Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

82. Report Prepared by an Interagency Study Group of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee¹

Washington, September 13, 1974.

MODIFICATION OF THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY TO ALLOW PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR EXCAVATION PROJECTS²

In response to the President’s request of September 7, 1974 this report has been prepared to supplement related studies concerning negotiation with the Soviet Union of the agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) contemplated by the July 3 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), and concerning our nonproliferation strategy. As discussed below, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) has a bearing on both of these related issues.

The present report reviews:

—the basic U.S. interests in the LTBT;

—the relationship of the LTBT to PNEs and to U.S. and Soviet PNE interests;

—the interaction of modification of the LTBT with other U.S. interests;

—Possible modes of modifying the LTBT;

—The prospect of international, congressional and public acceptance of LTBT modification; and

—Major alternatives.

U.S. Interests in the LTBT

As the first major arms control measure achieved following the Second World War, the LTBT remains a benchmark in the history of efforts to deal with the major security questions raised by the development of nuclear weapons. Originally negotiated and signed by the U.S., Soviet Union, and UK, the LTBT marked one of the initial steps in political efforts to improve East-West relations. From this standpoint, it was a forerunner of present efforts to achieve détente.

From the outset, it was recognized that the LTBT would not prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but it was envisaged that the LTBT would serve our interest in nonproliferation. A number of countries—including India, Israel, Egypt, Brazil, Spain, and South Africa—are parties to the LTBT but not the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While India’s nuclear test confirms the limitations of the LTBT in curbing proliferation, we have a continuing interest in maintaining the restraints imposed by the LTBT on countries which would otherwise be subject to no agreed restraints.

The fact that the U.S. and Soviet Union had halted atmospheric testing facilitated the subsequent conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a treaty which has been—and continues to be—considered an “unequal treaty” by a number of countries.

When the LTBT was signed, there was substantial public concern here and abroad about the effects of radioactive fallout. The LTBT was in part a response to that situation and remains important at a time when concern about many environmental problems has grown significantly in the U.S. and internationally.

The number of parties to the LTBT has grown from the original three to 104, the largest number of adherents to any arms control agreement.

We have no current PNE plans which would require modification of the LTBT. However, the question of whether we should consider modification of the LTBT has now arisen as a factor in bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations and in developing our nonproliferation strategy, in particular with respect to the 1975 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference.

Relationship of LTBT to PNEs

The LTBT bans the conduct of any peaceful nuclear explosion—as well as any nuclear weapons test—“if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction and control such explosion is conducted.”

In explaining the potential effects of the LTBT on PNEs during Senate hearings on ratification of the treaty, spokesmen for the then—Administration, in particular Dr. Seaborg, expressed the following views:

—that the treaty would not preclude PNEs whose effects could be contained underground;

—that some efforts looking toward development of PNE excavation techniques could be pursued; and

—that if large-scale excavation projects proved feasible, an amendment to the treaty would presumably be sought.

Similar views were subsequently expressed during ratification hearings on the NPT.

Respecting Art. V of the NPT, which contemplates provision of PNE services to non-nuclear weapons states, Dr. Seaborg said that excavation projects “could not be executed within the present restrictions of the limited test ban treaty as presently interpreted; modification would be required to permit the United States to provide the nuclear explosion service for such projects.”

However, there were some departures from the main policy lines established during the hearings on both treaties:

—During the LTBT hearings and 1968 NPT hearings, Secretary Rusk, in response to questions, envisaged some situations in which PNE excavation projects might either not be regarded as serious violations or might proceed despite LTBT limitations. In both cases he stressed the need for being satisfied that legitimate peaceful purposes were served.

—During the 1969 NPT hearings, Dr. Seaborg, while rejecting the idea of proceeding in violation of the LTBT, spoke of the possibility of interpreting rather than amending the treaty.³

In the hearings on the LTBT, Dr. Seaborg indicated that a detectability standard would apply in determining whether an underground explosion resulted in a violation of the Treaty. He said:

“The Treaty would prohibit a test which resulted in a quantity of radioactive debris delivered outside of the country’s territorial limits in amounts sufficient to establish that such contamination resulted from a recent test within that country.”

