Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

45. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, May 16, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Action Program Requested by NSDM 235

NSDM 235, issued in October 1973, established U.S. policy regarding the supply of large quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to foreign countries for a type of power reactor being developed (Tab D). It directed inter alia that any supply requests for HEU would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis and that any recipient must have acceptable physical security measures in effect.

In addition, NSDM 235 directed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (USC) to prepare an action program outlining steps the U.S. might take with other nations, particularly supplier nations, concerning the security, nonproliferation, and other problems associated with the increasingly large amounts of weapons useable and highly toxic materials from growing nuclear power industries.

The USC’s report for the President focuses on the two key materials—plutonium (Pu) and HEU, which are expected to become available in hundreds of thousands of kilograms in the next two decades—and on the specialized technology and equipment needed to produce these materials (report, Tab C/USC Chairman’s Memorandum, Tab B).

The USC recommends that the President approve consultations with other countries (particularly present or potential suppliers such as Germany, France, Canada, UK, Japan, and the USSR) with the following objectives:

1. Establishment of agreed international guidelines, preferably based on U.S. practice, to ensure the physical security of weapons useable materials whether internationally transferred or indigenously produced. (A prompt U.S. study of possible provisions for an international convention would be undertaken simultaneously with preliminary bilateral consultations with key countries.)

2. Establishment of common principles among potential suppliers of sensitive enrichment technology or equipment.

3. Agreement that a potential recipient’s adherence to the NPT be weighed in decisions to supply weapons useable materials or enrichment or reprocessing technologies and equipment.

4. Encouragement, where appropriate, of multinational enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities.

5. Consideration of denying materials, technology and equipment in situations where conflict or instability could present special hazards.

6. Encouragement that other countries adopt export controls, comparable to those of the U.S., governing international activities of their citizens in the fields of unclassified nuclear technology transfer and assistance related to the production of special fissionable materials.

The USC notes that some supplier nations may be reluctant to adopt all the measures the U.S. considers necessary, and that the timing and content of the consultations will have to be carefully developed in light of this potential reluctance and other nuclear energy-related discussions.

The USC’s recommendations are soundly based. The spread of weapons useable and highly toxic materials is a worldwide problem in terms of transportation and storage as nuclear power industries grow and exporting proliferates. Of course, even if all the above measures were successfully negotiated, potential problems associated with increasing quantities of nuclear materials would remain. Nonetheless, such measures should help make the general problem of materials control and security more manageable, and we should surely attempt to establish internationally those basic security measures and precautions which we consider necessary. (For example, the President just recently approved the major upgrading of and continuing priority effort for U.S. physical security measures.)

The NSDM at Tab A would approve the USC recommendations and request progress reports. It also asks State and AEC to look into the possibility of establishing better information exchange on transfers.

Domestic Council (Glenn Schleede), Richard Kennedy, Jan Lodal, and Denis Clift have concurred.

Recommendations:

1. That you initial the memorandum for the President (Tab 1) forwarding the USC’s recommendations; and

2. If he approves, that you issue the NSDM (Tab A).

1. Summary: Guhin sent Kissinger a summary of the action program prepared by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee regarding on the supply of highly enriched uranium to foreign countries for nuclear power reactors, noting that the Committee had requested that President Nixon approve its recommendations.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 32, Security Aspects of Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries (3). Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Elliott, who did not initial the memorandum. Notations on the memorandum in an unknown hand indicate that copies were sent for information to both Lodal and Boverie. Kissinger signed NSDM 255 on June 3; see Document 53. Tabs 1 and A are attached but not printed; the final version of Tab 1 is Document 51. Tab B is Document 39 and Tab C is Document 31. Tab D, NSDM 235, is Document 18.