Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

52. Paper Prepared by an Interagency Working Group¹

Washington, May 30, 1974.

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

SUMMARY

Implications of the Indian Test

India’s explosion of a nuclear device May 18, even though labeled a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE), represents a setback to our non-proliferation efforts. By itself, it will not prompt other near-nuclear powers to follow suit, but India’s action makes it easier for them to do so should they decide that a nuclear capability, either as a “prestige PNE” or a weapon, would be in their national interest.

The explosion also has implications for the Simla process of political accommodation in South Asia, although both India and Pakistan have now reaffirmed their support for that process.

Reactions to the Indian Test

While the Soviets share our concern about proliferation, they are wary of damaging their close ties with India and have refrained from any public comment. The Soviet news accounts have stressed the “peaceful” character of the test. The Chinese, who have long asserted the right of nations to test, have also not commented. Our intelligence suggests they do not regard the Indian test as a serious short-run threat.

Regionally, the impact has been hardest on Pakistan. Islamabad has asked the major powers, including the U.S., for protection against Indian nuclear “blackmail” and has made veiled suggestions of developing its own testing program. Given its limited capability, this would probably take as long as a decade barring external assistance. The Pakistanis are also urging an easing of U.S. arms supply restrictions to meet an increased Indian military threat.

Elsewhere, there have been wide expressions of concern about the spread of nuclear weapons, criticism of India for its choice of priorities, and skepticism about India’s professed peaceful intentions. The strongest reactions have come from Canada and Japan. Ottawa has suspended all nuclear cooperation and assistance, and asked other governments, including the U.S., to do the same. Japan is considering a reduction in economic aid, in addition to its public condemnation.

Indian Capabilities/Intentions

What the Indians hope to achieve is a sort of major power status on the cheap, through an inexpensive prestige PNE which also buoys sagging domestic morale. They have reaffirmed their intention not to go the nuclear weapons route.

For the time being, the Indians lack a credible delivery system—except against Pakistan where they do not need nuclear weapons to assert overwhelming superiority. They have neither long-range bombers nor an intermediate range ballistic missile capability.

The fledgling Indian space program aims at launching a satellite in the end of the 1970s. Unless they obtain significant foreign technical assistance, India probably cannot develop an IRBM until the early/mid 1980s. Moreover, to do so requires a major commitment of resources, perhaps more than $3 billion, a quantum jump from the present spending on space, budgeted at only $35 million in FY 1975. Alternatively, India could try to develop or acquire a long-range bomber capability.

U.S. Interests/Objectives

Limiting the number of nuclear weapons powers remains a major U.S. interest. The acquisition of nuclear devices by additional states has an adverse impact on global stability and hence our security.

With regard to our proliferation interests, our objectives are (a) that countries close to adherence to the NPT (Germany, Italy and Japan) not now alter their plans; (b) that other nuclear threshold powers (Israel, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, and South Africa in particular, as well as Pakistan) not follow the Indian example; (c) that international safeguards systems be strengthened; and (d) that India eschew the development of a sophisticated weapons and delivery system.

Attaining a peaceful and stable South Asia is also a relevant U.S. concern. To this end, we have supported the independence and integrity of Pakistan, have sought a better basis for relations with India, and have encouraged South Asian efforts toward normalization. Our objective is thus to minimize the damage to South Asian relationships and to prevent reversal of the promising trend toward subcontinental stability.

U.S. Options

In this study we have set forth a range of possible actions that relate primarily to India; a companion analysis (NSSM 202) will deal with broader nonproliferation issues, especially options to strengthen the international safeguards system. In updating NSSM 156, we have assumed that prevention of further proliferation remains a major U.S. global interest and that this transcends our desire for better relations with India.

Our options can be grouped into four clusters as follows:

1. Measures with India to Discourage or Inhibit Others from following the Indian Nuclear Example: These range from (a) doing virtually nothing, (b) reviewing our nuclear cooperation, including an effort to obtain tighter guarantees on the supply of enriched uranium to the U.S.-financed Tarapur power reactors (which are under full IAEA safeguards); (c) suspending all nuclear cooperation (as Canada has done); to (d) more extensive countermeasures, including possible withdrawal of our willingness to renew economic assistance.

Measures limited in scope specifically to the nuclear field would upset the Indians, but would probably not seriously damage bilateral relations over the longer term. Our failure to take any action, especially in light of the Canadian démarche, would be seen as signalling that the U.S. no longer took the proliferation issue seriously. [The Director-General of the IAEA has already expressed concern about the lack of a vigorous U.S. (and also USSR) response.]