In the period 1965–1968 (in support of the study of a new Atlantic-Pacific interoceanic canal) several small U.S. PNE excavation experiments were authorized and conducted notwithstanding a risk that we could be charged with violating this criterion.⁴

The most serious Soviet infraction of the LTBT detectability standard was in 1965 in connection with a PNE excavation project.

The U.S. PNE Program

The U.S. PNE program has not recently stressed PNEs for excavation purposes. We have not conducted any excavation tests since 1968.

A relatively “clean” device—intended to minimize radioactive debris problems associated with excavation PNEs—has been tested at a yield of 100 KT; however, additional development and testing would be required to perfect a device of the yield required (1 MT) in certain types of excavation projects.

Even in the absence of the constraints imposed by the LTBT, it is likely that environmental concerns would preclude domestic PNE excavation projects under foreseeable circumstances.

Emergence of the LTBT Modification Issue

Since the mid-1960s the Soviet Union has displayed—and continues to display—greater interest in PNEs, in particular excavation PNEs, than the U.S. both in conducting its nuclear test program and seeking means of accommodating PNE excavation projects with the LTBT.

A major focus of present Soviet interest is the employment of PNEs to excavate a portion of the Pechora-Kama canal project. An initial test was conducted in 1971. There have been indications of Soviet interest in conducting further tests related to this project later this year or next year.

The overall project would require some 250 nuclear explosions ranging from 40 to 600 KT. Resulting radioactive fallout would be readily detectable in Japan and the PRC and at lower radiation levels in the U.S.⁵

The Soviet Union’s technical preparations for this project have been paralleled by efforts to develop a new status for PNE excavation projects.

Since 1969, the Soviet Union has sought to interest us in the possibility of modifying the LTBT in a manner which would permit excavation PNEs provided resulting radiations did not exceed some agreed level judged to be acceptable from the standpoint of health and safety.⁶

They have brought up the question of LTBT modification during bilateral technical talks on PNEs. We have declined to pursue this line of discussion. However, we have explored and reached mutual understanding concerning procedures for predicting radioactive fallout and radiation doses to populations. This understanding could provide a starting point for developing international criteria in connection with PNE excavations and LTBT modification if desired.

In the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the Soviet Union has called for consideration of health and safety aspects of PNEs, including the question of radioactivity from PNE excavation projects.

At this juncture, we are confronted with four meetings in which the question of modifying the LTBT to permit excavation PNEs (subject to radiation criteria) will be an implicit if not necessarily explicit factor:

—the October bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks in Moscow on a PNE agreement ancillary to the Threshold Test Ban agreement and on Art. V of the NPT;

—further bilateral talks on technical aspects of PNEs, including radioactivity from PNE excavation projects, which the Soviets have proposed be held in Moscow in November;

—initial multilateral discussions in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna on health and safety aspects of PNEs in January of 1975; and

—the NPT review conference in May 1975.

The farther we proceed with these discussions the more likely the Soviets are to believe we are prepared to modify the LTBT to permit PNE excavation projects.

Interaction With Other Issues

The question of modifying the LTBT interacts with other U.S. interests in addition to U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations:

Continued effectiveness of the LTBT as a barrier to further proliferation of nuclear weapons. India has described its own nuclear test as a “peaceful nuclear explosion” and has argued that the U.S.-Soviet TTB agreement supports its view that there is a distinction between nuclear weapon and PNE development.

Modification of the LTBT to permit PNE excavation projects would raise the question of whether nuclear testing by India or other LTBT parties might be facilitated under the guise of conducting experiments related to PNE excavation.

A related question is whether pressures against atmospheric testing by the PRC (and France) would be neutralized if PNE excavation projects by the Soviet Union, U.S., and presumptively the UK, were permitted.

Implementation of Art. V of the NPT. Art. V contemplates the provision of PNE services to non-nuclear weapons states. This as well as other aspects of the NPT will be considered at the NPT review conference in 1975.

In connection with the negotiation of this article we stated that: “. . . if and when peaceful applications of nuclear explosives which are permissible under the test ban treaty, prove technically and economically feasible, nuclear weapons states should make available to other states nuclear explosive services for peaceful applications.”

