Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

84. Editorial Note

On September 23, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger delivered an address entitled “An Age of Interdependence: Common Disaster or Community” before the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Kissinger referenced his 1973 address before the General Assembly, noting that he had “asked other nations to join us in moving the world from détente to cooperation, from coexistence to community.” Since then, he continued, progress had been made in resolving various global problems; however, several fundamental issues persisted, and new problems had emerged. According to Kissinger, the question remained as to whether the global community’s vision would “keep pace” with these challenges: “New realities have not yet overcome old patterns of thought and action. Traditional concepts—of national sovereignty, social struggle, and the relation between the old and the new nations—too often guide our course. And so we have managed but not advanced; we have endured but not prospered; and we have continued the luxury of political contention.” Common interest in preventing local conflicts, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and increasing the economic viability of all nations would allow leaders to “remedy problems,” rather than simply responding to crises.

Kissinger devoted the first portion of his address to discussing regional conflicts before turning to arms control. He outlined not only the threats nuclear proliferation posed to world stability but also the efforts undertaken by the United States and other nations to limit strategic arms, establish nuclear safeguards, and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy:

“The world has grown so accustomed to the existence of nuclear weapons that it assumes they will never be used. But today, technology is rapidly expanding the number of nuclear weapons in the hands of major powers and threatens to put nuclear-explosive technology at the disposal of an increasing number of other countries.

“In a world where many nations possess nuclear weapons, dangers would be vastly compounded. It would be infinitely more difficult, if not impossible, to maintain stability among a large number of nuclear powers. Local wars would take on a new dimension. Nuclear weapons would be introduced into regions where political conflict remains intense and the parties consider their vital interests overwhelmingly involved. There would, as well, be a vastly heightened risk of direct involvement of the major nuclear powers.

“This problem does not concern one country, one region, or one bloc alone. No nation can be indifferent to the spread of nuclear technology; every nation’s security is directly affected.

“The challenge before the world is to realize the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology without contributing to the growth of nuclear weapons or to the number of states possessing them.

“As a major nuclear power, the United States recognizes its special responsibility. We realize that we cannot expect others to show restraint if we do not ourselves practice restraint. Together with the Soviet Union we are seeking to negotiate new quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic arms. Last week our delegations reconvened in Geneva, and we intend to pursue these negotiations with the seriousness of purpose they deserve. The United States has no higher priority than controlling and reducing the levels of nuclear arms.

“Beyond the relations of the nuclear powers to each other lies the need to curb the spread of nuclear explosives. We must take into account that plutonium is an essential ingredient of nuclear explosives and that in the immediate future the amount of plutonium generated by peaceful nuclear reactions will be multiplied many times. Heretofore the United States and a number of other countries have widely supplied nuclear fuels and other nuclear materials in order to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This policy cannot continue if it leads to the proliferation of nuclear explosives. Sales of these materials can no longer be treated by anyone as a purely commercial competitive enterprise.

“The world community therefore must work urgently toward a system of effective international safeguards against the diversion of plutonium or its byproducts. The United States is prepared to join with others in a comprehensive effort.

“Let us together agree on the practical steps which must be taken to assure the benefits of nuclear energy free of its terrors:

“—The United States will shortly offer specific proposals to strengthen safeguards to the other principal supplier countries.

“—We shall intensify our efforts to gain the broadest possible acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, to establish practical controls on the transfer of nuclear materials, and to insure the effectiveness of these procedures.

“—The United States will urge the IAEA to draft an international convention for enhancing physical security against theft or diversion of nuclear material. Such a convention should set forth specific standards and techniques for protecting materials while in use, storage, and transfer.

“—The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which this Assembly has endorsed, warrants continuing support. The treaty contains not only a broad commitment to limit the spread of nuclear explosives but specific obligations to accept and implement IAEA safeguards and to control the transfer of nuclear materials.

“Mr. President, whatever advantages seem to accrue from the acquisition of nuclear-explosive technology will prove to be ephemeral. When Pandora’s box has been opened, no country will be the beneficiary and all mankind will have lost. This is not inevitable. If we act decisively now, we can still control the future.” (Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1974, pages 498, 501–502)