBT to allow PNE excavations.) Domestically, opposition to TTBT ratification would increase if the Senate was asked at the same time to relax the LTBT standards—or even perceived the future necessity of doing so—something which at least in the short term would benefit only the Soviets.

The working group, drawing in part from the Under Secretaries Committee study at Tab C, has come up with the following four LTBT alternatives (see pp. 85–91 of Tab B for details):

1. Reject modification of the LTBT. This option is consistent with a U.S. approach which prohibited excavation PNEs in the PNE agreement, an approach which is advantageous but non-negotiable. It is also a no-cost option in terms of the U.S. PNE program, as we have no plans for PNE excavations. ACDA favors this option largely on the grounds that the Senate would reject any amendment in the LTBT.

2. Agree to consider modification of the LTBT to permit PNE excavation projects. Such agreement would be a valuable bargaining chip in the PNE agreement and might be traded for the verification provisions we require. However, agreeing to consider modification of the LTBT might not be enough for the Soviets. They would likely want a firm commitment of U.S. support for an amendment to the LTBT, for which the U.S. has a veto. Either approach is likely to stir environmental concerns in the U.S. and strengthen opposition to the TTB.

3. Formally reserve our position on a course of action at this time. This approach allows the PNE negotiations to proceed to deal with excavation applications yet avoids coming to grips with the LTBT issue and reserves our veto to an LTBT amendment. It might encourage the Soviets to be very forthcoming on verification to move us off this position and onto either option 2 or 4. On the other hand, it might stalemate the PNE negotiations.

4. Adopt a neutral position on LTBT modification but refrain from objecting if the Soviets desire to seek formal amendment of the treaty. This option would give up the U.S. veto but would place on the Soviets the difficult task of pursuing an amendment of the LTBT. We have nothing to gain from getting out in front of the LTBT amendment issue. However, we would probably end up having to justify this quasi-support, thus raising environmental and congressional opposition to the TTBT and to the LTBT amendment. The AEC favors this option, probably because it tends to commit us to modifying the LTBT.

It is likely that the Soviets will want to avoid bringing up the LTBT in the PNE negotiations (Morokhov recently told Gerry Tape that they will not bring it up). They will want to reach agreement on allowing excavation PNEs in the PNE pact, thus logically committing us to pursuing a follow-on LTBT amendment to allow excavation PNEs in the LTBT regime. Therefore, we will want to bring up the LTBT issue early in the PNE negotiations, saying that any PNE events which would violate the LTBT would of course not be permitted. We should leave it up to the Soviets to try to get the LTBT modified or to figure out how to do PNE excavations without violating the LTBT.

C. Proliferation Issues

In addition to Article III of the TTB, the Soviets also wish to discuss in October implementation of Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Tab F). Article V provides that nuclear weapons states which develop economic PNE applications will make them available on a nondiscriminatory basis and at the lowest possible price to non-nuclear weapons states. We are not at that stage of development and may never be in light of our current small R&D program on PNEs.

The Soviet view is that taking steps to implement Article V will enhance nonproliferation by removing any excuse for development of an indigenous “PNE device” on the Indian model. Another unspoken Soviet interest in moving on Article V is that they will be able to gain international prestige by providing PNE services to underdeveloped countries. The Soviets probably believe also that international endorsement of PNEs in an Article V arrangement would legitimize their own PNE program in light of Limited Test Ban and nonproliferation concerns. The interagency people who work on the NPT generally discount the Soviets’ nonproliferation argument and, in fact, feel that any progress in Article V may not only legitimize the Soviet PNE program but also PNEs in general, thus opening the way for other countries to go the Indian route.

We believe that the arguments of both the Soviets and our own nonproliferation specialists are overstated. The political and security factors entering into the decision of a country such as India to develop a nuclear explosive device far outweigh the effect of anything the U.S. and USSR might say or do about PNEs. India has used the PNE cover as a rationalization, and other countries might use the same public pretext for their own nuclear programs. But, while this cannot be discounted completely, U.S. and Soviet actions in terms of Article III of the TTB and Article V of the NPT will make a relatively small real contribution to nonproliferation.