Modification of the LTBT to permit PNE excavations would permit us to offer such services if this were considered desirable from the standpoint of meeting our Art. V obligation.

The availability of such services might undercut the possible argument by non-nuclear weapons states that they must develop PNEs of their own.

On the other hand, for the U.S. and Soviet Union to place emphasis on excavation PNE’s might stimulate the belief that PNE excavation projects are exceedingly promising (as yet an unresolved question). A number of countries might then ask why they should depend on the U.S. and Soviet Union rather than undertake their own development of devices ostensibly for PNE purposes.⁷

Eventual conclusion of a comprehensive test ban (CTB). The verification difficulties presented by PNEs have represented one of the unanswered questions confronting achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

If we wished in the future to move toward a CTB and if the only acceptable way of accomplishing this was to prohibit PNEs as well as other nuclear explosions, then modification of the LTBT to permit excavation PNEs could well make achievement of a CTB more difficult.

On the other hand, if key states including the Soviet Union might in any event prove unprepared to forego PNEs in order to achieve a CTB, the question arises whether a better understanding of ways of handling PNE aspects of a CTB might evolve out of experience with verification arrangements related to PNE activities associated with the TTBT and out of further improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations. However, extensive consideration of verification problems associated with the TTBT and a CTB does not afford grounds for optimism.

Substance and Possible Modes of LTBT Modification

Modification of the LTBT to permit excavation PNEs would involve the following changes:

—recognition of PNE projects as being subject to different rules than nuclear weapons tests;

—establishment of health and safety criteria for conducting excavation PNEs.

Collateral to these changes could be the establishment of a mechanism, possibly within the IAEA which is already concerned with various technical (but not legal) aspects of PNEs, for reviewing proposed projects in advance to assure consistency with established criteria. Monitoring of projects to ensure conformity with criteria might be required. Even if these aspects and related problems (including verification) were resolved bilaterally by the U.S. and Soviet Union, an effort to obtain international support for LTBT modification could lead to a need for additional arrangements to satisfy concerns of other countries. Some of these might differ from any bilaterally agreed U.S.-Soviet arrangements arrived at pursuant either to an LTBT modification or in other contexts.

Possible approaches to effecting LTBT modification might include the following:

Amendment. Art. II of the LTBT provides for amendment after approval and ratification by a majority of the parties, including the three original parties (U.S., Soviet Union, and UK). (British views on LTBT modification are unknown. They have no PNE program of their own.) A conference must be held if one-third of the parties request it.

This procedure would provide the recognized means of effecting LTBT modification, and once in force, any dissenting parties could not challenge the legality of the new arrangements.⁸

The 1967 U.S. “Statement of Principles Relating to Nuclear Explosion Services” stated that: “There should be full consultation among nuclear and non-nuclear parties to the limited test-ban treaty about any amendment of that treaty required in order to carry out feasible projects.”

Other parties might employ the amendment procedure to advance interests of their own. In particular, they might seek a commitment to achievement of (and possibly a timetable for) a CTB.

The Art. II requirement for our agreement to any LTBT amendment would safeguard us from unwanted amendments. On the other hand, other parties could decline to accept amendments we favored unless a bargain was struck.

The amendment process would fully involve the Senate through the normal process of treaty ratification.

—Reinterpretation. Strictly speaking, the terms of the LTBT cannot be modified or altered by “reinterpretation”; interpretation by the parties can only be directed at resolving ambiguities or gaps in the original text.

To achieve a situation in which PNE excavation projects were regarded as permissible, it would be necessary to “reinterpret” the LTBT as permitting, in the case of such projects, the deposit beyond national boundaries of “reasonable” levels of radioactive debris consistent with health and safety standards. This would amount to such a substantial “reinterpretation” that it would be inconsistent with the specific language of the LTBT. Moreover, such “reinterpretation” would not afford a basis for distinguishing between nuclear weapons tests and PNE excavation projects.

There are no specific ground rules for accomplishing “reinterpretation”, but presumably it would be essential to obtain the agreement of as many of the important parties as possible. This could also lead to bargaining in which other parties might seek commitments, say, to achieve a CTB as the price of accepting the “reinterpretation.” Dissenting parties would not be bound by any “reinterpretation” with which they did not agree.

