Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

51. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 29, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Action Program Requested by NSDM 235

NSDM 235, issued in October 1973, directed inter alia that any foreign requests for U.S. supply of large quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for power reactors would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis and that any recipient must have acceptable physical security measures in effect.

In addition, NSDM 235 directed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (USC) to prepare an action program outlining steps we might take with other nations, particularly supplier nations, concerning the security and other problems associated with the increasingly large amounts of weapons useable and highly toxic materials from growing nuclear power industries.

The USC recommends (Tab B) that you approve consultations with other countries (particularly present or potential suppliers such as Germany, France, Canada, UK, Japan, and the USSR) with the following objectives:

1. Establishment of agreed international guidelines, preferably based on U.S. practice, to ensure the physical security of internationally transferred or indigenously produced weapons useable materials.

2. Establishment of common principles among potential suppliers of sensitive enrichment technology or equipment.

3. Agreement that a potential recipient’s adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty be weighed in decisions to supply weapons useable materials or enrichment or reprocessing technologies and equipment.

4. Encouragement, where appropriate, of multinational enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities.

5. Consideration of denying materials, technology and equipment in situations where special hazards are present.

6. Encouragement that other countries adopt export controls, comparable to those of the U.S., governing international activities of their citizens in the fields of unclassified nuclear technology transfer and assistance.

Some supplier nations may be reluctant to adopt all the measures the U.S. considers necessary. However, the spread of weapons useable and highly toxic materials is a worldwide problem as nuclear power industries grow and exporting proliferates. Even if all the above measures were established, potential problems regarding these materials would remain. However, these measures should make the general problem of materials control and security more manageable, and we should surely attempt to establish internationally those basic security measures and precautions which we consider necessary.

I recommend therefore that you approve the USC’s recommended consultations with other countries. (An implementing NSDM is at Tab A and requests progress reports.)

Domestic Council (Glenn Schleede) has concurred.

Recommendation:

That you approve the NSDM at Tab A.

1. Summary: Kissinger recommended that the President approve the attached National Security Decision Memorandum implementing the action program prepared by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee in response to NSDM 235. The action program recommended consultations with supplier nations to control the profileration of highly-enriched plutonium.

   Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Institutional Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Box H–246, NSDM 255. Secret. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed for Kissinger. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Nixon saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Attached as Tab 1 to Document 45. NSDM 235 is Document 18. Tab A is the draft NSDM as approved, published as Document 53. Tab B is not attached; presumably it is a copy of the March 1 NSC Under Secretaries Committee action program, Document 31.