In economic terms, PNEs appear expendable. They would save the world tens of billions of dollars, rather than hundreds, over the foreseeable future compared to conventional methods.

The working group paper identifies four alternative approaches we might take to Article V at the October 1 talks (see pp. 92–94 at Tab B for details):

—Encourage and provide for the use of PNE services and promote an international mechanism for providing such services.

—Actively discourage other states from seeking any PNE assistance.

—Neither encourage nor actively discourage: both the U.S. and USSR to continue the status quo and continue their dialogue on this issue.

—Increase efforts to explore the potential utility as well as the practical limits of PNE applications, with a view toward reexamining the question of providing PNE services.

Apart from the hypothetical non-proliferation argument, the U.S. has no marked interest in the implementation of Article V. We have no domestic PNE applications to export. We could not get into export of PNE services without a substantial renewed PNE development program, for which there would be little domestic support. The Soviets, on the other hand, hope to have practical economic applications in hand in the near future. Thus, it makes sense for us to look at the Soviet interest in Article V in terms of bargaining leverage. We can trade off our willingness to take steps in the direction of Article V implementation for stricter verification provisions in the Article III PNE agreement. We should, however, play this card carefully and start off with a reserved and agnostic position on the Article V issue. However, with our general nonproliferation strategy currently under review, we should not let our Article V position crystallize until we understand its role in the general strategy.

II. CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES

There has been a considerable amount of adverse congressional comment on the threshold test ban. Many on the Hill feel that the agreement is questionable as an arms control measure, maintaining that the threshold is too high, the March 31, 1976 date is unjustified, and the PNE provision is a serious loophole. A follow-on PNE agreement which had unsatisfactory verification provisions and was felt to affect nonproliferation and the Limited Test Ban Treaty adversely would fuel opposition to the TTB. On the other hand, a PNE agreement with tight verification and some restriction on the size or numbers of large explosions could improve the prospects for ratification by closing the PNE loophole. We may be able to use this congressional problem to argue with the Soviets for a “tight” PNE agreement. In any event, congressional attitudes will create a difficult problem in balancing what we can negotiate with the Soviets against what will be acceptable on the Hill.

III. AGENCY VIEWS

AEC has generally taken a forthcoming attitude toward a PNE agreement, principally because they hope it will revive the U.S. PNE program. They have, for example, taken a leading role on the possibility of verifying that high-yield, low-fission PNE devices are not weapons-related. They have argued strongly, however, that the U.S. must be at least as active in PNEs as the Soviets, so that any R&D benefits with a possible security impact will be available to us as well as to the Soviets. Within AEC, there is considerable opposition to the pro-PNE view, with some officials hoping that a strong stance against PNEs will permanently sidetrack the TTB.

DOD has a much more reserved position on PNEs and has sharply damped AEC’s original enthusiasm. DOD is concerned that weapons-related information can be derived from a PNE program and argues that security interests dictate as restrictive a PNE regime as possible. DOD staff, however, is willing to support a PNE agreement having a 150 KT threshold for both contained and cratering explosions.

ACDA is strongly opposed to PNEs. They argue that the widespread use of PNEs and any effort to modify the LTBT fallout standards to permit cratering shots would have an adverse effect on nonproliferation. Moreover, there is some skepticism in ACDA regarding the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and consequently a view that we should take few risks to get it ratified. ACDA believes that a tough U.S. position would succeed because the Soviet Government is not unified behind Morokhov’s pro-PNE posture.

The State bureaucracy is willing to take a fairly forthcoming attitude in the negotiations but recognizes that as a practical matter the PNE agreement will have to be fairly restrictive for congressional reasons.

[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

IV. NEGOTIATING ASPECTS

For now, it will probably be unnecessary to finally resolve the agency differences, since we should take a fairly restrictive initial position with the Soviets. The Soviets will be arguing for minimum constraints on PNEs, minimum verification, U.S. support for implementation of Article V of the NPT and (at some stage in the negotiations) U.S. support for an LTBT revision. As we have pointed out, tight verification and some restrictions on PNE yield will be essential to get the PNE agreement and TTB treaty through Congress. On the other hand, depending on the outcome of our current review of the U.S. nonproliferation strategy, we may have some give on Article V implementation. It will be much more difficult to move on the LTBT, for both international and congressional reasons, but at some point in the negotiations we could perhaps offer the Soviets some degree of cooperation in making an effort on LTBT revision.