In general, it is not in our interest to establish precedents for such “reinterpretation” of treaties unilaterally or by a limited number of parties.

The “reinterpretation” approach could present special difficulties with the Senate if it were viewed as an effort to evade the formal ratification process (some technique such as seeking a “sense of the Senate” resolution might be weighed if “reinterpretation” were to be given serious consideration).

—Ad hoc exceptions. Conceivably we might proceed on an ad hoc basis, agreeing with the Soviets and other key parties from time to time to permit (or at least not to protest) specific non-contained excavation projects which served legitimate peaceful purposes and remained within tolerable limits as far as resulting radioactive debris was concerned. However, unless such a procedure were established through prior amendment of the LTBT, such actions would be in violation of the LTBT. Non-consenting parties could treat such actions as a breach of treaty obligations, possibly justifying their renunciation of the treaty or their resort to suit in the International Court of Justice.⁹

—Phased approach. It might also be possible to proceed on an interim basis through reinterpretation or ad hoc exceptions, while looking toward formal LTBT amendment, on the grounds, for example, that this might assist in securing data which might help in deciding whether a permanent change in the treaty should be sought. This course would be subject to the same legal challenges discussed above.

Factors Bearing on International Acceptability

We have very little basis at this time for judging the international acceptability of modification of the LTBT to permit PNE excavation projects. However, the following factors would influence the attitudes of other parties:

—Even if technically satisfactory radiation criteria could be developed, countries emotionally opposed to atmospheric nuclear weapons tests might well oppose permitting PNE excavation projects (we have no basis for judging whether such attitudes would be altered if the prospective number of such projects were limited).

—On the whole, the likelihood of acceptability would be substantially less if only one or a few countries were considered the beneficiaries of a change than if a number of countries, including developing countries, were viewed as potential beneficiaries. While several countries have expressed interest in PNE excavation projects, we have no measure of the seriousness of this interest, and no accurate measure of the full extent of eventual interest.¹⁰ In this regard, as examination of possible health, safety, environmental, and other effects of PNE excavation projects proceeds in the IAEA, a diminution of interest on the part of some countries could occur.

—If modification of the LTBT were viewed as being solely or primarily an outcome of bilateral U.S.-Soviet TTBT/PNE agreements, widespread international acceptance would be improbable.

The foregoing generalizations do not seek to take into account the ability of the U.S. or Soviet Union to persuade particular countries to accept modification of the LTBT.

Congressional Attitudes

Against the background of hearings on the LTBT and NPT, the debate concerning détente, and concerns respecting further proliferation of nuclear weapons, there is a virtual certainty that the Senate—in considering the TTBT and the related PNE agreement—will wish to explore implications for the LTBT. Unless and until this aspect is satisfactorily clarified, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee might defer action.¹¹

As noted above in considering various approaches to modification, the Senate would clearly expect to have its say concerning LTBT modification.

As to the substance of the issue, the following generalizations appear relevant:

—A proposed modification believed likely to weaken essential purposes of the LTBT (as regards testing of nuclear weapons, limitation of radiation hazards, and nonproliferation) would not be accepted.

—A proposed modification believed to be of greater benefit to the Soviet Union than the U.S. would also probably not be accepted unless “benefits” for the U.S. were viewed in terms broader than PNEs.

—A proposed modification justified on the basis of nonproliferation objectives (for example, meeting Art. V obligations) might have a better chance of being accepted than a modification proposed as an important component of U.S.-Soviet relations. However, such a justification would be subject to substantial skepticism.

The foregoing generalizations do not seek to take into account the effects of pressures from domestic environmental groups, arms control groups, or anti-détente groups.

Environmental Legislation

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires that an environmental impact statement be prepared prior to any “major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” Such statements must analyze in detail the potential environmental effects of the proposed action and of all reasonable alternatives. In the past, failures to comply with the Act have often resulted in the granting of injunctions by federal courts against carrying out the federal actions in question.