2. Measures to Discourage India from Developing Sophisticated Nuclear Weapons and Delivery System: These are of two sorts: the first, to consider finding a niche for India as a non-weapon nuclear state, including possible limited U.S. cooperation with India in a PNE program in order to have some influence over its directions and lessen incentives to focus on a nuclear weapons program; and the second, to make an Indian decision to seek a sophisticated weapons and delivery system as costly and as time consuming as possible. The first raises a number of serious problems that bear more broadly on our nonproliferation policies (NSSM 202). The second includes a careful review of current U.S. controls over exports of material and technology to the Indian atomic energy and space programs. As a practical matter, the USG already imposes restrictions under existing export control policy, but a review seems called for to prevent loopholes, especially with regard to India’s acquiring a ballistic missile or long-range bomber capability.

3. Measures to Strengthen Non-Proliferation and International Safeguards System: These measures would apply to all countries, not just India, and are to be considered primarily in NSSM 202. The fact that India almost certainly acquired its plutonium from the unsafeguarded CIRUS research reactor supplied by Canada points up the importance of the safeguards system. The risk that India will share its nuclear explosive technology with other states must also be addressed.

4. Measures Relating to South Asia Stability: Badly shaken by the nuclear test, Pakistan is seeking security assurances from the U.S. and other major powers, a relaxation of U.S. arms restrictions, and possibly in time its own nuclear test program. Our options on assurances/arms supply include the following:

a. Do Nothing. Failure to provide Pakistan any reassurance could prompt them to move toward their own nuclear program, as well as seriously affect U.S.-Pakistani relations.

b. Calm Pakistanis through Verbal Assurances but No New Commitments. We could recognize Pak fears as real, if overdrawn, and seek to convince them, perhaps with Iranian help, that we would be concerned by Indian nuclear “blackmail”. We could consider some form of public statement.

c. Limited Change in South Asia Arms Policy. We could somewhat ease our arms supply policy to permit enhancement of Pakistan’s defensive capability, especially as it relates to defense against nuclear attack by India’s Canberra bomber force. In combination with verbal assurances, this would steady Pak nerves, although it would almost certainly prompt Indian criticism.

d. Remove All Restrictions on Arms Deliveries to South Asia. This would be welcomed by the Pakistanis, but trigger strong Indian resentment, seriously setting back Indo-American relations and perhaps India’s willingness to continue its efforts toward more normal relations with Pakistan. We believe such a step by the administration would be sharply criticized in Congress.

e. Provide Pakistan a Formal Nuclear Umbrella. This would extend USG commitments, encounter sharp domestic opposition and set an unwelcome precedent that might prompt similar requests from other nations.

Public Posture

Our public stance should be geared to USG decisions on the various options. So far, in public statements U.S. spokesmen have strictly limited themselves to the general position that the USG continues to oppose nuclear proliferation because of the adverse impact it has on global stability. This puts us between Soviet/Chinese non-statements and Canadian/Japanese condemnation; the U.S. media have taken a line more critical of India than the official USG position.

Action of Other Countries

Since the Canadians have taken the lead in urging international counter-measures, their proposals—basically to suspend all nuclear cooperation with India—form the basepoint for our review. The USG response to the Canadian initiative will have a substantial effect on how the Germans, Japanese, and other major nuclear equipment suppliers react. Once the USG policy review is completed, we should consider consultations with friendly governments.

France and the USSR have particular importance in any measures vis-à-vis the Indians. In the past, the French refused to cooperate in international controls. We do not yet know if the new government will modify this policy in light of the Indian test. If it did, the chances for effective international action would be greatly improved. The Soviets have not been publicly willing to chastise the Indians, but have also not cooperated with Delhi in developing a military nuclear or ballistic missile capability. It would be useful to consult with the Soviets, especially within the IAEA context, where they have often echoed our concerns about the dangers of proliferation.

China’s posture, of major importance to the Pakistanis, will reflect both its reluctance to get out ahead of Pakistan on South Asian matters and its traditional opposition to big power assurances.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

1. Summary: Prepared in response to requests for an updated version of NSSM 156, the paper examined background information on Indian nuclear development and presented several options to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the region.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 11, VPWG (NPT), Nov. 15, 1974 (2). Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. Transmitted to Kissinger under a May 31 covering memorandum from Sober, Acting Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia. According to the covering memorandum, Kissinger had requested the study on May 18. NSSM 202 is Document 50.