As an initial position for the October talks, we see two alternatives:

—A restrictive proposal, say 150-kiloton limits on both contained and cratering shots, intrusive verification including observers with appropriate instrumentation, and the position that NPT Article V and LTBT matters should be set aside without prejudice until the Article III PNE agreement has been worked out. This position would give us considerable leeway with the Soviets and enjoy a broad consensus in Washington. Moreover, it would answer the argument that the Soviets are prepared to take the action away from Morokhov and be reasonable on PNEs if the U.S. will simply put some pressure on.

—Alternatively, we could take an exploratory approach in Moscow. We would tell the Soviets that we see considerable technical problems with the PNE agreement and feel these should be explored at the technical level before we discussed any proposals. We would then move toward formulating a proposal based on the outcome of the technical talks. (This is basically the approach we took at the beginning of the TTB negotiations.) This approach would also be supported by the Washington agencies. At most, however, it would be a holding action in the hopes that the Soviets would come up with a specific proposal as they did at the TTB talks in June. However, if the Soviets had no proposal to make, the talks would quickly bog down in sterile statement reading. Moreover, we might lose some flexibility if the Soviets table a proposal first.

Of the two approaches, we prefer a specific proposal early in the talks. An illustrative NSDM along these lines is at Tab G.

You have agreed with Dobrynin that Stoessel would head the U.S. side. The cable at Tab I names the U.S. delegation, which has been kept small and technically competent.

V. AGENDA OF TALKS

Based on communications with the Soviets here and in Moscow, we have been working for some time on the basis that the talks would embrace Article III of the TTB and Article V of the NPT. Vorontsov introduced a note of confusion last Thursday when he read Armitage an agenda including the uses of PNEs, radioactivity standards, and IAEA safety criteria for PNEs. Vorontsov’s subjects would be more appropriate for the bilateral technical talks on IAEA radiation standards which are tentatively scheduled for November.

We are not sure what the Soviet motive was in submitting the new agenda. Vorontsov could simply have been confused between the October Article III/Article V talks and the possible radioactivity talks in November. A second possibility is that the Soviet authorities have been working on a genuine assumption that Article V subjects would include technical aspects of radioactivity standards. There has been some ambiguity in our exchanges on this which could support a misunderstanding. Finally, the Soviets could be deliberately attempting to skew the October agenda so that we will talk about their interest in relaxed radiation standards for PNEs before they discuss our verification concerns under Article III of the TTB. Regardless of which of these interpretations is right, we should for now stick to our proposed agenda. Accordingly, State gave the Soviets a note last Friday (Tab J) reiterating our understanding that Article III and Article V will be the subjects of the October talks.

VI. CONDUCT OF THE MEETING

You should start the meeting by asking Carl Duckett to give a brief rundown of the Soviet PNE program. You should then review briefly the issues and ask for agency views. Talking points along these lines are at Tab A. Unless some major new issue comes up at the meeting, we see no need for additional verification panel work between now and the NSC meeting, assuming you still want an NSC meeting on this topic. The interagency working paper will give the Delegation sufficient background material.

David Elliott and Bill Hyland concur.

Your book is organized as follows:

Tab A—Talking Points

Tab B—VP Working Group Paper on PNE Issues

Tab C—USC Paper on Modification of the LTBT to Allow PNE Excavation Projects

Tab D—TTBT and Protocol

Tab E—LTBT

Tab F—NPT Article V (on PNE services)

Tab G—Illustrative NSDM

Tab H—UK Views on the PNE Agreement

Tab I—Composition of the U.S. Delegation

Tab J—U.S. Note of 9/20/74 on Agenda for October PNE Talks

1. Summary: Lodal and Sonnenfeldt provided Kissinger with an overview of subjects to be discussed at the Verification Panel meeting on peaceful nuclear explosions scheduled for September 28.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—Meetings, Box 1, Verification Panel Meeting, 9/28/74—Test Ban (1). Secret; Completely Outside the System. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. Tabs A–J were not attached; Tab C is Document 82.