The procedures of the Act have been applied to the negotiation and conclusion of a number of international agreements, and several impact statements have been prepared by federal agencies in connection with international negotiations, primarily those involving agreements on environmental standards. No real question has been raised under NEPA on any arms control negotiation since the passage of the Act, presumably because of the very inchoate and indirect relationship of those negotiations to the environment.

However, there would undoubtedly be great interest among public environmental groups in any proposal to modify the LTBT, in effect, to establish new minimum permissible levels of radioactive discharge outside a country’s territorial borders for nuclear excavation projects and there might be great public and congressional pressure to produce an environmental impact statement on the subject. This might, for example, involve the preparation of a draft statement prior to the final stage of any negotiations and a revised final statement prior to submission of the resulting agreement or amendment to the Senate.

Environmental groups might attempt to resort to the courts on any disputes in this area.

Major Options

In a broad sense, there are three basic alternatives:

—agree to consider modification of the LTBT;

—reject modification;

—adopt a neutral position but refrain from objecting if the Soviets desire to seek formal amendment of the treaty.

Alternative 1. Agree to consider modification of the LTBT to permit PNE excavation projects.

This alternative should be considered in terms of whether specific conditions would make it acceptable. Such conditions would center around three aspects of the overall problem:

—First, achievement of an acceptable PNE agreement, including acceptable verification provisions. This has been the subject of separate study. For present purposes, it should be noted that a Soviet willingness to accept observers under satisfactory arrangements could have special political significance.

—Second, Soviet recognition of the fact that circumstances could well arise which might make it infeasible for the U.S.—despite best efforts—to secure domestic and congressional acceptance of LTBT modification. It is inherent under Alternative 1 that we would cooperate with the Soviet Union in seeking LTBT modification. However, we have no way of ensuring this outcome.

—Third, development of a mutually acceptable approach to LTBT modification.

Pros

—If we are prepared to accept PNE excavation projects above the TTBT threshold, this alternative would improve our bargaining position for obtaining the verification arrangements, including adequate on-site monitoring, that we desire.

—This would also make it possible for us to provide PNE excavation services pursuant to Art. V of the NPT if we desired to do so.

Cons

—LTBT modification as such would not clearly serve our interests.

—We would encounter adverse reaction from countries opposed to LTBT modification.

—In the PNE field, the Soviets would gain a unilateral advantage unless we reinstituted a U.S. PNE excavation program (despite the lack of a domestic requirement).

—Removal of the legal obstacle presented by the LTBT to PNE excavation projects could give rise to pressures for us to provide excavation services under Art. V of the NPT even if we did not wish to do so.

—Additional opposition against the TTBT would be generated in the Senate and among the general public.¹²

NOTE: Methods of modifying the LTBT might include:

—the LTBT amendment process;

—reinterpretation; or

—acquiescence in ad hoc exceptions to the LTBT, for example, for nuclear explosions required for the initial phase of the Pechora-Kama project (if the Soviets would conduct this phase to provide data for use in evaluating health and safety criteria and other technical aspects and if international as well as U.S. observers were invited).

The relative advantages and disadvantages of these several approaches are discussed in preceding sections of this report.

Alternative 2. Reject Modification of the LTBT.

Pros

—As discussed in preceding sections of this paper, modification of the LTBT would entail serious risks to the integrity of the LTBT from the standpoints of arms control and public concern about environmental protection.

—The chance of winning congressional and domestic public acceptance of LTBT modification is slim at best and at least at this juncture is probably negative.

—If the Soviets were also prepared to reject PNE excavation projects, we could maintain a strong front against non-nuclear weapons states on this aspect of nonproliferation.¹³

Cons

—It would be premature to arrive at a flatly negative decision until the problem has been thoroughly explored with the Soviets and until domestic and international soundings have been taken.

—Rejection of LTBT modification might lead to Soviet rejection of the TTBT.

—The end product could be to introduce serious strains in U.S.-Soviet political relations.

—If it should become important to provide PNE excavation services within the NPT framework, this would be foreclosed.

Note: If a decision were made to reject LTBT modification, we would need to consider when to advise the Soviets of our position:

—If the message were conveyed at an early time, the Soviets could decide for themselves whether they did or did not wish to proceed with the TTBT and a PNE agreement on this basis.

