Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

86. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, September 28, 1974, 10:10–10:50 a.m.

Verification Panel

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

Kissinger: Carl (Duckett), what do you have for us?

Duckett: I thought I might refresh your memory on the Soviet peaceful uses tests. (Using chart “Soviet Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions”) We have identified [number not declassified] tests in this category and that is not necessarily a complete list. [2 lines not declassified]

The largest yield has been [less than 1 line not declassified] and was probably an attempt to create a new storage area or to stimulate the flow of oil or gas.

Kissinger: How do they do that?

Duckett: They break up the shale and create new cavities for the oil or gas to enter. They can also use it to seal off a leak or to put out a fire. The largest in the latter category was about [less than 1 line not declassified]. Since mid-1972 all their tests have been in cavity stimulation. Their experiments with cratering explosions apparently were finished at that time. Cratering is important to the Soviets because of the Pechora-Kama Canal project. A [less than 1 line not declassified] explosion would be required for the canal and, if they fired in salvo, it could mean as much as [less than 1 line not declassified].

Kissinger: I’ve looked at the working group papers and there are some problems on our nonproliferation preferences, including the strong views of some of the agencies, and our negotiating record. We cannot overturn what the President and Brezhnev agreed to in June.

Iklé: What did they agree to?

Kissinger: Let’s not be disingenuous. They agreed that we would negotiate concerning tests over 150KT to determine whether with on-site inspection and other provisions it was possible to distinguish PNEs from weapons tests. We may conclude it is impossible, but that is different from saying that it is undesirable. They agreed that we would look at the validity of on-site inspection. This was not a secret negotiation. At the lower KT yield, the problem was less severe. The main problem was the site. We would have to have adequate verification at the sites.

Stoessel: And some exchange of information.

Kissinger: Yes. Above 150 KT, the Soviets agreed to on-site inspection but this was not defined. We said we would look at the above 150 KT problem to see how it could be reconciled with the Threshold Test Ban. We cannot now say that, on nonproliferation grounds, we are overthrowing that understanding. We can negotiate on the relationship of this to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. We have no obligation to overthrow the LTBT. It’s hard to think of uses of above 150 KT in relation to the LTB but that’s a Soviet problem. We have no obligation to let them use the TTB to abrogate the LTBT. I’m not saying we should modify our position so as to change the LTBT. We have no interest in having the Soviets testing above 150 KT. But we have to make a serious effort to see if we can devise criteria to identify peaceful uses above 150 KT.

Iklé: Only underground?

Kissinger: Only underground. We have never discussed this in any other context.

1. Summary: The participants discussed the upcoming U.S.-Soviet talks on peaceful nuclear explosions.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—Meetings, Box 22, Meeting Minutes—Verification Panel (Notes) (3). No classification marking. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. There is no indication as to the drafter of the minutes or meeting location. The chart, “Soviet Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions,” is attached but not published.