—If the message were delayed, the Soviets might proceed on the basis of a false assumption that we would eventually acquiesce in LTBT modification. This could lead to subsequent charges of “bad faith” and possibly to a decision by the Soviets to proceed on their own with PNE excavation projects.

Alternative 3: Adopt a neutral position on LTBT modification but refrain from objecting if the Soviets desire to seek formal amendment of the treaty.

Under this alternative, we would inform the Soviets that we could proceed with a PNE agreement at this time only within the limits of the LTBT. We would advise them that if they wished to seek an LTBT amendment to permit excavation PNEs, we would not stand in their way but that we would provide no political assistance.

We might participate in multilateral examination of such matters as health and safety criteria and other technical aspects as long as this could be done without suggesting that we favored LTBT modification.

Pros

—This would place on the Soviet Union the burden of taking the lead on pursuing amendment of the LTBT, and they would have to bear any adverse reaction.

—If multilateral technical discussions of such matters as health and safety criteria brought about diminution of international interest in PNE excavation projects, the Soviets might eventually conclude that LTBT ratification was not practical.

Cons

—It would be increasingly difficult domestically and internationally to maintain a neutral position if the Soviets mounted an active campaign to amend the LTBT.

—If the Soviets were able to line up sufficient support to achieve an amendment, exercise of the U.S. veto at that stage (even if the character of the amendment was not to our liking) would be regarded as an act of “bad faith.”

Note: If we were otherwise prepared to accept LTBT modification (see pros and cons under Alternative 1), there might be a greater chance of securing Senate ratification if we had not assisted in promoting the amendment idea or in efforts to line up a majority of the parties.

1. Summary: The report, which President Ford had requested, provided three possible alternatives to modification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—Under Secretaries Committee, Box 74, NSC–U/DM 128–Limited Test Ban Treaty (1). Secret. Ingersoll sent Ford the report under a September 13 memorandum, Document 81. The annexes are not attached and not found. The 1967 U.S. “Statement of Principles Relating to Nuclear Explosion Services” is in Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 172–174.

2. This report was prepared by an interagency study group of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee comprised of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, ACDA, the AEC, and the NSC staff. The terms of reference of the study are presented in Annex B. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. Excerpts from Secretary Rusk’s and Dr. Seaborg’s testimony are presented in Annex A. [Footnote is in the original.]
4. The study of a new canal concluded that conventional methods should be used if a new canal was to be constructed in the near future. [Footnote is in the original.]
5. The increase in radiation exposure would be only a small fraction of that resulting from normal background radiation; however, adverse reaction would be likely. [Footnote is in the original.]
6. The text of the applicable treaty language does not refer to health and safety related standards. The English language text disallows explosions which cause “radioactive debris to be present” outside the country where the explosion occurred. The equally authentic Soviet text can be literally translated as prohibiting explosions which “cause a falling out” (or falling) of radioactive sediment, condensate, or precipitate outside of the country. Significant PNE excavation projects would not be consistent with either of these texts. [Footnote is in the original.]
7. Possible approaches to the questions raised by Art. V are being examined in response to NSSM 202 on nonproliferation. [Footnote is in the original.]
8. Countries might, however, exercise their right of withdrawal under the treaty if they considered that their “supreme interests” had been jeopardized. [Footnote is in the original.]
9. JCS Footnote: Ad hoc exceptions are not only politically disadvantageous but illegal. This alternative does not merit serious consideration. [Footnote is in the original.]
10. The three IAEA technical panels on PNE’s which have already been held have been attended by an average of 25–30 countries. [Footnote is in the original.]
11. As it has already done in the case of ratification of the Geneva Protocol. [Footnote is in the original.]
12. JCS Footnote: An additional disadvantage of Alternative 1 might be that permitting increased levels of radioactive debris outside territorial limits may be inconsistent with the proposed PNE verification constraint that would minimize fission yield of excavation devices. [Footnote is in the original.]
13. JCS Footnote: The third “pro” to Alternative 2 is considered to be an unrealistic statement and therefore should not be considered an advantage to the alternative. [Footnote is in the original.]